govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_25-cv-02242-1

1 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JAMES DOLAN, and TAMARA 
DOLAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC d/b/a 
MR. COOPER; U.S. BANK, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION as trustee for the 
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN 
TRUST 2006-4 MORTGAGE PASS-
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 
2006-4; MTC FINANCIAL INC., d/b/a 
TRUSTEE CORPS; and DOES 
1-100, inclusive, 
Defendants. 

 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
 
[ECF Nos. 31, 33] 
 
This case involves the alleged wrongful nonjudicial foreclosure sale of Plaintiffs’ 
family residence. ECF No. 28, ¶ 1. Before the Court are two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
complaint: one filed by Defendant s Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) and U.S. 
Bank, National Association as trustee for the Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006 -4 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 1 of 31
 
 
2 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4 (“U.S. Bank”), ECF No. 31; and one 
filed by MTC Financial Inc., doing business as Trustee Corps (“Trustee Corps”), ECF No. 
33. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS both motions to dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
 On March 16, 2006, Plaintiffs executed an adjustable-rate mortgage secured by a 
Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on a property located at 3155 Mount Acmar Court in San Diego, 
California (the “Property”). ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 4, 11. The DOT identified Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. as the lender, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the 
nominal beneficiary, and Reconstruct Company, N.A. as the trustee. Id. ¶ 11; ECF 31-2, at 
3. 
I. Assignments of the DOT and Note 
 The DOT and associated Note then underwent a series of purported Assignments. 
The order of events is as follows: 
 On or before April 28, 2006, Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan was sold to Harborview 
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4 mortgage-backed securities trust, for which Defendant U.S. 
Bank serves as a trustee. Id. ¶ 12. This securitization was governed by a Pooling Service 
Agreement, which required that all mortgage loans be transferred to the trust on or before 
April 28, 2006. Id. ¶ 13. 
On June 7, 2011, MERS executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust (“Assignment 
1”), purporting to transfer all beneficial interest in the Plaintiffs’ DOT and Note to BAC 
Home Loans Servicing LP (“BAC”). Id. ¶ 15; ECF No. 31 -2, at 2 5. Assignment 1 was 
recorded on June 13, 2011. ECF No. 28, ¶ 15; ECF No. 31-2, at 25. 
Plaintiffs allege that, at the time of Assignment 1, MERS no longer held any interest 
in Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan to convey, as it had been sold to Harborview Mortgage Loan 
Trust. ECF No. 28, ¶16. Further, Plaintiffs allege that, even prior to the sale, MERS had no 
interest in the Note or authority to assign the debt it purports to have assigned. Id. 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 2 of 31
 
 
3 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
On July 31, 2013, Bank of America National Association (“BANA”)—successor by 
merger to BAC —executed a corporate assignment of Deed of Trust (“Assignment 2”), 
purporting to transfer the beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ DOT, but not the Note, to U.S. 
Bank as trustees for the securities trust. Id. ¶ 17; ECF No. 31-2, at 28. Plaintiffs allege that 
Assignment 2 “is a legal nullity” because the DOT cannot be transferred without the Note. 
ECF No. 28, ¶ 18. 
On August 21, 2013, the servicing agent for U.S. Bank executed a Substitution of 
Trustee purporting to substitute National Default Servicing Corporation (“NDSC”) as 
trustee under the Plaintiffs’ DOT. Id. ¶ 19; ECF No. 31-2, at 31. The Substitution of Trustee 
was recorded on August 28, 2023. ECF No. 28, ¶ 19; ECF No. 31-2, at 31. Plaintiffs allege 
that the Substitution of Trustee “is void” because U.S. Bank lacked authority to execute 
the Substitution because it never received effective assignment of any interest in Plaintiff’s 
loan. ECF No. 28, ¶ 20. 
On October 15, 2013, the Assistant Vice President of BANA executed an 
Assignment of Deed of Trust (“Assignment 3”) purporting to assign the beneficial interest 
in Plaintiffs’ DOT and Note to Nationstar Mortgage LLC. Id. ¶ 21; ECF No. 31-2, at 33. 
Assignment 3 was recorded on October 24, 2013. ECF No. 28, ¶ 21; ECF No. 31-2, at 33. 
Plaintiffs allege that Assignment 3 “is fraudulent and void” because , at the time of 
Assignment 3, BANA had already assigned its purported interest in the loan and was not 
the purported beneficiary of record. ECF No. 28, ¶ 22. 
On May 19 , 2014, U.S. Bank, as trustee for the securities trust, executed an 
Assignment of Deed of Trust (“Assignment 4”) purporting to assign the beneficial interests 
in Plaintiffs’ DOT to Nationstar. Id. ¶ 23; ECF No. 31-2, at 36. Assignment 4 was recorded 
on July 10, 2013. ECF No. 28, ¶ 23; ECF No. 31-2, at 36. Plaintiffs allege that Assignment 
4 is “void” because, at the time of Assignment 4, (1) U.S. Bank had nothing to assign, and 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 3 of 31
 
 
4 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
(2) Nationstar was already the purported beneficiary of record when Assignment 4 was 
recorded. ECF No. 28, ¶ 24. 
On October 10, 2024, Nationstar executed a final Corporate Assignment of Deed of 
Trust purporting to assign its interest back to U.S. Bank as trustee for the securities trust 
(“Assignment 5”). ECF No. 28, ¶ 25; ECF No. 31-2, at 48-49. Assignment 5 was recorded 
on October 15, 2024. ECF No. 28, ¶ 25; ECF No. 31-2, at 48. 
Thus, a summary of the Assignments is as follows : (1) from MERS to BAC Home 
Loans Servicing; (2) from BANA (successor by merger to BAC) to U.S. Bank; (3) from 
BANA to Nationstar; (4) from U.S. Bank to Nationstar; (5) from Nationstar to U.S. Bank. 
II. Foreclosure Proceedings 
On June 24, 2024, Defendant Trustee Corps recorded a Substitution of Trustee 
purporting to substitute itself as trustee under the DOT. ECF No. 28, ¶ 27; ECF No. 31-2, 
at 39. Trustee Corps also recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 
Trust. ECF No. 28, ¶ 27; ECF No. 31-2, at 43. 
The Notice of Default declared a default amount of $647,914.77 as of June 24, 2024, 
and was executed by Dexter Honeycutt on behalf of Defendant Nationstar as attorney -in-
fact for U.S. Bank. ECF No. 28, ¶ 28; ECF No. 31-2, at 43. On October 17, 2024, Trustee 
Corps recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale and scheduled a sale for December 4, 2024, 
which was rescheduled to July 23, 2025. ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 29-30; ECF No. 31-2, at 51. 
Plaintiffs sent debt validation letters to Defendants pursuant to the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, including a September 16, 2024, letter to Nationstar. ECF No. 28, 
¶ 31. Defendants did not provide verification, and sent any responses to Plaintiffs’ former 
attorney, not to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 31. 
On July 23, 2025, Trustee Corps conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the 
Property. Id. ¶ 32. Multiple third -party bidders participated and offered bids beyond the 
amount necessary to cure the default and cover foreclosure costs. Id. ¶ 33. U.S. Bank —
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 4 of 31
 
 
5 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
through its agents Nationstar and Trustee Corps—submitted a credit bid, thereby acquiring 
the Property for itself. Id. ¶ 34. According to Plaintiffs, t he credit bid was hundreds of 
thousands of dollars higher than the amount necessary to satisfy the relevant indebtedness. 
Id. ¶ 35. 
Plaintiffs allege that, by making an inflated credit bid, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs 
of surplus proceeds that would have been payable to them had the Property sold to a third 
party. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that the purchase was not a good faith effort to protect a 
security interest, but rather an effort to keep Defendants’ wrongful foreclosure scheme—
including the chain of Assignments—from public scrutiny. Id. ¶ 37. 
III. Procedural Background 
Plaintiffs James and Tamara Dolan filed suit against Nationstar, U.S. Bank, Trustee 
Corps, and Does 1 -100, inclusive, in state court. ECF No. 1 -3. Defendants removed the 
case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1, at 2. Plaintiffs 
filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 26, 2026. ECF No. 28. 
In their FAC, Plaintiffs bring claims for (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) violation of 
the California Homeowners’ Bill of Rights, California Civil Code § 2924.17(b); (3) fraud; 
and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. See generally 
ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 42-73. Plaintiffs also bring a claim for quiet title against Defendants U.S. 
Bank and Nationstar, and a claim for violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”) against Nationstar. Id. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the July 23, 2025, 
Trustee’s Sale and accompanying Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale as void and issue an order 
quieting title in Plaintiffs’ favor and decreeing that Defendants have no right to the 
Property. ECF No. 28, at 13. P laintiffs also seek statutory, actual, and punitive damages, 
as well as disgorgement and attorneys’ fees. Id. 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 5 of 31
 
 
6 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank have jointly filed a motion to dismiss, ECF 
No. 31, and Defendant Trustee Corps has separately moved to dismiss, ECF No. 33. The 
motions are both fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 45, 47, 49, 50. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint fails to state or allege sufficient facts to 
support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non -moving party. 
Chubb Custom Inc. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013). However, 
a court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
“Where a motion to dismiss is granted, ‘leave to amend should be granted unless 
the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” Corbett v. Pharmacare U.S., Inc., 544 
F. Supp. 3d 996, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 
F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 6 of 31
 
 
7 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
A. Pro Se Litigants 
Though they have since acquired representation, ECF Nos. 53, 54, Plaintiffs filed 
their FAC pro se. See ECF No. 28. A document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, though courts must interpret pro se 
filings liberally, the court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not 
initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
DISCUSSION 
I. Request for Judicial Notice 
Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank have requested judicial notice of eleven 
exhibits, all of which are recorded instruments referenced in Plaintiffs’ FAC. ECF No. 31-
1, at 2-3. The exhibits include the initial Deed of Trust (“DOT”), each Assignment of the 
DOT, two Substitutions of Trustees, the Notice of Default, the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, 
and the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale. ECF No. 31 -1, at 2 -3. Defendant Trustee Corps also 
seeks judicial notice of ten recorded documents, all of which overlap with Nationstar and 
U.S. Bank’s request for judicial notice. ECF No. 33-1, at 2-3. 
A. Legal Standard 
Generally, on a motion to dismiss, courts will limit their review to the contents of 
the complaint and may only consider extrinsic evidence that is properly presented as part 
of the complaint. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). However, 
a court may “consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents 
incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice —without 
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. 
Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may take notice of facts not 
subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of accurate and ready determination by 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 7 of 31
 
 
8 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court 
can therefore “take judicial notice of matters of public record,” but “cannot take judicial 
notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689; Khoja v. 
Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. , 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub 
nom. Hagan v. Khoja, 139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019). The court may take notice of such facts on 
its own, and “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with 
the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 
B. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice - The Recorded Documents 
Defendants seek judicial notice of the documents on the grounds that each document 
is recorded and is therefore a public record. ECF No. 31-1, at 3. Defendants further assert 
that the Court can notice facts that derive from the legal effect of a legally operative 
document. Id. 
 Plaintiffs concede that the Court may take judicial notice of the fact that a document 
was recorded, the date it was recorded, and the parties to the transaction in each document. 
ECF No. 46, at 2. However, Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ request s to the extent they ask 
the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of disputed factual statements contained within 
the documents. Id. 
 To the extent that the recorded documents are public records and Plaintiffs do not 
dispute their authenticity, the Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1-11 to Nationstar and 
U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss (which includes Exhibits 1-10 of Defendant Trustee Corps’ 
request for judicial notice) . ECF No. 31-2. The Court does not grant judicial notice as to 
the truth of disputed facts stated in the documents. Lee, 250 F.3d at 690. However, where 
appropriate, the Court may “take judicial notice of the documents’ legal effect under 
California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme.” Elliott v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., No. 12 -CV-4370 YGR, 2012 WL 12965955 , *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2012) (citing 
Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th 256, 265 (2011)). 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 8 of 31
 
 
9 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 Additionally, “a court may consider evidence on which the complaint necessarily 
relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the 
plaintiffs’ claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 
12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels–Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of 
the documents, though they take issue with some factual statements contained therein. 
Further, Plaintiffs’ FAC references and relies upon each document included in Defendants’ 
requests for judicial notice. This reliance constitutes additional grounds to grant the request 
for judicial notice of the recorded documents contained in Exhibits 1-11. 
C. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice 
Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice alongside their opposition to Nationstar 
and U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 45-2. Plaintiffs also attached two exhibits to 
their opposition which are not included in their request for judicial notice. ECF No. 45, at 
14-54. 
“Courts regularly decline to consider declarations and exhibits submitted in support 
of [an] opposition to a motion to dismiss . . . if they constitute evidence not referenced in 
the complaint or not a proper subject of judicial notice. ” Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. 
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
As exhibits, Plaintiffs attach excerpts from a “2013 Securitization Audit,” ECF No. 
45, at 14 -22, and a “Property Securitization Analysis Report,” conducted by Mortgage 
Compliance Investigators, ECF No. 45, at 24-54. Though these exhibits were not included 
within Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, the Court will still consi der whether they are 
the appropriate objects for such. Plaintiffs formally request judicial notice of (1) the 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) for Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4; 
(2) a Congressional Oversight Panel report titled “Examining the Consequences of 
Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation” ; and (3) a 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 9 of 31
 
 
10 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) recorded by Plaintiffs on July 21, 2025. ECF 
No. 45-2, at 3-4. 
Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank object to all of Plaintiffs’ attached exhibits 
except for the Lis Pendens. ECF No. 49, at 2. Defendant Trustee Corps also objects to 
judicial notice of Plaintiffs’ exhibits. See ECF No. 50, at 6. 
The Court will not consider the information contained in the two exhibits attached 
to Plaintiffs’ opposition s. Plaintiffs include no information about the authors of the 
documents or any additional context regarding their creation or purpose. The Court agrees 
with Defendants that both documents are unauthenticated hearsay. ECF No. 49, at 2. 
Additionally, the documents are not relied upon by the FAC, matters of public record, or 
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 
Accordingly, judicial notice is inappropriate. 
As to the Pooling Service Agreement (“PSA”), Plaintiffs include only a hyperlink. 
ECF No. 45-2, at 6. While SEC documents can be the subjects of judicial notice, the Court 
was unable to use the provided hyperlink to access the PSA. Alghazwi v. Beauty Health 
Co., 801 F. Supp. 3d 982, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“Documents publicly filed with the SEC 
are subject to judicial notice. ”). Thus, the Court will not take judicial notice of the PSA 
that it is not able to locate. However, the Court will accept as true the allegations regarding 
the PSA included in the complaint, such as the closing date of April 28, 2006. ECF No. 28, 
¶ 13. 
The Court will also not take judicial notice of the Lis Pendens. As mentioned above, 
recorded documents are generally properly subject to judicial notice. However, the Court 
notes that the FAC includes no allegations regarding the Lis Pendens, its filing, or the 
purported notice that it allegedly provided to Defendants. See generally ECF No. 28. Given 
the utter lack of reference to the Lis Pendens in the FAC, Plaintiffs seemingly seek to utilize 
judicial notice of the document as a means to supplement and a mend their allegations, 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 10 of 31
 
 
11 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
which they cannot do. Gerritsen, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1033 n.93 (declining judicial notice 
where the document and facts therein were referenced only in opposition —not in the 
operative pleadings —and the documents sought to function as an amendment of the 
complaint). Thus, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the Lis Pendens. 
Lastly, as to the Congressional Oversight Panel report, the Court finds that the 
exhibit provided by Plaintiffs —which is a mere excerpt of the report, without a title or 
author or indication of where the report can be found —lacks the “sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify taking judicial notice of these facts.” United States v. Perez -Corona, 
295 F.3d 996, 1000 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice. 
1. Plaintiffs’ New Allegations 
Plaintiffs’ oppositions to Defendants’ motions to dismiss also contain several new 
factual allegations. For instance, Plaintiffs include additional facts about the Pooling 
Service Agreement—for instance, that it is governed by New York law—and elaborate on 
its role in Plaintiffs’ allegations. ECF No. 45, at 6 -7. Plaintiffs also include additional 
allegations regarding the foreclosure sale —that it was delayed by ninety minutes during 
which multiple third-party bidders left. Id. at 4-5, 9. Lastly, Plaintiffs include allegations 
regarding a recorded Pendency of Acti on (Lis Pendens) providing notice of this action 
affecting title to the Property. Id. at 4, 8. 
“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look 
beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition 
to a defendant's motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 
n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). A court may, however, consider such facts in 
determining whether to grant leave to amend. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 
n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court will limit its analysis of the motions to dismiss 
to the allegations included in the FAC. 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 11 of 31
 
 
12 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
II. Wrongful Foreclosure 
Plaintiffs bring their wrongful foreclosure claim against all Defendants. Under 
California law, the elements of a wrongful foreclosure cause of action are “(1) the trustee 
or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property 
pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the 
sale . . . was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor 
challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secu red 
indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” Miles v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 236 
Cal. App. 4th 394, 408–09 (2015). 
Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure was wrongful because (1) Defendants lacked 
standing to foreclose because none of them ever held a valid beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ 
mortgage loan; (2) the foreclosure documents were executed based on void assig nments; 
(3) the Notice of Default was recorded and the foreclosure pursued in violation of 
California Civil Code §§ 2924.17 and 2923.55; and (4) Defendants ’ conduct—making an 
inflated credit bid to outbid third -party purchasers and deprive Plaintiffs of surplus 
proceeds—constituted oppression, fraud, and malice. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack 
standing to challenge the Assignments and did not suffer any prejudice stemming fr om 
them. 
A. Void or Voidable Assignments 
“[A] home loan borrower has standing to claim a nonjudicial foreclosure was 
wrongful because an assignment by which the foreclosing party purportedly took a 
beneficial interest in the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void.” In re Turner, 859 
F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal.4th 
919, 929 (2016)). “Unlike a voidable transaction, a void one cannot be ratified or validated 
by the parties to it even if they so desire.” Id. (quoting Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 936). 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 12 of 31
 
 
13 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
A plaintiffs’ standing to raise such a challenge rests upon the debtor’s “assert[ion of] 
her own interest in limiting foreclosure on her property to those with legal authority to 
order a foreclosure sale.” Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 937. Thus, for a wrongful foreclosure 
plaintiff bringing her claim based on a void assignment, her “standing is predicated upon 
the loss of ownership of her home due to an allegedly illegal trustee’s sale that, but for the 
purported beneficiary ’s actions in ordering the sale based upon the allegedly void 
assignment, would not have occurred.” Marshall v. Gen. Motors/Corp. Serv. Co., No. 18-
CV-2551-GPC-JLB, 2019 WL 2642661, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) (citing Yvanova, 
62 Cal. 4th at 937). 
Plaintiffs allege that the assignments at issue are void because (1) MERS lacked 
authority to execute Assignment 1, ECF No. 28, ¶ 16, ECF No. 45, at 2; (2) Assignments 
were made after the securitization trust’s closing date outlined in the Pooling Service 
Agreement, ECF No. 28, ¶ 13, ECF No. 45, at 7 -8; (3) the Deed of Trust was separated 
from the loan. ECF 28, ¶ 18. Each of these arguments fails to allege a void assignment. 
1. MERS’ Authority to Assign the DOT 
Plaintiffs allege that MERS lacked authority to execute Assignment 1 because 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”), had previously sold the loan . ECF No. 
28, ¶ 16. However, this allegation is rebutted by the plain language of the Deed of Trust. 
The Deed of Trust identifies Countrywide as the “Lender,” and names MERS as a 
“beneficiary” of the loan and a “nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” 
ECF 31-2, at 3 (emphasis added). The DOT continues that “MERS holds only legal title to 
the interests granted by the Borrower in this Security instrument, but . . . MERS (as 
nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or 
all of those interest, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the 
property.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Courts have repeatedly held that this language grants 
MERS the authority to assign its interest in a DOT even after the initial lender has 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 13 of 31
 
 
14 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
transferred the property. Avila v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n , No. C 16 -05904 WHA, 
2016 WL 7425925, at *2-*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2016); Ratliff v. JPMorgan Chase Bank 
N.A., No. 17 -CV-02155-EMC, 2017 WL 2876141 , at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2017) ; 
Marshall, 2019 WL 2642661, at *8. Thus, the recorded documents indicate that MERS 
was authorized to assign the DOT in Assignment 1 , and that such an assignment was not 
void. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (courts 
entertaining motions to dismiss need not accept as true allegations that “contradict matters 
properly subject to judicial notice”). 
To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that MERS “never held any interest in the Note 
and had no authority to assign the debt,” their argument also falls short. ECF No. 28, ¶ 16. 
“California [courts] have universally held that MERS, as nominee beneficiary, has the 
power to assign its interest under a deed of trust. ” Morgan v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC , 
646 F. App’x 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (quoting Herrera v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. 
Ass'n, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1495 (2012)). 
2. Untimely Assignment Under Pooling Service Agreement 
To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that the Assignments were void because they were 
executed after the Trust’s Pooling Service Agreement’s closing date, California courts have 
consistently held that such an error renders an assignment voidable, not void. Turner v. 
Wells Fargo Bank NA, 859 F.3d 1145, 1149 -51 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting Glaski v. Bank 
of America, 318 Cal. App. 4th 1079 (2016)); Dahnken v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 705 F. 
App'x 508, 510 (9th Cir. 2017). 
3. Separation of the Note from the Deed of Trust 
Next, Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Assignments are void because they separated 
the Note from DOT are also unsuccessful. In fact, “California’s non-judicial foreclosure 
law rejects the splitting-the-note theory.” Kramer v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-01499, 
2014 WL 1577671, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) ; see also Spangler v. Selene Fin. LP, 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 14 of 31
 
 
15 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
No. 16-CV-01503-WHO, 2016 WL 3951654, at *4 n.8 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2016) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that her mortgage was rendered void when the deed of trust was 
allegedly assigned without the promissory note ); Marshall, 2019 WL 2642661, at *6 
(“Because a ‘party need not possess [the] promissory note to foreclose,’ there is no reason 
to credit Plaintiff's assertion that the assignments are void for want of the Note. ” (quoting 
Robertson v. Citibank, NA, 713 F. App’x. 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)). 
4. Irregularities in Transfer of DOT 
The Court does take note of the problematic nature of Assignment 3, wherein Bank 
of America, N.A. (“BANA”) purported to assign its interest in the Deed of Trust to 
Nationstar after already assigning that interest to U.S. Bank. ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 17, 21; ECF 
No. 31-2, at 28, 33. Such an Assignment is seemingly “erroneous and void, as BANA had 
nothing to assign because interest in the DOT belonged to [U.S. Bank].” Ponthieux v. 
Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 218CV0608TLNDBPS, 2022 WL 3230033, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-CV-00608-TLN-DB, 2022 
WL 4484097 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-16603, 2023 WL 8047828 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 21, 2023); see also Hill v. U.S. Bank, N.A., Case No. EDCV 19-110 JGB (SPx), 2019 
WL 3240107, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019) (“Where an entity holding no interest in a 
note purports to sell that interest to another, the assignment is void, not merely voidable, 
because there was no interest to assign.”). 
However, the flawed nature of Assignment 3 still does not convey standing to 
Plaintiffs because it does not bear on the legal authority of the ultimate foreclosing party. 
See Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 937. Per Plaintiffs’ complaint, after BANA purported to 
transfer its interest to Nationstar, U.S. Bank —the party to which the recorded documents 
demonstrate an unbroken chain of title—assigned its interest to Nationstar on May 19, 2014 
(recorded on July 10, 2014). ECF No. 28, ¶ 23; ECF No. 31-2, at 36. Thus, aside from the 
apparent flaws in Assignment 3, Plaintiffs have not alleged that those errors impacted 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 15 of 31
 
 
16 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Nationstar’s ultimate interest in the DOT or authority to assign that interest back to U.S. 
Bank.1 C.f. Pointheaux, 2021 WL 211252, at *5 (declining to dismiss claims when BANA 
similarly assigned its interest in the DOT twice, but where the alleged ultimate interest lied 
with different parties). See also Kalnoki v. First Am. Tr. Servicing Sols., LLC, 8 Cal. App. 
5th 23, 50, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 313 (2017) (“Thus, even assuming for sake of argument 
that prejudice can be established simply by alleging facts showing the wrong party 
foreclosed as found in Sciarratta, the judicially noticeable documents in this case show the 
proper party foreclosed[.]”). 
Accordingly, omitting Assignment 3, the chain of recorded assignments at hand—
(1) from MERS to BAC, (2) from BANA (successor by merger to BAC) to U.S. Bank, (3) 
from U.S. Bank to Nationstar, and (4) from Nationstar to U.S. Bank —demonstrate a 
cohesive chain of title from MERS to U.S. Bank, and Plaintiffs’ allegations have not shown 
that any Assignment impacting U.S. Bank’s ultimate interest is void . Thus, any alleged 
irregularities or defects in the Assignments themselves do not demonstrate that U.S. Bank 
lacked authority to foreclose. 
B. Prejudice 
However, even if a defective assignment has taken place, a plaintiff alleging 
wrongful foreclosure based on a void assignment must show some additional prejudice 
 
1 The Court also notes that, per the recorded documents, the Substitution of Trustee 
instituting Trustee Corps as Trustee under the DOT was executed on June 12, 2024 
(recorded on June 24, 2024), and lists U.S. Bank as the current beneficiary of the DOT. 
ECF No. 31 -2, at 39 -41. However, U.S. Bank executed its Assignment of DOT to 
Nationstar on May 19, 20 14 (recorded on July 10, 20 14), ECF No. 31 -2, at 36 , and 
Nationstar did not Assign the DOT back to U.S. Bank until October 10, 2024 (recorded 
October 15, 2024). The Court will not assess whether this irregularity might bear on 
Plaintiffs’ claims, as Plaintiffs make no allegations regarding the validity of the 
Substitution of Trustee to MTC. 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 16 of 31
 
 
17 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
beyond the foreclosure itself. Cardenas v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 862, 
872 (N.D. Cal. 2017 ) (“The weight of published California Court of Appeal decisions, 
however, holds that a borrower must alleges prejudice beyond the foreclosure itself.”). 
Specifically, “if an allegedly defective assignment did not alter the plaintiff ’s payment 
obligations, and plaintiff does not deny that she defaulted and her debt is in arrears, she 
cannot show that the allegedly invalid assignment could cause injury and warrant voiding 
the foreclosure sale.” Ancheta v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc ., No. 16-CV-06520-
YGR, 2017 WL 3033630, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2017), aff'd, 730 F. App’x 509 (9th Cir. 
2018). See also Dahnken v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 705 F. App ’x 508, 509–10 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“Further, even if MERS lacked authority to transfer the note, the assignment merely 
substituted one creditor for another and did not change [plaintiff’s] obligations, so 
[plaintiff] cannot show the prejudice necessary to challenge foreclosure.”) (citing Fontenot 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 198 Cal. App. 4th 256, 272 (2011), disapproved of on other 
grounds by Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 939 n.13). 
Thus, a plaintiff alleging wrongful foreclosure on the basis of a void assignment 
must allege additional harm stemming from the assignment, “ like (1) that the void 
assignment changed the borrower's payment obligations; (2) that the void assignment 
‘interfered in any manner with [the borrower's] payment’; or (3) that the true owner of the 
loan—the entity that actually has the authority to foreclose —‘would have refrained from 
foreclosure under the circumstances presented .’” Cardenas, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 872 
(quoting Fontenot, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 272). This requirement rests on the reasoning that 
“because an assignment on its own ‘merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without 
changing’ the borrower's payment obligations, the ‘true victim’ of a void assignment is not 
the borrower, but rather the true owner of the loan, because a void assignment causes the 
true owner of the loan to ‘suffer[] the unauthorized loss’ of the loan.” Id. (quoting Fontenot, 
198 Cal. App. 4th at 480). 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 17 of 31
 
 
18 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Because Plaintiffs’ FAC does not allege any prejudice beyond the foreclosure itself, 
the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure under 
California law on the basis of defective Assignments . Plaintiffs do not allege that any 
allegedly void Assignment affected Plaintiffs’ payment obligations or their ability to meet 
them, nor that the assignments led to a foreclosure that otherwise would not have occurred. 
See Cardenas, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 872 (citing cases and rejecting the reasoning in Sciarratta 
v. U.S. Bank N.A., 247 Cal. App. 4th 552, 565–66 (2016)). 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants ’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
wrongful foreclosure cause of action. Because Plaintiffs’ may allege additional facts 
regarding the prejudice experienced or the voidness of the recorded documents, the 
dismissal is with leave to amend. 
C. Other Theories of Wrongful Foreclosure 
Plaintiffs allege additional wrongful foreclosure theories that do not rely on 
Plaintiffs’ claims that the Assignments are void. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the 
foreclosure was wrongful because the foreclosure documents violated California Civil 
Code § 2924.17 and § 2923.55 and because U.S. Bank’s inflated credit bid constituted 
oppression, fraud, and malice. 
As discussed below, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants violated 
§ 2924.17. As to Plaintiffs ’ claim that the foreclosure was wrongful based on a violation 
of § 2923.55, Plaintiffs FAC contains no allegations in support of such a claim other than 
the conclusion that foreclosure “was pursued in violation of . . . 2923.55.” ECF No. 28, ¶ 
44(c). Even liberally construing the FAC, such bare and conclusory allegations cannot 
support Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure was wrongful because 
Defendant U.S. Bank made an “inflated credit bid” to acquire the Property for itself, their 
claim also fails. ECF No. 28, ¶ 40. Plaintiffs allege that the amount bid by Defendant was 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 18 of 31
 
 
19 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
“hundreds of thousands of dollars above the default amount.” Id. ¶ 2. However, the 
recorded Notice of Trustee’s Sale indicated that the total amount of unpaid balance in 
addition to costs and advances was estimated to be $1,155,872.87. ECF No. 31 -2, at 52. 
Nowhere in the FAC do Plaintiffs dispute the accuracy of the balance of their debt at any 
time, including as stated in the Notice of Trustee’s sale. Further, the Trustee’s Deed Upon 
Sale indicates that the amount of the unpaid debt was exactly equal to the amount paid by 
U.S. Bank—$1,201,556.66. ECF No. 31 -2, at 55. Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations that U.S. 
Bank’s credit bid was maliciously greater than the default amount are contradicted by the 
recorded documents and cannot form the basis of Plaintiffs’ wro ngful foreclosure claim. 
See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (courts entertaining motions to dismiss need not accept as 
true allegations that “contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice”) ; see also 
Biancalana v. T.D. Serv. Co., 56 Cal. 4th 807, 816 (2013) (a “lender is entitled to make a 
credit bid up to the amount of the outstanding indebtedness” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
1. Tender 
Lastly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege tender. “The tender rule applies to equitable 
claims, such as claims to set aside a trustee’s sale, to quiet title, to cancel an instrument, or 
for wrongful foreclosure.” Santana v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 3d 926, 937 (S.D. 
Cal. 2020) (quoting Green v. Central Mortg. Co., 148 F. Supp. 3d 852, 870 (N.D. Cal. 
2015)). “The rationale behind the rule is that if plaintiffs could not have redeemed the 
property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in 
damages to the plaintiffs.” FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 
1018, 1022 (1989). 
California caselaw recognizes four exceptions to the tender rule, including where (1) 
a borrower attacks the validity of the underlying debt; (2) the person seeking to set aside 
the sale has a counter -claim against the beneficiary; (3) tender would be ineq uitable; and 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 19 of 31
 
 
20 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
(4) the trustee’s deed is void on its face. Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 89, 112–
13 (2011). A plaintiff may be excused from the tender rule if his allegations support an 
exception. See Sciarratta v. US. Bank Nat'l Ass ’n, 247 Cal. App. 4th 552, 568 (2016) (if 
the plaintiff properly alleges the foreclosure is void, tender is not required in causes of 
action for wrongful foreclosure, cancellation, of instruments and quiet title); Azam v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. , 677 Fed. App ’x 326, 327 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A full tender may not be 
required where one or more of four recognized exceptions applies.”) . Courts have 
discretion in considering whether application of the tender rule would be equitable in a 
given circumstance. Santana, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 938. 
While allegations of a void sale —if sufficiently pled—may invoke an exception to 
the tender rule , Plaintiffs’ other foreclosure theories do not invoke any exception to the 
tender rule. Thus, Plaintiffs’ alternate theories of wrongful foreclosure further fail because 
Plaintiffs have not alleged tender. See Warren v. PNC Bank Nat'l Ass ’n, 671 F. Supp. 3d 
1035, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2023). 
D. Trustee Corps’ Trustee Privilege 
While Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure in any capacity, 
Defendant Trustee Corps raises additional defenses unique to its role as Trustee. 
Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim against Trustee Corps seems to rest on Trustee 
Corps’ role in recording the foreclosure documents. See generally ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 42 -44. 
Trustee Corps argues that its foreclosure-related actions taken in its capacity as Trustee are 
subject to privilege under California Civil Code § 2924(d). ECF No. 33, at 14-15. 
Section 2924(d) states that the “‘mailing, publication, and delivery’ of foreclosure 
notices and ‘performance’ of foreclosure procedures’” are “privileged communications” 
under California law. Cisneros v. Instant Cap. Funding Grp., Inc ., 263 F.R.D. 595 , 605 
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(d)); see also Permito v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. C–12–00545–YGR, 2012 WL 1380322, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (citing 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 20 of 31
 
 
21 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Kachlon v. Markowitz , 168 Cal. App. 4th 316 (2008)) (“Absent factual allegations of 
malice, a trustee’s performance of the statutory procedures in a nonjudicial foreclosure is 
subject to the qualified, common-interest privilege of California Civil Code § 47(c)(1).”). 
Trustee Corps argues that its actions are entitled to absolute privilege. ECF No. 33, 
at 15-17. In their opposition, Plaintiffs dispute that Trustee Corps is entitled to absolute 
privilege but concede that Trustee Corps’ actions are subject to qualified privilege. ECF 
No. 47, at 3 -4. California courts have noted that § 2924 “fails to specify whether the 
intended . . . privilege is absolute or qualified, creating an ambiguity in the statute.” 
Alphonso v. Real Time Resols., Inc ., No. 23 -CV-01488-JSC, 2023 WL 3794502, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2023) (quoting Kachlon v. Markowitz , 168 Cal. App. 4th 316, 334 
(2008)) (cleaned up). 
The Court need not resolve which privilege applies because Trustee Corps’ alleged 
activity was privileged under even the lower qualified privilege standard . Trustee Corps’ 
conduct in recording foreclosure-related documents is covered by qualified privilege unless 
it was undertaken with malice. Alphonso, 2023 WL 3794502, at *2. In this context, an 
action was undertaken with malice if “the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will 
towards the plaintiff or . . . the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth 
of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights .” 
Kachlon, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 336 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs have not alleged malice on behalf of Trustee Corps, nor do their allegations 
support an inference of actual malice. The only allegation of malice in the FAC refers to 
U.S. Bank’s conduct in making an “inflated credit bid.” ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 40, 44(d). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim against Trustee Corps further fails due 
to statutory privilege. 
// 
// 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 21 of 31
 
 
22 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
III. Quiet Title 
Plaintiffs allege a claim for quiet title against Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank. 
The FAC alleges that “Plaintiffs are the record owners of the Subject Property and are 
entitled to exclusive possession thereof”; that “Defendant U.S. Bank claims an int erest in 
the Property by virtue of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale”; and that “Defendant Nationstar 
claims an interest as purported servicer and through various assignments.” ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 
48-49. 
An action to quiet title can be brought “to establish title against adverse claims to 
real or personal property or any interest therein.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 760.020. To state 
a cause of action for quiet title, a plaintiff must allege (1) the property ’s legal description 
and its street address or common designation; (2) the plaintiffs’ title and the basis of the 
title; (3) the “adverse claims to the title against which a determination is sought”; (4) the 
“date the determination is sought”; and (5) a prayer for the determination of the plaintiffs’ 
title against the adverse claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 761.020. In California, a plaintiff 
may “assert quiet title only if they currently possess an interest in the property at issue. ” 
Jacobsen v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 661 F. App’x 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) 
(citing Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864 (1968)); Lanin v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 
CV S-09-2461 FCD/DAD, 2010 WL 11574165 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010) (“In order to 
proceed on a claim to quiet title, the plaintiff must have a legal interest in the property.”) 
Here, a claim for quiet title may not be brought against Defendant Nationstar as the 
loan servicer, because a loan servicer does not have an adverse interest to the property. 
Santana, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 949 (“[A] quiet title claim cannot be alleged against Defendant 
BSI, the loan servicer[.]”); Watson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 16CV513-GPC(MDD), 2016 
WL 3552061, at *20 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (“A loan servicer cannot have an adverse 
interest to property .”). To the extent Plaintiffs allege that Nationstar holds an adverse 
interest due to the previous assignments, the recorded documents show that Nationstar 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 22 of 31
 
 
23 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
assigned its interest in the DOT to U.S. Bank on October 10, 2024, before the foreclosure 
sale on July 23, 2025. ECF No. 31 -2, at 49; ECF No. 28 ¶ 32. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim for 
quiet title against Nationstar is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Defendant U.S. Bank does have an interest in the property after purchasing the 
property at the foreclosure sale on July 23, 2025. ECF No. 28, ¶ 32; ECF No. 31-2, at 55. 
However, while Plaintiffs have alleged that U.S. Bank has an interest in the property, 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they retain any interest in the property themselves. 
Though Plaintiffs assert that they are “record owners” of the Property, they have not alleged 
any facts supporting that conclusion. ECF No. 28, ¶ 48. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege, and the 
judicially noticed documents confirm, that a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded 
conveying the Property to U.S. Bank. Id. ¶ 41. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs allege that the sale did not extinguish Plaintiffs’ interest 
in the property due to the invalid Assignments, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs’ 
allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the Assignments or ultimat e foreclosure 
were void. While Plaintiffs, in their opposition, refer to the recorded Lis Pendens in support 
of their quiet title claim, the FAC makes no reference to the document. ECF No. 45, at 12. 
Further, Plaintiffs “have not alleged that they are the rightful owners of the property, i.e. 
that they have satisfied their obligations under the Deed of Trust.” Kelley v. Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for quiet title against U.S. Bank, 
and U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED with leave to amend. 
IV. Violation of California Civil Code § 2924.17 
Plaintiffs allege a violation of § 2924.17 by all Defendants. “California Civil Code 
§ 2924.17(a) mandates that certain documents related to the foreclosure process, including 
‘a notice of default, notice of sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or substitution of trustee 
recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage service r in connection with a foreclosure,’ ‘shall 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 23 of 31
 
 
24 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
be accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.’” Cardenas 
v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 862, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Cal. Civ. 
Code § 2924.17). 
In support of their § 2924.17 claim, Plaintiffs allege that “the foreclosure documents 
recorded by or on behalf of Nationstar —including the Substitution of Trustee, Noti ce of 
Default, and Notice of Trustee’s Sale —were not supported by competent and reliable 
evidence substantiating Plaintiffs’ default or Defendants’ right to foreclose.” ECF No. 28, 
¶ 55. The allegations continue that “Nationstar failed to review competent evidence before 
recording these documents.” Id. ¶ 56. 
A. Defendant Trustee Corps 
Trustee Corps argues that Plaintiffs have “failed to allege any facts demonstrating a 
violation of § 2924.17 by Trustee Corps.” ECF No. 33, at 23. The Court agrees. While 
Plaintiffs’ § 2924.17 claim is brought against “All Defendants,” Plaintiffs include no 
allegations regarding Trustee Corps’ conduct or how it violated the statute. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs refer only actions taken “by or on behalf of Nationstar.” ECF No. 28, ¶ 55. 
Accordingly, Defendant Trustee Corps’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff s’ 
§ 2924.17 claim. 
B. Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank 
Plaintiffs’ allegations under § 2924.17 amount to a recitation of the elements of the 
claim. Plaintiffs do not indicate what aspects of the Substitution of Trustee, Notice of 
Default, and Notice of Trustee’s sale were incorrect or unsupported by evidence. Further, 
Plaintiffs do not indicate what competent evidence Nationstar failed to review. 
To the extent Plaintiffs’ § 2924.17 claim rest s on Defendants’ alleged lack of 
authority to foreclose based on the allegedly defective chain of title, the Court has already 
determined Plaintiffs allegations have not shown that Defendants lacked authority to 
foreclose where the recorded documents demonstrate that (1) MERS had the authority to 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 24 of 31
 
 
25 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
execute Assignment 1; and (2) a cohesive chain of title from MERS to BANA to U.S. Bank 
to Nationstar to U.S. Bank. 
To support their § 2924.17 claim, Plaintiffs refer to information included in the 2013 
Securitization Audit which they attached as an exhibit to their opposition. ECF No. 45, at 
9. However, as mentioned above, the Court cannot consider such evidence —which is not 
included in the complaint, relied upon by the complaint, or from a source whose authority 
cannot reasonably be questioned—in adjudicating the motions to dismiss. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ have failed to allege a violation of § 2924.17, and the Court 
GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend. 
V. Fraud 
Plaintiffs bring a claim for fraud against all Defendants. Under California law, the 
necessary elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, 
or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce 
reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Alliance Mortgage Co. v. 
Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1266, 1239 (2016). 
Defendant Trustee Corps argues that Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations are barred by the 
three-year statute of limitations to the extent they arise from the allegedly inadequate 
Assignments that took place from 2011 to 2014. ECF No. 33, at 24 (citing Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc. §338(d)). Ho wever, this argument overlooks that Plaintiffs allege fraudulent 
statements in relation to the foreclosure documents filed in 2024. Thus, Plaintiffs’ fraud 
claims are timely. 
Fraud allegations are subject to the heightened pleading requirement set forth in Rule 
9(b), which requires that a plaintiff must “state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “ To properly plead fraud with 
particularity under Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and 
how of the misconduct charged.” In re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2024) 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 25 of 31
 
 
26 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
(quoting Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2018)). “In other 
words, it must provide ‘an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false 
representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations. ’” Id. 
(quoting Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007)). “Most importantly,” a 
plaintiff must explain what is false about the statement and why. Id. (citing Davidson, 889 
F. 3d at 964). 
 Plaintiffs allege that each Defendant “knowingly made false representations in 
recorded documents and communications with Plaintiffs.” ECF No. 28, ¶ 59. However, 
Plaintiffs then identify several “statements” that were not made by any Defendant in this 
case. See ECF No. 28, ¶ 59 (referencing statements made by MERS, BANA, and NDSC). 
Plaintiffs then allege that “all of the above fraudulent misrepresentations were repeated, 
falsely ratified and otherwise associated with the Notice of Default recorded on June 24, 
2024 by MTC at the direction of Nationstar on behalf of U.S. Bank, and the subsequent 
Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded on October 17, 2024, and the illegal sale of July 23, 
2025, and the associated Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded August 12, 2025.” Id. ¶ 63. 
This statement is too vague to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards. It 
does not allege which representations were actually made by which Defendant, alleging 
that some were “repeated” in a document or communication while others were merely 
“otherwise associated.” Id. The allegations are unclear as to which Defendant made which 
statement in which communication, and how and why each identified statement was 
misleading or false. This falls short of the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs do not indicate how they relied on the identified statements 
beyond “Plaintiffs justifiably relied on these representations.” Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiffs do not 
allege any action they took or did not take in reliance on the alleged fraudulent statements. 
“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do” to sufficiently 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 26 of 31
 
 
27 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Thus, Plaintiffs have also failed to allege the 
reliance element of a fraud claim. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud 
claims. Because Plaintiffs may possibly allege additional facts regarding the alleged 
fraudulent statements and Plaintiffs’ reliance thereon, the dismissal is without prejudice 
and with leave to amend. 
VI. Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 
Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act against 
Defendant Nationstar. “In order to state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege 
facts that establish the following: (1) plaintiff has been the object of collection activity 
arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ under the 
FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a 
requirement imposed by the FDCPA.” Bird v. Real Time Resols., Inc ., 183 F. Supp. 3d 
1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Dang v. CitiMortgage, Inc ., No. 5:11 –cv–05036 
EJD, 2012 WL 762329, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2012)). 
Plaintiffs specifically allege a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) for failing to provide 
Plaintiffs with proper debt verification. ECF No. 28, ¶ 67. Plaintiffs also make secondary 
FDCPA allegations, alleging that: “Nationstar’s conduct in pursuing foreclosure without 
legal authority and making false representations in connection with debt collection also 
violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (false or misleading representations) and § 1692f (unfair or 
unconscionable means).” ECF No. 28, ¶ 69. 
Section 1692g(a) outlines information that a debt collector shall provide to a 
consumer within five days of the “initial communication” regarding the collection of a 
debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). After receiving that information, a consumer has thirty days to 
dispute the validity of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). If the consumer does so, then the 
debt collector must obtain verification of the debt. Id. § 1692g(b). 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 27 of 31
 
 
28 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plaintiffs’ FAC includes no allegations regarding when or if any “initial 
communication” occurred, or when and whether Nationstar sent the required information 
under § 1692g(a). Given the lack of such information, Plaintiffs also do not allege that they 
sought verification of the debt within the thirty-day period necessary to give rise to 
Nationstar’s obligations under § 1692g (b). Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts 
demonstrating that Nationstar violated § 1692g(b). McMillan v. Bank of Am., N.A ., No. 
14CV1575-MMA BLM, 2015 WL 1942743, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) (dismissing 
§ 1692g(b) claim where plaintiff failed to allege that notification of the disputed debt was 
made within the thirty-day period after the receipt of the initial communication) ; Aragon 
v. DZR Grp. Inc., No. 25-CV-0264-AGS-BLM, 2025 WL 1082755, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 
10, 2025) (same). 
Next, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ § 1692e claims relate to Nationstar’s conduct in 
pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure, such a claim must fail, as such conduct is not “debt 
collection” under § 1692e. Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg ., LLC, 852 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 
2017). More specifically, “the Ninth Circuit has held that the FDCPA can only impose 
liability when an entity is attempting to collect money, and ‘the object of a non -judicial 
foreclosure sale is to retake and resell the security, not to collect money from the 
borrower.’” Ramirez v. NBGI, Inc., No. CV 22-5695-MWF (JPRX), 2024 WL 1677517, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2024), reconsideration denied, No. CV 22-5695-MWF (JPRX), 2024 
WL 3512835 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2024) (quoting Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 
NA, 858 F.3d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiffs have made no allegations that Nationstar 
attempted to collect on any debt —only claims in relation to Nationstar’s general 
foreclosure-related conduct and communications. Additionally, because Plaintiffs’ § 1692e 
claim is based on “false representations in connection with debt collection,” such a claim 
sounds in fraud and is subject to the heightened pleading standards of 9(b), which Plaintiffs 
have failed to meet. Mill v. SchoolsFirst Fed. Credit Union , No. 5:25 -CV-00060-SSS-
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 28 of 31
 
 
29 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
DTBX, 2025 WL 3049844, *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (citing cases and explaining how 
§ 1692e claims may be subject to Rule 9(b) pleading standard when they sound in fraud). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims related to Nationstar’s foreclosure-related actions 
under § 1692e are unsuccessful. 
The Court acknowledges that the FDCPA does regulate security interest 
enforcement activity—such as a nonjudicial foreclosure —through § 1692f(6). Dowers v. 
Nationstar Mortg., LLC , 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while the 
FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so only through Section 
1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only 
to the collection of a money debt”). Section 1692f(6) asserts that a debt collector violates 
the FDCPA if it takes a nonjudicial action to effect dispossession of property where, among 
other things, “there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral 
through an enforceable security interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). Thus, while § 1692f(6) 
does present a potential pathway for Plaintiffs to challenge Nationstar’s foreclosure-related 
conduct under the FDCPA, Plaintiffs have not adequately stated a claim under the statute. 
Plaintiffs’ claims that Nationstar lacked authorit y to initiate foreclosure proceedings are 
based on the alleged invalidity of MERS initial assignment; a theory that the Court has 
rejected due to the plain language of the recorded DOT. Further, Plaintiffs have not alleged 
that they were not in def ault on their loan such that a fore closing actor had no right to 
initiate foreclosure proceedings. See, e.g., Abrams v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, No. CV 
21-02906-MWF (EX), 2021 WL 3932306, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2021). 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Nationstar’s motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to bring claims related to 
Nationstar’s foreclosure -related activity under a section of the FDCPA other than 
§ 1692f(6), such claims are dismissed without leave to amend. However, to the extent that 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 29 of 31
 
 
30 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plaintiffs can allege additional facts in support of their § 1692g(b) or § 1692f(6) claims, 
the claims are dismissed with leave to amend. 
VII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Plaintiffs bring their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all 
Defendants. A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when 
there is “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, 
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's 
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate cau sation of 
the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 
1035, 1050 (Cal. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitt ed). Conduct is 
“outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 
civilized community.” Id. 
 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct was outrageous and extreme because 
Defendants allegedly (1) pursued foreclosure through fraudulent documents; (2) made 
inflated credit bids to prevent competitive bidding; and (3) wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs 
of their home. ECF No. 28, ¶ 13. 
 As discussed above, the recorded documents contradict Plaintiffs’ assertions that (1) 
the foreclosing parties lacked authority to foreclosure because of void assignments, and (2) 
that U.S. Bank’s credit bid was inflated beyond the debt due. Additionally, Plaintiffs have 
insufficiently alleged that the documents were fraudulent. Lastly, Plaintiffs have also failed 
to state a claim that the foreclosure was wrongful. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that 
any Defendant’s conduct qualifies as outrageous or is indicative of bad faith. See, e.g., 
Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP , 725 F. Supp. 2d 862, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ; 
Espinoza v. Mroczeck , No. 23 -CV-00228, 2024 WL 201104 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 
2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 223CV00228TLNJDP, 2024 WL 689544 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2024) ; Jose v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc ., No. 16CV106 -MMA 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 30 of 31
 
 
31 
25-cv-2242-GPC-BJW 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
(RBB), 2016 WL 4581394, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (“[M]any courts have found as 
a matter of law that foreclosing on property does not amount to the ‘outrageous conduct’ 
required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
 Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant s’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Plaintiffs may possibly allege 
additional facts showing Defendants’ bad faith in the foreclosure process, the Court grants 
leave to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants Nationstar and U.S. 
Bank’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 31, and Defendant Trustee Corps’ motion to dismiss, 
ECF No. 33. 
Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed WITHOUT leave to amend only as to (1) Plaintiffs’ 
claim for quiet title against Defendant Nationstar and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims related to 
Nationstar’s foreclosure -related acts under any section of the FDCPA other than 
§ 1692f(6). 
All other claims are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
If Plaintiffs seek to file a Second Amended Complaint, they may do so within thirty-
five (35) days of the issuance of this Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 17, 2026 
 
Case 3:25-cv-02242-GPC-BJW Document 62 Filed 06/17/26 PageID.<pageID> 
Page 31 of 31

Passage view · GavelSight