govinfo:USCOURTS-mtd-6_24-cv-00040-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
REGINALD COREY GRAY,
C V 24-40-H-WWM
Plaintiff,
ORDERvs.
ERIC STRAUSS^ JIM SALMONSEN,
CHRIS LAMB, and TERRIE
STEFALO,
Defendants.
PlaintiffReginaldCorey Gray (“Gray”),a stateprisonerproceedingpro se
and informa pauperis,allegesthatMontana StatePrison(“MSP”) has
substantiallyburdened and continuesto burden hisrighttopracticehisreligious
beliefundertheReligiousLand Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act of2000
(“RLUIPA”). 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-l(a);(Docs.1-2).Defendantshave moved for
summary judgment. (Docs.31-34). The motion ishillybriefed.For the reasons
providedbelow,summary judgment isgranted.
I. BACKGROUND
Gray isincarceratedatMSP inDeer Lodge and isa practicingMuslim.
(Doc.34 atm 1-2,8;Doc. 39 at4, 12).Gray wears a traditionalhead-covering
*EricStrausshas replacedBrianGootkin astheDirectorof theMontana Department of
Correctionsand,thus,has been substitutedhere.

calleda kufias a partof hisreligiouspractice.(Doc. 34 atK 2;Doc. 39 at 12).The
Montana Department of Corrections(“DOC”) regulatesthe religiousactivitiesof
inmates inDepartment facilitiesand prescribesMSP Procedureson religious
headgear and otherreligiousitems in MSP. (Doc. 34 at 3-4; Doc. 39 at 12).
Under Procedure 5.6.1on religiousprogramming, inmates atMSP may use
personalpropertylistedinProcedure 4.1.3as a partof theirreligiouspractice.
(Doc. 34-1 at 1,11 (Procedure5.6.1(111)defining“PersonalArticles”;Procedure
4.1.3listingitems allowed forIslamicinmates)).A kufifallsunder “[pjrayercap'
listedin Procedure 4.1.3as an “articledallowed forservicesinthe [Religious
Activities Center!. (Doc. 34-1 at 11).Accordingly,itisan articlesubjectto
Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D).(See Doc. 34 at 4-7; Doc. 39 at 12).fifi
Under Procedure5.6.1(III)(D)(5),“[a]ninmate may only use hispersonal
religiouspropertyitemsinhiscellor atcommunal religiousactivities”and “may
bringtheirpersonalreligiouspropertyforthecorrespondingreligiousservicethey
areattending.”(Doc.34-1 at4). Procedure5.6.1(III)(D)(6)then statesthat
ur
ijnmatesmay onlyutilizetheirreligiouspersonalpropertyitems in accordance
with thereligiouspurpose they were designed.” (Doc. 34-1 at4). Under
Procedure5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(a),religiousmedallionsmust be tucked under an
inmate’sshirt,and inmatesmay wear themedallionon the outsideof theirshirt
onlywhen incellor attendinga religiousserviceor activity.”(Doc. 34-1 at4
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(emphasis added)). Similarly,and relevanthere,Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)
requiresthat“inmates who choose to wear theirreligiousskullcaps outsidetheir
cellor communal serviceswillwear the skullcap discreetlyand fullycovered
underneathan approved cap.” (Doc. 34-1 at4). For “securityreasons,”Procedure
5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)permitsstaffto “requirean inmate toremove, and may search.
the religiousskullcap atany time.” (Doc. 34-1 at4). Read together.Procedure
5.6.1(III)(D)(5)suppliesthe baselinelimitationon where personalreligious
propertymay be used,while Procedure 5.6.1(I1I)(D)(6)imposes additional
conditions on the manner of that use.
Should an inmate violatesubsections(a)or (b) of Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6),
Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(c)providesthattheviolation“may resultinthe
confiscationof the item(s)as contraband in accordance with ...Procedure 3.4.1,
InstitutionalDiscipline.”(Doc.34-1 at4). Under Procedure 3.4.1,possessionof
non-dangerous unauthorizeditems” constitutesa “minor ruleinfraction,'see
Procedure 3.4.1(Attachment A: DisciplinaryRule Infractionslist:Minor Rule
Infractions:(4319)),and may resultin,among othercombined sanctions,a “1-2
days cellrestriction”on the firstoffense,see id. (Attachment E: Inmate
DisciplinarySanctionGrid: Minor: 1stOffense).
On January9,2024,prisonstaffinformedGray that,ifhe wears hiskufi
outsideof hiscellor religiousservices,itmust be covered by anotherauthorized
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cap,such as a stockingcap or baseballhat. (Doc. 34 at5). Gray initiateda
grievanceon thispolicywith MSP and sought a religiousaccommodation to allow
him to wear hiskufiuncovered anywhere and atany time inthe prison. (Doc. 34
at6). He was advisedthatthe policywould not change,and thathe must cover his
kufi.Id. As a result,he filedthislawsuitallegingviolationsof the First
Amendment and RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l,etseq. Gray seeks declaratory
and injunctivereliefagainstDefendants EricStrauss(“Strauss”),as the Director of
theMontana Department of Corrections,Jim Salmonsen (“Salmonsen”),Chris
Lamb (“Lamb”),and TerrieStefalo(“Stefalo”),(collectively“Defendants”).
(Doc. 2 at2-3, 5). (BrianGootkin,atthetime Gray filedhissuit,was the Director
of theMontana Department of Corrections.{Id.at2;Doc. 13 at2). He has been
substitutedby Strauss.)Salmonsen istheWarden ofMontana StatePrison.
(Doc. 2 at2; Doc. 13 at2). Lamb istheAssociateWarden of Montana State
Prison.{SeeDoc. 2 at2;Doc. 13 at3). StefaloistheReligiousActivities
CoordinatoratMontana StatePrison.{Seeid.).Defendantsmoved to dismiss both
claims.Gray’s FirstAmendment claimwas dismissedon November 19,2024.
(Doc. 12 at6-11). Accordingly,Gray’s only remainingclaim arisesunder
RLUIPA.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment isappropriate“ifthemovant shows thatthereisno
genuine disputeas to any materialfactand themovant isentitledtojudgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).A factismaterialifitimpacts the outcome
of the case in accordancewith governing substantivelaw. Anderson v.Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,All U.S. 242,248 (1986).A disputeof materialfactisgenuine “ifthe
evidenceissuch thata reasonablejurycouldreturna verdictforthe nonmoving
party.” Id. All reasonableinferencesmust be viewed in the lightmost favorableto
the nonmoving party.Tatum v.Moody, 768 F.3d 806,814 (9thCir.2014).
Nonetheless,the nonmoving partymust identify,with some reasonable
particularity,theevidencethatitbelievesprecludessummary judgment. See Soto
V.Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865,870 (9thCir.2018) (explainingthatwhile pro se
partiesareexempted from '^strictcompliancewiththesummary judgment rules,
theyare“notexempt[ed]...from allcompliance,”such as the requirementto
identifyor submitcompetentevidenceinsupportoftheirclaims).
III. ANALYSIS
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisonsof
thiscountry.” Wolffv.McDonnell, A\%\I.S.529,555-56 {\91A). However,
simply because prisoninmatesretaincertainconstitutionalrightsdoes not mean
thattheserightsarenot subjecttorestrictionsand limitations.Lawful
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incarcerationbringsabout thenecessarywithdrawal or limitationof many
privilegesand rights Bellv. Wolfish,441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) (citations
and internalquotationmarks omitted).“The limitationson the exerciseof
constitutionalrightsariseboth from the factof incarcerationand from valid
penologicalobjectives—includingdeterrenceof crime,rehabilitationof prisoners.
and institutionalsecurity.”O'Lone v,Est.ofShabazz. 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
Gray allegesthatDefendants“were aware of [his]religiousrightto be able
topracticehisreligiousbeliefby wearinghis[kjufiat alltimes,but were
deliberatelyindifferentto [his]religiousright.”(Doc. 2 at 27). He further
allegesthatthisclaimed deliberateindifferencehas caused him “to choose between
practing[sic]and adherung [sic]to hisreligiousbeliefor receivingdisciplinary
actionand beingplacedinlockedhousing.. Id. Gray seeksdeclaratoryand
injunctivereliefrelatingtohisallegedinabilityto wear hiskufi“uncovered,
anywhere withinthefacility”underRLUIPA. {Id.TfK28-29).
RLUIPA providesthat‘[n]ogovernmentshallimpose a substantialburden
on thereligiousexerciseofa personresidinginorconfined to an institution,’
unlessthe government can demonstratethatthe burden ‘isin furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest’and ‘theleastrestrictivemeans of furthering
thatcompellinggovernmentalinterest. Jones V.Slade,23 F.4th 1124, 1139
(9thCir.2022) (quoting42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-l(a)).A plaintiffbearsthe initial
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burden of demonstratingthatan institution’spolicyconstitutes(1)a substantial
burden on (2)hisexerciseof religion.42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). Once an inmate
makes [this]prima facieshowing, theburden shiftsto thegovernment to prove that
theburden istheleastrestrictivemeans of furtheringa compelling governmental
interest.”Jones,at 1141 (citing42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l(a),-2(b)).In rulingon
Defendants’ motion to dismiss,(Doc. 8),the Court determined thatDefendants
have a compelling governmental interestto circumscribethe time,place,and
manner inwhich inmatesarepermittedtodisplaytheirpersonalreligiousproperty
for“maintainingsecurityand orderwithinthefacility.”(Doc. 12 at6).
Accordingly,theonly components of Gray’sRLUIPA claimrequiringexamination
arewhether (1)Gray’sreligiousexerciseissubstantiallyburdened, and (2)whether
MSP’s Procedures are the least restrictive means of achievingitscompelling
governmental interest.42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
A. Substantial Burden
While RLUIPA does not define“substantialburden,”the Ninth Circuit
construestheterm “inaccordancewith itsplainmeaning”. San Jose Christian
Coll V.CityofMorgan Hill,360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9thCir.2004). Taking the
words in turn,“substantial”isdefined as “considerable in quantity,”id.(quoting
Merriam-Webster’s CollegiateDictionary1170 (10thed.2002)) (internal
quotationmarks omitted),and a “burden”is“somethingthatisoppressive,”id.
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(quotingBlack’sLaw Dictionary190 (7thed.1999))(internalquotationmarks
omitted).Accordingly,a “substantialburden” on religiousexercise“must be
‘oppressive’to a ‘significantlygreatextent, or in otherwords, it“must impose a
significantlygreatrestrictionor onus upon such exercise. Id. A “substantial
burden” occurs“where thestate...denies[animportantbenefit]because of
conduct mandated by religiousbelief,therebyputtingsubstantialpressureon an
adherentto modify hisbehaviorand to violatehisbeliefs.”Hartmann v.
CaliforniaDep’t ofCorr. & Rehab.,707 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9thCir.2013)
(citingWarsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9thCir.2005) (alterationin
original)(quotationomitted)).
RLUIPA defines“religiousexercise”as “any exerciseof religion,whether
or not compelled by, or centralto,a system of religiousbelief” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A); Warsoldier,418 F.3d at994. And “[t]hedistinctionbetween
questionsof centralityand questionsof sincerityand burden isadmittedlyfine.
CityofBoerne v.Flores,521 U.S. 507,534 (1997)(internalquotationmarks and
citationomitted).With respectto questionsof centralityand substantialburden.
((r
cjredibilitydeterminations,theweighing of the evidence,and the drawing of
legitimateinferencesfrom the factsarejury functions,not those of a judge.
Reeves v.Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,Inc.,530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (internal
quotationmarks omitted),and the“complex and intractable”problems of prison
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administrationcounseljudicialrestraint,see,e.g.,Mauro v.Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054,
1058 (9thCir.1999) (quotingTurner v.Safley,482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)).This
applieswith particularforceto “substantialburden” determinationsin which the
inquiryof whether a restrictioncoercesa plaintiffto modify hisreligiousexercise
or violatehisreligiousbeliefsiscloselyintertwinedwith the theological
centrality”of the asserted“religiousexercise.”See Thomas v.Review Bd. of
Indiana Employment SecurityDiv.,450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
Defendants contend thatProcedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)does not
substantiallyburden” Gray’s religiousexerciseof wearing hiskufibecause MSP
permitshim to wear a kufiatalltimes,providedthatoutsidehis celland outside
communal services,itiscoveredby an approved cap. (Doc. 32 at 8-11; Doc. 34
14, 18-20). This assertionisbased on theambiguityin Gray’s Complaintfifiat
and briefingover whether hissincerebeliefisthathe must wear the kufi at all
times, or thathe must wear ituncovered atalltimes. Gray submitted an exhibitin
supportofhisStatementof DisputedFactsthatpurportedlyestablishesthe
sincerityof hisbeliefthathe isrequiredto wear hiskufiuncovered atalltimes.
(Doc. 39 at 19 (clearercopy atDoc. 42)).This document only muddies the waters.
however, sinceitstatesthatthe Prophetwore “both a turban and a cap underneath
it.”Accordingly,theissueof exactlywhat Gray sincerelybelieves,or what his
exactreligiouspracticeis,isnot entirelyresolved.The exactsincerepractice,in
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turn,affectswhether Defendants’policysubstantiallyburdens it.IfGray’s
practiceisconstruedas only wearing thekufiatalltimes,Defendantsprevailon
the issue of substantialburden, because Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)does not
forbidpossessionof a kufior itscontinuouswear insome form,with very brief
exceptions.On the record properlypresented.Gray has not demonstratedthat
Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)“substantiallyburdens” his“religiousexercise'
definedonly as wearing a kufi“atalltimes.”Accordingly,summary judgment is
appropriateto thatextent.
But Gray alsoclaims hispracticeisto wear the kufiuncovered atalltimes.
For thepurpose ofthismotion.Defendantsdo not challengethe sincerityof this
belief (Doc.32 at7). Gray submitteda sworn affidavitstatingthat,as a resultof
Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b),he facestheburden of eitherwearing hiskufiin
accordance with hisreligion,uncovered atalltimes,or expectingdisciplinary
action.(Doc. 39 at26). IfGray’s assertedexerciseiswearing hiskufiuncovered,
thenProcedure5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)doesnotmerelyregulatethemanner of his
practiceatthemargins;itforbidsthatpracticeinmost areasof MSP. Procedure
5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)thereforeplacespreciselythekind of pressureconstitutinga
substantialburden”under RLUIPA: itrequiresGray eitherto modify conduct he
assertshisreligionrequiresor to riskpunishment. See Warsoldier,418 F.3d at
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995-96; Walker v.Beards 789 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9thCir.2015); Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 717-18.
Accordingly,to the extentGray’s RLUIPA claim ispremised on the theory
thathisreligionrequireshim to wear hiskufiuncovered,he has sufficiently
allegedand supporteda “substantialburden” on his“religiousexercise,”and
Defendants have not carried their burden as movants forsummary judgment to
demonstratetheabsenceof a genuinedisputeof materialfacton thatissue.To be
sure,the Court does not conclude thatGray has establisheda “substantialburden
asa matteroflaw.^Gray hasnotalwaysarticulatedwith precisionwhether the
religiousexerciseatissueiswearing a kufiatalltimes or wearing ituncovered.
But because the record as itstands demonstrates that the contestedpolicypermits
Gray’s continuouswear of hiskufi,only the“substantialburden” allegedlyarising
from Gray’s inabilityto wear hiskufiuncovered willbe consideredunder the least-
restrictive-meansanalysis.
B. Compelling Governmental Interestand Least RestrictiveMeans
For purposesof Defendants’motion,Gray has adduced sufficientevidence
to assertthatMSP’s Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)“substantiallyburdens” his
“ In Muhammad v.Arizona Dep'tof Corr^,No. CV-11-1890-PHX-SMM, 2013 WL 3864253
(D. Ariz.July25,2013),forexample,theplaintiff,likeGray, determinedthathisreligion
requiredhim to wear his kufiatalltimes,otherthan when sleeping.But the accommodation he
sought from hisfacilitywas what theMSP policyrequires,coveringthe kufiwith anothercap at
most times. Id.,at *9.
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assertedreligiousexerciseof wearing hiskufiuncovered. In response,Defendants
must demonstratethatProcedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b)’scoveringrequirementis“in
furtheranceof a compelling governmental interest”and “the leastrestrictivemeans
of furtheringthatcompellinggovernmental interest.”42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
Because Defendants were alreadydeterminedto have a compelling government
interest,(Doc. 12 at6),the remaining and more demanding inquiryconcerns
whether Defendants have shown that MSP “lacks other means of achievingits
desiredgoal without imposing a substantialburden on the exerciseof religionby
^Gray].”Holt,574 U.S. at364-65 (internalquotationmarks and alterations
omitted). “Ifa lessrestrictivemeans isavailablefor [MSP] to achieve itsgoals,
MSP] must use it.”Id.at365 (internalquotationmarks and alterationsomitted).
To demonstrate the absence of a lessrestrictivemeasure, MSP must proffer
evidencethatit“actuallyconsideredand rejectedthe efficacyof lessrestrictive
measures beforeadoptingthechallengedpractice.”Warsoldier,418 F.3d at999.
And “where [Gray]challenges[MSP’s] justifications,[Defendants]must setforth
detailedevidence,tailoredto the situationbefore the court,thatidentifiesthe
failingsinthealternativesadvanced by [Gray].”Id.at 1000 (quotingMay v.
Baldwin,109 F.3d 557,563 (9thCir.1997))(internalquotationmarks and
alterationsomitted,emphasis inoriginal);seealsoAl Saud v.Days, 50 F.4th705,
713 (9thCir.2022). Inthisinstance,Gray has notproposed an alternative.
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Defendants’least-restrictive-meansshowing restson thepolicyhistoryof
Procedure 5.6.1(III)(D)(6)(b),and the elucidationof thepolicywith the affidavitof
Defendant Stefalo,who has been theReligiousActivitiesCoordinatoratMSP
since2012. (Doc. 34-2). Defendants concede they “have not been able to locate
recordsindicatingthatwhen the 2011 amendments were implemented[,]otherless
restrictivepossibilitieswere considered.”(Doc. 32 at 14-15). The relevant
provisionswere adopted “over a decade ago and,atthispoint,no recordhas been
locatedidentifyingwhat alternativeswere considered.”(Doc. 40 at4).
Priorto 2011, MSP “had a lessrestrictiveprocedurethatgoverned religious
property.” (Doc. 32 at 14;Doc. 34 at 17,23). Under the earlierrule,Procedure
5.6.1(III)(I)(4),inmates could possessapproved religiouspersonalproperty,and
there were no restrictions on when inmates could wear or displaythose items.
(Doc. 34 at^ 17;see Doc. 34-3 at7). Defendants assertthat,inresponseto
inmatesdisplayingand alteringreligiouspersonalpropertyto identifythemselves
as gang members, MSP amended Procedure 5.6.1in 2011 to includespecificrules
governingtheuse and displayof religiousmedallions.(Doc. 32 at 14;Doc. 34 at
15,21-23; see Doc. 34-4 at4). The 2011 amendment did not addressreligious
headgear. (See Doc. 34-4 at4). In 2014, Procedure 5.6.1was amended again to
add a subsectionspecificallyaddressingreligiousheadgear,(Doc. 34 at% 24;
Doc. 34-5 at4),which isthe most recentiterationand thepolicythatGray
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challenges.In Defendants’view, thisevolutiondemonstratesMSP’s attemptata
lessrestrictivepolicy,which itfound insufficientand ledto adoptionof the current
ruleafterbeing “forcedtoreject”theearlierregime. (Doc. 32 at 15;Doc. 40
at 4-5).
Whether thisshowing issufficientunder Warsoldierrequiresa closerlook at
the factsof thatcase. In Warsoldier,the issuewas an institutionalban on long
hair. Warsoldier,418 F.3d at 992. There, the Ninth Circuitconcluded thatthe
defendantinstitutionhad not considereda religiousexemption tothe grooming
policythatwould allow individualswith a sincerereligiousbeliefto be exempt
from the generalprohibition.Id. The courtconcluded thattherewere several
alternativesto a complete prohibitionon hairlongerthan threeinchesthatwere not
consideredpriorto implementingthepolicy.The recorddid not show thatthe
defendantsin Warsoldierhad sufficientlyconsideredthese alternatives,and thus,
the policyran afoulof RLUIPA.
Itisimportantto note,however, thatRLUIPA does not requireDefendants
to shouldera “herculeanburden” of refutingeveryconceivablealternative.May,
109 F.3d at563. The recordinthismattermore closelyresemblesMay. In May,
defendantsaddressedthealternativestothechallengedhair-searchpolicyin
sufficientdetailto obtainsummary judgment, and theNinth Circuitpanel affirmed
when itcould find no facts in the record from which a jury could findthata less
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restrictivemeans existed.May, 109 F.3d at564-65. The same conclusionoccurs
here. MSP’s previouspolicyallowedreligiousheadgearwithout restriction,which
iswhat Gray advocateshere. (Doc. 2 at5,askingtheCourt to “command[ ] the
defendantsto change theMSP procedure5.6.1(3)(D)(6)(b),and allow forinmates
to be ableto practicetheirreligiousbeliefsby wearing theirreligioushead
gear/skullcaps atalltimes,uncovered,anywhere withinthe facility”).And while
there is no record of the discussion that occurred when thepolicychanged in2014,
thepolicychanged to a more restrictiverule.Itisdifficultto imagine any middle
ground between thepreviouspolicyof unfettereduse to the currentpolicyof
coveredbut almostconstantuse. Any sortof thirdpath would run intothe issue
confrontedby theNinth CircuitinAl Saud and Walker. In both of those cases,the
courtconcludedthatthepolicyadoptedwas theleastrestrictivemeans, because to
adopt a looserpolicywould drivetheprisonintoa dead end, where itwould create
constitutionalequalprotectionconcerns forotherreligions,whose visual
symbolism isalsorestrictedby thesepolicies.As statedinAl Saud, “[t]hereisno
means of grantingthataccommodation thatwould not resultin discriminating
againstothers.”Al Saud, 50 F.4that713 (9thCir.2022).
This analysisdoes notplacean improperburden on Gray to develop an
alternative;itmerely acceptsthattheissueof covered/uncovered isbinary.There
isno viablealternativethatmeets thepurposeofthe policyto limitsecurityissues
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relatedtoreligioussymbols, while allowingas much religiousfreedom as possible.
Having moved from a lessrestrictiveto a more restrictivepolicy over time,
Defendantshave sufficientlyconsideredlessrestrictivemeans to furthertheir
compelling governmental interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
For theforegoingreasons.Defendants’motion forsummary judgment is
granted.Gray has not shown thereisa disputedmaterialfactthatwarrantsa trial.
Assuming Gray has shown thatDefendants’policysubstantiallyburdens his
sincerelyheldreligiousbelief.Defendantshave shown theirpolicyisthe least
restrictivemeans to furthertheircompellinggovernmentalinterest.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendants’motion forsummary judgment (Doc.31) isGRANTED. The
Clerk of Court isdirectedto enterjudgment pursuantto Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
The Clerkof Court isdirectedto notifythepartiesof the making of this
Order.
DATED this11thday of June,2026.
WILLIAM W. MERCER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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