govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_17-cr-00157-7

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
United States of America,  
 
 Plaintiff, 
v.        MEMORANDUM OPINION  
         AND ORDER 
        Crim. No. 17-00157(MJD) 
Todd Seaver Knutson, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
Katherine T. Buzicky, Assistant United States Attorney, Counsel for Plaintiff. 
Todd Seaver Knutson, Defendant, Pro Se. 
 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Pro Se Rule 60 Motion.  
(Doc. 194.)     
I. Background 
 In January 2018, Knutson pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the superseding 
indictment charging him with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or 
more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and(b)(1)(A).  In 
April 2019, this Court sentenced Knutson to a 235-month prison term.  Knutson 
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.  United States v. Knutson, 967 F.3d 
754 (8th Cir. 2020).  On December 23, 2024, Knutson filed an untimely motion 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing, as relevant here, that the 
warrant for his arrest lacked probable cause.  Specifically, he argued that the 
motion was timely based on his “diligence in pursuing his rights,” which had led 
him to discover the reference to a 2024 “domestic violence/probable cause pick 
up” in Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer’s Report and Recommendation.  (Docs. 
174; 189 (Reply (citing Doc. 61 (R&R) at 6 n.2)).)  The Government opposed the 
motion based on the statute of limitations.  The Court denied Knutson’s motion 
and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.  (Doc. 191.)  The Court found 
that Knutson could have discovered Magistrate Judge Bowbeer’s mention of the 
domestic violence/probable cause pick up “as of November 2017 because it was 
part of the record.”  (Id. at 7.)  On April 17, 2025, the Court entered judgment.  
(Doc. 192.)   
Knutson now files a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) arguing that the 
Court erred in making its finding.  (Doc. 194 at 1-2.)  Knutson asks the Court to 
reopen his § 2255 motion so that he can pursue the claim discussed above.         
II. Defendant’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion 
 Because the Court has ruled on the § 2255 petition and judgment has been 
entered, the Court must determine whether to construe the present motion as 
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one under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or as a successive 
habeas petition. 
III. Rule 60(b)(6) 
Rule 60(b)(6) provides in relevant part that “[o]n motion and just terms, 
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . any other reason justifying 
relief.”  “[R]elief under rule 60(b)(6) remains an extraordinary remedy for 
exceptional circumstances.”  City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1155 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 
When a petitioner files a motion pursuant to Rule 60 following the 
dismissal of his habeas petition, the Court is to conduct a brief initial inquiry to 
determine whether the allegations in the Rule 60(b) motion in fact amount to a 
second or successive collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Boyd v. United 
States, 304 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir. 2002).  This inquiry is necessary because the law 
is clear that a petitioner “may not bypass the authorization requirement of 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) for filing a second or successive § 2254 or § 2255 action by 
purporting to invoke some other procedure.”  United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 
1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005).  Prior to filing a successive petition for relief, the 
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petitioner must first move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 
authorizing the district court to consider the application.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).   
 A Rule 60(b) motion should be construed as a successive habeas petition if 
the motion contains a claim as defined in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 534 (2005).  
See Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 2009).  In Gonzalez, the Supreme 
Court defined a “claim” as one that sought to add a new ground for relief or one 
that attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.  545 
U.S. at 532.  On the other hand,  
[n]o claim is presented if the motion attacks some defect in the integrity of 
the federal habeas proceedings.  Likewise, a motion does not attack a 
federal court’s determination on the merits if it merely asserts that a 
previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error— 
for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural 
default, or statute-of-limitations bar.  This reasoning is illustrated 
in Gonzalez, in which the petitioner moved for relief from judgment 
challenging the district court’s determination that his habeas petition was 
time barred under AEDPA.  Because the motion challenged only the 
statute of limitations that applied to the habeas proceeding and did not 
assert a claim, the Supreme Court held that it was not a second or 
successive habeas petition.  
 
Ward, 577 F.3d at 933 (internal citations omitted). 
 A Rule 60 motion that is “an attack based on the movant’s own conduct, or 
his habeas counsel’s omissions, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the 
proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined 
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favorably.”  Id. (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5).  Based on Gonzalez, the 
Eighth Circuit held a Rule 60(b) motion that claimed the petitioner was 
incompetent when his original habeas petition had been litigated was, in effect, a 
new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to 
present petitioner’s incompetence to the court, and that the district court was 
correct to dismiss the motion as a successive habeas petition.  Id. at 934.   
In this case, Knutson argues that the Court erred when it found that he 
could have discovered Magistrate Judge Bowbeer’s mention of the “domestic 
violence/probable cause pick up” in November 2017 “because it was part of the 
record.”  (Doc. 191 at 7.)  This is not a claim that attacks “some defect in the 
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings” or a claim involving “failure to 
exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.”  Ward, 577 F.3d at 933.  
Rather,  the Court finds that Knutson attacks the federal court’s previous 
resolution of a claim on the merits.  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532.  Accordingly, 
the Court finds that the motion before it is a successive habeas petition.   
Moreover, Knutson did not move in the Court of Appeals for an order 
authorizing the district court to consider his motion as required under § 2255(h).  
As a result, dismissal of the motion is appropriate.  See Boyd, 304 F.3d at 814. 
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IV.  Certificate of Appealability 
With regard to the Court’s rulings, the Court concludes that no 
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 
claims debatable or wrong” nor would “jurists of reason . . . find it debatable 
whether the district court was correct in its procedural rulings.”  Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).  Therefore, the Court denies a Certificate of 
Appealability in this case. 
V.  Order 
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED: 
1. Defendant’s Pro Se Rule 60 Motion [Doc. 194] is DISMISSED without 
prejudice;  
  
2. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion For Relief From 
Judgment Under Rule 60 [Doc. 196] is GRANTED; and 
 
3. No certificate of appealability shall issue.  
 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.  
 
Date:  May 12, 2026 
s/Michael J. Davis      
Michael J. Davis 
United States District Court 
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