govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-5_25-cv-02574-1

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JUSTIN NORDGREEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
SCOTTS VALLEY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, et al., 
Defendants. 
 

 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Re: ECF No. 40 
 
 
Plaintiff Justin Nordgreen sued the Scotts Valley Police Department (“SVPD”), the City of 
Scotts Valley (“City”), and three police officers, Trevor Hutchinson, Aaron Roberts, and Nicholas 
Stoeberl, in their individual and official capacities (collectively, Defendants) for using excessive 
force and prolonging a traffic stop. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
second amended complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 40. Having considered the papers filed by both 
parties and the relevant law, the Court determined that oral argument was not required and vacated 
the motion hearing. L.R. Civ. 7-1(b). Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court assumes familiarity with the background and procedural history of this case. 
See ECF No. 38. 
On November 12, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first 
amended complaint (“November 2025 Order”), and permitted Plaintiff leave to file an SAC. ECF 
No. 38. The Court additionally granted Defendants’ request to incorporate by reference body 
worn camera footage from Officers Stoeberl, Roberts, and Hutchinson. Id. 
In the November 2025 Order, the Court held that Plaintiff had failed to allege facts that 
supported his theory that the officers’ actions during the traffic stop were spurred by “retaliatory 

 
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animus.” This allegation served as the undercurrent for each of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court 
found that, to the extent Plaintiff asserted that his traffic stop was pre-textual or lacked probable 
cause, he had failed to allege that theory with specificity and had not provided detailed facts to 
support those claims. 
In addition to Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a lack of probable cause or support his 
retaliatory animus theory, the Court identified specific deficiencies in Plaintiff’s pleadings. For 
his Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force, the Court held that Plaintiff had not shown that 
force was actually used against him, nor that Plaintiff was aware of any alleged use of force at the 
time of the incident. As to Plaintiff’s Monell and supervisory liability claim, the Court found that 
Plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that the municipality had a policy, that the policy amounted to 
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights, and that any such policy 
instigated the alleged violations. 
In the SAC, Plaintiff maintains the same five claims against Defendants. Plaintiff brings 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of the First Amendment; (2) violation of the Fourth 
Amendment for excessive force; (3) violation of the Fourth Amendment by Defendants Roberts 
and Stoeberl for failure to intervene; (4) violation of the Fourth Amendment by Defendants 
Hutchinson, Roberts, and Stoeberl for unreasonable search and seizure; and (5) Monell and 
supervisor liability. Defendants move to dismiss all Plaintiff’s claims. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 
in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2005). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies the Court identified in the November 2025 
Order. 

 
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A. First Amendment – Retaliation 
Plaintiff contends that Defendants retaliated against him after he “petition[ed] the 
government for redress by seeking help from the SVPD for the violations of his son’s 
constitutional rights by Scotts Valley Unified School District.” SAC ¶ 77. By “petitioning the 
government,” Plaintiff refers to (1) his visit with SVPD in “early 2022 . . . to ask the officers to 
arrest six school officials for isolating his six-year-old son, akin to adult solitary confinement, for 
simply not wearing a mask;” (2) his conversation with SVPD Seargent Wowak; and (3) a “civil 
lawsuit filed against the school district.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff contends that SVPD officers retaliated 
against him for his “petitioning” actions by pulling him over “in the form of an illegal traffic 
stop,” arresting him, conducting an “unreasonable 45 minute detention, not letting him ask 
questions of the officers or to challenge the stop, and [using] excessive force by pulling a gun on 
him for no objective factual reason.” Id. ¶ 77. 
“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ‘that (1) he 
was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity[,] and (3) the 
protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.’” Capp v. 
Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting O'Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 
932 (9th Cir. 2016)). “To ultimately ‘prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a “causal 
connection” between the government defendant’s “retaliatory animus” and the plaintiff’s 
“subsequent injury.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 581 U.S. 391, 398 (2019)). 
In the SAC, Plaintiff fails to establish such a “causal connection” between the officers’ 
alleged “retaliatory animus” and Plaintiff’s injuries. Simply, Plaintiff has not shown that the 
officers had any individual knowledge of Plaintiff’s petitioning actions, nor that the officers were 
upset by Plaintiff’s petitioning actions. While Plaintiff has alleged that he spoke with SVPD 
Seargent Wowak and the Chief of Police, Plaintiff has not shown that the individual officers 
involved in the traffic stop were made aware of those conversations. Plaintiff’s facts demonstrate 
only that the SVPD Seargent and Chief of Police documented Plaintiff’s visits in their usual 
course, not that Plaintiff’s actions were discussed among the police department or shared with the 

 
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individual officers. Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged no facts that show that the SVPD Seargent, 
Chief of Police, or the individual officers were upset by Plaintiff’s actions to such an extent that it 
“was a substantial or motivating factor” in the officers’ conduct during the traffic stop. Capp, 940 
F.3d at 1053. 
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 1. 
B. Fourth Amendment Claims – Excessive Force, Failure to Intervene, and 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
For his Fourth Amendment claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights by 
using excessive force, failing to intervene when fellow officers were using excessive force, and 
unreasonably prolonging the traffic stop. 
1. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene 
Plaintiff contends that, during the traffic stop, Officer Hutchinson “aimed a loaded firearm 
in compressed ready position” at Plaintiff, “which resulted in [Plaintiff’s] emotional injuries” and 
constitutes use of excessive force. SAC ¶ 89. Plaintiff asserts that the other officers should have 
intervened when Officer Hutchinson held out his gun. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those 
which are unreasonable.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citations omitted); United 
States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997). “For purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, a seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer, by means of physical force or show 
of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen.” Id. (emphasis added). Claims that law 
enforcement officers used excessive force, (either deadly or non-deadly) during an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other seizure of a citizen, fall under the Fourth Amendment analysis and its 
standard of objective reasonableness. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381-83 (2007); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Fourth Amendment claims require a showing that: (1) a 
seizure occurred, (2) excessive force was used to seize the plaintiff, and (3) that the force applied 

 
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was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381; Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, Calif. v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017). 
The Ninth Circuit has held that in certain circumstances pointing a gun at an individual and 
threatening force constitutes excessive force. Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 
2018) (holding that pointing a gun at plaintiff’s head and threatening to kill him amounted to 
unreasonable force); Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that “pointing a loaded gun at a suspect, employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a 
high level of force”). In each case, the excessive force was the “means of . . . some way 
restrain[ing] the liberty of a citizen.” Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1326. In simple terms, the force 
was used to effectuate the seizure. See e.g., Green v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 
1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that there was a triable issue of fact on excessive force claim 
where plaintiff alleged that she was “ordered out of her vehicle by as many as six officers, many 
of whom pointed handguns and a shotgun directly at her,” “was forced to her knees and 
handcuffed,” and “officers continued to train weapons upon her while she was handcuffed on the 
ground” for ten minutes). 
Here, however, Plaintiff is explicit in the SAC that he was not aware that a gun was drawn 
at the time of the traffic stop. Instead, it was not until months later that Plaintiff learned that 
Officer Hutchinson had his gun drawn. SAC ¶ 45 (“Unbeknownst to NORDGREEN, until he 
obtained body cam footage months later, at this time during the encounter his instincts had been 
correct that his life was at risk as the other officer, the second officer HUTCHISON, had drawn 
his service weapon on NORDGREEN.”). The drawn gun could not have been a “means of” 
restraining Plaintiff if Plaintiff did not know Officer Hutchinson was holding a gun. Chan-
Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1326; see also Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that plaintiff alleged a seizure as a result of excessive force because “with a gun pointed 
at his head and then handcuffed, he reasonably believed he was not free to leave.”). The Court 
finds that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that “excessive force was used to seize” Plaintiff. 
Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. 
As the Court stated in the November 2025 Order, Plaintiff’s claim for failure to intervene 

 
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is derivative of his excessive force claim. Sanders v. City of Pittsburg, No. 18-CV-04326-SK, 
2019 WL 11542388, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2019), aff'd, 14 F.4th 968 (9th Cir. 2021) 
(“Because Plaintiff’s claims for failure to intervene and municipal liability are predicated on the 
claim for excessive force, those claims likewise fail.”). Because Plaintiff has not provided a 
factual foundation to support his excessive force claim, he has likewise failed to state a claim for 
failure to intervene. 
2. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claim 
Plaintiff alleges that “[e]ight minutes into the ordeal,” he was “told he was being detained, 
“was patted down and handcuffed,” and then “locked in the back of Officer Stoeberl’s squad car” 
for 45 minutes. SAC ¶ 50.1 Plaintiff contends that detaining him for approximately 45 minutes 
constitutes an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop amounting to an unreasonable search and 
seizure. 
“A seizure violates the Fourth Amendment when an officer ‘extend[s] a traffic stop with 
tasks unrelated to the traffic mission, absent independent reasonable suspicion.’” United States v. 
Williams, No. 22-10052, 2023 WL 5925893, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023) (quoting United States 
v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2019)). “This mission is limited to addressing the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop and attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Id. (citing United 
States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 785 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotes and citations omitted). “Tasks 
not related to the traffic mission . . . are therefore unlawful if they ‘add[ ] time’ to the stop, and are 
not otherwise supported by independent reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting 
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015)). 
 In the SAC, Plaintiff does not adequately support his unreasonable search and seizure 
claim. Plaintiff has not pleaded facts to raise a plausible inference that the officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion to justify the long traffic stop. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 
1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[R]easonable suspicion is enough to support an investigative traffic stop”). 
In fact, Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
 
1 This series of events took place after Officer Hutchinson holstered his gun, which Plaintiff had 
not seen. SAC ¶ 50. 

 
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support an investigative traffic stop. Plaintiff acknowledges that he “noticed a car with a bright 
light speeding up upon him and saw it turn on its emergency lights,” but he did not pull over. 
SAC ¶ 23. Plaintiff recounts: 
Instead [Plaintiff] . . . traveled a short distance, turned left onto 
Hidden Glen Drive. . . . It was not until going up Hidden Glen when 
the officer activated his emergency horn and sirens signaling he 
wanted NORDGREEN to yield. Since there was no place to pull over 
and it was extremely dark, NORDGREEN drove a short distance, 
activated his turn signal and turned into his driveway. 
 
Id. Over the next eight minutes, Plaintiff and the officers “had a discussion about when the sirens 
were turned on,” and Plaintiff “challenged the person’s statements by stating there was no safe 
place to pull over and it agitated the person further.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 29, 50. Following, Officer 
Stoeberl told Plaintiff he “was stopped because of a headlight being out.” Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff was 
then detained and placed in the squad car. Once in the car, “Defendant Stoeberl stated to Plaintiff 
that he ‘detected the odor of alcohol’ on him when he was bending over near Plaintiff’s rear end.” 
Id. ¶ 52. The officers next asked Plaintiff to participate in field sobriety tests, which the “officer 
claimed that he was going to put him through . . . due to his ‘driving behavior.’” Id. ¶ 58. These 
facts, as alleged by Plaintiff, indicate that, while the investigation added time to the traffic stop 
and seizure, the prolongation was lawful because it was “supported by independent reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing,” specifically, that the officers stated that they identified a need to 
conduct a field sobriety test, investigate Plaintiff’s broken tail light, and inquire into why Plaintiff 
failed to pull over. Evans, 786 F.3d at 786. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a 
claim for an unreasonable search and seizure based on prolonged detention. 
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 2, 3, and 4. 
C. Monell Liability 
Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants’ actions were directed, encouraged, and 
ratified by the City and SVPD as part of “an unwritten department wide policy they regularly 
employ on innocent citizens” to “carry out or tolerate unlawful arrests without probable cause,” 
among other actions. SAC ¶ 115. 
“To establish municipal liability under Monell [v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 

 
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(1978)], [plaintiff] must prove that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the 
municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional 
right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. 
County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). “Monell liability for an improper 
custom or practice cannot be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents and instead must be so 
persistent and widespread that the custom or practice constitutes a permanent and well settled city 
policy.” Lopez v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 25-CV-04390-LB, 2025 WL 2223431, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2025); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (holding that 
the practice must be “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the 
force of law.”). Establishing Monell liability is a high bar. 
In the SAC, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the municipality had a policy, that the 
policy amounted to deliberate indifference to his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and that the 
policy instigated the alleged violations. Plaintiff’s only allegations in support of his claim are that 
the City’s and SVPD’s conduct was not limited to him, namely that Plaintiff is aware of Officer 
Stoeberl receiving “an award for his ‘DUI enforcement efforts,’” and that he knows other citizens 
who have been pulled over “for ridiculous reasons.” Id. ¶¶ 116-121. The incidents Plaintiff relies 
on are too sporadic to constitute “a permanent and well settled city policy.” Lopez, 2025 WL 
2223431, at *3. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for Monell liability. 
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 5. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. 
Because Plaintiff was previously granted an opportunity to remedy the flaws identified but 
failed to do so, Plaintiff’s claims are now dismissed without leave to amend. Benavidez v. Cnty. of 
San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that district court has discretion to 
dismiss with prejudice where allegations of additional facts could not cure the deficiencies in the 
complaint). 
/ / / 
/ / / 

 
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The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 17, 2026 
 
Noël Wise 
United States District Judge 

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