govinfo:USCOURTS-moed-4_25-cv-00936-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 EASTERN DIVISION 
 
ESTATE OF LAMOREE’ MOORE, by and ) 
through its Administrator, Leonetta Simpson, et al.,  ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. )      Case No. 4:25-CV-936-ZMB 
  ) 
ALPHA KAPPA ALPHA SORORITY, )  
INC., et al.,  ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on several motions, including various Defendants’ requests 
to dismiss, transfer venue, and take judicial notice. Docs. 82, 84, 86, 88, 95, 124. Significantly, all 
remaining Defendants argue that the Eastern District of Missouri is an improper venue for a case 
involving hazing at Southern Illinois University—Carbondale (SIUC), which Plaintiffs allege resulted 
in their daughter taking her own life. As almost none of the events giving rise to this claim occurred 
in Missouri, the Court transfers this case to the proper venue of the Southern District of Illinois.  
BACKGROUND 
I. Factual Background1 
LaMorre’ Moore transferred to SIUC in 2019 with the hope of joining Defendant Alpha 
Kappa Alpha Sorority (AKA). Doc. 80 ¶ 50. Moore began the initiation process at SIUC that year, 
id. ¶ 80, but she immediately began experien cing problems , id. ¶ 51. Despite AKA policy 
 
1 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept the well-pled allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non -moving party. See Zutz v. Nelson , 628 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Likewise, 
when venue is challenged, the prevailing view appears to be that the Court “must accept as true all allegations in the 
complaint, at least where they are not contradicted by a defendant ’s affidavit, and resolve all conflicts in favor of the 
plaintiff.” See Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552, at *15 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) (collecting cases). 
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forbidding hazing, some of the initiation requirements included physically strenuous activity and, 
at times , even resulted in physical abuse. Id. ¶ 51. The hazing also included psychological 
elements, ranging from threats and intimidation to “forced isolation.” Id. ¶ 52.  
 Following initiation, AKA sisters and members of a fraternity, Defendant Alpha Pi Alpha 
(APA), subjected Moore to “post-process,” which involved more hazing. See id. ¶¶ 53, 56. In one 
instance, members of APA and AKA instructed Moore to give “sexually suggestive ‘lap dances’” 
to members of APA . Id. ¶¶ 53, 58. Moore also received “hostile and coercive text messages” in 
October 2019. Id. ¶ 61. All of this occurred in Illinois or SIUC’s campus. See id. ¶¶ 50–63. 
At some point during her time at SIUC , Moore was sexually assaulted. See id. ¶¶ 73–74. 
As she later disclosed to medical professionals, she was sexually assaulted by multiple men, 
including those involved in the 2019 initiation process. Id. ¶ 54. While she did not specifically 
identify the perpetrators, it became apparent that an APA member was among those she accused 
of perpetrating the assault. See id. ¶ 55. Moore attempted to bring the issue up with Defendant 
Kyra Rogers, but the situation quickly deteriorated. Id. ¶ 73.  
 Moore then returned to Missouri in October 2020. Id. ¶ 74. After her return, Moore 
continued to receive “group communications ” that contained “disparaging and coercive 
statements,” id. ¶ 65, through “text messages, emails, and social media communications,” id. ¶ 74. 
This ongoing abuse was part of a vague “multiyear scheme orchestrated and perpetuated” by AKA 
and APA members, although Rogers is the only identified individual who sent such 
communications. Id. ¶¶ 76, 163.  
While in Missouri, the lasting impacts of the hazing became apparent. Moore was 
hospitalized multiple times from 2020 to 2022 for mental health concerns that professionals linked 
to trauma from the hazing she endured at SIUC. Id. ¶ 9. Her mother reached out to AKA officers 
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in October 2021 about “the severe psychological trauma [Moore] was experiencing” as a result of 
her participation in the sorority. Id. ¶ 80. Moore’s mother sought some form of assistance from 
AKA, including by “reintegrate[ing] her daughter into the organization” to “help restore her 
dignity and support her emotionally,” but that request fell on deaf ears. Id. ¶¶ 82–87. In early 2022, 
Moore was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. Id. ¶ 54. Tragically, Moore took her life in 
November 2022 while at her family’s home in Missouri. Id. ¶ 75.  
II. Procedural Background 
In June 2025, Plaintiffs Estate of Lamoree’ Moore, Loenetta Simpson (Moore’s mother), 
and Andre Moore (Moore’s father) (collectively “the Estate”) filed their complaint. Doc. 1. Several 
months later, t he Estate obtained leave and filed an Amended Complaint , which brings several 
causes of action: wrongful death , a “survival action ,” negligent supervision , hazing, negligent 
entrustment, intentional infliction of emotion distress , negligent infliction of emotional distress , 
civil conspiracy, and conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Id. ¶¶ 100–200. The majority of the 
claims are brought under Missouri law, except for the last claim . Id. The Amended Complaint 
initially listed 27 Defendants, but 12 of them have since been dismissed, see Docs. 114, 118.  
The remaining Defendants filed several motions to dismiss, Docs. 82, 84, 86, 88, 124, and 
all functionally raise the same arguments . Spe cifically, they raise  issues related to standing, 
personal jurisdiction, fail ure to state a claim, choice of law, and venue. See, e.g., Doc. 83. The 
Estate opposed these motions, Docs. 83, 90, 92, 93, 94, 127, and the respective Defendants replied, 
Docs. 99, 96, 97, 100, 128.  
LEGAL STANDARD 
A defendant may respond to a complaint by moving to dismiss or transfer a case for 
improper venue. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). In an action such as this, venue is proper in “(1) a judicial 
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district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the [forum] State,” “(2) a 
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 
occurred,” or, if neither of those apply, (3) “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject 
to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “When venue 
is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls within one of [these] three 
categories.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. , 571 U.S. 49, 56 (2013). “If it does, venue is 
proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the case must be dismissed or transferred under 
§ 1406(a).” Id. A plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that their chosen venue is proper. 
See, e.g., Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 
F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 2005). But once the Plaintiff puts forward facts sufficient to support venue 
in the chosen forum, the burden is on the defendant to show why the chosen forum is improper  
through affidavit and facts outside of the pleadings. C.H. Robinson Worldwide v. Tu, 2019 WL 
7494686, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2019).  When considering venue under section 1392(a), the 
Court does not “ask which district among two or more potential forums is the ‘best’ venue,” but 
rather “whether the district the plaintiff chose had a substantial connection to the claim .” Setco 
Enters. v. Robbins, 19 F.3d 1278, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994). 
DISCUSSION 
While Defendants raise a number of arguments in support of dismissal, the Court need only 
address their  arguments regarding improper venue .2 Because the Defendants are of diverse 
citizenship, the venue analysis turn s on whether “a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The Eighth Circuit 
 
2 While certain Defendants minimally developed the argument in their joint memorandum in support of dismissal, 
Doc. 89, they all assert  improper venue, Doc. 88 ¶  6, and the Court grants  their motion in this respect because the 
arguments advanced by the other Defendants apply equally to them. 
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has not developed its own standards  for assessing whether events are “substantial” within the 
meaning of section 1391. See Setco Enters., 19 F.3d at 1281 (citing out of circuit authority for the 
proposition that “venue is proper if the events in a district ‘were not insubstantial and the forum is 
a convenient one balancing the equities and fairness to each party ’”). But an important factor to 
consider is the “conduct of the parties ” in relation to the “nature of the dispute.” Catipovic v. 
Turley, 2012 WL 2089552, at *15 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) (citations omitted). “When 
determining whether a substantial part of the events occurred in a forum, the court’s focus must be 
on relevant activities of the defendant in the forum state, not on the effect of those activities on the 
plaintiff in the forum state.” Paragon Freight Sys. v. River City Ins. Agency , 2021 WL 3636062, 
at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2026) (quotation and emphasis omitted). 
Defendants all essentially contend that the substantial part of the events occurred in Illinois, 
not Missouri. See, e.g., Doc. 83 a t 11–12. The Estate claims Defendants “do[] not address the 
factual allegations in the complaint that detail the communications directed to Moore in Missouri,” 
and argue that it makes “no sense to transfer a wrongful death case” out of the state where the 
death occurred. Doc. 91 at 8. Among their replies, Defendants argue that the “general allegations 
about unidentified messages” are insufficient to show that they constitute substantial events giving 
rise to the claims, especially when the unspecified communications are compared with the Estate’s 
“detailed factual allegations about the events occurring in Illinois.” Doc. 97 at 6–7.  
Defendants correctly assert that the Eastern District of Missouri is not the proper venue for 
this dispute. The nature of this suit relates to hazing that occurred at SIUC. The Amended 
Complaint provides specific and detailed instances of harassment by the named Defendants while 
Moore was at college in Illinois. Doc. 80 ¶¶ 51–52. While the effects of this conduct perhaps were 
felt by Moore most acutely in Missouri, that alone cannot confer venue. See Woodke v. Dahm, 70 
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F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir.1995) (“[I]f Congress had wanted to lay venue where the plaintiff was residing 
when he was injured, it could have said so expressly .”); see also Ragsdale v. Byassee, 2011 WL 
4499349, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2011) (rejecting a claim that the place a plaintiff receives medical 
treatment can create proper venue because it “would mean, in effect, that in nearly every personal 
injury case venue would lie where the plaintiff resides because an injured person  typically will 
receive medical treatment in the state where he resides ”). Based on the nature of the dispute and 
on where Defendants’ conduct occurred, the substantial events occurred in Illinois, not Missouri. 
Nor is venue in this District saved by virtue of the alleged text messages alone. Venue is 
proper where a substantial amount of activity occurred that gives rise to the claims. See Catipovic, 
2012 WL 2089552, at *15. But the Estate’s underdeveloped allegations regarding text messages 
do not constitute a substantial part of the events. The Amended Complaint is bereft of details on 
the frequency, content, or the identity of the alleged senders.3 Only Rodgers is identified by name. 
See Doc. 80 ¶ 163. But even that allegation describes the messages as “repeated[,] coercive[,] and 
threatening,” id., with little in way of nonconclusory facts. In any event, it is unclear how the 
unilateral actions of one co-defendant could constitute a substantial part of the events as it relates 
to all defendants in a case, especially when there is no way to evaluate the substance of the 
interactions. Moore’s mental-health treatment and death are the only concrete events that occurred 
 
3 These underdeveloped allegations also raise serious doubts about whether this Court could obtain personal 
jurisdiction over certain  Defendants because it is wholly unclear which Defendant s would have made “sufficient 
minimum contacts” with Missouri such that they could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” here. Federate 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. FedNat Holding Co., 928 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2019). For instance, there is no allegation that other 
named Defendants sent messages to Moore. And in any event, “ telephone calls, written communications, and even 
wire-transfers to and from a forum state do not create sufficient contacts to comport with due process such that a 
[defendant] could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. ” Deloney v. Chase, 755 F. App’x 592, 596 (8th 
Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). Thus, even if the Eastern District of Missouri were a proper venue, it is highly unlikely 
that specific personal jurisdiction exist s as to at least some Defendants. And if the C ourt cannot exercise personal 
jurisdiction over all of the Defendants, then venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is also improper.  See Richards 
v. Aramark Servs., 108 F.3d 925, 928  (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal for lack of venue where the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over on of the defendants).  
 
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in Missouri, and the Estate suggests that the gravity of this effect is precisely why the Court should 
find that venue is proper  here. See, e.g., Doc. 91 at 8. But at least for purposes of venue, that 
consideration merely identifies where the ultimate result of Defendants’ conduct  occurred, not 
about where Defendants’ substantial acts giving rise to the claim, which is what matters for venue. 
See Paragon Freight Sys., 2021 WL 3636062 at *3. As such, Illinois—not Missouri—is the proper 
venue for this action.4 
On a final note , the Court finds that the interest of justice weighs strongly in favor of 
transfer, rather than dismissal. When an action is filed in the wrong venue, the Court may either 
“dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [the improperly filed] case to any district or 
division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Most Defendants have, by 
their representations to the Court , consented to be sued in Illinois and concede that the Southern 
District of Illinois is the appropriate venue. See Doc. 83 at 12; Doc. 85 at 12; Doc. 87 at 12; Doc. 
125 at 13. The majority have even identified transfer as appropriate here. But see Doc. 88. In any 
event, the Court finds that the interests of justice warrant transfer because of the amount of effort 
Plaintiffs has expended in serving all Defendants and to allow for a speedy resolution of this case.  
 
4 Even assuming that venue is proper in this District, the Court still would transfer this case to the Southern District 
of Illinois, as it is the most convenient forum . Federal courts have “ the authority under 28 U.S.C. §  1404(a) to sua 
sponte transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice. ” Clark v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co. , 2010 WL 2771916,  at *3 (E.D. Ark. June 
18, 2010) (citations omitted). A transfer under section 1404(a) is proper when the interests of justice and balance of 
convenience favors transferring the case to a more appropriate forum. See C-Mart, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
No. 4:13-CV-52-AGF, 2013 WL 2403666, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 31, 2013) . There are a number of relevant factors, 
id., but the key considerations here can be summarized succinctly. Even assuming Missouri law applies to this case, 
most if not all of the witnesses, events, and records are located in Illinois. Further, the comparative costs of litigating 
in Illinois are relatively low for Plaintiffs , an Illinois judgment can be enforced easily in Illinois  against Illinois 
residents, and there are no obstacles to a fair trial in Illinois. And given that every Defendant ha s purposely availed 
themselves of Illinois through their personal conduct there, the same personal jurisdiction concerns at issue in this 
Court will not be present in the transferee court. As such, even if Missouri were a proper venue, transfer still would 
be warranted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ [82] [84] [86] [88] [124] motions 
to dismiss insofar as they seek to transfer to the Southern District of Illinois  for improper venue. 
The Court defers ruling on the substantive motion to dismiss and all other motions so that the 
transferee court may address these issues in the first instance.  
The Court will issue a separate Order of Transfer to accompany this order. 
So ordered this 12th day of June 2026. 
 
 
   
 ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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