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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CHASE NEILL,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 26-3136-DDC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights case. Plaintiff is in custody at the Osage County Jail
in Lyndon, Kansas (“OCJ”). He asserts that the bases for jurisdiction in this case include 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, Bivens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c), the First Amendment, the
Prohibitive Powers Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(c), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (Doc. 1,
at 3.) Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3.)
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff alleges in Claim One that Defendant s 1–4 (the United States, two federal judges,
and a federal prosecutor) are unlaw fully detaining him and that they have implied he is mentally
unstable because of his sincerely-he ld religious beliefs. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff believes he is a
true prophet and “Watchman of God” and that he has a duty to communicate God’s warnings.1 Id.
at 5, 6. Plaintiff claims a violation of his First Ame ndment right to freely practice his religion.
He claims that his criminal proceedings curtail and deny him the right to obey God and “speak His
wrath/judgements when commanded.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims that denying him his right to speak
God’s words causes him to suffer spiritual and physical injuries. Id. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin his

1 In his motion seeking a TRO/PI, Plaintiff asserts that he “is, factually, ‘God’s Firstborn,’ ‘God’s Watchman,’ and a
‘true prophet,’ a ‘messenger of God.’” (Doc. 4, at 2.)

criminal proceedings where, he claims, th e prosecutor has charged him for communicating
threatening rhetoric “when he properly identifies the speech as God’s, that he speaks on behalf of
God, and he sincerely believes God will carry out the threats.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff alleges as his second claim (“Cl aim Two”) that Defendant 5 (“Osage County
Sheriff’s Office Medical Provider”) has violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to refill
his Suboxone prescription for treatment of opioid use disorder (“OUD”) while housed at the OCJ.
Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that hi s prescription only lasted for a few days after his December 2,
2025 arrest. Id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that this “[f]ailure to continue the prescription often results
in the patient’s OUD—once in remission—coming back to life & resuming drug use that can lead
to death.” Id. Plaintiff also claims he has suffer ed from “extreme symptoms of withdrawal,
including high blood pressure, he adaches, nausea, diarrhea, st omach cramps, and puking, and
lethargy.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he returned to prison around February 13, 2026, and “[h]is drug
use problem returned.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff returned to the OCJ on April 27, 2026, 2 and began
suffering withdrawal. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant 5 did not treat him for his OUD, but
gave him Hydroxyzine to alleviate his withdrawal symptoms. Id. Plaintiff claims that “Defendant
5 consists of trained nurses and a doctor.” Id. Plaintiff seeks to continue the prescription he had
on December 2, 2025, “but at a lower initial dose.” Id. Plaintiff claims th at staff at the OCJ
conceded on May 6, 2026, that they would provide Plaintiff with Suboxone if it is ordered by an
outside provider. Id. Plaintiff claims that between May 1 and May 7, “Osage County” promised
that it would allow Plaintiff to call his doctor, but he was not allowed to call thereby delaying his
medical care. Id. Plaintiff seeks to compel Defenda nt 5 to provide him with Suboxone as
prescribed at arrest. Id. at 14.

2 Although Plaintiff refers to April 27, 2025, it appears from the context that he returned to the OCJ in 2026.

Plaintiff names as defendants: the United States of America; Assistant U.S. Attorney
Stephen Hunting; U.S. Magistrate Judge Jill Morrison; U.S. District Judge Holly Teeter; and Osage
County Sheriff’s Office Me dical Provider. Plaintiff seeks in junctive relief, declaratory relief,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 14.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seek ing relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or suitable portions of the complaint if a plaintiff has raised
claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to stat e a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the vi olation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson , 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting fa ctual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106,

1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘ground s’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Instead, the complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to ra ise a right to relief above the sp eculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico , 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Our Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson
gave rise to a new standard of revi ew for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d
1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint
to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218
(citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitte d). “Plausible” in this
context does not mean “likely to be true,” but refe rs rather “to the scope of the allegations in a
complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his ] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.

Ct. at 1974).
III. Discussion
A. Unrelated Claims
Plaintiff’s Complaint includes unrelated claims. He brings Claim One against the federal
defendants based on his federal criminal procee dings, and brings Claim Two under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against unnamed medical staff at the OCJ regarding his medical care.
Rule 20 governs permissive joinder of parties. It provides, as pertinent here:
(2) Defendants. Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Rule 18(a) governs joinder of claims and pertinently provides: “A party
asserting a claim . . . may join . . . as many claims as it has agai nst an opposing party.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 18(a). While joinder is encouraged for purposes of judicial economy, the “Federal Rules
do not contemplate joinder of diffe rent actions against different parties which present entirely
different factual and legal issues.” Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., Inc ., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1225 (D. Kan. 2001) (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit held in George v. Smith that under
“the controlling principle” in Rule 18(a), “[u]nrelated claims agai nst different defendants belong
in different suits.” George v. Smith , 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (Under Rule 18(a),
“multiple claims against a single party are fine , but Claim A against De fendant 1 should not be
joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.”).
Requiring adherence in prisoner suits to the fe deral rules governing joinder of parties and
claims prevents “the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s].” Id. It

also prevents prisoners from “dodging” their fee obligations and the three strikes provisions of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. (Rule 18(a) ensures “that prisoners pay the required filing fees—
for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 th e number of frivolous suits or appeals that any
prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.”).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authori ze a court, on its own initiative at any stage
of the litigation, to drop any party and sever any claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Nasious v. City & Cnty.
of Denver Sheriff’s Dept., 415 F. App’x 877, 881 (10th Cir. 2011) (to remedy misjoinder, the court
has two options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped or (2) any claims against misjoined parties
may be severed and proceeded with separately). This rule gives “district courts discretion to sever
any claim against a party and proceed with the claim or claims separately.” Huffman v. Forest
River, Inc. , 2024 WL 4188442, at *7 (D. Kan. 2024) (citati on omitted). “When determining
whether severance is appropriate under Rule 21, the court considers the convenience of the parties,
avoiding prejudice, promoting expedition and economy, and the separability of law and logic.” Id.
(citation omitted). These factors favor severance here.
Plaintiff brings Claim One against federal defendants seeking to enjoin federal criminal
proceedings pending against him. This Court would be required to abstain from hearing this claim
because his federal crimina l proceedings are ongoing. See United States v. Neill , Case No. 22-
CR-40037 (D. Kan.). The Younger doctrine requires this Court to abstain when ongoing state
court criminal proceedings remain pending. See Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
“While Younger applies explicitly to pending state court claims, ‘federal courts have applied the
abstention doctrine . . . when as ked to enjoin or dismiss enforcement of federal criminal
proceedings.’” Roberts v. Wiles , 2024 WL 4298762, at n.1 (D. Kan. 2024) (quoting Purvis-
Mitchell v. Bacon, 2020 WL 6043937, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (citations omitted); see also Giles v.

Garland, 2024 WL 2138624, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (finding that “a similar rule of abstention
applies when federal pretrial detainees challenge ongoi ng federal criminal proceedings through
civil actions”); Peters v. United States , 2024 WL 2274079, at *6 (D. Co lo. 2024) (stating that
“courts routinely have applied Younger to federal criminal investigations and prosecutions
pursuant to separation of powers prin ciples”) (quotation cleaned up)); see also Johnson v. Bass ,
2023 WL 8040780, at *3 (E.D. Tex. 2023), adopted by 2023 WL 8037331 (finding that plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief must fail becaus e the claims concern his ongoing federal criminal
case); George v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr ., 2015 WL 2398179, at *2 (D. Colo. 2015) (stating that
Younger abstention applies to criminal proceedings as well as parole revocation proceedings)
(citations omitted).
Although Claim One would requir e abstention, Claim Two is unrelated to his criminal
proceedings. Plaintiff bases Claim Two on his medical care at the OCJ and he names as a
defendant an Osage County Sheriff’s Office Medica l Provider. As set forth, above, requiring
adherence in prisoner suits to the federal rules governing joinder of parties and claims prevents
“the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produc e[s]” and also prevents
prisoners from “dodging” the fee obligations a nd the three strikes provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (Rule 18(a) ensu res “that prisoners pay the
required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits
or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.”).
The Court thus will sever Claim Two and direct the Clerk to initiate a new case number for
this claim. Claim One will remain a part of this case, No. 26-3136-DDC.

B. Three Strikes
Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proc eed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3.) The Court
finds that Plaintiff is subject to the “three-str ikes” provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Court
records establish that Plaintiff “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . , brought
an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was di smissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”3 Accordingly, he
may proceed in forma pauperis only if he can establish a threat of “imminent danger of serious
physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
In his motion for leave to proc eed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff claims that he has “tolled”
his three-strikes limitation due to the imminent danger alleged in his Complaint and in his motion
seeking injunctive relief. (Doc. 3, at 3.) In his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
and Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) (Doc. 4), Plaintiff seeks to: 1) en join his criminal proceedings
“insofar as that case prosecutes him, in any way, for communicating threatening rhetoric when he
properly identifies the speech as God’s, that he speaks on behalf of God, and he sincerely believes
God will carry out the threats”; 2) enjoin the admission of any competency evaluation or the use
of competency statutes, to the extent they identify his religious beliefs as factually false or render
him mentally ill; and 3) compel Defendant 5 to provide Plaintiff with the Suboxone he was
receiving at the time of his arrest, but “only if” his criminal proceedi ngs are not immediately
enjoined. (Doc. 4, at 9.) The Court has severed Plaintiff’s claim based on his medication. It no
longer is part of this case.

3 Prior to filing the Complaint at issue here, the Court finds at least three prior civil actions filed by Plaintiff which
qualify as “strikes” under § 1915(g). See Neill v. Hunting, Case No. 23-3131-JAR, Doc. 6 (D. Kan. June 12, 2023)
(dismissing for failure to state a claim); Neill v. Teeter , Case No. 23-3143-JAR, Doc. 6 (D. Kan. June 21, 2023)
(dismissing for failure to state a claim); Neill v. Maag , Case No. 23-3126-JAR, Doc. 13 (D. Kan. June 30, 2023)
(dismissing for failure to state a claim); and Neill v. Godinez, Case No. 23-3149-JAR, Doc. 12 (dismissing for failure
to state a claim) (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2023).

“To meet the only exception to the prepayme nt requirement, a prisoner who has accrued
three strikes must make ‘specifi c, credible allegations of immin ent danger of serious physical
harm.’” Davis v. GEO Group Corr. , 696 F. App’x 851, 854 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(quoting Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 635 F.3d 1172, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011)). “Vague and
utterly conclusory assertions are insufficient.” Id. The harm must present as imminent or
occurring at the time the complaint is filed; “allegations of past harm do not suffice.” Id. (citations
omitted). Also, the “imminent danger” exceptio n has a temporal limitation—“[t]he exception is
construed narrowly and available only ‘for genuine emergencies,’ where ‘time is pressing’ and ‘a
threat . . . is real and proximate.’” Lynn v. Roberts, No. 11-3073-JAR, 2011 WL 3667171, at *2
(D. Kan. Aug. 22, 2011) (citation omitted). “Congress included an exception to the ‘three strikes’
rule for those cases in which it appears that judicial action is needed as soon as possible to prevent
serious physical injuries from occurring in the meantime.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s claim that his inab ility to practice his religion will result in physical injuries is
wholly conclusory and speculative. See Neill v. Rardin, 2025 WL 1360679, at *2 (D. Minn. May 9,
2025), aff’d 2025 WL 3900531 (8th Cir. July 2, 2025) (findi ng that Neill failed to satisfy the
“imminent-danger-of-serious-physical-injury” exception to § 1915(g) where his “assertion that his
health has been negatively impacted by FMC-Rochester officials’ refusal to allow him to practice
his religion in accordance with his ‘sincerely held beliefs’ is wholly conclusory”).
The Court has examined the Complaint and other filings in this action and finds no showing
of imminent danger of serious physical injury from Plaintiff’s claim based on his ongoing criminal
proceedings. So, consistent with § 1915(g), Plain tiff may not proceed in fo rma pauperis in this

civil action. The Court will give Plaintiff time to pay the full $405 district court filing fee.4 If he
fails to pay the full fee within the prescribed time, the Court will dis miss the case based on
Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the statutory district court filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914.
C. Motions Seeking Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also has filed motions seeking injunctive relief. See Doc. 4 ( Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Prelimin ary Injunction (“PI”)); Doc. 12 (Motion for
Emergency Preliminary Injunctive Relief & Hearing to Enjoin Unlawful Competency Order); and
Doc. 14 (Combined Motion to (a) Provide Copies of Filing(s); (b) Unconventionally File Enclosed
22CR40037 Motion as Evidence; (c) Order Transcript from 22CR40037 be Sent).
As already set forth, even if Plainti ff submits the filing fee in this case, Younger would
require the Court to abstain. In Peters v. United States , the plaintiff also filed a motion for
injunctive relief and a motion to expedite the proceedings on her motion. See 2023 WL 8810999
(D. Colo. 2023). The court found that it “must firs t determine whether it is required to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Younger; were the court to find that abstention is
mandatory, ‘[t]he question of wh ether to preliminary [sic] en join [the] ongoing state court
proceeding [would be] precluded.’” Id. at *2 (citations omitted). “Accordingly, this Court may
properly address the Younger abstention doctrine be fore initiating proceedings on the merits, as
the resolution of the Younger issue may moot Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief.” Id. (citing
Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 891 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court “correctly
refrained from conducting a heari ng on the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction” after
dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit on abstention grounds); see also Baca v. Berry, 806 F.3d 1262, 1269,

4 If a person is not granted in forma pauperis status under § 1915, the fee to file a non-habeas civil action includes the
$350.00 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and a $55.00 general administrative fee pursuant to § 1914(b) and the
District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

1270 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that a district court has “broad discretion to stay proceedings
as an incident to its power to control its own docket” and may “stay proceedings pending before it
. . . for the purpose of economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants” (quotation
omitted))).
In a subsequent determination, Peters noted that because a significant question was raised
whether the court should abstain from reaching the merits of the claim under Younger, “and thus,
any request for preliminary injunc tion,” the court denied the plaint iff’s request to expedite the
preliminary injunction proceedings and ordered pl aintiff to respond to the motion to stay. See
Peters v. United States, 2024 WL 83333, at *3 (D. Colo. 2024), aff’d 2024 WL 3086003 (10th Cir.
2024), application for writ of injunction denied, 2024 WL 3511647 (2024).
In sum, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s motions seeking injunctive relief or take any
further action in this case unles s Plaintiff pays the filing fee a nd a determination is made that
Younger abstention does not apply. Plaintiff must refrain from filing any additional motions until
he has paid the fee and the issue of Younger abstention is resolved. A conclusion that Younger
abstention applies ends the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until July 17, 2026, to submit the
$405.00 filing fee. The failure to submit the fee by that date will result in the dismissal of this
matter without prejudice and without additional prior notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim One shall remain in this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Two is severed from this case and the Clerk is
directed to initiate a new action for Claim Two against the Osage County Sheriff’s Office Medical
Provider. The Clerk should replicate all the filings in this case in the new case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated June 17, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
DANIEL D. CRABTREE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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