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govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00334-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois · 2026-06-17

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:51:03

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
NIRIN WALLS, R49110, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) 
 ) 
DR. KHAN, ) 
DR. BOOSE, ) 
MS. CUNNINGHAM, ) 
LT. HUNDLEY, ) 
SGT. WILSON, ) 
NURSE J. BROWN, ) Case No. 26-cv-334-SPM 
LATOYA HUGHES, ) 
NURSE SIMPSON, ) 
SUSAN COLE, ) 
LT. YATES, ) 
C/O WHITE, ) 
LT. REID, ) 
C/O STREETER, ) 
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, INC., ) 
DR. REISTER, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
McGLYNN, District Judge: 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Nirin Walls’ Motion for an Injunction, 
Temporary Restraining Order, and Change of Venue (Doc. 10). The underlying 
complaint, which is still awaiting prelim inary review, concerns Walls’ medical and 
disability needs while incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence) (Doc. 1). 
In the Motion, Walls alleges that he has been transferred from Lawrence to Menard 
Correctional Center (Menard), and he attributes the transf er to the undersigned. Walls Page ID
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states that he needs a change of venue and judge in order to avoid damage to his rights, 
his health, his mobility, and his rehabilitation. (Doc. 10 at 2). 
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the portions of the 
motion indicating he wishes for the undersigned to recuse as being brought pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 455. See Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083–84 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (citation 
omitted) (reasoning that the disqualification of federal judges is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 
455 and 28 U.S.C. § 144, with the latter being unavailable to pro se litigants in light of the 
statutory requirement of a good faith certificate from “counsel of record”). Pursuant to 
28 USCA § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 USCA § 455(a). The statute also 
provides a number of circumstances in which a judge shall disqualify themself, for 
example, where he or she is related to a party, has a financial interest in the outcome, has 
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or has personal knowledge regarding 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings. (Id.). Opinions held by judges about things 
that they learned in earlier litigation with the parties are not evidence of bias. See, e.g., 
Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (“Also not subject to deprecatory 
characterization as ‘bias' or ‘p rejudice’ are opinions held by judges as a result of what 
they learned in earlier proceedings.”); In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There 
is no rule that requires a judge to recuse himself from a case, civil or criminal, simply 
because he was or is involved in litigation with one of the parties.”); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The factual allegations must fairly support the 
charge of bias or impartiality and must be specific.”). Page ID
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Here, Plaintiff has not provided any basis for his bald assertion that the 
undersigned somehow contacted the Illinois Department of Corrections and directed that 
he be relocated and deprived of needed accommodations. The allegations about the 
undersigned’s involvement in Plaintiff’s livin g situation or accommodations are purely 
conclusory and have no basis in reality. The undersigned has not taken any action yet in 
this case either positive or negative, and in fact has not even yet reviewed the full contents 
of the complaint. Beyond Plaintiff’s own bare assumption that the undersigned is 
somehow involved, he provides no rationale as to why the undersigned would behave 
inappropriately in association with this case or any other. There is simply no basis for 
recusal. 
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from his recent prison transfer 
from Lawrence to Menard, and for his lack of accommodations, he may not proceed. The 
complaint focuses on healthcare and accommodations rendered at Lawrence and 13 of 
the 15 defendants are Lawrence employees, bu t Plaintiff is now housed at Menard and 
does not suggest a re-transfer is likely. Ge nerally, a prison transfer moots a demand for 
injunctive relief if it is tied to living at a particular facility. See e.g., Higgason v. Farley, 83 
F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (if a prisoner is transferred to another prison, his request for 
injunctive relief against officials at the first pr ison is moot unless a retransfer is likely). 
Plaintiff cannot now seek injunctive relief from the 13 defendants at Lawrence. 
This leaves Defendants Hugh es and Wexford Health Sour ces. Plaintiff does not 
mention Wexford in the Motion (Doc. 10), so there is not basis to grant injunctive relief 
concerning Wexford. In order to secure injunctive relief in this matter concerning Page ID
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Hughes, Plaintiff would need to raise allegations in his Motion (Doc. 10) that align with 
the allegations in the operative complaint (Doc. 1). See e.g., Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 22-
2411 (S.D. Ill. 2023) (Doc. 16) (denying injunctive relief, including a request for a transfer, 
where the injunctive relief sought was not narrowly tailored and did not align with the 
claims in the case) aff’d in Tatum v. Hunter , Case No. 23-2253 (7th Cir. May 16, 2024); 
Daniels v. Dumsdorff, et al. , Case No. 19-cv-394 (S.D. Ill. 2019). The only thing the 
complaint says about Hughes is that she failed to arrange for adequate mental health care 
services at Lawrence (Doc. 1 at 11, 13-14), bu t the present Motion (Doc. 10) says nothing 
about mental health care at Menard. Given the disconnect between the legal theory 
against Hughes in the Complaint, and the distinct allegations against Hughes in the 
present Motion about Plaintiff’s transfer and lack of ADA accommodations at Menard, it 
would not be appropriate for the Court to grant the injunctive relief sought in this Motion. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 10) is DENIED in full. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 17, 2026
__________________________
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
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