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govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_26-cv-01688-0

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia · 2026-06-16

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:49:20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
CRAIG A. BREED, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01688 (UNA) 
v. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
DONALD TRUMP, et al., ) 
 ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to 
Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and his pro se Complaint, ECF No. 1. The Court 
grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter 
without prejudice. 
 Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues the President of the United States and Goldman 
Sachs, see Compl. at 1–2, but provides no contact information for the Defendants, in contravention 
of D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). The allegations are vague and difficult to follow. He alleges 
only that his “patent was stolen and then used to form Business Global Peace Application,” and 
seeks “the return of the business assets so that it might be put to a different use. Id. at 4. No other 
supporting details or context is provided. The remainder of the Complaint consists of unexplained 
exhibits and memoranda, see id. at 6–11; Exhibits, ECF No. 1-2; see also D.C. LCvR 5.1(e). These 
exhibits and memoranda relate to random topics, largely cryptocurrency and purported far-
reaching political conspiracies spanning several decades. See Compl. at 6–11; Exhibits. 
 

 Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. 
Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 
standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can 
prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of 
res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 Plaintiff’s allegations cannot be described as clear and direct , see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), 
and the paragraphs are not limited to a single set of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). When, 
as here, a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely 
stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal 
comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D ist. of Columbia, 319 
F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017 
WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Put differently, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of 
charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort 
Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).
 Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category, failing to provide the Court or the 
Defendants with adequate notice of a claim, and falling short of establishing the Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations centered on his belief in ongoing government 
conspiracies are patently frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Such allegations that are 

“so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 
U.S. 528, 536- 37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport , 193 U.S. 561, 579 
(1904)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff 
allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain 
origins.”). 
 Accordingly, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate O rder accompanies 
this Memorandum Opinion. 
 
Date: June 16, 2026 
 
Tanya S. Chutkan 
TANYA S. CHUTKAN 
United States District Judge 
 
 

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