govinfo:USCOURTS-miwd-1_26-cv-01577-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
______ 
 
HERIBERTH JOSE DIAZ MADERA, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al., 
 
Respondents. 
____________________________/ 
 
 

 
Honorable Jane M. Beckering 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently 
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated 
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
Discussion 
I. Procedural History 
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention 
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either 
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing. 
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In an Order entered on May 15, 2026, the Court directed Respondents 
to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested 
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on May 
20, 2026. (ECF No. 5.) 
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II. Factual Background 
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuel a. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 5-1, 
PageID.27.) On September 24, 2024, Petitioner entere d “the United States of America at the 
Nogales, [Arizona] Port of Entry[.]” ( Id.) At that time, the Depart ment of Homeland Security 
(DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, ch arging him with inadmissibility pursuant to 
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who, 
at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigra tion and travel 
documents].” (Id., PageID.30.) DHS then paroled Petitione r into the United States pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), until April 24, 2026. (For m I-94, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Thereafter, 
Petitioner filed a Form I-589, A pplication for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. (2026 
Form I-213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Id.) 
On January 13, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE agents. (Id., PageID.40.) Petitioner’s 
application for asylum remained pending at the time of his arrest. (Id., PageID.41.) 
In an order entered on March 19, 2026, the Detr oit Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s 
application for asylum and wit hholding of removal because that application was incomplete. 
(Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 5-7, Page ID.46–47.) In that same order, the Detroit 
Immigration Court ordered that Petitioner be removed to Venezuela. (Id.) Petitioner filed an appeal 
to the Board of Immigration App eals (BIA), which remains pending. See Automated Case 
Information, https://acis.eoir .justice.gov/en/ (enter “244728178” for the A-Number, select 
“Venezuela” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Jun. 12, 2026). Because 
Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pe nding, Petitioner’s order of removal is not 
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“administratively final” for purposes of the INA. 1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A). 
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard 
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. 
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue 
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This in cludes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump , 
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). 
IV. Merits Discussion 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention 
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled 
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.27; Form I-94, 
 
1 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and rem oval of aliens ordered removed,” provides in 
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to 
run until “[t]he date the order of re moval becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a 
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration 
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff , No. 07-15450, 2007 WL 
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discuss ing that a final removal order becomes 
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has revi ewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order 
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review ha s expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a 
court issues a stay. That reinfo rces why Congress included ‘admin istratively’ before the word 
‘final’ in the first pr ovision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231 
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The 
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”). 
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ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Petitione r also filed a Form I-589 A pplication for Asylum and for 
Withholding of Removal, which remained pendi ng at the time of his arrest. (2026 Form I-213, 
ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) 
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from 
the United States, with regulat ions promulgated by the enforc ing agencies providing further 
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who 
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry docume nt, like Petitioner, are deemed 
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7 
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply, 
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without pr oper documentation”). On ce a noncitizen is 
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the 
noncitizen indicates an inte ntion to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The governme nt may place the noncitizen into expedited 
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into 
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). 
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides th at “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for 
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not 
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitte d, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding 
under section 1229a of this title. ” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Howe ver, “applicants for admission 
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or 
significant public benefit,’” as se t forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to 
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then, 
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall 
forthwith return or be returned to the custody fro m which he was paroled a nd thereafter his case 
shall continue to be dealt with in the same mann er as that of any other applicant for admission to 
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 
To terminate the previously granted parole, th e agency must comply with the applicable 
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the 
“[t]ermination of parole,” 
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[2] upon accomplishment of 
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the 
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor 
public benefit warrants the continued presen ce of the alien in the United States, 
parole shall be terminated upon written noti ce to the alien and he or she shall be 
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. 
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may 
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public 
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025 
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below, 
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory 
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed 
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be 
 
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where 
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the 
parole was authorized. The partie s have not suggested that either circumstance applies here. In 
fact, Respondents concede that Petitioner’s parole did not expire until April 24, 2026. (Resp., ECF 
No. 5, PageID.16.) 
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subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL 
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft , No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same). 
First, based on the information before the C ourt, it does not appear that the purpose of 
Petitioner’s parole had been accomp lished at the time of his arre st. Petitioner left Venezuela, 
seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. 
(NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.27; 2026 Form I- 213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) At that time, 
Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into 
the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). (Form I-94, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.35.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application 
for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, which remained pendi ng at the time of his arrest. 
(2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-5, PageID.41.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and 
detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See id.) Moreover, there is nothing before the Court 
to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer 
applied. Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination 
of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations had been satisfied. 
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have 
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires 
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statut e,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these 
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer , 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146 
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitte d) (addressing this issue, a nd granting the petitioner’s motion 
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the peti tioner’s habeas petition and 
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ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4 
(same); Noori v. LaRose , No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal. 
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and 
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release 
from custody); Orellana v. Francis , No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed 
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s 
order to release the petitioner).3 
Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case 
determination regarding the re vocation of Petitione r’s parole was made. Indeed, Respondents 
concede that Petitioner’s parole was not termin ated before his recent arrest. (Resp., ECF No. 5, 
PageID.16.) 
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the 
Court, there is no indication th at Respondents followed the appli cable statutory and regulatory 
requirements to revoke or ter minate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those 
 
3 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant 
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’ s stay of the termination notice for previously 
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing 
that under the statute, the Secr etary must terminate these grants of paro le under the [parole] 
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the 
present case for the same reasons th e Court found it dist inguishable in Caceres Martinez v. 
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. 
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado 
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D. 
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026). 
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requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there 
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk 
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab. , No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022) 
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own 
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to 
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends 
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation 
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force , 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))). 
Respondents assert that Petitioner’s parole expired by its terms and therefore, Petitioner is properly 
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because of his status as a noncitizen who is “seeking admission” 
to the United States. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.17–19.) But Petitioner’s parole did not expire 
until April 24, 2026, more than three months afte r ICE arrested Petitioner. (Form I-94, ECF 
No. 5-3, PageID.35.) 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above , the Court concludes that Respondents failed 
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. 
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations 
Petitioner also argues that his detention vi olates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice 
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, and has appeared in removal proceedings. 
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s curr ent detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth 
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in 
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each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at 
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8 
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026). 
V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief 
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does 
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. 
VI. Proper Respondents 
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent 
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondent.4 
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Dir ector is not the only proper 
Respondent for the reasons set fort h in the Court’s analysis of th e same argument in each of the 
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. 
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem , No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, 
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). 
To ensure that this Court’s orders regardi ng a hearing or release will bind at least one 
Respondent with authority to act in the event th at Petitioner is transferred out of the Western 
 
4 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent. 
(Order, ECF No. 4.) 
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District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary 
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above , the Court will enter a Judg ment granting Petitioner’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will 
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under 
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report 
within three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with 
this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. 
 
Dated: June 17, 2026 /s/ Jane M. Beckerin
g 
Jane M. Beckering 
United States District Judge 
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