govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_21-cv-00506-4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
TIFFANY WADE, individually, and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
 P l a i n t i f f s , 
 
 v. 
 
JMJ ENTERPRISES, LLC & TRACI 
JOHNSON MARTIN, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t s . 
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1:21CV506 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
LORETTA C. BIGGS, Senior District Judge. 
Tiffany Wade, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, (“Plaintiffs”), 
brought this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and violations of the 
North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, against JMJ Enterprises, LLC and Traci Johnson Martin 
(“Defendants”). (ECF No. 53 ¶¶ 74–95.) This case was prev iously set for trial, however, 
following a hearing, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Continue Trial and continued the 
matter to allow the parties time to file the motions that are addressed in this Order. (Minute 
Entry dated April 9, 2025.) Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, (ECF 
No. 120), Defendants’ Motion to Amend Class Certification, (E CF No. 122), and Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Clarification, (ECF No. 127). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Reconsideration will be denied , Defendants’ Motion to Amen d Class Certification will be 
denied, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification will be granted. 

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I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Tiffany Wade (“Plaintiff Wade”) co mmenced this action on June 21, 2021. 
(ECF No. 1.) On January 10, 2022, this Court, upon motion of Plaintiff, conditionally certified 
Plaintiff’s action as a Fair Labor Standards Ac t (“FLSA”) collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) with respect to her claims under the FLSA. (ECF No. 21 at 6.) Plaintiffs subsequently 
filed an Amended Complaint on June 7, 2022. (ECF No. 53.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendants failed to compensate them for time associated with attending trainings 
and mandatory meetings, failed to pay them overtime, and failed to pay them on time. (ECF 
No. 53 ¶¶ 66–95.) 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains five counts, three of which are federal claims 
under the FLSA: (Count I) failure to pay mi nimum wages for all hours worked; (Count II) 
failure to pay overtime wages; and (Count V) retaliation. ( Id. at ¶¶ 66–73, 74–81, 96–98.) 
Plaintiffs’ two other claims are state law claims under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act 
(“NCWHA”): (Count III) failure to pay wages due, and (Count IV) failure to pay overtime 
wages. ( Id. at ¶¶ 82–88, 89–95.) De fendants in their Answer to the Amended Complaint, 
asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff Wade for breach of contract. (ECF No. 54 at 13–14.) 
On September 30, 2023, this Court, granted in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify a Rule 
23 Class, dismissed Count IV of the Amended Complaint, and denied Defendants’ Motion to 
Decertify the FLSA Collective Action. (ECF No. 90 at 27–28.) Regarding Rule 23 class 
certification, the Court conditionally certified the NCWHA class for wages due for training, 
wages due for mandatory meetings, and wages due for improper reductions from employee 
time logs pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6 and § 95-25.7. (Id.) Further, regarding Count 

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IV of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, failure to pay overtime wages under the NCWHA, the 
Court found that claim to be preempted by the FLSA. (Id. at 4.) 
Following discovery, Defendants filed a Mo tion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 
77.) The Court found that a genu ine issue of material fact exis ts with respect to Count V, 
Plaintiff Wade’s individual count of retaliation, and denied summary judgment. (ECF No. 103 
at 7.) Additionally, the Court denied summ ary judgment with re spect to Defendants’ 
counterclaim of breach of contract. (Id. at 10.) However, as the Court made findings regarding 
class certification prior to ruling on Defendan ts Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
found Defendants’ motion to be moot with respect to the issues in Count I, II, and III as they 
pertain to the Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective action. (Id. at 2–3.) The Court ordered 
that Defendants were allowed to file a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 
I, II, and III. (Id.) 
On February 26, 2024, Defendants filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the issues in Count I, II, and III. (ECF No. 108.) The Court granted in part and denied in 
part Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 117 at 13.) The Court granted the motion with respect 
to Plaintiffs’ claim in Count I of failure to pa y wages due for trainings that occurred prior to 
the first day of work, and the Court denied the motion with respect to all other claims under 
Count I, II, and III. ( Id.) The parties then filed the thr ee instant motions. The Court will 
address each motion in turn. 
II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts Order granting Defendants’ 
Motion for summary judgment with respect to Pl aintiffs’ claim in Count I of failure to pay 

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wages due for trainings that occurred prior to the first day of work. (ECF No. 120.) Plaintiffs 
argue that the Order “requires reconsideration to correct a clear error of law and to prevent 
manifest injustice.” (ECF No. 121 at 1.) Defendants counter that Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden to prove a clear error of law as they “cite to no legal authority upon which this Court 
could base a reconsideration of its previous ruling.” (ECF No. 124 at 3.) 
A. Standard of Review 
Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Ci vil Procedure, the “district court retains 
the power to reconsider and modify its interl ocutory judgments, including partial summary 
judgments, at any time prior to final judgment when such is warranted.” Am. Canoe Ass’n v. 
Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). That power 
is “committed to the discretion of the district court” and may be exercised as justice requires. 
Am. Canoe Ass’n , 326 F.3d at 515. Although the Ru les “do not set out a[ ] standard for 
reconsideration of interlocutory orders,” most courts have “adhered to a fairly narrow set of 
grounds” in assessing a Rule 54(b) motion: whether “(1) there has been an intervening change 
in controlling law; (2) there is additional evidence that was not previously available; or (3) the 
prior decision was based on clear error or would work manifest injustice.” See Akeva, L.L.C. 
v. Adidas Am., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565–66 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2005). In general, Rule 
54(b) motions “should not be used to rehash arguments the court has already considered” or 
“to raise new arguments or evidence that could have been raised previously.” South Carolina v. 
United States, 232 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (D.S.C. 2017). 
B. Discussion 
In this Courts’ ruling on summary judgment, the Court granted Defendants’ summary 
judgment only with respect to Plaintiffs’ clai m in Count I of failur e to pay wages due for 

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trainings that occurred prior to the first day of work. (ECF No. 117 at 13.) The Court 
determined that under the FLSA the type of trai ning that Plaintiffs underwent prior to their 
first day of work (i.e., CPR, first aid, medi cation management, and seizure management) was 
not compensable because they are not “specific to the functions related to JMJ Enterprises.” 
(Id. at 8.); See McLaughlin v. Ensley , 877 F.2d 1207, 1208, 1210 (holding that the plaintiff’s in 
that case are considered employees for FLSA purposes because the training included “specific 
job functions related to [the employer’s] own business,” which were of “practically no 
transferable usefulness.”). Therefore, Defend ants were granted judgment as a matter of law 
on that claim under Count I. (ECF No. 117 at 8.) 
Plaintiffs, in their brief, repeatedly make the argument that the court sua sponte raises 
the issue of whether Plaintiffs were employees du ring their initial training. (ECF No. 121 at 
1, 2, 6, 8.) Plaintiffs state that if they kne w the court would sua sponte raise the issue they 
would have “directed the Court to multiple pla ces in the record where Plaintiffs’ status as 
employees was admitted by JMJ and/or correctly assumed by this Court.” (Id. at 2.) 
First, the Court did not sua sponte raise the issue of whether Plaintiffs were considered 
employees prior to their first day of work. In arguing for summary judgment Defendants state 
“Wade could not be, and was not considered, an employee of JMJ unless and until she completed 
voluntary, state mandated requirements related to healthcare providers.” (ECF No. 109 at 8.) 
(emphasis added). In fact, Defendants specifi cally refer to the training as “pre-employment 
training.” (Id. at 10.) Defendants then argue that the FLSA is not applicable because Plaintiff 
Wade’s first day of work was on February 25, 2021, when she first began at JMJ not on 
February 23, 2021, when she completed her training. (Id.) 

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Therefore, the issue before the Court on summary judgment was whether Plaintiffs are 
considered employees under the FLSA, therefore entitling them to compensation for training 
completed prior to their first da y o f w o r k . W h a t t h i s C o u r t determined is that training 
completed prior to the first day of work is not compensable under the FLSA. (ECF No. 117 
at 8.); see also McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209, 1210 (1989). 
Although Plaintiffs make the assertion that the dismissal of their claim “constitutes a 
clear error of law” they cite to no case law contrary to the Court’s decision. ( See ECF No. 
121.) Plaintiffs’ main argument to support a reconsideration is that there are multiple instances 
in the record and in this Courts previous Orde r’s that state that Plaintiffs were employees. 
The Court is not persuaded by this argument. 
First Plaintiffs argue that their Amended Complaint and Defendants Answer show that 
there was never any question as to whether Plaintiff Wade was an employee when she attended 
the training.” (ECF No. 121 at 2–3.) However, allegations in initial pleadings are just that, 
allegations. 
Plaintiffs further argue that “[t]he Court has repeatedly recognized that Plaintiff Wade 
was employed at the time she attended the initial training.” (ECF No. 121 at 4.) To support 
this argument, Plaintiffs cite to this Courts ’ statement of facts in its previous Orders. 
However, the Courts factual statements in the Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Conditional Certification, and the Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the 
Complaint, were a recitation of the allegations in the Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 21 at 1–2; 49 
at 1–4; 52.) None of the Orders Plaintiffs list constitute factual findings by the Court. 

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“Motions for Reconsideration are an extr aordinary remedy which should be used 
sparingly.” Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Inc. Co ., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998). The 
Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion is “merely an attempt to reassert arguments previously 
before the Court and [to] disagree with the Court’s ruling in this matter.” Matter of Vulcan 
Constr. Materials, LLC. , 433 F.Supp.3d 816, 822 (E.D. Va. Ju ly 16, 2019). To the extent 
Plaintiffs disagree with the Courts ruling, their recourse is appeal, they have not stated a basis 
for this Court to alter its’ prior Order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is 
denied. 
III. MOTION TO AMEND CLASS CERTIFICATION 
The second motion before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Amend the Class 
Certification Order, (ECF No. 90). (ECF No . 122.) Defendants argue that the class 
certification requires amendment because of new case law and the Court’s Order on summary 
judgment. (ECF No. 123 at 1.) Plaintiffs coun ter that the new case law does not affect the 
class certification and that no “new facts” were established after the Order conditionally 
certifying the class or the Order granting in part summary judgment. (ECF No. 125 at 1.) 
A. Standard of Review 
Under Fed R. Civ. P. 23, “[ a]n order that grants or de nies class certification may be 
altered or amended before final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1)(C). The rule “empowers 
district courts to ‘alter or amend’ class certification orders based on circumstances developing 
as the case unfolds. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds , 568 U.S. 455, 479, n.9 
(2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C)) (internal citati ons omitted). “Even after a 
certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent 
developments in the litigation.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 

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B. Discussion 
As stated above, on September 30, 2023, this Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Certify a Rule 23 Class for Plaintiffs’ claim of failure to pay wages due under the NCWHA. 
(ECF No. 90 at 27–28.) The Court conditionally certified the NCWHA Class for “wages due 
for training, wages due for mandatory meetings, and wages due for improper reductions from 
employee time logs pursuant to N.C. Ge n. Stat § 95-25.6 and § 95-25.7. ( Id. at 19, 27.) The 
Court did not grant Plaintiffs request for class certification pursuant to Count IV of failure to 
pay overtime wages. ( Id.) It is this Order, (ECF No. 90), that is the subject of Defendants’ 
Motion to Amend. (See ECF No. 123 at 1.) 
Defendants first argument is that in light of the Fourth Circuit decision in Stafford v. 
Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc., the class definition is “too broad.” (ECF No. 123 at 4.) In 2024, the 
Fourth Circuit in Stafford, vacated a certification order beca use the district court relied on a 
vague and overly general policy in deciding commonality, and because the district court created 
an overly broad class definition. 123 F.4th 671, 678. 
In Stafford, the certified class was defined as “all persons who worked as a shift manager 
at Bojangles in the state of North Carolina at an y time from three years prior to the filing of 
this Complaint to the entry of judgment in the case.” Id. at 677. Here, Defendants argue that 
“[t]he Plaintiff’s NCWHA class has been broadly defined as all non-exempt hourly 
paraprofessionals/residential counselors who worked for JMJ Enterprises, LLC and/or Traci 
Martin, in the state of North Carolina, at any time from June 21, 2019, to present.” (ECF No. 
123 at 2.) 

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This Court does not find Defendants’ arguments persuasive. The Court in Stafford 
found that the class was too broadly defined because the “sole defining characteristic” of the 
class is that the class contains Bojangles shift managers. Stafford, 123 F.4th at 681. The Court 
held that the class contained no reference to the type of work the members performed nor 
whether they must allege a denial of overtime pay or time-shaving, plaintiffs other claims. Id. 
However, in the instant case, the Court in certifying the class stated in its Order that the class 
is conditionally certified for “wages due for training, wages due for mandatory meetings, and 
wages due for improper reductions from emplo yee time logs.” (ECF No. 90 at 27.) This 
Court specifically stated that it was “organiz[ing] the class by issue”, (id. at 18), which satisfies 
the lack of “precise class parameters” that were at issue in Stafford. Stafford, 123 F.4th at 682. 
Further, this case is distinguishable from Stafford, because in Stafford the Fourth Circuit 
held that the “putative class is too overinclu sive to ensure commona lity” as some members 
“may lack off-the-clock or time-shaving claims . . . thus no question of law or fact is common 
with these individuals.” Id. at 681. The Fourth Circuit in that case found that when the district 
court analyzed the commonality element of class certification, the court relied “most heavily” 
on the fact that 80% of the prospective class members worked the opening shift and were 
required to complete tasks before opening for which they were not compensated. Id. at 676, 
677. 
It was the district courts reliance on the tasks completed on opening shift to find 
commonality that was the issue, because the commonality was found on only one of the class 
claims. The Fourth Circuit stated that “the district court did not address whether any of 

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plaintiffs’ other off-the-clock and time-shavi ng claims constituted a common question.” Id. 
at 679. That is distinct from this Courts’ findings in the instant case. 
In this Court’s Order granting class certification on Plaintiffs’ NCWHA claims, when 
analyzing commonality, the Court held, 
After reviewing the entirety of the reco rd, the Court finds that the questions 
central to Plaintiff’s claim for wages du e unite putative class members under a 
“common contention.” See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. The questions here all 
center on Defendants’ employee time recording and wage policies and practices 
and relate to whether Defendants pr operly compensated putative class 
members for time worked. Furthermore, these questions are all based on the 
same legal theory ―violation of the NCWHA’s payd ay provisions, specifically 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6 and § 95-25.7. Based on the information in the record, 
these questions appear well suited to common resolution—a “yes, they did” or 
“no, they did not” that will apply to all class members and “resolve an issue that 
is central to the validity” of each member’s claim for wages due. 
 
(ECF No. 90 at 9.) “[T]he Rule 23 inquiry does not end upon the identification of a common 
question alone . . . [the common contention] mu st predominate over all other individualized 
issues.” Stafford, 123 F.4that 679. Therefore, this Court finds that the holding in Stafford does 
not alter this Courts Order granting Rule 23 class certification. 
Next, Defendants, in their brief, go through each of Plaintiffs’ claims and argue that 
class certification should be decertified or modified. The Court first notes that it is unclear on 
the basis of Defendants arguments here. 
Defendants spend seven pages going through ea ch of Plaintiffs’ claims citing almost 
exclusively to allegations in the Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 123 7–13.) Defendants 
discuss Plaintiffs claims regarding training, meetings, overtime, and itemized deductions. (Id.) 
However, Defendants’ arguments appear to be a recitation of the Amended Complaint and 
this Court’s summary judgment Order. Defendants end each section of their arguments with 

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“having come to this conclusion in the pres ent case, different questions abound, most 
importantly those about [] whether the class w ill meet the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 
(b)(3). (ECF No. 123 at 9, 10–11, 12, 13.) The Court is unclear what this means as Defendants 
do not point the Court to specific portions of Rule 23 that they believe are called into question. 
Nor do defendants clearly argue their positions or cite to any case law or evidence from the 
record that supports such positions. It is not this Court’s job to piec e together Defendants’ 
arguments. For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Amend Class Certification is denied. 
IV. MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
The third motion before the Court is Plaint iffs’ Motion for Clarification. (ECF No. 
127.) In this motion Plaintiffs “ask the Court to clarify whether Count III, seeking, ‘all wages 
and tips accruing to the employee on the regu lar payday,’ includes promised overtime, or 
whether the Court intends that the only overtime available in this case is through Count II, 
failure to pay overtime under the FLSA.” (ECF No. 128 at 2.) Defe ndants do not respond 
to the substance of Plaintiffs’ arguments, rather they state that Plaintiffs failed to state the 
grounds for the relief they seek. (ECF No. 129 at 1.) 
When Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, they asserted two claims for overtime 
pay: failure to pay overtime wages under the FLSA (Count II) and failure to pay overtime 
wages under the NCWHA, (Count IV). (ECF No. 53 ¶¶ 74–81, 89–95.) This Court certified 
the FLSA collective action with respect to the overtime wage claim under the FLSA. (ECF 
No. 21 at 6.) However, in certifying the Ru le 23 class with respect to Plaintiffs’ NCWHA 
claims (Counts III and IV outlined above), th is Court found that the overtime wages claim 
(Count IV) is preempted by the FLSA. (ECF No. 90 at 2–5.) 

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Plaintiffs overtime wages claim under Count IV alleges that Defendants failed to pay 
overtime wages in violation of N. C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.4. (ECF No. 53 ¶ 90.) In it’s Order 
this Court found that N.C. Gen. Stat. §95-25.4 is exempted under the NCWHA, and it is also 
preempted by the FLSA as it is duplicative of the overtime claims br ought under the FLSA. 
(ECF No. 90 at 3–4.) Plainti ffs agree that “the Court correctly concluded that Count IV 
should be dismissed,” (ECF No. 128 at 7). 
However, Plaintiffs contend that although Count IV regarding overtime wages is 
dismissed, they should be able to bring claims regarding overtime wages for their other claim 
under the NWCHA, Count III. ( Id. at 2.) Count III alleges that Defendants failed to pay 
Plaintiffs “all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the regular payday” pursuant to N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. (ECF No. 53 at ¶¶ 82–88.) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6 states that “every 
employer shall pay every employee all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the regular 
payday.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. 
Plaintiffs seek clarification of whether the Court’s Order dismissing their overtime 
claim under Count IV, stops them from seeking recovery of overtime hours under Count III. 
The Court will clarify that it does not. The Co urt specifically stated in its Order, “Count III 
brought under § 95-25.6 [] of the NCWHA is not preempted by the FLSA.” (ECF No. 90 at 
4.) 
Further, Count III is not exempted by the NCWHA. As Plaintiffs’ claim under Count 
III relates to an alleged failure by Defendants to pay “all wages earned by Plaintiff” it is not 
specific to just unpaid overtime wages and not exempted under the NCWHA. See Roldan v. 
Bland Landscaping Company Inc., 3:20-CV-00276-RJC-DSC, 2021 WL 7185223 at *7 (W.D.N.C. 

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Mar. 15, 2021) (finding that Plaintiff brining overtime clai ms in not exempt under the 
NCWHA because his claims “relate to all earned, accrued, and unpaid wages —not just unpaid 
overtime wages—and are not to be exempted under N.D. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.14.”). 
While this Court believes that the Order speaks for itself, the Court did not say anything 
about overtime claims with respect to Count III, the Order merely dismissed Plaintiffs’ 
overtime claim under § 95-25.4 (Count IV). To the extent Plaintiffs deem that a clarification 
the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, (ECF 
No. 120), is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Amend Class Certification 
Order, (ECF No. 122), is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification of the Court’s 
Order, (ECF No. 127), is GRANTED in part. 
This, the 29th day of August 2025. 
 
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs 
Senior United States District Judge 

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