govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_12-cr-00295-7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEIN SCRUGGS 
 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
NO. 12-295-3 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Stein Scruggs was working at a McDonald’s in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania when he 
recruited two childhood friends to stage an armed robbery of the restaurant. For his role as the 
heist’s getaway driver, he was convicted of robbery; conspiracy to commit robbery; and, using, 
carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. His conviction 
was upheld on appeal. United States v. Scruggs, 617 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2015). Now 
serving a 205-month sentence as an inmate at FCI Allenwood, Scruggs—proceeding pro se—
moves for immediate release pursuant to the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A). For the reasons below, his Motion will be denied. 
 DISCUSSION 
The compassionate release statute authorizes courts to modify a term of imprisonment 
only if there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(b), 
(c)(1)(A).1 
Congress delegated to the United States Sentencing Commission the authority to 
“describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence 
reduction.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Accordingly, the Commission has issued a policy statement 
 
1 Before bringing a motion for compassionate release, a defendant must first exhaust administrative remedies. See 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, the Government does not dispute that Scruggs satisfied that requirement. 

2 
 
defining six circumstances that warrant relief: the defendant’s (1) medical circumstances, (2) 
age, and, (3) family circumstances; (4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse while in 
custody; (5) other reasons “similar in gravity” to those previously described; and, (6) whether the 
defendant received an “unusually long” sentence. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)-(6). This 
framework, absent unusual circumstances, is binding upon courts. See United States v. 
Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 375 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[T]he Commission’s policy statements are 
generally binding on us.” (citing United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 
2012))).
2 In this case, Scruggs argues that qualifies for release under the first category (on two 
bases) and the fifth category. 
A. Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care 
Extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist where a defendant suffers from “a 
medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided 
and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.13(b)(1)(C). In his Motion, Scruggs notes that he suffers from several afflictions, including 
colorectal cancer, supraventricular tachycardia (SVT), chronic gastroesophageal reflux disease 
(GERD), and a vitamin D deficiency.
3 All parties agree that the BOP and outside health 
providers are actively treating Scruggs’s conditions. 
 
2 Even if an inmate presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, the Commission’s policy statement 
further requires courts to: (1) consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) determine that the inmate is 
“not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)”; and, (3) 
find that a reduction is consistent with the policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). As explained below, the grounds 
for Scruggs’s Motion do not rise to the level of “extraordinary and compelling” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, these additional requirements need not be considered here. See United States v. 
Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2023) (framing whether a prisoner establishes extraordinary and compelling 
reasons as a “threshold eligibility hurdle” for a sentence reduction). 
 
3 Scruggs also asserts that he has stage-two kidney disease. A search of his BOP medical records, however, does not 
corroborate that assertion. Meanwhile, the records reveal additional ailments, such as anxiety disorder and a chronic 
ulcer on his right foot, that he does mention in his Motion and thus will not be considered here. 
 

3 
 
To start, Scruggs was recently diagnosed with stage-two colorectal cancer. About a year 
before his diagnosis, he had complained of abdominal pain and rectal bleeding that BOP health 
officials sought to evaluate via colonoscopy. For reasons unknown, however, Scruggs refused 
the colonoscopy at the last minute. When his symptoms eventually worsened, causing Scruggs 
to vomit and become bedridden, BOP transported him off-site to a hospital. A CT scan then 
revealed a malignant tumor in his abdomen. Doctors successfully removed the diseased portion 
of his colon and performed a colostomy. The next step in his treatment is chemotherapy, which 
BOP will support. His prognosis is generally favorable, as his cancer has not extended into 
nearby organs or lymph nodes and was assigned a low risk of metastasis. 
Although Scruggs does not argue that BOP has failed to provide him cancer treatment, he 
expresses a particular concern about the “high risk of falling seriously ill with COVID-19 
because of [his] colorectal cancer.” He references a Wall Street Journal article reporting that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved next year’s COVID-19 boosters for a limited 
population: “older adults and high-risk younger people.” Sumathi Reddy, How to Get the New 
Covid-19 Vaccine, Wall St. J. (Sept. 2, 2025, at 9:00 pm ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare/covid-vaccine-what-to-know-how-to-get-0b075ae6. 
Scruggs thus seems to be under the impression that he is ineligible for next year’s COVID-19 
booster, putting him at an increased risk of severe illness in his immunocompromised state. 
The COVID-19 vaccine is not a cure-all. As experience and research have shown, 
periodic boosters are necessary to fortify the immune system against COVID-19 variants and 
regenerate antibodies, which naturally decrease over time. Why do vaccines require boosters?, 
UCLA Health (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.uclahealth.org/news/article/why-do-vaccines-
require-boosters. Because the FDA has announced restrictions on next year’s boosters, some 

4 
 
experts speculate that COVID-19 transmission and death rates will increase in the near future. 
See Reddy, supra. “[T]he mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may 
spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release.” United 
States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (2020). And, for the past few years, the widespread 
availability of a vaccine has persuaded courts to deny compassionate release even for inmates 
with a pre-existing condition. See, e.g., United States v. Hannigan, 2022 WL 815449, at *15 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (“District Courts in the Third Circuit consistently agree that an FDA-
approved vaccination against COVID-19 lessens the risk of serious illness or death from 
COVID-19 such that the threat of the pandemic, even combined with pre-existing medical 
conditions, does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate 
release.”). However, an inmate with a high-risk condition who is unable to obtain a booster 
while infection rates resurge might qualify for a sentence reduction. See, e.g., United States v. 
Davis, 2021 WL 662409, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2021) (holding, at a time when vaccines were 
not widely available, that an inmate demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons because 
his cancer and obesity put him at a heightened risk of a COVID-19 infection). 
On the current record, however, Scruggs’s generalized distressed about future limits on 
booster eligibility and the consequences of that policy are wholly speculative. He does not assert 
that he has been denied booster. Nor does he report an outbreak of COVID-19 at FCI 
Allenwood. Moreover, although it is true that the FDA approved next year’s vaccine only for a 
limited population, cancer patients like Scruggs are a high-risk group who are booster eligible. 
See Underlying Conditions and the Higher Risk of Severe COVID-19, Ctr. Disease Control & 
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/covid/hcp/clinical-care/underlying-conditions.html (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2025). Thus, while Scruggs’s concern is understandable, it is inchoate and, thus, 

5 
 
insufficient to warrant his immediate release. 
In addition to his cancer, Scruggs also suffers from SVT, a heart rhythm disorder that 
causes a fast or erratic heartbeat. Supraventricular tachycardia, Mayo Clinic, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/supraventricular-tachycardia/symptoms-
causes/syc-20355243 (last updated Mar. 7, 2024). BOP is also treating this condition. Initially, 
he was prescribed a beta-blocker that slowed and regulated the heartbeat. Then he underwent an 
ablation procedure to block the abnormal electrical signals causing the arrhythmia, and he 
discontinued the beta-blocker. The procedure had mixed success, so BOP restarted the beta-
blocker to manage Scruggs’s lingering SVT episodes. Scruggs asserts that he requires another 
procedure to manage his SVT, but his medical records reflect a plan to “[f]ollow up in 6 months 
or sooner.” 
Finally, Scruggs reports that he has GERD, a condition marked by persistent acid reflux,4 
and a vitamin D deficiency. Even assuming, without deciding, that these conditions “require[] 
long-term or specialized medical care” without which Scruggs is “at risk of serious deterioration 
in health or death,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), his medical records again indicate that BOP is 
addressing each condition through prescription medication. 
In sum, the record demonstrates that BOP has timely responded to Scruggs’s numerous 
and evolving medical needs, even when he has been uncooperative about his own treatment.
5 He 
therefore has not shown that “medical care . . . is not being provided” to him. U.S.S.G. § 
 
4 Gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/gerd/symptoms-causes/syc-20361940 (last updated Apr. 23, 2025). 
 
5 For example, in September 2025, Scruggs was scheduled for a CT scan of his chest, abdomen, and pelvis so that 
doctors could plan his chemotherapy treatment. Scruggs refused the scan because he did not want to go the Special 
Housing Unit the night before the scan, which is a standard security precaution when inmates are transported off-
site. BOP and Scruggs had extensive discussions about the risks of forgoing treatment, such as cancer progression 
and death. BOP was eventually able to persuade him to go forward with the CT scan. 

6 
 
1B1.13(b)(1)(C); see also, e.g., United States v. Ho-Sue, 2025 WL 1698743, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 
17, 2025) (denying compassionate release where medical records showed the defendant received 
insulin and oral medication for his diabetes); United States v. Pierce, 2025 WL 1171587, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025) (denying release where the inmate, after undergoing an amputation, 
received wound care multiple times a week, went off-site for medical appointments, and 
obtained prescriptions to address his medical needs). 
B. Serious Condition, Serious Impairment, or Age-Related Deterioration 
Reasserting the same conditions as previously described, Scruggs also moves for release 
under a different provision of the compassionate release statute concerning an inmate’s medical 
circumstances: 
(B) The defendant is-- 
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or 
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging 
process, 
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or 
she is not expected to recover. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B). In other words, extraordinary and compelling reasons exist where 
the defendant (1) suffers from a serious condition, serious impairment, or age-related 
deterioration (2) that substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care and (3) from which 
he is not expected to recover. Id. The policy statement does not define “the ability of the 
defendant to provide self-care,” but “[c]ourts generally interpret the phrase to refer to a 
defendant’s ability to independently ambulate, take care of personal hygiene, and perform other 
[activities of daily living] such as dressing, eating, and taking medication.” United States v. 
Bailey, 2025 WL 1114185, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2025) (collecting cases). 
None of Scruggs’s conditions qualify under this provision. With respect to his cancer: 

7 
 
his treatment plan indicates he is expected to recover. Moreover, the cancer’s effect on his 
ability to provide self-care appears to be minimal; Scruggs notes that he wears an ostomy bag 
following his procedure, but he has not demonstrated that he incapable of managing the bag or 
his personal hygiene more generally. 
For his other conditions, his Motion does not provide any basis to conclude that they 
“substantially diminish[]” his ability to provide self-care. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B). The 
notes from his most recent medical check-up indicate that he has “mobility problems” and 
occasionally uses a wheelchair, but they add that he has a “normal gait/transferring.” There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that he cannot move around independently, dress, eat, or take his 
medications. Accordingly, because Scruggs has failed to address a key requirement for 
compassionate release under this medical circumstance, relief cannot be granted on this basis. 
See, e.g., Ho-Sue, 2025 WL 1698743, at *4-5 (denying compassionate release where the inmate 
failed to demonstrate that his diabetes, glaucoma, and osteoarthritis made him “unable to care for 
himself”). 
C. “Other Circumstances” for Relief 
Finally, Scruggs’s Motion presents two additional reasons for compassionate release: 
staff shortages at FCI Allenwood have disrupted rehabilitation programs and increased the 
number of lockdowns, and he has served a substantial majority of his term of imprisonment. 
The statute authorizes relief if “[t]he defendant presents any other circumstance or 
combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the 
reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in 
paragraphs (1) through (4).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). The grounds for relief in subsections 
(b)(1)-(4) are “uncommon circumstances” where “continued imprisonment would result in a 

8 
 
significant collateral or secondary harm to the defendant.” United States v. Andrews, 480 F. 
Supp.3d 669, 684 (E.D. Pa. 2020), aff’d, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021); see also U.S.S.G. §§ 
1B1.13(b)(1)-(4) (authorizing relief where, for example, the inmate has a terminal illness or has 
suffered abuse at the hands of a prison official). 
The words “extraordinary and compelling” also inform the kinds of “other 
circumstances” that would warrant a sentence reduction. “Extraordinary” is defined as 
“[b]eyond what is usual, customary, regular, or common.” Extraordinary, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). And based on the definition for “compelling need,” a compelling 
reason is one that is “so great that irreparable harm or injustice would result if [relief] is not 
[granted].” Compelling Need, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
When considered alone or together with Scruggs’s medical problems, Scruggs’s other 
circumstances do not warrant release. That FCI Allenwood has a staffing shortage, resulting in 
lockdowns and reduced programming, is regrettable, but it is not “similar in gravity” to the 
exceptional situations enumerated in subsections (b)(1)-(4). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Instead, 
the shortage is a “generic hardship[], common to federal prisoners, [that] cannot be regarded as 
extraordinary.” United States v. Wilson, 2024 WL 4793713, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2024) 
(citation omitted). Similarly, that Scruggs has served approximately 177 months of his 205-
month sentence is not a unique circumstance. At some point, every inmate nears the end of his 
term of imprisonment, and there is no irreparable harm or injustice that flows from a prisoner 
serving his full sentence.
6 
Thus, because Scruggs has not met his burden of establishing that “extraordinary and 
 
6 Instead of constituting an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, “the time remaining in [a] sentence” is 
more appropriately considered at the next step in the compassionate release analysis, when determining “whether 
immediate release would be consistent with [the § 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 331 
(3d Cir. 2020). 

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compelling reasons” warrant a modification of his sentence, he is not eligible for relief pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and his Motion will be denied. 
An appropriate order follows: 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J. 
 
 
 
 

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