govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-2_26-cv-00373-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION 
 
SELAH DINE HABIB, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00373-JRO-MKK 
 ) 
BRISON SWEARINGEN, in his official 
capacity as Sheriff of the Clay County 
Justice Center, 
) 
)
) 
 
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, in his or her 
official capacity as Field Office Director of 
the Chicago Field Office of Enforcement 
and Removal Operations, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity 
as Acting Director, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official 
capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 
) 
) 
) 
 
U.S. Attorney General TODD BLANCHE, 
in his official capacity as Acting Attorney 
General of the United States, 
) 
) 
) 
 
 ) 
Respondents. ) 
 
 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) not only authorizes but 
requires the Executive to detain certain aliens without a bond hearing pending 
decisions on their removability. The main issue in this case is whether the 
Petitioner, Selah Dine Habib, falls into the category of aliens subject to 
mandatory detention. He does under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As such, his 
detention without bond pending removal proceedings does not violate the INA or PageID #:
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its regulations governing bond determinations. Moreover, Petitioner’s current 
detention does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court 
therefore DENIES his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. 1. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
The following alleged facts are not in dispute and the Court finds that they 
are true based on its review of the verified Petition, the answers to the Court’s 
Order to Show Cause, and the accompanying documentary evidence. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2242; id. § 2243 (“The court shall summarily hear and determine the 
facts . . . .”); id. § 2248 (“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus 
or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not 
traversed, shall be accepted as true . . . .”). 
Petitioner is a citizen of Mauritania. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 8 at 2. On or about 
March 18, 2023, he entered the United States without inspection. Dkt. 1 at 23; 
Dkt. 8 at 2; Dkt. 8-1 at 2; Dkt. 1-2 at 2. The Department of Homeland Security 
initiated removal proceedings by issuing him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on March 
20, 2023. Dkt. 8 at 2; Dkt. 8-1 at 6; Dkt. 1-2 at 2. The NTA charges state that 
Petitioner is removable based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in 
the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United 
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is 
inadmissible.”). Dkt. 8-1 at 6; Dkt. 1-2 at 2. On March 23, 2023, ICE issued 
Form I-220A, Order of Release on Recognizance, to Petitioner, but the form 
expressly noted that “[y]ou must surrender for removal from the United States if PageID #:
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so ordered.” Dkt. 1-2 at 4; Dkt. 8 at 2. Since his initial detention, Petitioner has 
filed for asylum and obtained employment authorization. Dkt. 1 at 26. 
Petitioner appeared for a scheduled appointment with ICE on May 21, 
2026, in Indianapolis, Indiana. Dkt. 1 at 23; Dkt. 8 at 2. That same day, ICE 
officers issued and served an I-200 warrant for his arrest and took him into 
custody, without any “opportunity for release on bond while his removal 
proceedings are pending.” Dkt. 1 at 3, 23; Dkt. 8-1 at 10. ICE also cancelled 
his Order of Release on Recognizance. Dkt. 8 at 2; Dkt. 8-1 at 11. 
Petitioner was detained at the Clay County Justice Center in Brazil, 
Indiana, when he commenced this habeas action. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 8-2 at 2. He 
names as Respondents Brison Swearingen, Sheriff of the Clay County Justice 
Center, Brazil, IN; Field Office Director of the Chicago ICE Field Office; 
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; and Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General 
of the United States. Dkt. 1 at 8–10. 
B. Statutory Background 
As amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), two statutory provisions principally govern 
the detention of aliens pending their removal proceedings—8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 
8 U.S.C. § 1226. While Section 1225 mandates detention in all cases, Section 
1226 permits the release of some aliens on bond. 
Key to Section 1225 is its definition of “applicant for admission.” Section 
1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as an alien “who arrives in the PageID #:
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United States” or who is “present in” the country but “has not been admitted.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that “applicants for 
admission fall into one of two categories”—”those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and 
those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). 
Section 1225(b)(1) requires the detention and “expedited removal” of 
certain applicants for admission. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 
591 U.S. 103, 108–09 (2020). An applicant is subject to expedited removal if he 
is “arriving in the United States” and determined by an immigration officer to be 
“inadmissible” because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid entry 
documentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 1 Upon such determination, the 
officer “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further 
hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for 
asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.” Id. (emphasis added). Where an alien 
claims asylum, the immigration officer “shall refer” the alien to an asylum officer 
for an interview to determine whether he has a “credible fear of persecution.” Id. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). Aliens determined to have a credible fear of persecution 
“shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum” in a 
standard removal hearing. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); see Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 
109 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f)). Aliens determined to lack a credible fear of 
 
1 “[C]ertain other aliens ” are also subject to expedited removal, including any aliens 
“designated by the Attorney General” who have “not been admitted or paroled into the 
United States, and who [have] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an 
immigration officer, that [they have] been physically present in the United States 
continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of 
inadmissibility” for fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid entry documentation. 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I)–(II). PageID #:
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persecution are subject to expedited removal and shall be detained “until 
removed.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
Section 1225(b)(2) “is broader” and “serves as a catchall provision that 
applies to all applicants for admission not covered by Section 1225(b)(1).” 
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. With exceptions not relevant here, Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for 
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien 
shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, detention is mandatory 
pending “the usual removal process,” which “involves an evidentiary hearing 
before an immigration judge” where “an alien may attempt to show that he or 
she should not be removed.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 108. 
Section 1226(a), by contrast, more generally provides that, “[o]n a warrant 
issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending 
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney 
General to release an alien on “bond” or “conditional parole,” unless the alien 
“falls into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and 
terrorist activities.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E). 
For those enumerated categories, detention pending removal is also mandatory. PageID #:
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II. DISCUSSION 
Petitioner seeks release from detention while he awaits his removal 
proceedings because he contends he is detained pursuant to a recent, unlawful 
policy shift by Respondents. Respondents rely upon Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to 
detain Petitioner without a bond hearing pending his removal proceedings 
because they argue he is an “applicant for admission.” Petitioner argues that 
Section 1226(a) and its associated regulations govern his detention and that he 
not only has a right to a bond hearing but is entitled to immediate release 
“[b]ecause the initial deprivation was, and continues to be unlawful.” Dkt. 1 at 
3. He also brings a claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Ultimately, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.2 
A. Castañon-Nava does not control this case. 
As a preliminary matter, Respondents and the Petitioner discuss the 
Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep artment of 
Homeland Security, 175 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2026), see dkt. 1 at 12–13; dkt. 8 at 
12–14. Castañon- Nava includes a fulsome discussion of the Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) issue presented in the petition. However, as Respondents point 
out, see dkt. 8 at 12–14, that opinion confirms that the Seventh Circuit has yet 
to issue binding precedent resolving the scope of Respondents’ mandatory 
detention authority under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 
 
2 Petitioner argues that the Court should not require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in this case. Dkt. 1 at 5–8 . Respondents do not argue exhaustion in their 
Returns to the Order to Show Cause, dkts. 8, so the Court does not address the issue. PageID #:
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On the scope of the “government’s ability to detain noncitizens pursuant 
to its authority under § 1225(b)(2)(A),” Castañon-Nava, 175 F.4th at 842, 
Castañon-Nava is a fractured 1–1–1 opinion. Judge Lee confronted the 
defendants’ Section 1225(b)(2)(A) argument and disagreed with it, while 
acknowledging that “his colleagues . . . believe that we should not reach this 
issue.” Id. at 842–856 (Lee, J.). Indeed, Judge Pryor concluded that it was not 
necessary for the Court to “reach[] the merits of the Plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Defendants’ interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is improper,” declining to 
join that portion of Judge Lee’s opinion and voting to resolve the case on other 
grounds. Id. at 857 (Pryor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); 
see id. at 860–863. And Judge Kirsch concluded in his dissent that the 
defendants’ reading of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is correct. Id. at 871–877 (Kirsch, 
J., dissenting). 
The portion of the merits opinion in Castañon-Nava addressing the 
meaning and applicability of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is, therefore, not a 
precedential holding of the Seventh Circuit,
3 and both Judge Lee’s and Judge 
 
3 The Seventh Circuit’s discussion of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) in its emergency stay order 
in Castañon-Nava, 161 F.4th 1048, is also not binding precedent. And as the merits 
opinion in Castañon -Nava all but confirms, the stay order ’s discussion of Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) is dicta because it was not essential to the resolution of the stay order or 
the merits. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996) (“When an 
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the 
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound. ”). Further, decisions from 
motions panels at the stay stage, even those directly on point, are “not entitled to the 
weight of a decision made after plenary submission ” because they are “summary in 
character” and “made often on a scanty record.” Johnson v. Burken , 930 F.2d 1202, 
1205 (7th Cir. 1991). PageID #:
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Kirsch’s opinions are persuasive authority on this issue. While the reasoning in 
these opinions does not arise from the procedural posture of this case (i.e., a 
habeas petition directly challenging the Respondents’ application of Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) to the petitioner), both warrant serious consideration. The same is 
true of the many orders from this District that have deferred to Judge Lee’s 
reasoning in the Castañon -Nava stay opinion,
4 which mirrors his reasoning in 
his merits opinion and three other recent opinions from the Second, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuits. See Da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 
1258 (11th Cir. 2026). 
Respectfully, and for the reasons explained below and in this Court’s prior 
orders, e.g., Demir v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00086-JRO-MKK, 2026 WL 706485, at 
*4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 13, 2026), this Court reads Section 1225(b)(2)(A) in line with 
Judge Kirsch’s merits opinion in Castañon-Nava, which is consistent with the 
reasoning of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits addressing the precise issue on the 
 
4 See, e.g., Alejandro v. Olson, 817 F. Supp. 3d 672, 683 (S.D. Ind. 2025) (“The phrase 
‘seeking admission, ’ . . . means that a noncitizen must be actively ‘ seeking’ ‘lawful 
entry.’” (internal citation omitted)); Campos Leon v. Forestal, No. 1:25 -cv-01774-SEB-
MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 22, 2025) (“Meanwhile, the respondents’ 
contention that Mr. Campos Leon ’s detention is mandatory under § 1225(b)(2) is, at 
best, incomplete. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Campos Leon is an 
‘applicant for admission, ’ the respondents has not explained how he is ‘ seeking 
admission’ such that § 1225(b)(2) applies.”). Opinions of other judges in this District do 
not bind this Court. Trump v. CASA, Inc. , 606 U.S. 831, 858 n.17 (2025) (citation 
omitted) (“[D]istrict court opinions lack precedential force even vis-à-vis other judges in 
the same judicial district.”). PageID #:
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merits in habeas actions. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi , 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 
2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026).5 
B. Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing because Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) mandates his detention pending removal proceedings. 
 
Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s plain terms require Petitioner’s detention pending 
his removal proceedings. When engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court 
“start[s] with the text of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning.” United States 
v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). In determining a statute’s plain meaning, the Court is guided by the 
statutory language at issue and the language and design of the statute as a 
whole. Id. at 852. Unless specifically defined, a statute’s words are given their 
“ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning by looking at what they meant 
when the statute was enacted . . . .” Id. 
To start, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission.” The term is expressly 
defined in the statute as follows: “An alien present in the United States who has 
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a 
designated port of arrival . . .) shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). While the definition of “applicant for admission” does 
encompass aliens who may have recently arrived at a port of entry or crossed 
 
5 See also Rayo v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-2064-BHL, 2026 WL 594079 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 
2026); Hernandez v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-1670-BHL, 2026 WL 161509 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 21, 
2026); Rodriguez v. Olson , 814 F. Supp. 3d 945 (N.D. Ill. 2026) (Pacold, J.); Ugarte -
Arenas v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-1721-WCG, 2025 WL 3514451 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2025), 
appeal docketed, No. 26-1023 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026); Rojas v. Olson, No. 2:25-cv-1437-
BHL, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025), appeal docketed , No. 25-3127 (7th 
Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). PageID #:
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the border, that definition is broader. “[A]pplicant for admission” includes any 
unadmitted alien present in the United States no matter when they entered or 
how long they have been here. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502 
(“Presence without admission deems the petitioners to be applicants for 
admission.”). There is no dispute that Petitioner is an alien who is present in 
the United States and has not been admitted. He is therefore deemed an 
“applicant for admission” under the statute. 
As noted above, the detention of applicants for admission falls into one of 
two statutory categories—Section 1225(b)(1) or the “catchall” Section 1225(b)(2). 
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The Court has established that Section 1225(b)(1) 
does not apply to Petitioner. See Section I.B, supra. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) 
requires the detention of applicants for admission pending removal proceedings 
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission 
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Petitioner makes no 
argument that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” to the 
country. Thus, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates his detention pending removal 
proceedings. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220, 229 (BIA 
2025) (holding that immigration judge “lacked authority to hear” alien’s bond 
request “because aliens who are present in the United States without admission 
are applicants for admission as defined under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and 
must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings”). PageID #:
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Petitioner raises several arguments rejecting this straightforward 
application of Section 1225. The Court does not find these arguments 
persuasive. 
1. “Seeking Admission” 
First, Petitioner argues Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s “seeking admission” 
language limits its applicability to aliens who, unlike himself, affirmatively seek 
lawful entry into the United States. Dkt. 1 at 3, 11, 13. Petitioner also argues 
that this Court should follow the judicial decisions holding that Section 
1225(b)(2)(A)’s “seeking admission” language limits its applicability to aliens 
who, unlike Petitioner, affirmatively seek lawful entry at the country’s borders. 
See Dkt. 1 at 14–15. The Court disagrees. 
As explained above, no binding precedent requires this Court to adopt 
Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See Section II.A & nn. 3 & 4, 
supra. This Court has previously determined that the statutory language and 
context confirm that there is no separate and independent “seeking admission” 
element to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See Demir, 2026 WL 706485, at *4; Singh v. 
Swearingen, No. 2:26-cv-00167-JRO-MG, 2026 WL 847715, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 
27, 2026). Read most plainly, the term “seeking admission” is simply a synonym 
for applying for admission. And applying for admission is a participial form of 
the noun “applicant for admission.” See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502 
(“The everyday meaning of the statute’s terms confirms that being an ‘applicant 
for admission’ is not a condition independent from ‘seeking admission.’”); Avila, PageID #:
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170 F.4th at 1134 (“When a person applies for something, they are necessarily 
seeking it.” (cleaned up)). 
This plain language reading that all “applicant[s] for admission” are, by 
definition, “seeking admission” does not render superfluous the words “seeking 
admission” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Rather, because “applicant for admission” 
is expressly defined in the statute, it is best understood to qualify the broader 
meaning of “seeking admission.” Cf. United States v. Woodward, 376 F.2d 136, 
141 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding statutory terms “‘alarm or disturb’ . . . qualify the 
broader meaning of ‘breach of the peace’” and are not superfluous). This makes 
sense, as one can also “seek[] admission” even when he is not at a port of entry 
or present in the United States. Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 741 
(BIA 2012) (noting, for example, “an alien can ‘again seek[] admission’ . . . by 
applying for a visa at a consulate abroad”). 
Indeed, other provisions in Section 1225 demonstrate that all “applicant[s] 
for admission” are “seeking admission,” not just those who recently arrived. 
Take Section 1225(a)(3), which provides that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants 
for admission or otherwise seeking admission . . . shall be inspected by 
immigration officers.” The provision’s use of “or otherwise” indicates that 
“‘applicants for admission’ are a subset of those ‘seeking admission.’” 
Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 503; see Avila, 170 F.4th at 1135 n.4. Consider 
too Section 1225(a)(5): “An applicant for admission may be required to state 
under oath any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the 
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States . . . .” (emphasis added). Notably, the provision refers to the purposes and 
intentions of “the applicant in seeking admission”—not “the arriving alien in 
seeking admission.” In other words, all “applicant[s] for admission” are 
necessarily “seeking admission,” regardless of when they arrive. 
What’s more, Congress knew how to say “arriving alien” when it wanted to 
in Section 1225. It did not need to qualify “applicant for admission” with a 
separate and independent “seeking admission” requirement to achieve that 
effect. For example, Section 1225(b)(1)(A) explicitly limits its applicability to 
(1) ”an alien . . . who is arriving,” and (2) certain other unadmitted aliens who do 
not have two years of continuous physical presence in the United States. 
Tellingly, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) contains no such temporal limitation. See 
Negrete Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00206-CMS, 2026 WL 251725, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 30, 2026) (“If Congress intended that an alien no longer is ‘seeking 
admission’ after some amount of time in the United States, it could have said 
so.”). 
Petitioner may find it strange that he could be “seeking admission” if he is 
already in the United States. But that is a feature of Section 1225, not a bug. 
The INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United 
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Petitioner never effected a lawful entry into the country. He 
was not admitted. In the eyes of the INA, he remains an “applicant for admission” 
knocking on the proverbial door—that is, “seeking admission.” This is not a PageID #:
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novel or even recent understanding of our immigration laws. In 2012, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals explained: 
In ordinary parlance, the phrase “seeks admission” 
connotes a request for permission to enter . . . . The 
problem, however, is that Congress has defined the 
concept of an “applicant for admission” in an 
unconventional sense, to include not just those who are 
expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those 
who are present in this country without having formally 
requested or received such permission, or who have 
been brought in against their will under certain 
circumstances. . . . In other words, many people who 
are not actually requesting permission to enter the 
United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless 
deemed to be “ seeking admission” under the 
immigration laws. 
Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. Thus, the term “seeking admission” 
does not create an independent pre-requisite for mandatory detention under 
Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 
2. Jennings v. Rodriguez 
Second, Petitioner argues he is not subject to mandatory detention 
because, broadly speaking, Section 1225 applies only to aliens “at the Nation’s 
borders and ports of entry.” Dkt. 1 at 1 2 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 
U.S. 281, 287 (2018)). He says he is not an “arriving alien,” as he has been in 
the country since March 2023. Accord Mohammed v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-02404-
TWP-MKK, 2025 WL 3541819, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2025) (“Considering 
§ 1225 as a whole demonstrates that the most natural meaning of § 1225 is that 
it applies to ‘arriving’ noncitizens attempting to enter the United States.”). 
General characterizations of a statute’s overall purpose, however, cannot 
substitute for its specific and plain words. See Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, PageID #:
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55 n.4 (2012) (“[E]ven the most formidable argument concerning the statute’s 
purposes could not overcome the clarity . . . in the statute’s text.”). As this Court 
discussed in a prior Order, Section 1225 concerns “applicant[s] for admission,” 
which is a clearly defined term that includes but is not restricted only to arriving 
aliens or other recent border crossers. Demir, 2026 WL 706485, at *5. 
The Supreme Court did not hold otherwise in Jennings v. Rodriguez. That 
decision repeatedly stated that it was summarizing Sections 1225 and 1226 in 
“general” terms. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (“That process of decision 
generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the 
Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is 
admissible.” (emphasis added)); id. at 288 (“Section 1226 generally governs the 
process of arresting and detaining [aliens inside the United States] pending their 
removal.” (emphasis added)). Accord Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 505; 
Avila, 170 F.4th at 1136–37. 
Granted, it is beyond question that Section 1225 applies to “arriving 
aliens.” Section 1225, however, does not apply only to arriving aliens but to all 
non-admitted aliens present in the country, regardless of when they arrived. Any 
argument based on how this statute applies in many or even most cases does 
not tell us anything about what it means in every case, and specifically, nothing 
about what it means when applied to the facts before the Court today. 
3. 1225 Versus 1226 
Third, Petitioner argues that Section 1226, not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), 
“applies to individuals who have not been admitted and entered [the United PageID #:
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States] without inspection,” including aliens “inadmissibl[e] for entry without 
inspection.” Dkt. 1 at 11. Petitioner argues that Section 1226 applies to all 
aliens present in the United States without admission or parole and placed in 
removal proceedings and that aliens like Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing 
under Section 1226(a). Dkt. 1 at 11, 15. This argument both overlooks the text 
of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—stating the applicant for admission “shall be detained” 
for removal proceedings—and misunderstands the provision’s relationship with 
Section 1226(a). 
“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs 
the general[,]” especially when construing comprehensive statutory schemes—
like the INA—that are often interspersed with “specific solutions” to “specific 
problems.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 
645 (2012) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 
(1992) and Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 519 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)). “The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to 
statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific 
prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision 
is construed as an exception to the general one.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 
U.S. at 645. “[T]he canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a 
specific provision that is swallowed by the general one.” Id. 
Here, the INA contains a general provision—the Attorney General may 
release most ICE arrestees on bond, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—and a specific 
provision—every “applicant for admission” must be detained without a bond PageID #:
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hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The specific is the exception to the general, 
and it applies to Petitioner in this case. Accord Rodriguez v. Olson, 814 F. Supp. 
3d 945, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2026) (applying general/specific canon to enforce Section 
1225(b)(2)(A) over Section 1226(a)); Ayala v. Harper, No. 1:26-cv-204-CLM-GMB, 
2026 WL 501113, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2026) (same). 
Applying the general/specific canon here is consistent with the plain text 
and structure of Section 1225 and 1226. Section 1226(a) is permissive: “[A]n 
alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is 
to be removed from the United States.” (emphasis added). In other words, the 
Executive is free to exercise its discretion in how it executes the provisions of 
Section 1226 provided it does so within the bounds of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s 
clear mandate to detain “applicants for admission” pending removal proceedings 
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission 
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 
Enforcing that more specific mandate of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not 
render any of Section 1226 superfluous as to the Petitioner. It harmonizes the 
two provisions. At any rate, a “preference for avoiding surplusage constructions 
is not absolute,” especially when the general/specific canon better harmonizes 
the apparently conflicting statutory provisions. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 
526, 536 (2004); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. at 645; see also Rimini Street, 
Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 346 (2019) (“Sometimes the better overall 
reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”); see also Castañon-Nava , 
175 F.4th at 877 (Kirsch, J., dissenting) (“The government’s interpretation of § PageID #:
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1225(b)(2)(A) does not make the Laken Riley Act superfluous, and any overlap is 
understandable given that Congress passed the Act ‘at a time when the Executive 
was still declining to exercise its full enforcement authority [under § 1225].’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 505)). 
4. Past Practice 
Petitioner also argues that Respondent’s application of Section 
1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision not only to recent arrivals but also 
to unadmitted aliens already in the country like himself is contrary to “decades 
of prior [agency] practice.” Dkt. 1 at 11. However, the Court takes seriously its 
independent duty—which Petitioner emphasizes, see id. at 30—to interpret the 
law as written, regardless of an agency’s past practice. And “in cases where [a 
court’s] own judgment . . . differ[s] from that of other high functionaries,” the 
Court is “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.’” Loper Bright Enters. v. 
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (quoting United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 
(15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.)). Past practice aside, Respondent’s 
interpretation of “seeking admission” is not entirely novel. See Matter of Lemus-
Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. 
* * * 
Stepping back to consider the big picture, Petitioner’s perspective on the 
meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) necessarily implies that aliens who evade 
inspection and detention at a port of entry enjoy the privilege of a bond hearing 
while those who submit to inspection upon first arrival do not. As the Fifth 
Circuit explained, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility PageID #:
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Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) aimed to “reduce th[at] incongruity.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 
166 F.4th at 499; see also Avila, 170 F.4th at 1135–36; Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 
918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining IIRIRA “did away with” the “anomaly 
whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States 
were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully”). 
Nothing in the text of the statute suggests that the privilege of a bond hearing is 
based upon the arbitrary standard of avoiding inspection and living in the United 
States for an unspecified time. 
These concerns are muted somewhat in Petitioner’s case: his arrest 
occurred when he faithfully visited ICE for a routine check-in approximately 
three years after his arrival. But granting habeas relief on the premise that ICE 
does not have the statutory right to detain him—despite his non-admitted 
status—leads to the conclusion that the force of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) arbitrarily 
dissipates with time. That is plainly not what Congress meant when it wrote 
“seeking admission” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or enacted the bond hearing 
provision in Section 1226(a). It is also inconsistent with Congress’s IIRIRA 
amendments and encourages the “perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful 
rather than a lawful location” against which the Supreme Court has warned. 
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (“Like an alien detained after arriving at a port of 
entry, an alien like respondent is ‘on the threshold.’ The rule advocated by 
respondent and adopted by the Ninth Circuit would undermine the ‘sovereign 
prerogative’ of governing admission to this country and create a perverse PageID #:
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incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.” (citations 
omitted)). 
In sum, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pending removal 
proceedings under the plain terms of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). As such, 
Respondents have not violated Section 1226(a) by detaining him without a bond 
hearing. As he is not eligible for a discretionary bond hearing, the Court does 
not address his argument that he is entitled to immediate release. 
C. Bond Regulations 
Petitioner next argues that “[t]he application of § 1225(b)(2) to [himself] 
unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates [the bond regulations 
at] 8 C.F.R. § 236.1, 1236.1 and 1003.19.” Dkt. 1 at 24. But this argument 
simply restyles his previous argument that Section 1226(a) applies to his 
detention and not Section 1225. 
The regulations Petitioner cites implement and elaborate upon the 
procedures prescribed by Section 1226. As their shared title suggests, the 
regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1 and 1236.1 concern the same subject matter—
”apprehension, custody, and detention.” These regulations include procedures 
for the Section 1226(a) bond determinations and appeals thereof. For example, 
both regulations state: 
Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, 
in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described 
in section 236(c)(1) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)], 
under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the 
Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), (3)]; provided that the alien 
must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that 
such release would not pose a danger to property or PageID #:
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persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any 
future proceeding. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8); id. § 1236.1(c)(8) (emphasis added). They also provide: 
[T]he immigration judge is authorized to exercise the 
authority in section 236 of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226] 
. . . to detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and 
determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the 
respondent may be released, as provided in § 1003.19 
of this chapter. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1); id. § 1236.1(d)(1) (emphasis added). For its part, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19 further specifies that ”bond determinations made by the service 
pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236 may be reviewed by an Immigration Judge 
pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236” and establishes procedures for such review. 
These regulations implement Section 236 of the INA, that is, 8 U.S.C. § 
1226, and impose no broader obligation on the government than Section 1226 
itself. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 301 (2022) (“An agency’s 
regulation cannot operate independently of the statute that authorized it.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court has determined that 
Section 1225 governs Petitioner’s detention—not Section 1226 and its 
discretionary bond provision. The cited bond regulations therefore do not apply 
to Petitioner, and Respondents have not violated them by detaining him without 
bond pending removal proceedings. 
D. Petitioner’s current detention does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Finally, Petitioner argues his current detention violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Dkt. 1 at 24; Dkt. 10 at 20–22. It does not. PageID #:
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Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause entitles him to immediate 
release or a bond hearing where the Government must prove he is either a flight 
risk or a danger to the community. Dkt. 1 at 28–29. However, the Supreme 
Court has held that “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally 
permissible part of that process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). That 
holding settles the issue. And this Court reached the same conclusion in a 
previous action that is materially indistinguishable from this case. Demir, 2026 
WL 706485, at *7–8. 
Petitioner argues that due process requires the Government bear the 
burden of proving that Petitioner specifically “poses a danger or flight risk.” 
Dkt. 1 at 29. But the Supreme Court already anticipated this objection and 
rejected it: “[W]hen the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due 
Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to 
accomplish its goal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Applied to Petitioner, this means 
that Respondents do not have to justify mandatory detention on a case-by-case 
basis. Respondents may enforce the policy Congress already adopted when it 
enacted the mandatory detention provision in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) without an 
individualized bond hearing. 
Petitioner cites Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) to support his 
argument, dkt. 1 at 26–27, dkt. 9 at 21, but that case is distinguishable. There, 
the Supreme Court addressed whether a post-removal-period detention statute 
authorized potentially indefinite detention. In construing the statute to reject 
that conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished the due process PageID #:
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issues inherent in the petitioner’s indefinite detention from “detention pending a 
determination of removability,” which has an “obvious termination point.” 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. Petitioner’s detention here is a detention pending 
removal proceedings. Thus, it does not implicate the due process concerns 
addressed in Zadvydas. 
And even in cases like Zadvydas—where the Supreme Court held that 
removal is “no longer practically attainable,” id. at 690, thereby eliminating the 
premise for detention pending removal—detention for up to six months was 
presumptively constitutional, id. at 701. Petitioner has been detained by ICE 
pending his removal proceedings for just under two months. Accordingly, 
Petitioner’s current detention by ICE does not violate his due process rights. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner Selah Dine Habib’s 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, dkt. [1], and DISMISSES this case with 
prejudice. Final judgment shall issue by separate entry. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 17, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution: 
 
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