govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_21-cv-00970-4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
HERBERT GRAY, 
 
Civil Action No. 21-00970 (RMB) 
(SAK) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 v. 
UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL 
HEALTHCARE RUTGERS, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
BUMB, Chief District Judge. 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon two pro se motions filed by 
Plaintiff Herbert Gray ( “Gray” or “Plaintiff”), a state prisoner incarcerated at South 
Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey. The first is a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction ( Dkt. No. 139), filed November 10, 2025, seeking an order compelling 
Defendants to administer Gray ’s prescribed ophthalmic eye drops. The second is a 
“Motion for Legislative New Jersey Constitution ‘Isolated Confinement Restriction 
Act’” (Dkt. No. 142), filed December 15, 2025, invoking New Jersey ’s Isolated 
Confinement Restriction Act, P.L. 2019, c. 160. Defendant University Correctional 
Healthcare (“UCHC”) and Amanda Williams oppose. Dkt. No. 142. (Dkt. No. 145.) 
Defendants UCHC and Williams have separately submitted sealed medical records 
responsive to this Court’ s December 5, 2025 Text Order. ( Dkt. No. 143.) For the 
reasons set forth below, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction ( Dkt. No. 139) is PageID:
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DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the Motion Regarding the Isolated 
Confinement Restriction Act (Dkt. No. 142) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Gray has been a state prisoner within the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections (“NJDOC”) for over eight years and has been housed at South Woods 
State Prison for approximately three of those years. ( Dkt. No. 139 at 5.) Gray suffers 
from severe bilateral glaucoma. An ophthalmology consultation conducted on May 
21, 2025, by Dr. Walter Beckford, O.D. at the NJDOC documented the following 
findings: (1) end- stage advanced glaucoma in the right eye; (2) neovascularization 
glaucoma of the left eye with no light perception; (3) monocular vision; (4) mild 
cataract of the right eye; and (5) no background diabetic retinopa thy of the right eye. 
(Dkt. No. 139 at 10–11.) Gray’s corrected visual acuity is 22/200 in the right eye, with 
no light perception in the left eye. ( Id.) Dr. Beckford prescribed a multi -drug 
ophthalmic regimen — including atropine 1%, brimonidine 0.2%, Cosopt, Restasis, 
Muro 128, Refresh Optive, Rhopressa, and latanoprost — and referred Gray to 
glaucoma specialist Dr. Turbin at University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
(“UMDNJ”) for evaluation of possible enucleation of the left eye. ( Id. at 11.) The 
consulting physician further documented that Gray “ is visually compromised, needs 
to be in the infirmary and needs assistance with eating and feeding.” (Id.) 
Gray initiated this action in January 2021. ( Dkt. No. 1.) Following several 
rounds of screening and amendment, Gray’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 
89) is the operative pleading, asserting Section 1983 claims arising from alleged denial PageID:
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of adequate medical care and conditions of confinement at South Woods State Prison, 
including claims against Defendant UCHC, its administrators, and various NJDOC 
officials. The case was administratively terminated pending the appointment of pro 
bono counsel (Dkt. No. 127), a process that has proved protracted. Most recently, this 
Court appointed James E. Cecchi, Esq., but that appointment was vacated after 
counsel advised his firm could not accept it. (Dkt. Nos. 148, 150, 151.) The search for 
new pro bono counsel remains ongoing. 
On November 10, 2025, Gray filed the present Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction ( Dkt. No. 139), alleging that Defendants stopped administering his 
prescribed eye drops on August 11, 2025, and that continued deprivation will result in 
permanent loss of vision in his only functional eye. (Dkt. No. 139 at 2–3.) On October 
23, 2025, Gray had raised these same medication allegations before Magistrate Judge 
King at a telephonic status conference. ( Dkt. No. 136.) Magistrate Judge King 
thereafter directed defense counsel to advise his clients of Gray’s allegations. (Dkt. No. 
138.) 
On December 5, 2025, the Court directed Defendants UCHC and Williams to 
file, within ten days, a letter describing Gray ’s medical treatment for glaucoma — 
including his prescription eye drops — with supporting medical records under seal. 
(Dkt. No. 141.) Defendants timely complied on December 15, 2025. ( Dkt. No. 143.) 
By Text Order dated December 30, 2025, the Court sealed those records pursuant to 
Local Civil Rule 5.3(c)(3) and Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 2001), and PageID:
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deferred a full briefing schedule on the motion pending appointment of pro bono 
counsel. (Dkt. No. 144.) On December 15, 2025, Gray separately filed his Motion 
Regarding the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act (Dkt. No. 142). Defendants filed 
their opposition on January 6, 2026. (Dkt. No. 145.) Both motions are now ripe. 
The Court has reviewed the sealed medical records submitted by Defendants 
(Dkt. No. 143-1), which include Gray’s chart summary, a medications report, and 
Medication Administration Records ( “MARs”) covering August through December 
2025. The Court describes their contents only to the extent necessary to explain its 
ruling, consistent with the privacy interests underlying the sealing order. See Doe v. 
Delie, 257 F.3d at 311. 
The sealed records disclose that the events of August 11, 2025 are considerably 
more complex than Gray’s motion suggests. Nursing notes from that date document 
two separate encounters in which Gray declined to receive his ophthalmic drops. In 
the first, a licensed practical nurse brought the drops to Gray’s cell door and informed 
him that he would henceforth be responsible for self- administration; Gray stated he 
could not self-administer because of his legal blindness and prior difficulty, but then 
declined an offer of staff assistance and refused to sign a refusal form. A second nurse 
documented a substantially similar encounter later that afternoon. On the same date, 
Defendant Dr. Sherita Latimore- Collier entered a chart order modifying the 
administration protocol to provide that nursing staff would deliver the drops to Gray’s 
cell door for him to self -administer, with staff to retrieve the medications afterward. PageID:
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The MAR data for August 2025 reflects numerous entries coded “ N” (Not 
Administered) for the ophthalmic medications beginning on or around August 11. The 
record does not clearly distinguish, on a dose -by-dose basis, between instances of 
patient refusal and instances of non-delivery attributable to Defendants. 
These facts materially complicate Gray ’s characterization of August 11 as a 
straightforward medication stoppage. Whether the protocol change to self -
administration was medically appropriate — given that the consulting 
ophthalmologist had specifically documented that Gray requires infirmary -level 
assistance and is “ maximized on medications ” — is a question the Court cannot 
resolve on the present record. (Dkt. No. 139 at 11.) That question is addressed further 
below. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 
A preliminary injunction is “ an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 
right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success 
on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; 
(3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is 
in the public interest. Id. at 20; Reilly v. City of Harrisburg , 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d C ir. 
2017). The movant bears the burden of establishing each factor. Opticians Ass’n of Am. 
v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990). Where, as here, the movant 
seeks a mandatory injunction compelling affirmative conduct rather than preserving PageID:
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the status quo, that burden is “even more stringent.” Acierno v. New Castle County , 40 
F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In the prison medical care context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–
05 (1976). A serious medical need is “ one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize 
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate 
indifference requires that the defendant subjectively knew of and disregarded an 
excessive risk to the prisoner ’s health. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
“[M]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment ” does not satisfy this 
standard. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Because Gray is proceeding 
pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 –21 
(1972). That obligation does not, however, relieve him of the burden of satisfying the 
substantive requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 139) 
 
1. Serious Medical Need 
 
The Court has no difficulty concluding that Gray ’s bilateral glaucoma 
constitutes a serious medical need. Gray has been diagnosed with end-stage advanced 
glaucoma in his only eye with any residual visual function, has no light perception in PageID:
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his left eye, and has been deemed legally blind by the State of New Jersey and 
NJDOC’s medical program. (Dkt. No. 139 at 5 –6.) His consulting ophthalmologist 
has prescribed a complex, multi -drug regimen to manage intraocular pressure and 
preserve his remaining vision. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347; Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 
257, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the seriousness of a medical need when delay 
in treatment risks permanent injury). This factor is not in dispute. 
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 
Gray’s characterization of August 11, 2025 as a straightforward denial of 
prescribed medication is not supported by the sealed record. The documentation 
reflects that on that date nursing staff brought Gray’s drops to his cell door, informed 
him of a protocol change requiring self -administration, offered to assist him in doing 
so, and documented his refusal. The Court does not read that sequence as a simple 
stoppage of care. 
The deliberate indifference question, however, does not end there. The relevant 
inquiry is not only whether Gray refused, but whether the protocol change that 
precipitated the refusal was itself constitutionally adequate. A prisoner ’s refusal of 
treatment does not insulate medical staff from Eighth Amendment liability where the 
conditions under which treatment was offered were themselves deficient. See White v. 
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990) (deliberate indifference may be established 
where pris on medical staff “prevent an inmate from receiving recommended 
treatment”). Here, the consulting ophthalmologist specifically documented that Gray PageID:
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is “maximized on medications,” requires infirmary placement, and “needs assistance 
with eating and feeding. ” (Dkt. No. 139 at 11.) The protocol change that shifted 
responsibility for administering a complex, multi-drop ophthalmic regimen to a legally 
blind patient — without apparent reference to those specialist findings — is not 
obviously consistent with the standard of care the specialist prescribed. Whether Dr. 
Latimore-Collier’s August 11 order constituted a knowing departure from those 
recommendations, and whether it contributed to the subsequent pattern of non -
administration documented in the MARs, are questions the Court cannot resolve 
without adversarial briefing. 
The motion has not been fully briefed. Defendants have submitted sealed 
medical records but have not filed a substantive merits opposition. Gray has not had 
the assistance of counsel. On this record, the Court declines to make a finding — in 
either direction — on the likelihood of success. The deliberate indifference question is 
a live one, and the Court does not foreclose it. What the record does not support is the 
threshold finding required to issue a mandatory injunction. 
3. Irreparable Harm 
 
Permanent vision loss is, by its nature, an injury that damages cannot remedy. 
See Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass’n v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 
2002) (irreparable harm must be imminent, not speculative). The Court takes seriously 
the risk that delay could result in permanent injury. At the same time, the sealed record 
does not clearly establish that Gray is currently being denied his ophthalmic PageID:
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medications in any manner unattributable to his own documented refusals, nor does 
it establish the status of his eye drop administration with sufficient clarity to support 
mandatory injunctive relief. Updated medical records, obtained on a current record 
with counsel’s assistance, are necessary to assess this factor properly. 
4. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 
 
Were deliberate indifference established, the balance of equities and the public 
interest would unambiguously favor Gray. There is no legitimate penological interest 
in withholding from a legally blind prisoner the ophthalmic medications prescribed by 
a specialist to preserve his only functional eye. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04; Helling 
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). These factors weigh in Gray’s favor. They do not, 
however, independently supply the threshold showing of likelihood of success required 
to issue a mandatory injunction. Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653. 
5. Disposition 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 139) 
is denied without prejudice. Upon appointment of pro bono counsel, the Court will set 
an expedited briefing schedule for any renewed motion. The Court separately directs 
Defendants UCHC and Williams to supplement the sealed medical records previously 
submitted (Dkt. No. 143-1) with updated records reflecting Gray’s current ophthalmic 
treatment and medication administration, to be filed under seal within fourteen (14) 
days of the date of this Opinion. The Court’s denial is without prejudice to, and should PageID:
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not be read as foreclosing, a renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief on a fully 
developed record. 
B. Motion Regarding the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act (Dkt. No. 142) 
 
Gray’s second motion asks this Court to “ argue the New Jersey Constitution 
Legislation for the ‘Isolated Confinement Restriction Act’” and to enjoin Defendants 
from violating that Act ’s standards with respect to his isolated confinement at South 
Woods State Prison. ( Dkt. No. 142 at 1 –2.) The motion also reasserts Gray ’s 
allegations regarding his medical treatment and conditions of confinement. (Id. ) 
Defendants oppose. (Dkt. No. 145.) 
The motion fails for two independent reasons. 
First, the New Jersey Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, P.L. 2019, c. 160, 
codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:4 -82.5 through 30:4 -82.11, is a state statute. This 
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction rests on Gray’s federal constitutional claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Act does not, of itself, create a federal right enforceable under 
Section 1983. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). To the extent Gray 
seeks to enforce the Act as an independent cause of action in this Court, he must 
identify a basis for federal jurisdiction or invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The motion does neither. 
Second, Gray asks this Court to “argue” state legislation on his behalf. That is 
not relief a federal district court can provide. A court adjudicates disputes; it does not 
advocate legislative positions or serve as counsel to a party. See U.S. Const. art. III. PageID:
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The Court notes that Gray ’s underlying concerns — including the use of 
isolated confinement in a cell incompatible with his disability and medical needs — 
may present cognizable claims under the Eighth Amendment or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which are already pleaded or potentially available 
in the operative complaint. Appointed counsel may assess whether those claims 
warrant additional development. Accordingly, the denial of Dkt. No. 142 is without 
prejudice to Gray’s ability, through appointed counsel, to assert any properly framed 
federal or state-law claim arising from his conditions of confinement. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For
 the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 139)
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Motion Regarding the Isolated 
Confinement Restriction Act (Dkt. No. 142) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
Upon appointment of pro bono counsel, the Court will set an expedited briefing 
schedule for any renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Defendants UCHC 
and Williams are directed to file supplemental sealed medical records as set forth 
above within fourteen (14) days. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
Dated: June 12, 2026 
s/ Renée Marie Bumb 
Renée Marie Bumb 
Chief U nited States 
District Judge PageID:
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