govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_24-cr-00141-4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
USA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
LINWEI DING, 
Defendant. 
 

 
 
ORDER DENYING DING’S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO 
BATSON V. KENTUCKY 
Re: Dkt. No. 392 
 
 
Ding’s motion pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), is denied because 
Ding has not shown that the government’s proffered reasons for exercising its challenged strikes 
were pretextual. At trial, Ding twice challenged the government’s exercise of its peremptory 
strikes against prospective jurors of Chinese descent. Ding first raised a Batson challenge after 
the government struck Juror 45, which was the government’s third overall strike and its second 
strike against a prospective juror of Chinese descent. Ding again raised a Batson challenge after 
the government struck Juror 84, which was the government’s fifth overall strike and its third 
against a prospective juror of Chinese descent. Ding timely raised both Batson challenges, and 
the Court asked the government to articulate its race-neutral reasons for each challenged strike. 
After considering those reasons, the Court denied the challenges without prejudice to filing a 
written post-trial motion. The Court now concludes that Ding has not met his burden to show 
that the government’s strikes were motivated by discriminatory intent. 
The government consistently exercised its challenges based on prospective jurors’ 
statements expressing: (1) strong negative opinions about Google; (2) strong anti-Administration 

 
2 
views; and (3) concern about the juror’s ability to follow the law.1 Ding’s comparative analysis 
does not undercut this because it focuses on seated jurors whose statements were not as extreme 
or case specific as the statements made by the jurors the government struck. Ding’s assertion that 
the government’s previous attempts to excuse the struck jurors for cause adds to the inference of 
racial discrimination is also unpersuasive. If the government has a colorable argument for 
excusal based on hardship or cause, it is natural that it would prefer to have the juror excused on 
that basis rather than having to exercise one of its peremptory challenges. 
With respect to Juror 84, Ding also argues that the government’s stated reasons were not 
race-neutral. The government’s proffered reasons for striking Juror 84 included Juror 84’s 
statements questioning the government’s motive for prosecuting IP theft cases against Chinese 
nationals, which Juror 84 referred to as often being based in “witch-hunting or racial 
discrimination.” It is true that the government cannot simply assume that a juror of a certain 
racial group will be biased in favor of the defendant. United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 
1260 (9th Cir. 1987). But where a prospective juror makes a statement suggesting that their 
concern about racial discrimination might prevent them from being impartial, the government 
does not discriminate by striking such a juror based on their statement. See Cummings v. Martel, 
796 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2015), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 822 F.3d 1010 (9th 
Cir. 2016); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 953 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Juror 84 made statements in his juror 
questionnaire that justified the government’s concern about his ability to be impartial. But in any 
case, that was not the government’s sole basis for excusing Juror 84. The government also 
pointed to Juror 84’s statements expressing concern about Google’s role in society. Although the 
 
1 The government articulated the following reasons for its challenged strikes: 
• Juror 43: strong views about Google and statements expressing concern about his ability 
to follow laws he personally disagreed with; 
• Juror 45: strong views against the administration and skepticism about the government’s 
motive for prosecuting the case; 
• Juror 84: statements expressing concern about Google’s influence on society and that 
cases of IP theft against Chinese nationals are often motivated by racial discrimination. 

 
3 
Court may have arrived at a different conclusion about Juror 84’s ability to serve as an impartial 
juror, that is not enough to conclude that the government’s strike was based on racial 
discrimination.2 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 12, 2026 
______________________________________ 
VINCE CHHABRIA 
United States District Judge 
 
 
2 Ding points to the fact that, after the government stated its reasons for striking Juror 84, the 
Court noted that Juror 84 “seemed very solid” and expressed concern about the strike. See 
Transcript of Voir Dire on Jan. 7, 2026 (Dkt. No. 369) at 252:13-16, 254:8-11. But ultimately, 
the relevant question is not whether the Court agrees with the government’s assessment of a 
particular juror but rather whether the government’s asserted rationale is credible. See United 
States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Ultimately, we must 
determine whether the ‘stated reasons were the prosecutor’s genuine reasons for exercising a 
peremptory strike.’”) (quoting Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

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