govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_21-cv-00506-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
TIFFANY WADE, individually, and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
JMJ ENTERPRISES, LLC & TRACI 
JOHNSON MARTIN, 
 
 Defendants. 
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1:21CV506 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge. 
Tiffany Wade, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, (“Plaintiffs”), 
brought this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and violations of the 
North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, against JMJ Enterprises, LLC and Traci Johnson Martin 
(“Defendants”). (ECF No. 53 ¶¶ 74–95.) Before the Court is Defendant’s Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 108.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion 
will be granted in part and denied in part. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Tiffany Wade (“Plaintiff Wade”) commenced this action on June 21, 2021. 
(ECF No. 1.) On January 10, 2022, this Court, upon motion of Plaintiff, conditionally certified 
Plaintiff’s action as a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) with respect to her claims under the FLSA. (ECF No. 21 at 6.) Plaintiffs subsequently 
filed an Amended Complaint on June 7, 2022. (ECF No. 53.) Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint 
contains five counts, three of which are federal claims under t he FLSA: (Count I) failure to 

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pay minimum wages for all hours worked; (Count II) failure to pay overtime wages; and (Count 
V) retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 66–73, 74–81, 96–98.) Plaintiffs’ two other claims are state law claims 
under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”): (Count III) failure to pay wages 
due, and (Count IV) failure to pay overtime wages. ( Id. at ¶¶ 82–88, 89–95.) Defendants in 
their Answer to the Amended Complaint asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff Wade for 
breach of contract. (ECF No. 54 at 13–14.) 
On September 30, 2023, this Court, granted in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify a Rule 
23 Class, dismissed Count IV of the Amended Complaint, and denied Defendants’ Motion to 
Decertify the Collective Action . (ECF No. 90 at 27 –28.) Regarding class certification, the 
Court conditionally certified the NCWHA class for wages due for training, wages due for 
mandatory meetings, and wages due for improper reductions from employee time logs 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95 -25.6 and § 95 -25.7. (Id.) Further, reg arding Count IV of 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, failure to pay overtime wages under the NCWHA, the Court 
found that count to be preempted by the FLSA. (Id. at 4.) 
Following discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 
77.) The Court found that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Count V, 
Plaintiff Wade’s individual count of retaliation, and denied summary judgment. (ECF No. 103 
at 7.) Additionally , the Court denied summary judgment with respect to Defendants’ 
counterclaim of breach of contract. (Id. at 10.) Further, as the Court made findings regarding 
class certification prior to ruling on Defendants Motion for Summ ary Judgment, the Court 
found Defendants’ motion to be moot with respect to the issues in Count I, II, and III as they 
pertain to the Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective action. ( Id. at 2–3.) The Court ordered 
that Defendants were allowed to file a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 

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I, II, and III. (Id.) Therefore, here, Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment solely 
addresses the issues in Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 
108.) 
The facts and circumstances regarding this case surround Plaintiffs employment at JMJ 
Enterprises. Traci Johnson Martin (“ Defendant Martin ”) is the owner of JMJ Enterprises 
(“JMJ”), a residential mental health company. (ECF No. 78-1 at 20:5-13.) JMJ provides care 
for clients that are “not able to care for themselves,” or who have “mental health issues.” (Id. 
at 20: 18-19, 21:9.) Additionally, Defendants operate three different group homes in 
Greensboro, North Carolina . (Id. at 27:19 -23.) Defendant Martin is the sole owner and 
administrator, and she employs qualified professional s, program directors , associate 
professionals, and paraprofessionals at each group home. (Id. at 32:1-4, 32:7-8, 53:23-54:1, 
124:19-22.) 
To receive funding from the state of North Carolina, Defendants are required to have 
employees certified in CPR , first aid, medication man agement, blood-borne pathogens, and 
seizure management. (Id. at 95:13-20, 100:8-11.) This training occurs “before [employees] can 
work for [Defendants].” (Id. at 95:19-20.) Thereafter, during the course of their employment, 
employees undergo yearly trainings to attain recertification. (Id. at 106:23-24.) 
Further, Plaintiffs were paid on a monthly basis. (Id. at 77:12-13.) To keep track of 
time throughout the month, Defendants utilized “chrontek” a system which requires the staff 
to call into a phone line to clock in and out of work . (Id. at 64:15-65:4.) The phone system 
asks employees for their name and identification code and records the time, which is then 
downloaded and sent to Defendants’ payroll system. (Id. at 65:1-15.) If any adjustments need 
to be made, employees are expected to have those changes written down on a time correction 

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sheet located at each group home. (Id. at 198:24-25, 199:19-24.) The qualified professionals 
are then in charge of making corrections from the time correction sheet to employee’s hours. 
(Id. at 64:12-14, 202:20–23.) 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to compensate them for time associated 
with attending trainings and mandatory meetings, failed to pay them overtime, and failed to 
pay them on time. (ECF No. 53 ¶¶ 66–88.) Defendants filed this second Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law related to these 
allegations. (ECF No. 109 at 5.) The Court will now address Defendants’ arguments. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts. , 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “[I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, a 
district court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant” 
and to “draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 272 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (citing Jacobs , 780 F.3d at 568). A court “cannot weigh the evidence or make 
credibility determinations,” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 569 (citations omitted), and thus must “usually” 
adopt “the [nonmovant’s] version of the facts,” even if it seems unlikely that the nonmoving 
party would prevail at trial, Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). 
Where the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party seeking summary 
judgment bears the initial burden of “pointing out to the district court . . . that there is an 

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absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 325 (1986). If the moving party carries this burden, then the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to point out “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In so doing, “the 
nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the 
building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash 
v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). Instead, the nonmoving party must support 
its assertions by “citing to particular parts of . . . the record” or “showing that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages for all Hours Worked Under the FLSA 
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1983 “to protect all covered workers from substandard 
wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 
739 (1981) (citations omitted) . “ [T]he FLSA was designed to give specific minimum 
protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the [FLSA] 
would receive a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work and would be protected from the evil of 
overwork as well as underpay.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis omitted). 
For employers to satisfy their FLSA obligations, they must pay employees hourly wages 
in excess of the statutory minimum -wage and overtime requirements. Wai Man Tom v. Hosp . 
Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1032 (4th Cir. 2020). This payment must be “for all work” 
preformed. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123 , 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944), 

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superseded by statute on other grounds , 29 U.S.C. § 251(a), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Solutions, 
Inc., v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014). 
Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint allege that they “were not paid minimum wages 
for all hours actually worked.” (ECF No. 53 ¶ 71.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they were 
not paid to attend training sessions nor paid to attend mandatory meetings. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 70.) 
1. State Mandated Training Sessions 
The first issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs , who have to undergo state 
mandated training before they start working in the group homes , are considered employees 
under the FLSA. Defendants argue that the state mandated trainings Plaintiffs underwent 
“do[] not invoke the FLSA” if they were conducted prior to employment. (ECF No. 109 at 
8.) Defendants specifically argue that Plaintiff s could not be considered employee s until 
“complet[ion] [of] voluntary state mandated requirements related to healthcare providers .” 
(Id.) Plaintiffs in their Response do not address Defendants argument that Plaintiffs are not 
employees until they have completed training. ( See ECF No. 112.) Therefore, the Court will 
determine if Defendants have proven that they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue 
as a matter of law. 
The FLSA defines a n employee as “any individual employed by an employer,” and it 
defines the verb “employ” to mean “suffer or permit to work.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), (g)). The Supreme Court 
has defined “work” and “employment” as “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome 
or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer and his business.” Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 598. 

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Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that “the [FLSA] covers trainees, beginners, 
apprentices, or learners if they are employed to work for an employer for compensation. ” 
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. , 330 U.S. 148, 151 (1947). This means that “ employers who 
hire beginners, learners, or handicapped persons, [and] expressly or impliedly agree to pay 
them compensation, must pay them the prescribed minimum wage.” Id. at 151-52. 
When a training program “most greatly benefits” the trainee it is not covered by the 
FLSA. Id. at 153; see also McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (1989). The Fourth Circuit 
“specifically recognize[s] the importance of transferability of the training received when 
balancing who—employer or trainee—benefitted most from the training.” Harbourt v. PPE 
Casino Resorts Maryland, LLC, 820 F.3d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1210). 
Here, Plaintiffs underwent training for CPR , first aid, medication management, and 
seizure management prior to their first day of work . Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs their 
hourly wage while they were at these trainings. (ECF No. 78-1 at 98:1-3.) While these trainings 
are required for Plaintiffs to work for Defendants, they are not trainings that solely benefit 
Plaintiffs. All the trainings Plaintiffs received can be used elsewhere as , in fact, Defendants 
have hired employees that do not need to attend pre-employment training as they already had 
the necessary certifications. (Id. at 96:15-21.) 
In McLaughlin v. Ensley , the Fourth Circuit held that routemen of a food distribution 
company were to be considered “employees” for FLSA purposes because they participated in 
a five-day training program where they learned to load trucks, maintain vending machines, and 
helped the experience routeman perform their duties. 877 F.2d at 1208, 1210. In that case, 
the employer received the principal benefit because trainees were taught “specific job 
functions related to [the employer’s] own business,” which were of “practically no transferable 

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usefulness.” Id. at 1210. That is not the case before this Court. The trainings Plaintiffs 
underwent before their first day of work in the group homes were not specific to the functions 
related to JMJ Enterprises. See Chao v. Tradesmen Intern., Inc., 310 F.3d 904, 909 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 148) (“under settled Supreme Court precedent, employers 
who furnished training to potential employees were not required under the FLSA to 
compensate trainees for time spent in the training program”) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, 
this Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue 
of whether they violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs an hourly wage for training 
sessions held prior to the first day of work in the group homes. 
Plaintiffs also allege that they were not paid when they had to recertify their trainings 
during the course of their employment . The Court finds that t here is a genuine dispute of 
material fact on whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs who had to recertify their training. 
The FLSA outlines factors that must be met in order for mid-employment training not 
to be counted as working time: “(1) [a]ttendance is outside of the employee’s regular working 
hours; (2) [a]ttendance is in fact voluntary; (3) [ t]he course, lecture, or meeting is not directly 
related to the employee’s job; and (4) [t]he employee does not preform any productive work 
during such attendance.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.27(a)-(d). 
Defendant Martin herself testifies that “every year [employees] have to be recertified . 
. . [i]f they work for us; they just have to clock in and out for that.” (ECF No. 78-1 at 106:24-
107:1.) While Defendant Martin testifies that employees were paid for recertification, 
Plaintiffs that were long term employees testified that they were not compensated for trainings 
they took every year, and the cost of the trainings were deducted from their paychecks. (ECF 
Nos. 78-23 at 31:3 -11; 78-24 at 28:14 -17.) Add itionally, Defendant Martin’s testimony that 

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employees clock in and out for recertification trainings creates genuine disputes of fact on 
whether the trainings were conducted outside of the employee’s regular working hours, the 
first element that must be met for mid -employment training to not be counted as working 
time. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.27(a). As Defendants have not shown evidence of a lack of genuine 
dispute on the first element, the Court will not consider the other elements as they are all 
necessary to prevail on the claim. 
Thus, the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 
Defendants failed to pay current employees for their yearly recertification trainings. However, 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding trainings that were held prior 
to Plaintiffs first day of work. 
2. Mandatory Meetings 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay them for time spent in mandatory 
meetings. (ECF No. 53 ¶ 70 .) As stated above, employers must pay their employees hourly 
wages in excess of the statutory minimum -wage “for all work” preformed. Tenn. Coal, 321 
U.S. at 602. While Defendant Martin ’s testimony is that she informed her employees “that 
they had to pay their staff for any mandatory meeting,” (ECF No. 78-1 at 112:13-14), Plaintiffs 
testify to the contrary. Plaintiffs state that they were not compensated for the hours they spent 
attending mandatory meetings. (See ECF Nos. 78-12 at 7; 78-22 at 14:24-15:2; 78-24:22-24.) 
Therefore, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiffs were paid for mandatory 
meetings. 
B. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages Under the FLSA 
“[T]he FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to covered employees who work 
more than 40 hours in a week.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 81 (2018) (citing 
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)). Overtime compensation must be “at a rate not less than one and one-half 

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times the regular rate at which [a covered employee] is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1 ). 
Section 216(b) of the Act gives employees a cause of action against employers who have 
violated § 207(a)(1) and allows them to recoup the overtime wage plus liquidated damages, 
attorney’s fees, and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
“To establish a claim for unpaid overtime wages, an employee must establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, (1) that [they] worked overtime hours without compensation, 
(2) the amount and extent of overtime work as a matter of just and reasonable inference, and 
(3) that [their] employer knew or should have known that [they] worked overtime.” Castillo v. 
Joann Urquhart, M.D., P.C., 855 F. App’x 877, 879–80 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Davis v. Food Lion, 
792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
To survive summary judgment, a non -movant plaintiff must show “the amount and 
extent of improperly compensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Pforr v. 
Food Lion, Inc., 851 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted). Plaintiffs may utilize “estimates and approximations” to satisfy this burden. Castillo, 
855 F. App’x at 880 (citing Pforr, 851 F.2d at 106, 107–09). 
Regarding the first two elements, deposed Plaintiffs state that they worked overtime 
without compensation. (ECF Nos. 78-22 at 15:3-7; 78-24 at 16:8-17.) However, Defendants 
argue that Plaintiffs failed to put forth actual evidence of their overtime hours worked. (ECF 
No. 109 at 20.) The FLSA requires that employers “make, keep, and preserve” records of 
wages, hours, and “other conditions and practices of employment.” 29 U.S.C. §211(c). “A 
prima facie case can be made through an employee’s testimony giving [ their] recollection of 
hours worked . . . [and their case] is not to be dismissed nor should recovery be denied, because 
proof of the number of hours worked is inexact or not perfectly accurate.” McFeeley v. Jackson 

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St. Entm’t, LLC, 47 F. Supp. 3d 260, 276 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Donovan v. Kentwood Dev. Co. , 549 F. Supp. 480, 485 (D. Md. 1982)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
“When employment records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot 
offer convincing substitutes, the court is not to penalize the employee by denying him recovery 
on the ground that he is unable to probe the precise extent of hours of uncompensated work.” 
McFeeley, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 276 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In her deposition, Defendant Martin states that they were unable to find the logs of 
employee time adjustments. (ECF No. 78- 1 at 226 :22-24; 227:15-20.) T he Court will not 
penalize Plaintiffs for their inability to give precise numbers on the amount of overtime they 
earned as the full records of Plaintiffs time were unable to be produced in this case. See Landers 
v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ost[,] if not all[,] of the detailed 
information concerning a plaintiff-employee’s compensation and schedule is in the control of 
the defendants.”). 
Regarding the third element of Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, Defendants have the burden to 
prove that there is no genuine dispute as to their knowledge of Plaintiffs’ uncompensated 
overtime. See Bailey v. Cnty. Of Georgetown , 94 F.3d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 1996). The Court finds 
there are genuine disputes related to this element as Defendants own evidence shows that 
there have been complaints of uncompensated overtime. Defendant Martin was asked “[i]s it 
your testimony that no employees have ever complained to you about you shorting their 
paycheck for regular time or overtime?” (ECF No. 78-1 at 126:17-19.) To which Defendant 
Martin responds, “[n]o that’s not my testimony . . . [i]f they said that they were short then . . . 
I’ll go and I’ll take care of it immediately.” (Id. at 126:20-25.) 

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The lack of adequate records of the hours Plaintiffs worked and Defendant Martin’s 
own testimony that she has been made aware of instances of uncompensated overtime create 
a genuine dispute of material fact on this claim. 
C. Failure to Pay Wages Due Under the NCWHA 
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the NCWHA, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95 -25.6 and § 95- 25.7, by failing to pay for time spent attending trainings, 
failure to compensate for each hour worked, and failure to timely pay wages when due. (ECF 
No. 53 at ¶¶ 83 –86.) In its previous Order, the Court conditionally certified the NCWHA 
class for wages due for training, wages due for mandatory meetings, and wages due for 
improper reductions from employee time logs. (ECF No. 90 at 27–28.) 
§ 95-25.6 of the NCWHA is commonly known as the “payday statute” and requires 
each employer to pay “all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the regular payday.” See 
Martinez-Hernandez v. Butterball, LLC, 578 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818, 821 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2008) 
(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95 -25.6) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 95-25.7 provides that, “[e]mployees whose employment is discontinued for any reason 
shall be paid all wages due on or before the next regular payday.” § 95-25.7. 
Here, there are genuine disputes of material fact on whether Defendants violated N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 95–25.6 and § 95-25.7. Regarding Defendants alleged failure to pay wages when 
due, Plaintiffs allege that paychecks have taken longer than one month before they were 
received. (ECF No. 78-2 at 46:11-14.) Defendant Martin confirms this when asked “that was 
the month you weren’t paying people until the 22nd following the month worked, correct?” 
(ECF No. 78-1 at 272:3-5.) To which she responds “mm-hmm . . . it was the next month . . . 
that they got paid.” (Id. 272:6, 272:11-12.) Additionally, Plaintiffs have stated that they clocked 

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in more hours than were reflected on their paystubs and that they were, at times, unable to 
receive their paystubs. (ECF Nos. 78-2 at 46:7-8; 78-12 at 5–6; 78-21 at 21:19-23.) See Webb 
v. Daymark Recover Sevs., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 3d 675, 688–89 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2022) (finding 
that discrepancies in employees timesheet when compared to their paystubs created a genuine 
dispute on the payday claim). 
There are also genuine disputes regarding whether improper reductions were taken 
from employee’s paychecks and whether they were paid for trainings. Plaintiffs state that their 
paystubs would include itemized deductions for trainings . (ECF No. 78-23 at 31:15 -25.) 
When Defendant Martin was asked whether she had written authorization to take deductions 
for trainings out of an employee’s paycheck she states, “I don’t know. I have no idea.” (ECF 
No. 78-1 at 273:22-24.) 
Therefore, Defendants have not shown an absence of any genuine dispute of material 
fact as it pertains to their alleged failure to pay wages due under the NCWHA. 
Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (ECF No. 108), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED 
with respect to Plaintiff’s claim in Count I of failure to pay wages due for trainings that occurred 
prior to the first day of work, and it is DENIED with respect to all other claims under Counts I, 
II, and III. 
This, the 1st day of April 2025. 
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs 
Senior United States District Judge 

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