govinfo:USCOURTS-tnmd-3_25-cv-01230-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
NAPOLEON EDMONDSON, 
 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
EVA M. LEMEH, 
 
Appellee. 
 
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No. 3:25-cv-01230 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans 
(“R&R”) (Doc. No. 10) recommending that the Court deny Napoleon Edmondson’s motion for 
leave to appeal the bankruptcy court’s interlocutory order (Doc. No. 5). Edmondson objects that 
the R&R (1) incorrectly concludes that there is no controlling question of law; (2) incorrectly 
characterizes the issue as mere disagreement with the bankruptcy court’s factual treatment; (3) 
incorrectly concludes that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the litigation; (4) 
gives insufficient weight to the property-title nature of the dispute; (5) should have recommended 
granting leave to appeal; (6) f ailed to address Edmondson’s statute-of-limitations argument; and 
(7) failed to address tolling, equitable estoppel, and the legal effect of the prior settlement 
agreement. (Doc. No. 11 at 2–9). 
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the portions of the R&R to which Edmondson 
objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court agrees with the Magistrate 
Judge that Edmondson has not shown that this is the exceptional case warranting interlocutory 
review under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). (Doc. No. 10 at 3–4). Courts evaluating requests to appeal 
interlocutory bankruptcy orders apply 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Th at statute requires considering PageID #: <pageID>
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whether the bankruptcy order (1) “ involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (2) whether “an immediate appeal from the order 
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
Edmondson has not made either showing. First, he has not shown that his proposed appeal 
presents a controlling legal question as to which substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist. 
The Bankruptcy Court simply applied Tennessee’s statute of limitations to several of Edmondson’s 
counterclaims and concluded that those claims were untimely. Edmondson’s disagreement with 
the Bankruptcy Court’s application of settled law does not establish a substantial ground for 
difference of opinion warranting interlocutory review. 
Second, Edmondson has not shown that an immediate appeal would materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation. On the contrary, interlocutory review would halt an ongoing 
bankruptcy proceeding where several of Edmondson’s counterclaims remain pending. Discovery 
and the ordinary bankruptcy process may further develop or resolve the issues Edmondson seeks 
to raise. Under these circumstances, the Court declines to interfere with the Bankruptcy Court’s 
management of the adversary proceeding before entry of a final appealable order. 
Accordingly, Edmondson’s objections (Doc. No. 11) are OVERRULED, the R&R (Doc. 
No. 10) is ADOPTED, and Edmondson’s Motion for Leave to Appeal (Doc. No. 5) is DENIED. 
The Clerk shall close the file. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
 
____________________________________ 
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID #: <pageID>

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