govinfo:USCOURTS-idd-2_24-cv-00417-0

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
U
NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F
OR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
ROBERT TAECKENS and MARY 
SHAVER, 
 Plaintiffs, 
v. 
S
CHWEITZER OPERATIONS INC. 
d/b/a SCHWEITZER MOUNTAIN 
RESORT and/or SCHWEITZER 
MOUNTAIN and/or SCHWEITZER, and 
DOES 1-10, inclusive, 
 Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
I. I
NTRODUCTION
Before the Court are a variety of motions related to discovery and scheduling. The 
Court’s holding as to each motion is outlined below.1 
II. BACK
GROUND
A. Factual
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff Robert Taeckens was injured on August 31, 
2024, while attempting to board the Great Escape chairlift at the Schweitzer Mountain 
Resort in Sandpoint, Idaho, which is operated by Defendant.2 The chairlift hit Taeckens on 
1 The Court finds the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented and will decide the Motion on the 
record and without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). 
2 Although Defendant is comprised of various legal entities, the parties refer to them all as the singular 
“Defendant.” The Court will do likewise. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
the back of the legs, causing him to fall forward and off the loading platform. 
Unfortunately, Taeckens broke his spinal cord upon impact. He is now a quadriplegic 
requiring constant care and will be on a ventilator for the rest of his life. 
B. Procedural3 
Taeckens and his wife filed this action on September 10, 2024, asserting two causes 
of action: negligence/negligence per se and loss of consortium. Dkt. 1. 
Roughly one year into discovery, Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted the Court to initiate 
the Court’s informal discovery dispute process based upon Defendant’s purported failure 
to meaningfully respond to their requests. The mediation was amicable, and Defendant 
represented it would file responses forthwith. Plaintiffs were not satisfied with the 
responses and filed a Motion to Compel. Dkt. 22. Defendant opposes the Motion. Dkt. 24. 
Around this same time, and—at least in part — due to Defendant’s evasive discovery 
responses, Plaintiffs moved the Court to amend their complaint to add a negligence per se 
claim out of an abundance of caution. Dkt. 23. Defendant opposes the Motion. Dkt. 25. 
A few months later, Plaintiffs filed a second Motion to Compel—again, after having 
completed the Court’s informal process and after receiving assurances from Defendant that 
discovery responses were forthcoming. Dkt. 34. Defendant opposes the Motion. Dkt. 40. 
Plaintiffs also moved to amend their complaint again, this time to add new parties 
who they suspected to be parent companies and/or shell companies to the existing 
Defendant. Dkt. 35. Defendant opposes the motion. Dkt. 41. 
 
3 Motion-specific background will be provided below; however, a broad overview it helpful for context. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 42) and Motion 
to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 43). 
That same day, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order. Dkt. 44. 
Defendant noted there were multiple pending motions before the Court and an extension 
of the discovery cutoff and dispositive motion deadline was warranted. Plaintiffs oppose 
amending the schedule. Dkt. 46. 
The next day, Defendant changed counsel. Dkt. 45. Considering this change, 
Plaintiffs afforded new counsel certain extensions to briefing deadlines —specifically to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See, e.g., Dkt. 50. Defendant then went 
a step further requesting a longer extension (Dkt. 52) which Plaintiffs opposed (Dkt. 54). 
The Court granted Defendant’s request for an extension and noted a more fulsome analysis 
of its reasoning would be forthcoming. Dkt. 56. 
The Court will now address each motion, in turn. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Compel (Dkt. 22) 
1. Background 
Plaintiffs served their First Set of Interrogatories and Second Set of Requests for 
Production on Defendant on July 25, 2025. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendant had to respond within 30 days, by August 25, 2025. Defendant did not respond 
or object to any requests, nor did it request an extension of the deadline. 
Plaintiffs then repeatedly asked when they would be receiving responses and 
requested a time to meet and confer. Plaintiffs did so via a formal letter on August 29, 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
2025, and through a follow -up email on September 5, 2025. On September 9, 2025, 
Defendant responded, offering to meet and confer on September 11, 2025. Ten minutes 
before the agreed-upon time, Defendant emailed Plaintiffs requesting to postpone the meet 
and confer to the next day. Plaintiffs agreed. 
The next day, Defendant sent a formal letter one minute before the scheduled call 
and, among other things, stated it had not responded due to a calendaring error and 
promised that it would “produce complete answers and responses by September 19, 
2025”—a promise that was echoed on the call. Plaintiffs did not agree to this unilateral 
extension of deadlines, but nonetheless patiently waited in the spirit of cooperation. Yet, 
the next week, Defendant again failed to meet its (now self-imposed) deadline. 
Having been repeatedly stonewalled by Defendant, Plaintiffs contacted the Court 
and requested a discovery mediation with the Court’s law clerk. Notably, although the law 
clerk requested that each party submit their position statements the day before the 
mediation, Defendant did not provide its statement until 36 minutes before the scheduled 
call. During the mediation, Defendant committed to provide complete responses to 
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests by October 8, 2025. 
On October 8, 2025, 76 days after the date on which Plaintiffs first served their 
requests, Defendant finally served its responses. However, Plaintiffs deemed the majority 
of Defendant’s responses to be improper, evasive, and/or incomplete. 
Plaintiffs sent a final letter to Defendant on October 17, 2025, outlining the 
deficiencies they had identified in Defendant’s responses and asked Defendant to, among 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
other things , address each of Plaintiffs’ stated issues and remedy its flawed discovery 
responses. Defendant did not respond, so Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion. 
2. Legal Standard 
Discovery is permitted “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1). Relevant information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” 
Id. A party may move for an order compelling a discovery response pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, a party may move to compel discovery 
responses if, among other things, an opposing party fails to answer interrogatories or 
produce requested documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)- (iv). “While the moving 
party must make a threshold showing of relevance . . . the party resisting discovery carries 
the ‘heavy burden’ of showing specifically why the discovery request is irrelevant, unduly 
burdensome, disproportional to the needs of the case, or otherwise improper.” Strojnik v. 
Block 22 LLC, 2019 WL 6315523, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 25, 2019) (citation modified). 
3. Analysis 
Simply put, obtaining discovery from Defendant in this case has been like “pulling 
teeth.”4 As outlined above, Plaintiffs afforded Defendant numerous extensions and 
 
4 The Court is loath to criticize attorneys in written orders. The Court is familiar with Defendant’s prior 
counsel and has always found her to be very capable and professional. This case has been an anomaly to 
say the least. And while the Court could suppose the discovery failures here are more appropriately directed 
at the client as opposed to counsel, such a supposition would not account for Defense counsel’s extremely 
tardy submission to the Court’s law clerk prior to the scheduled informal mediation and the fact that almost 
 
(Continued) 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6 
opportunities to respond . When Defendant did eventually respond, it largely objected to 
Plaintiffs’ requests or provided vague, unverified responses. 
The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs, the underlying discovery requests, and 
Defendant’s responses. For the following two reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED.5 
First, Defendant objected to many of Plaintiffs’ requests. Such was improper. By 
failing to timely respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery, Defendant waived its rights to object. 
Unless otherwise agreed, a party must serve their responses and any objections to 
RFPs promulgated during discovery within thirty days after their service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
34(b)(2)(A). Generally, “a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required 
constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 
F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Notably, Rule 33, which also provides a thirty -day timeframe for a party to serve 
their answers and any objections to interrogatories (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2)), allows courts 
to excuse a party ’s failure to timely assert objections “for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
33(b)(4). Rule 34 does not contain an analogous “good cause” exception. However, the 
Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to interpret Rule 34 as imposing an automatic waiver 
penalty for u ntimely discovery responses. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. 
 
ever single one of Defendant’s response briefs to Plaintiffs’ motions were filed after the deadline as well . 
The Court does not know if this situation is the result of an overworked attorney, an unresponsive client, or 
something else entirely. However, the situation should not have got to the point it did. 
5 As a threshold matter, Defendant suggests Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel should be denied outright because 
they failed to meet and confer before filing the Motion. In fact, the bulk of Defendant’s response brief is 
dedicated to this concept. Dkt. 24, at 7–13. But this is entirely incorrect. As outlined above, Plaintiff worked 
with Defendant for months. The Court was also involved. There was no reason for Plaintiff to meet and 
confer again and their motion was not procedurally improper. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7 
Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a “per se waiver 
rule that deems a privilege waived if a privilege log is not produced within Rule 34’s 30 -
day time limit.”). 
Many courts have found “there is no reason to treat waiver under Rule 34 any 
different than Rule 33.” See, e.g., Apple Hill Growers v. El Dorado Orchards, Inc., 2022 
WL 1506205, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2022) (citation modified). Thus, most courts have 
applied a broad “good cause” standard in both instances. 
On the current record, the Court finds Defendant has not provided any good cause 
for its failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Second Set of 
Requests for Production. It blew through the initial deadline (and multiple re-set deadlines), 
and provided little excuse, if any, for its repeated failures. Accordingly, Defendant must 
withdraw all objections, specify whether it has withheld any documents or information 
subject to those objections, provide satisfactory responses to Plaintiffs’ areas of inquiry, 
and produce any documents or information it has withheld based on its objections. 
Second, Defendant did not substantively respond to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel or 
suggest why its responses were adequate. 6 The sole exception was a discussion about 
certain privileged emails. These emails were the subject of some discussion during the 
Court’s informal conference. In short, Defendant redacted several emails regarding 
Taeckens’ fall citing the work product doctrine and the idea that these emails were t rial 
preparation materials. But the emails in question were exchanged between Tom Chasse, 
 
6 As noted, see footnote 5, the bulk of Defendant’s response focused on procedural arguments. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8 
Schweitzer’s President, and Andrew Lynch, “VP, Risk Management and Insurance” for 
Alterra Mountain Company, on September 5, 2024, a mere five days after Taeckens’ fall 
and long before any litigation was filed. Although Chasse or Lynch may have (correctly) 
thought litigation was forthcoming, that alone is not sufficient to shield their 
communications. See Dewitt v. Walgreen Co., 2012 WL 3837764, at *5 (D. Idaho Sept. 4, 
2012) (“The work product rule does not come into play merely because there is a remote 
prospect of future litigation.”). These emails are not protected and must be turned over. 
In sum, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (Dkt. 22) is GRANTED. Defendant must 
withdraw its objections and substantively respond to those requests identified in Plaintiffs’ 
Motion—including those related to the aforementioned emails. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to award their attorneys’ fees in bringing the instant 
motion. Defendant half-heartedly objects based upon, again, Plaintiffs’ failure to meet and 
confer. The Court has already rejected Defendant’s meet and confer argument. 
“When a motion to compel has been granted, the Court must . . . require the party 
whose conduct resulted in the motion, or attorney advising the conduct, or both, to pay the 
reasonable attorneys’ fees of the movant. Manley v. Winsupply Inc., 2023 WL 7164564, at 
*1 (D. Idaho Oct. 30, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)). “Awarding attorneys’ fees 
is mandatory under this rule unless the moving party filed the motion before making a good 
faith effort to obtain disclosure without court intervention, the nondisclosure was 
substantially justified, or other circumstances make the aw ard of fees unjust.” Id. (citing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)–(iii)). 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9 
Plaintiffs made substantial efforts to resolve the discovery issues without Court 
intervention. Defendant repeatedly flouted the Federal Rules and stonewalled Plaintiffs 
without justification. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are awarded their attorneys’ fees incurred in 
bringing this motion. Plaintiffs shall file appropriate documentation for the Court to 
calculate the amount of the award.7 
B. Motion to Amend (Dkt. 23) 
1. Background 
As noted, Plaintiffs two causes of action when they originally filed this suit were: 
negligence/negligence per se and loss of consortium. Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs’ negligence per se 
theory as originally pled was based upon Schweitzer’s duty to construct, operate, maintain, 
and repair its chairlift in accordance with the American National Standards Institute’s 
safety requirements for aerial passenger tramways. 
During discovery, Plaintiffs received varying, and sometimes conflicting, responses 
from Defendant about the chairlift, its design , and any modifications that have occurred 
over the years. Ultimately, Plaintiffs determined Defendant may have violated other 
applicable building codes when they made these modifications and now seeks to amend 
their complaint to more clearly allege such a theory under the ir negligence per se claim. 
See generally Dkt. 23. Defendant opposes the Motion. Dkt. 25. 
 
 
7 Plaintiffs need not brief the fees issue; the Court has found fees are warranted. Plaintiffs need only include 
a summary of its counsel’s hourly rates and the hours expended on this motion. In like manner, Defendant 
cannot object to the imposition of fees . It can, however, object to the hours expended and hourly rate if it 
so chooses. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10 
2. Legal Standard 
When the Court’s deadline for amending pleadings and joining parties has passed, 
a party seeking leave to amend his complaint must show “good cause” for amendment 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers 
the diligence of the party seeking amendment. Id. at 609. Although prejudice to the 
opposing party may also be considered, the focus of the inquiry is on the movant’s reason 
for seeking amendment. Id. “If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 
If a party seeking amendment establishes good cause pursuant to Rule 16(b), that 
party must then demonstrate that amendment is proper under Rule 15(a). Id. at 608. Rule 
15(a)’s liberal amendment policy focuses on prejudice to the opposing party and the bad 
faith, if any, of the party seeking leave to amend. Id. at 609; Barden v. Goodsell, 2022 WL 
11734742, at *3 (D. Idaho 2022). Rule 15(a)’s policy— which requires courts to grant leave 
to amend “freely” as justice so requires —must be applied “with extreme liberality.” 
Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The purpose of 
Rule 15 is to facilitate a decision on the merits, rathe r than on the pleadings or 
technicalities. Stanton v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC., 83 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (D. Idaho 
2015). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) is 
in the sole discretion of the trial court. Id. at 949. 
 The Court considers five factors under Rule 15 when determining whether leave to 
amend should be granted: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11 
(4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.8 
In re W. State Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013). 
3. Analysis 
As Plaintiffs correctly note, Dkt. 23-1, at 11 –12, they are not required to amend 
their complaint to pursue this alternate theory. In fact, they do not even have to plead 
negligence per se in the first instance because they have pleaded straight negligence. See 
Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 188 P.3d 834, 840 (Idaho 2008) (“a party is not required 
to separately plead negligence per se as a theory distinct from ordinary negligence.”). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint out of an abundance of caution, so 
their full theory of the case is clear. The Court finds there is good cause to do so for the 
reasons explained below. 
On the one hand, Plaintiffs do not present an overly compelling case for leave to 
amend because, as they admit, amendment is not actually necessary. But by the same token, 
because amendment is not entirely necessary, it can hardly be said allowing the same will 
be particularly prejudicial to Defendant. 
Most factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. They have not previously amended their 
complaint. No bad faith or undue delay appears present as Plaintiffs moved to amend as 
soon as they became aware of the issue. And, as noted, there is little prejudice to Defendant. 
The final factor is whether the amendment is futile. Again, somewhat oddly, while 
 
8 Some courts do not include prior amendment of the complaint as a factor, making four factors to consider. 
See, e.g., DCD Programs, Ltd. V. Leighton , 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); Lemar v. CVS Pharmacy, 
Inc., 2014 WL 12725107 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12 
recognizing Plaintiffs do not actually need to amend their complaint to pursue this theory, 
Defendant nevertheless suggests the amendment would be futile. It postures Plaintiffs have 
not identified what building code it supposedly violated nor how any provision of that code 
could have prevented Taeckens’ injury. In response, Plaintiffs highlight the relatively low 
pleading standard and that they cannot be more specific because Defendant ha s not 
provided substantive discovery that would allow them to know when any repairs or 
modifications were made, and which version of the Idaho Building Code (or other relative 
codes) were in effect. That said, this argument is now somewhat outdated as Plaintiffs have 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on this claim and have, as part of that motion, 
identified certain code sections they believe Defendant violated. Suffice it to say, the 
amendment does not appear futile. 
The Court will discuss Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in greater 
detail below. As for this motion, however, the Court finds Plaintiffs have met their burden 
to amend and include this alternate negligence per se theory. The Motion is GRANTED. 
C. Motion to Compel (Dkt. 34) 
1. Background 
Plaintiffs served their Second Set of Interrogatories and Third Set of Requests for 
Production on September 24, 2025. Those requests seek information regarding what 
modifications Defendant made to the chairlift and loading platform, when those 
modifications were made, and whether permits or approvals were obtained. 
In response, Defendant asserted boilerplate objections claiming the term 
“modification” is vague and that the requests were overly broad. Defendant then refused 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13 
to answer the interrogatories at all, stating it would provide a response only after further 
meet-and-confer discussions about the meaning of “modification.” Defendant similarly 
refused to produce corresponding responsive documents. 
As before, Plaintiffs made repeatedly attempted to resolve these issues without the 
Court’s intervention. Even after Plaintiffs narrowed and clarified their requests, Defendant 
ignored follow-up written meet -and-confer letters, promised, then failed , to provide 
discovery responses by the end of 2025, and later agreed in writing, then again failed, to 
provide verified responses by January 28, 2026. 
Plaintiffs were, again, forced to seek the Court’s assistance, but to no avail. Despite 
talking the situation over with the Court’s law clerk and, generally speaking, coming to a 
reasonable resolution —in which Defendant represented it would provide substantive 
responses—it still has not done so. 
Thus, Plaintiffs filed this second Motion to Compel. 
2. Legal Standard 
The legal standard is the same as above and will not be repeated here. 
3. Analysis 
Defendant explains it took it longer than expected to review the materials in question 
and reiterate their primary o bjection that Plaintiffs’ request s are simply too broad —
spanning the last 35 years and seeking all “modifications” without more clarifying 
language on what qualifies as a modification. 
It is understandable that Defendant might have needed longer than 30 days to 
prepare adequate responses. Sometimes it takes longer than initially anticipated to review 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14 
discovery. But again, that does not excuse Defendant’s failure to engage with Plaintiffs in 
the process. Nor does it excuse Defendant from fulfilling its promise to provide 
responses—even if those promises were informally between counsel or informally in front 
of the Court’s law clerk. If more time was needed, Defendant should have asked instead of 
ignoring the deadlines. In law, if not always in life, it is better to ask permission than 
forgiveness. 
Next, Defendant raises an overbreadth challenge. While the requests may be 
somewhat broad, that is not necessarily a problem. Plaintiffs seek to understand when, 
whether, and how the chairlift was serviced, what modifications (if any) were made, and 
whether all permitting was appropriately obtained. While potentially broad, these requests 
are all relevant and discoverable based on the claims at issue in this case. More importantly, 
however, Plaintiffs tried to work with Defendant to alleviate its concerns . Plaintiffs 
repeatedly clarified the scope of the requests, identified specific examples of relevant 
modifications, and explained why that information was relevant, including through a 
detailed meet- and-confer letter. Plaintiffs also offered to narrow both the scope and 
timeframe of the requests further if Defendant could provide some foundational 
information so Plaintiffs could make those limitations . Ultimately, however, Defendant 
refused to engage in that process. 
The Court has reviewed the briefs, Plaintiffs’ underlying discovery requests, and 
Defendant’s responses and finds Plaintiffs Motion is well taken. Plaintiffs’ Motion to 
Compel (Dkt. 34) is GRANTED . Defendant must provide complete interrogatory 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15 
responses regarding modifications and must update its answers to Plaintiffs’ third set of 
requests for production regarding permitting. 
Plaintiffs again seek their fees in bringing this Motion. Dkt. 34, at 12–13. Defendant 
objects, again, arguing their refusal was justified based on Plaintiffs ’ broad terminology. 
Defendant’s response here is a bit more meaningful than before. However, the result is no 
different. T his is not a situation where Plaintiffs rushed to the Court without giving 
Defendant a meaningful opportunity to respond or propounded excessive discovery 
requests to Defendant’s prejudice. As explained above, Plaintiffs narrowed t heir requests 
on multiple occasions and made concessions as a starting point to engage Defendant. They 
waited, engaged with the Court, and w ere justified in resorting to another motion. 
Defendant’s delay s and non -responsiveness is not justifiable. Fees are, therefore, 
appropriately granted as to this motion as well. 
As outlined above, Plaintiffs shall file their appropriate documentation to which 
Defendant may object. 
D. Motion to Amend (Dkt. 35) 
1. Background 
Discovery in this case has been contentious and protracted to say the least . In 
response to Plaintiffs’ requests, Defendant served deeds and mortgages indicating its sister 
entity, Husky Mountain, owned the land on which the chairlift and its loading platform 
were located, along with the chairlift itself. It also served documents indicating Husky 
Mountain applied for and owned the state -issued alcohol beverage license for the Resort 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16 
and in that application, Husky Mountain indicated it was operating as “Schweitzer 
Mountain Resort.” 
Confusingly, however, “Schweitzer Mountain Resort” is an assumed business name 
held by Schweitzer Operations, not Husky Mountain. Alterra Mountain Company U.S. 
Inc., and Alterra Mountain Company are the parent companies of Husky Mountain and the 
other Schweitzer entities. 
Based upon this confusion, Plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint to add Husky 
Mountain Acquisition Inc., Alterra Mountain Company U.S. Inc., and Alterra Mountain 
Company as Defendants based upon alter ego theories of liability. 
2. Legal Standard 
As outlined above, the Court must first find good cause to allow amendment under 
Rule 16 and then, under Rule 15, consider the following five factors: (1) bad faith, (2) 
undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether 
plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. See In re W. State Wholesale Nat. Gas 
Antitrust Litig., 715 at 738. 
3. Analysis 
Defendant object s to amendment on two bases. First, it alleges Plaintiffs were 
dilatory in bringing this motion. Second, it alleges it will be significantly prejudiced if more 
parties are added to the point this case will essentially have to “re -start.” Dkt. 41, at 13. 
Defendant’s concerns are overblown. 
By all accounts, Plaintiffs did not discover the identities of these related entities 
until more recently. The Court finds Plaintiffs moved to amend with relative speed and 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17 
there was good cause to do so even considering the deadline has passed. 
Turning to prejudice and the existing schedule, as will be discussed next, Defendant 
itself has moved to extend the deadlines in this case. Thus, any additional discovery will 
not unduly extend this case. Moreover, Plaintiffs have represented the discovery they will 
need from these entities is discrete and related to ownership, operational control, and the 
relationship between each entity. 
Finally, Plaintiffs note they could file another lawsuit and move to consolidate that 
action with this one if the Court does not believe amendment is proper. Dkt. 35 -1, at 15–
16. Defendant’s response: “let them.” Dkt. 41, at 16. Such a course of action is unnecessary. 
In fact, it would strain the judicial resources in an already overburdened district to follow 
such a plan when a relatively straightforward option is available here. 
Ultimately, the Court finds allowing this limited amendment will not unduly 
prejudice Defendant and will be more economical in the long run. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file an 
Amended Complaint that includes these Defendants—and its negligence per se theory 
based on building codes—within three business days of the date of this decision. 
E. Motion to Amend (Dkt. 44) 
1. Background 
Following various modifications to the Court’s scheduling order, the dispositive 
motion deadline was set for April 22, 2026. Dkt. 33. On that day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 42) and Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 43) . 
Plaintiffs’ motion seeks summary judgment on a variety of matters such as their negligence 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18 
claim and Defendant’s affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment on 
their negligence per se claim based upon various building code violations —a theory that 
technically is not part of the operative complaint. More on that in a moment. 
Also on April 22, 2026, however, Defendant file a Motion to Amend the scheduling 
order. Dkt. 44. Defendant references the pending motions as well as a then-pending 
30(b)(6) deposition as justification for moving the deadlines out roughly four months. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Dkt. 46. 
2. Legal Standard 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] schedule may be modified only for 
good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit has 
held that “good cause” “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 
amendment,” and that “[i]f that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Johnson v. 
Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Although prejudice may 
provide an additional basis to deny relief, the absence of diligence alone is dispositive. Id. 
3. Analysis 
In Plaintiffs’ estimation, this is just the latest example of Defendant’s failure to 
follow the Court’s orders and play fair. They suggest Defendant’s filing for an extension 
on the day dispositive motions were due illustrates Defendant was not diligent . Plaintiffs 
also subtly suggest Defendant forgot about the deadline and filed this to save face and buy 
more time to put together a dispositive motion. 
The Court understands Plaintiffs’ frustration. As outlined above, there has been a 
pattern of delay and obstruction in this case. That said, Defendant ’s point is well taken . 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19 
With so many pending motions —two of which will materially alter the complaint —it is 
prudent to get everything in order before moving to substantive motion practice. 
Additionally, it was during this same week that Defendant obtained new counsel. Setting 
aside all other considerations, the Court typically allows extensions so that new counsel 
can get up to speed on a case.9 
For these reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Extend Deadlines. As part of 
this omnibus order, the Court will require the parties to meet and confer and determine, 
among other things, a new schedule moving forward. 
F. Motion for Extension (Dkt. 52) 
1. Background 
Relatedly, after Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
parties agreed to extend Defendant’s deadline to respond. Dkt. 50. This was primarily due 
to the change in defense counsel. The Court approved the agreement. Dkt. 51. 
More recently, however, Defense counsel asked for a second extension to respond 
because discovery has taken time to review, and Plaintiffs are moving for summary 
judgment on five causes of action and four affirmative defenses—including two causes of 
action that are not alleged in the operative complaint. Dkt. 52. 
Because the deadline Defendant sought to move was fast approaching, the Court 
expedited briefing on the matter. Dkt. 53. Plaintiffs opposed Defendant’s request (Dkt. 54) 
 
9 Defendant’s change in counsel is, of course, not Plaintiffs’ fault and they should not be penalized. Again, 
however, the Court strives to resolve all cases and controversies on the merits and with the benefit of 
completed discover and full briefing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20 
and Defendant replied (Dkt. 55). With the deadline a few days away, and in light of the 
Court’s schedule, the Court summarily granted the motion to extend and explained a 
decision would follow. Dkt. 56. This is that decision. 
2. Legal Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(A) “provides that a district court may 
extend a deadline ‘for good cause.’” Tindall v. First Solar Inc., 892 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th 
Cir. 2018). “[D]istrict courts normally grant these requests in the absence of bad faith or 
prejudice to the adverse party.” Id . However, “a court is not required to grant a motion 
under Rule 6(b)(1)(A) —even where good cause is demonstrated—if the circumstances 
warrant a denial.” Rodriguez v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 2025 WL 1332074, at *4 (D. Idaho May 
7, 2025) (citin g Tindall, 892 F.3d at 1048). Rather, “Rule 6 provides that the court may 
grant the motion for good cause, not that it must do so.” Tindall, 892 F.3d at 1048. In 
addition, “[b]oth Rule 6(b) and the case authorities make clear that the showing needed to 
extend a pretrial deadline is more onerous the later in the game it is made.” Savage v. City 
of Twin Falls, 2015 WL 12681319, at *7 (D. Idaho Jan. 20, 2015). 
3. Analysis 
As an academic exercise, the Court understands Defendant’s concern about whether 
Plaintiffs can move for summary judgment in the first instance based upon matters not in 
the complaint. However, as outlined above, it is likely not entirely necessary for Plaintiffs 
to amend their complaint to plead an alternate theory when the claim itself is already 
properly raised. Thus, Plaintiffs motion was not improperly filed. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 21 
And Plaintiffs concerns about delay do not fall on deaf ears. However, the Court is 
concerned about capturing the full scope of the issues before ruling. It does not like to re-
open discovery once closed or allow supplemental briefs to address matters that belatedly 
come to light. 
Accordingly, it is best to get Plaintiffs’ amended complaint in the case, allow 
Defense counsel to get up to speed on everything, complete discovery, and then complete 
briefing on this motion. The Motion is GRANTED. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Regarding the discovery motions, the Court finds Defendant has been unnecessarily 
obstinate in providing adequate responses to Plaintiffs’ inquiries. Plaintiff was patient, tried 
to work with Defendant, involved the Court, and only as a last resort filed motions to 
compel. The Court grants both Motions, orders Defendant to comply as outlined above, 
and awards Plaintiffs the fees they incurred in bringing the Motions. 
 Plaintiffs’ Motions to Amend are timely, appropriate, and appear targeted to 
achieving a more complete resolution of this matter. For those reasons, both will be 
granted. As noted, Plaintiffs shall file an Amended Complaint within three days. 
As for the scheduling motions, the Court seeks to adjudicate matters as quickly and 
efficiently as possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. In light of the pending motions to amend, 
Defendant’s change in counsel, and the Court’s own docket, achieving that goal here means 
GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Amend the scheduling order and Motion for 
Extension. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 22 
Considering the Court’s myriad rulings, the Parties are directed to meet and confer 
regarding: 1) Defendant’s discovery response; 2) Plaintiffs ’ Amended Complaint and 
Defendant’s answer—specifically , whether current defense counsel will represent the other 
entities and how discovery related to the other entities will unfold; 3) new dates and 
deadlines for the completion of discovery, dispositive motions, and ADR; 3) new deadlines 
for Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.10 
V. ORDER 
The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 22) and Second 
Motion to Compel and for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 34) are GRANTED. 
a. Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs discovery within 14 days of the date 
of this order. 
b. Plaintiffs shall file their bills of costs within 14 days of the date of this 
order. The standard deadlines for briefing will follow. 
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (Dkt. 23) and Second Motion to Amend (Dkt. 35) 
are GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a single Amended Complaint that includes 
their negligence per se theory and all new Defendants within three days of the 
date of this order. 
 
10 The Court’s standard practice is to address all dispositive motions at the same time. Therefore, the Court’s 
preference would be to hold briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion until around the time of any other dispositive 
motions. That said, the parties may feel is less burdensome to brief Plaintiffs’ motion now and then brief 
later motions in a few months once all other discovery and deadlines have passed. Again, however, 
regardless of what the parties decide, the Court will likely wait to hear all dispositive motions at the same 
time. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 23 
 
 
3. Defendant’s Motion to Amend/Correct (Dkt. 44) and Motion for Extension (Dkt. 
52) are GRANTED. 
4. The Parties will provide a status update to the Court, including all deadlines 
moving forward, on or before July 1, 2026. 
 
DATED: June 17, 2026 
 
 
 _________________________ 
 David C. Nye 
 U.S. District Court Judge 

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