govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-5_17-cr-00341-2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 
 : 
 v. : No. 5:17-cr-0341 
 : 
LARRY HAYWOOD CULBREATH, JR., : 
 Defendant. : 
____________________________________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
Defendant’s Letter-Motion for Reduction and for Counsel, ECF No. 117 - Denied 
 
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. June 17, 2026 
United States District Judge 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Defendant Larry Haywood Culbreath, Jr., who is serving a 240-month sentence for drug 
and firearms charges, has filed a letter-motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) based on non-retroactive amendments under the First Step Act of 2018 that 
lowered the mandatory minimum penalty for his offense. He also seeks appointment of counsel. 
The Government opposes a reduction. For the reasons set forth below, the letter-motion is 
denied in its entirety. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 On May 5, 2016, a sealed Complaint was filed against Culbreath. An Information was 
thereafter filed on June 29, 2017, charging Culbreath with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or 
more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and with 
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On July 7, 2017, 
the Government filed an Information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 charging prior offense. See ECF 
Nos. 80, 83. The following week, Culbreath waived his right to be charged by indictment and 

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pled guilty to both charges pursuant to a plea agreement made under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) wherein the parties agreed to a sentence of 240 months imprisonment, 
followed by ten (10) years supervised release. See ECF Nos. 82-86. The Government further 
agreed to list only one prior drug felony conviction. On November 1, 2017, this Court accepted 
the plea agreement and sentenced Culbreath consistent with the parties’ recommendations. 
Almost a year later, Culbreath filed an appeal. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the 
appeal on June 18, 2019. 
 Months later, Culbreath filed a Motion to Vacate Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
That Motion was denied and dismissed on January 7, 2020. See ECF Nos. 108-109. On 
November 1, 2022, Culbreath filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) (Compassionate Release), arguing that the COVID-19 variant Omicron posed a 
risk to his health and, also, that extraordinary and compelling reasons existed due to non-
retroactive changes in the law under the First Step Act that reduced the mandatory minimum 
penalty for his offense from twenty (20) years to fifteen (15) years. See ECF No. 111. 
Following receipt of the Government’s opposition brief, this Court denied the motion on 
December 14, 2022. See ECF Nos. 113-114. 
Culbreath has again sought a reduction in sentence pursuant to the compassionate release 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), based on non-retroactive amendments under the First Step 
Act of 2018 to the applicable mandatory minimum. See Mot., ECF No. 117. This time he 
argues that: (1) because the Government filed an information under § 851 before he waived 
indictment, he was not subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and (2) he 
received an “unusually long sentence.” Id. The Government has filed a response in opposition, 
asserting that: (1) the timing of the § 851 filing could have been raised on direct appeal or under 

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28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Supreme Court precludes a defendant from challenging his conviction 
through a motion for compassionate release, and the applicable policy statements of the 
Sentencing Commission do not permit a compassionate release motion based on this type of 
sentencing challenge, and (2) this Court rejected Culbreath’s challenge based on a change in the 
sentencing law in his first motion for compassionate release and the Supreme Court recently held 
that § 1B1.13(b)(6) (“unusually long sentence”) does not allow consideration of nonretroactive 
changes in sentencing law. See Resp., ECF No. 118 (citing, inter alia, Fernandez v. United 
States, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2295 (May 28, 2026); Rutherford v. United States, 146 
S. Ct. 1320 (2026)). 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion for Compassionate Release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) - Review of 
Applicable Law 
 
The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to request compassionate release with 
the court after first complying with the exhaustion requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
1 
This section dictates that the defendant must first move for compassionate release with the 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), which then has thirty (30) days to consider the request. After 
exhaustion, the court “may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of 
probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved 
portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 
3553(a)[2] [18 USCS § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . 
 
1 Section 3582(c) is part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) but was amended 
by the First Step Act to provide prisoners a more direct route to court for their claims. See 
United States v. Torres, No. 18-414, 2020 WL 3498156, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2020). 
2 The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include, but are not limited to: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant; 

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extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A).3 
The “applicable policy statement[]” is USSG § 1B1.13, which defines what 
circumstances should be considered “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). “One year after Congress passed the First Step Act, 
however, the U.S. Sentencing Commission lost its quorum to amend the compassionate release 
policy statement (USSG § 1B1.13) to reflect the First Step Act’s provision that a defendant was 
now authorized to file their own motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Castillo, 
No. 12-cr-230-3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20260, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2024). For this reason, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.13 was 
advisory and “not binding—for courts considering prisoner -initiated motions.” See United States 
v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2021) (stating that the descriptions of “extraordinary 
and compelling reasons” in the policy statement could nevertheless guide a court’s decision). 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
. . . 
[4] the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 
 . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
3 See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (“The Commission, in promulgating general policy 
statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, 
shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence 
reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.”). 
 

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“This changed in April 2023, when the Sentencing Commission promulgated new amendments 
to the Sentencing Guidelines.” Castillo, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20260, at *6 (explaining that the 
Commission regained its voting quorum in 2022). 
Amendment 814 to the Sentencing Guidelines revised § 1B1.13 and makes the 
Commission’s policy statement binding. See id. Amendment 814 also expanded the categories 
of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a sentence reduction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See id. at *7. The modified categories are as follows: (1) medical 
conditions of the defendant; (2) health deteriorations in the defendant as a result of old age; (3) 
family circumstances of the defendant; (4) the defendant was the victim of abuse while 
incarcerated, (5) “other reasons,” and (6) unusually long sentence.4 The Commission’s now-
binding policy statement also requires the petitioner to show that he “is not a danger to the safety 
of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” See USSG § 
1B1.13(2). 
B. Appointment of Counsel - Review of Applicable Law 
A defendant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel 
when seeking compassionate relief. See United States v. Dorsey, No. 14-323-1, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28178, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021). However, several circuit courts have held that the 
 
4 Subsection (b)(6) further provides: 
If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years 
of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in 
determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling 
reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the 
sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion 
is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized 
circumstances. 
USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6).
 

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court has discretion to appoint counsel in such cases. See id. Because the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has not established a standard for the appointment of counsel in compassionate release 
cases, district courts in this Circuit consider the standard followed in deciding motions for 
counsel in other contexts. See id. 
 When deciding whether to appoint counsel, the court first considers whether the claim 
has some arguable merit in fact and law. See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d 
Cir. 2002). If this initial hurdle is overcome, other factors to be examined are: 
(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own case; 
(2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; 
(3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of 
 the claimant to pursue investigation; 
(4) the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf; 
(5) the extent to which the case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and 
(6) whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses. 
 
Id. (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993)). Other factors include: (1) the 
court’s willingness to aid the indigent party in presenting his or her case; (2) the available supply 
of lawyers willing to accept § 1915(e) requests within the relevant geographic area; and (3) 
whether there is “the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for example, from his 
probable inability without such assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a 
complex but arguably meritorious case.” See Gordon v. Gonzalez, 232 Fed. Appx. 153, 156 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2007); Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 Culbreath’s argument regarding the timing of the Government’s information under § 851 
is not appropriate for consideration under the compassionate release statute. See Fernandez, 
2026 U.S. LEXIS 2295, at *19 (“The name for § 3582(c)(1)(A)— ‘Compassionate Release’—
highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs.”). Allowing Culbreath 

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to present this claim under § 3582(c)(1)(A) more than eight and a half years after his conviction 
became final would circumvent the one-year period of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), as well 
as the prohibition against second or successive filings in § 2255(h). See id. at *15 (“Challenging 
the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting 
requirements of § 2255”). Accordingly, this argument is denied. 
 To the extent Culbreath seeks relief from an “unusually long sentence” pursuant to § 
1B1.13(b)(6), his argument is based on non-retroactive changes in the First Step Act. See First 
Step Act § 403(b), 115 P.L. 391 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“This section, and the amendments made by 
this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this 
Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” (emphasis 
added)). However, “[t]he duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an 
extraordinary or compelling circumstance [because t]here is nothing ‘extraordinary’ about 
leaving untouched the exact penalties that Congress prescribed and that a district court imposed 
for particular violations of a statute.” United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 260-61, cert. 
denied 2022 U.S. LEXIS 1891 (U.S., Apr. 4, 2022) (quotations omitted). The Sentencing 
Commission’s amended policy statement in § 1B1.13(b)(6) for “unusually long sentences” does 
not abrogate Andrews. See United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2024). 
Because Congress took retroactivity “off the table” in the First Step Act, the Policy Statement in 
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) “cannot change that.” See id., aff’d 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2294, at *25 (“The 
statutory text and structure make clear that Congress’s nonretroactive change to § 924(c)—
considered by itself or in combination with other factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for 
compassionate release. To the extent that it counsels otherwise, the Commission’s policy 
statement is invalid.”). Accordingly, changes to mandatory minimum sentences under the First 

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Step Act “cannot be considered in the analysis of whether extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” See id. 
 Because the motion for compassionate release lacks merit, Culbreath’s request for 
appointment of counsel is denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Compassionate release is not an appropriate vehicle to raise sentencing challenges and 
may not be based on non-retroactive changes in the law. Because Culbreath’s motion for 
compassionate release lacks merit, appointment of counsel is not warranted. The letter-motion 
for compassionate release and the appointment of counsel is denied. 
A separate Order follows. 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.________ 
 JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR. 
 United States District Judge 

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