govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cr-00039-2

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 
 v. 
 
KENDALE WILSON and ALTON 
DURHAM,
 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
Case No. 2:25-cr-00039 (BRM) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Before this Court is Defendant Alton Durham’s (“Durham”) Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
(Durham’s Omnibus Discovery Mot. (ECF No. 34) at 2.) Durham is being prosecuted alongside 
co-defendant Kendale Wilson (“Wilson”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Complaint (ECF No. 
1).) Wilson has not requested any evidence to be suppressed. ( See generally Wilson’s Omnibus 
Discovery Mot. (ECF No. 33).) Durham initially raised this Motion to the Court as part of his 
Omnibus Discovery Motion. (ECF No. 34 at 2.) The Government briefed its opposition to the 
Motion in its letter opposing both Defendants’ Omnibus Discovery Motions. (ECF No. 35 at 6.) 
Durham replied in his Omnibus Discovery Reply Brief. (ECF No. 36.) On October 15, 2025, the 
Court held a hearing to consider the arguments and evidence specifically pertaining to the issue of 
suppression. (Tr. of Suppression Hearing (ECF No. 46).) At the end of the hearing, the Court 
granted both sides leave to file a single, supplemental brief to address the suppression issue 
specifically. (Id. at 197:22–198:24.) On December 5, 2025, each party supplied the C ourt with a 
supplemental brief. (Durham’s Suppl. Br. In Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (ECF No. 48); Gov’t Suppl. 
Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Suppress (ECF No. 49).) PageID:
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Having reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions filed in connection with the 
Motion and having heard oral argument for this issue on October 15, 2025, for the reasons set forth 
below and for good cause appearing, Durham’s Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 34) is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
On April 6, 2024, an anti-crime task force consisting of the New J ersey State Police 
(“NJSP”), agents from the Division of Criminal Justice ( “DCJ”), another state law -enforcement 
agency, and the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) conducted 
a surveillance operation within “high-crime” areas of New Jersey. (ECF No. 33 at 2; ECF No. 34 
at 1 ; ECF No. 35 at 2. ) The task force was organized into a convoy of approximately twenty 
officers across ten to twelve police vehicles. (ECF No. 46 at 16 :13–20.) The officers were 
uniformed with tactical vests identifying the officers as law enforcement and bearing the insignia 
of their respective organizations, but the vehicles themselves were unmarked. (Id. at 16:5–15.) 
The convoy patrolled the city in a unit, moving around the city while monitoring the streets 
for indicia of criminal activity —particularly drug or gun crime. ( Id. at 16:21–17:10.) The task 
force works in conjunction with the Real-Time Crime Center (the “Crime Center”), which provides 
them with a map displaying the hotspots in the operational area with an elevated number of “violent 
crimes [including] guns, drugs, [and] robberies .” (Id. at 122:21–123:7.) The map provided to the 
officers did not highlight the area in which Defendants Durham and Wilson had congregated as a 
criminal hotspot but did flag that gun recoveries had occurred at the location. ( Id. at 89:17–23.) 
The Crime Center also provided the officers photos of individuals with outstanding warrants, 
which did not include either of the defendants. (Id.) The detectives who testified at the suppression PageID:
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hearing, Detectives Juan Molina, Samuel Lauture, and Luis Quispe, were each positioned near the 
front of the convoy. (Id. at 17:8–22.) 
The convoy operated by splitting into different squads before patrolling the city of 
Paterson. (Id. at 122:21–123:8.) The vehicles in the convoy were unmarked, and the officers inside 
were dressed in plain clothes with police identifiers. ( Id. at 125:5–9.) These squads were in 
persistent contact via radio and shared details on potential crimes each surveillance unit observed. 
(Id. at 16:21–17:4.) While the convoy was focused on high- crime areas, they did travel through 
and report on other areas within Paterson. (Id. at 89:9–23.) The breadth of the surveillance activity 
was driven by both the convoy’s need to navigate these areas to surveil hotspots identified by the 
Crime Center and because of the d etectives’ own professional experience regarding high-crime 
areas in Paterson. (Id. at 122:21–124:3.) 
That night, Defendants Durham and Wilson were standing outside El Fogón Restaurant, 
Bar, and Liquor (“El Fogón”) in Paterson, New Jersey. (ECF No. 33 at 3; ECF No. 34 at 1; ECF 
No. 35 at 3.)1 At the end of their surveillance patrol, the convoy of officers were traveling down 
Union Avenue, which led them to the front of El Fogón. (ECF No. 46 at 19:3–15.) Although El 
Fogón provides several products, the officers involved with Defendants’ arrest knew of it primarily 
as a liquor store. (Id. at 19:3–5, 86:1–12, 192:20–25.) As they approached the liquor store around 
11:00 p.m., the officers saw a group of men standing outside wearing dark clothing; two of these 
men were Defendants Wilson and Durham (Id. at 125:17–126:2 (placing the time the officers first 
approached El Fogón at “10:37 p.m.”), 132:10–20 (identifying the defendants).) 
 
1 Wilson and Durham were accompanied by an additional individual , Myron Menchan, who was 
also arrested but is not a defendant in this matter. (ECF No. 34 at 1.) PageID:
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Without leaving their vehicles, the officers engaged Defendants in a conversation, the tenor 
of which the parties dispute. (Id. at 104:16–105:3.) According to the Government and the officers, 
the officers called out from their car with a conversational tone and proceeded to have a short 15- 
to 30-second conversation with Defendants. (Id. at 136:7–137:24.) Detective Molina testified that 
engaging the public in a “casual conversation” is a standard practice for plain clothes officers, 
because it allowed them to “gauge the reaction of the public to [the] presence [of police] in these 
high-crime areas.” (Id. at 22:1–23:19.) Individuals who may be engaged in criminal activity were 
more likely to “give[] . . . some sort of indicator,” such as “blad[ing] their body or grab[bing] their 
waistband” in an effort to conceal something from the plainclothes officers. (Id. at 23:12–19.) 
Defendants provide a different account of t his conversation. According to Durham , no 
casual conversation occurred ; instead, immediately after driving up to the group, the officers 
“ordered [them] . . . not to move,” shined their flashlights into the eyes of the group, and “barked 
commands . . . in an aggressive manner.” (Durham Cert. (ECF No. 34-2) ¶ 2.) 
However, in either version , while speaking with the group, the officers noticed Wilson 
“blading” his body, i.e., positioning himself so the officers could not get a good view of one side 
of his body. (ECF No. 46 at 77:20–78:5.) Although the other members of the group spoke to the 
officers, Wilson did not engage and instead began to walk backwards into the alle y beside El 
Fogón. (Id. at 78:6–10.) According to the officers, Durham moved in front of Wilson to conceal 
his retreat into the alley. (Id. at 30:7–25.) Detectives Lauture and Molina used their flashlights to 
observe Wilson’s waistband, where they saw him clutching an object under his clothing. ( Id. at 
135:5–24.) Seeing Wilson clutching an object under his clothes and taking steps to conceal himself 
from the officers, the officers decided that they would need to stop Wilson and search him, so they 
exited their vehicles and began to approach Wilson. (Id. at 30:18–31:18.) PageID:
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Seeing the officers approach him, Wilson began to flee , turning and sprinting down the 
alleyway. (Id. at 31:11–16.) Detectives Lauture and Molina chased Wilson down into the alley, 
and during the chase they observed Wilson grasp at his “upper torso” before discarding a handgun 
and running in the opposite direction. ( Id. at 32:18–33:12.) Seeing Wilson being pursued by the 
detectives, Durham, who had initially engaged with the officers himself, began to flee in a different 
direction, across the street toward the rest of the officers. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 5:00–5:50.) Durham was 
swiftly stopped by the detail of officers—one officer tripped Durham to prevent his flight, and a 
loosely secured handgun was flung from Durham’s waistband as he fell to the ground. (Gov’t Ex. 
4 at 0:30–1:30.) 
The Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey has instructed law 
enforcement on when and how they are supposed to employ their body worn cameras (“BWC s”) 
and has published those requirements (the “BWC Policy”). (ECF No. 48 at 240.) This document 
instructs that officers “equipped with a BWC” are “required to activate the device . . . at the 
initiation of any law enforcement or investigative activity.” ( Id. at 253.) Despite this policy, the 
officers did not immediately activate their body worn cameras. ( See ECF No. 46 at 22:7–15.) 
Detective Lauture activated his camera shortly after engaging Defendants in conversation, but the 
details of the exchanges were not audible from the recording. (Gov’t Ex. No. 5 at 0:00–0:30.) Other 
officers activated their cameras shortly before, or during, the ensuing chase. (ECF No. 46 at 30:18–
31:18.) 
B. Procedural History 
This case was broug ht on June 17, 2024, with a criminal complaint against both Wilson 
and Durham alleging Possession of a Machine Gun and Possession of Ammunition by a Convicted 
Felon against Wilson, alongside Possession of a Machine Gun and Possession of a Firearm by a PageID:
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Convicted Felon against Durham. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2–5.) Shortly thereafter, on August 22, 
2024, the Court issued an order advising the Government of its ongoing obligation to turn over all 
exculpatory evidence to Defendants. (ECF No. 8. ) The same day, the Court appointed attorneys 
for both D efendants; John McMahon was appointed as Counsel for Wilson (ECF No. 9) and 
Charles B. McKenna was appointed as Counsel for Durham (ECF No. 13). 
On January 17, 2025, Defendants were indicted on all the charges listed in the Complaint. 
(ECF No. 22.) On April 11, 2025, Defendants submitted their Omnibus Motions contesting all 
discovery issues between Defendants and the Government. (ECF No. 33; ECF No. 34.) Durham’s 
Motion also argued firearms recovered by the detectives must be suppressed pursuant to 
Defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 34 at 2–3.) The Government filed an opposition 
on May 9, 2025, arguing it had satisfied its ongoing discovery obligations and would continue to 
do so and that maintaining suppression of the firearm evidence was not warranted. (ECF No. 35 at 
6–8, 13–16.) Durham filed a Reply on May 9, 2025, arguing suppression of the firearm evidence 
was warranted because Defendants had been seized and submitted to the authority of the detectives 
at the outset of their encounter . (ECF No. 36.) On July 11, 2025, based on the Court ’s 
understanding that the Government had fully complied with its discovery obligations and would 
continue to do so, the Court issued an Order Denying Without Prejudice all of Defendants ’ 
discovery motions, save for Durham’s Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 39.) As to the suppression 
issue, the Court scheduled a suppression hearing. (Id.) 
The Court held a s uppression hearing on October 15, 2025, where the Court had the 
opportunity to consider the parties’ arguments regarding suppression along with the credibility of 
the detective’s testimony involved with the arrest and discovery of the evidence. (ECF No. 45.) At 
the end of the hearing, the Court provided the parties with an opportunity to file additional briefing PageID:
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regarding the suppression issue (ECF No. 46 at 197:22–198:24) , which they submitted on 
December 5, 2025. (ECF No. 48.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 41(h) provides “[a] defendant may move to 
suppress evidence in the court where trial will occur, as Rule 12 provides.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h). 
Rule 12 requires suppression motions be made prior to trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (b)(3)(C). 
The Supreme Court “created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the 
prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis 
v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011) . “The Fourth Amendment forbids ‘ unreasonable 
searches and seizures, ’ and this usually requires the police to have probable cause or a warrant 
before making an arrest.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136 (2009). However, a traffic 
stop of a vehicle requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause. 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). A 
policeman who lacks probable cause, “but whose ‘observations lead him reasonably to suspect ’ 
that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain 
that person briefly in order to ‘investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.’” Id. The test 
for reasonable suspicion is an objective one —“ as a general matter, the decision to stop an 
automobile is reasonable where . . . a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 810 (1996); United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining 
police officers may perform investigatory traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion that an 
individual has violated a traffic law). Where a stop is not supported by reasonable suspicion, any 
evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed, a bsent some other exception. United States v. 
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). PageID:
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Unless the investigation provides the officer with probable cause for further search of the 
detainee’s person or vehicle, or probable cause for arrest, the detainee must be released. Berkemer, 
468 U.S. at 439–40. “Probable cause exists when ‘ there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 
(2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ). The “automobile exception” to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment “permits vehicle searches without a warrant if there 
is ‘probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. ’” United States v. 
Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Matthews, 597 F. Supp. 
3d 694, 703 (D.N.J. 2022) (“Where an officer has probable cause to believe an automobile contains 
evidence of an offence, the so- called ‘automobile exception’ permits a warrantless search of the 
vehicle.”). “The probable cause inquiry is ‘ commonsense,’ ‘practical,’ and ‘nontechnical;’ it is 
based on the totality of the circumstances and is judged by the standard of ‘reasonable and prudent 
men.’” United States v. Lackey, No. 20-2977, No. 20-2978, 2022 WL 313807, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 
2, 2022) (quoting Donahue, 764 F.3d at 301). 
Generally, “[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.” United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1257 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978) ). However, “[i]n the case of a 
warrantless search, the government bears the burden to show that the search or seizure was 
reasonable.” United States v. Howard, 787 F. Supp. 2d 330, 331 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing United States 
v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
When acting as the finder of fact , the Court deploys its sound judgment to determine the 
credibility of witness testimony. The Court considers a number of factors, including: PageID:
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(1) The opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know 
the things about which the witness testified; (2) The quality of the 
witness’ knowledge, understanding, and memory; (3) The witness’ 
appearance, behavior, and manner while testifying; (4) Whether the 
witness has an interest in the outcome of the case or any motive, 
bias, or prejudice; (5) Any relation the witness may have with a party 
in the case and any effect the verdict may have on the witness; (6) 
Whether the witness said or wrote anything be fore trial that was 
different from the witness’ testimony in court; (7) Whether the 
witness’ testimony was consistent or inconsistent with other 
evidence that you believe; and (8) Any other factors that bear on 
whether the witness should be believed. 
 
United States v. Outlaw, No. 2:21-CR-00382 (BRM), 2024 WL 5704408, at *9 n.14 (D.N.J. May 
14, 2024), aff'd, 138 F.4th 725 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 3.04). 
III. D
ECISION 
A. Durham’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated. 
Durham’s motion to suppress relies on two fundamental elements, both of which must be 
true to justify suppression: (1) that Durham was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and (2) that law enforcement did not have “ reasonable suspicion on the basis of 
articulable facts” at the time he was seized. United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 
2002). It is the Court’ s job to determine at which point each defendant was seized before 
determining whether the Government has met its burden in showing the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to justify the stops. 
A suspect “has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view 
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Chruby 
v. Gillis, 54 F. App’ x 520, 524 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). The Supreme Court is clear that while 
circumstances like the “threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an PageID:
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officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled,” might indicate a seizure, 
mere “inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of 
law, amount to a seizure of that person.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. However, a seizure is not 
effectuated until the person in question submits to a show of police authority or is brought under 
their physical control. United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2000). Stated simply 
if “the suspect does not submit, there is no seizure.” Id.; see also Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 
593, 596–97 (1989) (holding that despite a 20- mile car chase, a suspect was only seized after he 
was brought under the officers’ “physical control” by colliding with a police roadblock). 
For a seizure to be justified under the Fourth Amendment , the law enforcement personnel 
involved in the seizure must provide different levels of evidence, depending on the invasiveness 
and duration of the seizure. Any substantial seizure such as an “arrest or post-arrest detention” are 
reasonable “‘only if based on probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a 
crime.’” Kendig v. Stolar, 173 F.4th 466, 472 (3d Cir. 2026) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 568 
U.S. 186, 192 (2013)). However, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct 
a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.” United States v. Torres , 534 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). These stops are commonly called “Terry stops,” after the 
case which held such stops are compatible with the Fourth Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, so long as 
the investigative stop was justified by “specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant 
that intrusion .” 392 U.S. 1 (1968) . This requirement for “ reasonable suspicion is a generally 
undemanding standard,” but it does require more than a mere hunch; instead, “a police officer does PageID:
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have the initial burden of providing the specific, articulable facts,” which justify the officer’s belief 
that the suspect was violating the law. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 397. 
Regardless of the type of seizure, where that seizure was not justified, “ all evidence 
obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure [is] inadmissible in a federal court .” Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). Although typically the “exclusionary rule requires that [the court] 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search ,” there are a handful of exceptions 
whereby the Government may still rely on such evidence. United States v. Stabile , 633 F.3d 219, 
243 (3d Cir. 2011). The “independent source doctrine” permits the Government to use “evidence 
initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained 
independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.” Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 
558 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2009)). Similarly, if the evidence obtained as a consequence of an 
illegal search “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means then . . . the 
evidence should be received.” Id. at 245 (quoting United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 
192, 195 (3d Cir. 1998)). Finally, evidence is admissible under “the attenuation doctrine . . . when 
the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been 
interrupted by some intervening circumstance.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016). 
There are three moments when the parties plausibly contend a seizure occurred. First, when 
the police first approached Defendants and began asking them questions. (ECF No. 48 at 8.) 
Second, when the officers displayed their authority by exiting their vehicle and attempting to 
prevent Defendants from leaving. (ECF No. 46 at 22:1–10.) Finally, the moments when the officers 
used physical force to prevent Defendants from leaving . (ECF No. 49 at 7.) The Court finds that 
Durham was not seized until an officer tripped him, using physical force to prevent Durham’s 
escape for the reasons set forth below. PageID:
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1. The officers’ innocuous initial contact with Defendants did not amount 
to a seizure. 
Durham contends he was seized at the very instant the officers drove up to the group of 
men and began asking them questions. (ECF No. 48 at 8.) According to Durham, the combination 
of “enormous police presence, the shining of the flashlight, and the questioning by the officers, 
undoubtedly” would have signaled to a reasonable individual “they were not free to leave.” (Id. at 
13.) The Court disagrees. Although the Court considers Durham’s claims that the police 
immediately “barked commands” and blinded the group with “flashlights [pointed] into our faces,” 
these allegations contradict the weight of the credible evidence before the Court. (ECF No. 34- 2 
¶ 2.) Detectives Lauture and Molina offered consistent and believable testimony that they neither 
barked commands, nor shined the flashlight in either man’s face. (ECF No. 46 at 24:1–8, 25:18–
26:1, 136:7–137:22.) Instead, according to Detective Lauture , he called out to Defendants and 
“asked them how they were doing” and as ked what “they [were] doing on that corner.” ( Id. at 
137:16–20.) The detectives also testified that Detective Lauture used his flashlight to light up the 
ground before moving the beam of the flashlight up to Wilson’ s waist and retreated the beam 
shortly thereafter— at no time did the detectives deliberately shine their flashlight into the faces of 
Defendants. (Id. at 137:5–10.) All the detectives to testify offered c redible testimony, consistent 
across direct and cross examination as well as consistent with the testimony of other detectives . 
(ECF No. 46 at 24:1–8, 25:18–26:1, 136:7–137:22, 181:2–182:20.) 
Three law enforcement officers, Detectives Molina, Lauture, and Quispe provided 
testimony regarding the stop. (See generally ECF No. 46.) In considering their testimony, the Court 
found no indicia in the tone, body language, or substance of their testimony to believe the 
Detectives were being anything but forthright and truthful in their representations before the Court. PageID:
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(Id.) Each officer provided answers which were consistent with their other testimony, the 
testimony of the other detectives, and the other evidence before the Court. (Id.) In favor of the 
defense, Durham submitted an affidavit to the Court . (ECF No. 34- 2.) The affidavit contains 
representations both as to the conduct and the detectives and to his own perceptions at the time . 
(Id.) Durham’s statements are also broadly consistent with the other evidence available to the 
court. (Id.) However, because he did not testify, the Court was unable to examine his behavior, or 
how his testimony would fare if subject to the rigors of cross -examination. (See generally ECF 
No. 46.) The Court must also consider the clear interest Durham has in ensuring evidence against 
him is suppressed when considering the value of his affidavit as evidence. See Outlaw , 2024 WL 
5704408, at *9 n.14. For each of these reasons, the Court will credit all of the testimony before it 
as credible evidence while giving greater weight to the in-court testimony of the detectives. 
The physical evidence both parties present ed to the Court further confirms the credibility 
of the detectives’ testimony. For example, Detective Lauture’s BWC was not active to capture the 
entirety of his initial conversation with D efendants. (Gov’t Ex. No. 5 at 0:00–0:30.) However, 
Detective Lauture’s conduct at the beginning of the recording supports the credibility of his 
testimony, as it demonstrates he was sitting in a relaxed position and speaking calmly when he 
retrieved his flashlight. ( Id.) This is contrary to Durham’s affidavit, which claims the detectives 
immediately and simultaneously gave commands and used their flashlight upon arriving at El 
Fogón. (ECF No. 34- 2 ¶ 2.) The video from the camera pole further supports the detectives ’ 
testimony. It shows that over the course of a minute after the police arrived, they engaged 
Defendants in a casual conversation, and only then did the detectives use their flashlights , which 
they kept focused close to the ground—not the faces of the Defendants. (Gov’t Ex. No. 2 at 5:00–
6:30.) PageID:
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Durham stresses Detective Lauture spoke with an elevated voice when en gaging 
Defendants in a casual conversation from several feet away. (ECF No. 48 at 2–3 (arguing Durham 
was seized because officers “had to raise their voices to be heard”).) However, there is a large gap 
between needing to raise one’s voice to be heard at a distance and “shouting” or “barking orders,” 
as Durham’s certification claims. (ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 2.) Defendants’ position poses a false choice, 
either police use their indoor voice at all times—even if that would render them inaudible —or else 
risk inadvertently seizing anyone they speak to. Here, though the precise tone is unknown, the 
content of Detective Lauture’s discussion is unrebutted: he asked the group of men how their night 
was going and what they were doing out on the corner. (ECF No. 46 at 137:16–24.) This is the 
precise type of “ inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police ” which the 
Supreme Court has held “ cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.” 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (holding that merely approaching and asking questions of potential 
suspects does not implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
Durham also objects to Detective Molina’s admission he lacked any personal knowledge 
of Defendants at the time he and Detective Lauture decided to engage them in conversation. (ECF 
No. 48 at 7.) More specifically, when Durham’s attorney cross -examined Detective Molina, the 
attorney asked a series of questions about whether the detectives possessed any personal 
knowledge of Defendants before talking with them. (ECF No. 46 at 83:24–85:4.) Detective Molina 
truthfully answered he only knew of what could be visually ascertained: that Defendants were 
black, male, wearing black hoodies, congregating around a liquor store near midnight with a group 
of other men, and that they appeared to be attempting to shield one of their members from the view 
law enforcement. (Id. at 82:4–85:4.) To the degree Durham argues this is insufficient knowledge 
to justify the initial decision to question, no such justification is necessary. (ECF No. 48 at 7.) It is PageID:
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well-settled that the detectives asking Defendants how their night was going is the kind of 
innocuous contact between law enforcement and the public that does not implicate any Fourth 
Amendment protection. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. 
However, just because no justification is required , that does not mean the government is 
free to act on invidious motives, namely racial discrimination. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 84–86 (1986) (holding although the prosecution was “entitled to use [its] peremptory 
challenges to strike anybody [it] want[s] to” without specific justification it may not use that to 
engage in “[p]urposeful racial discrimination”). To the degree Defendants argue the police acted 
on such purposeful discrimination, this argument fails for two reasons: first, the officer’s subjective 
reasons to initiate inoffensive or consensual contact are irrelevant to whether there has been a 
seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment . Whren v. U nited States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996). S econd, the record simply does not support the inference that Detectives Molina and 
Lauture were being purposefully discriminatory when approaching Defendants. (ECF No. 34-1 at 
10 (arguing “racial profiling . . . is antithetical to the constitution”).) 
Although “ the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 
considerations such as race,” the suppression of evidence is a Fourth Amendment remedy, and 
“the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary 
. . . Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. Furthermore, even if the Fourth 
Amendment contemplates the suppression of evidence due to the discriminator y intent of the 
officers, the detectives’ testimony does not support finding any such intent . (See generally ECF 
No. 46.) Defendants ask the Court to focus on the portion of testimony from Detective Molina 
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talk with Defendants was that they were “black” and “male.” (Id. at 84:19–25.) However, it is clear 
from the context Detective Molina was only testifying that he lacked any “hard information” about 
Defendants, not as to his or Detective Lauture ’s motive for talking to D efendants. (Id. at 83:24–
84:25 (testifying he did not know whether Defendants had outstanding warrants, their names, or 
any specific personal information). For example, both Detectives testified they could observe 
several suspicious behaviors on the part of the group which provided reason for approaching them, 
independent of any alleged discriminatory motive. (Id. at 83:24–85:4, 136:7–144:2 (testifying they 
observed a group of men wearing all black outside a liquor store near midnight, and these men 
acted together to obscure the detectives’ view of Wilson and the gun he was carrying).) Therefore, 
the Court disagrees with Defendants’ position that they were seized from the moment the police 
arrived at El Fogón and finds there is no basis for believing this contact was initiated due to 
purposeful discrimination. 
2. Defendants were not seized at the officer’s display of authority because 
they refused to submit to said authority. 
The next possible moment where the police could have affected a seizure is when 
Detectives Lauture and Molina exited their vehicles and began to approach D efendants. The 
detectives themselves testified this was the point where they understood themselves to be required 
to activate their BWCs, because at that point a suspect “was not free to leave.” (Id. at 22:7–15.)
2 
However, as the Government correctly points out, there are two conditions where law enforcement 
is considered to have seized a citizen: (1) when they employ physical force to restrain the citizen, 
 
2 Whether a suspect would feel free to leave is an objective test, based on when a reasonable person 
would believe that they were no longer free to leave. Shuman ex rel. Shertzer, 422 F.3d at 147 (“A 
seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave.”). PageID:
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or (2), in the absence of force where there is “submission to [an officer’s] assertion of authority,” 
by the citizen. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). The citizen’s submission is the 
critical element; if “the subject does not yield,” then there has been no seizure. Id. 
Here, neither Defendant submitted to the officer’s authority. Wilson, who had already been 
concealing himself and retreating into a nearby alley, had broken into a full sprint away from the 
detectives either directly before or after they exited their vehicle. (Gov’t Ex. 3 0:30–1:30; see also 
ECF No. 46 at 32:9–33:14.) For Durham’s part, while he did not flee at the same time as Wilson, 
it is clear he did not submit either. (Id. at 91:8–11.) Durham, by his own telling, attempted to flee 
immediately upon seeing Detectives Molina and Lauture chase Wilson into an alleyway. (ECF No. 
34 ¶ 4. ) The Defendants argue Durham ’s “fourteen second[]” pause before fleeing to officers 
amounted to submission to their authority. (ECF No. 36 at 3.)3 However, such “momentary pause 
or mere inaction” does not mean a suspect has submitted to the authority of the officers, 
particularly where the momentary pause was merely a tactical decision to help in evading the 
officers pursuing another suspect. United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
The Court therefore agrees with the Government that Defendants were not seized until they 
were met with physical force. For Durham, this was when he was tripped by the officer and 
detained thereafter. (Gov’t Ex. 4 0:25–0:45.) 
3. The officers possessed reasonable suspicion when they seized 
Defendants by bringing them under the Ooficer’s physical control. 
 
3 Defendants contest the exact amount of time Durham paused before fleeing from the police. (ECF 
No. 36 at 3 n.2.) There are different accounts which place Durham ’s pause between fourteen and 
twenty seconds after encountering the police. ( Id.) However, the Court ’s analysis would remain 
the same, even if Durham paused for an additional six seconds. PageID:
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Defendants were only seized when they came under the physical control of the detectives, 
and the question is whether the d etectives had reasonable suspicion to seize D efendants at that 
moment. United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 431 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining the inquiry for the 
Fourth Amendment is whether “the facts known to the officers at that moment of seizure [gave] 
rise to reasonable suspicion ”). To determine whether such reasonable suspicion existed, the 
Government and Defendants focus heavily on the case Illinois v. Wardlow, which held “headlong 
flight is the consummate act of evasion ,” and when it occurs in a “high- crime area,” that can 
support the officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
Here, there is no question Defendants engaged in immediate, headlong flight. Upon seeing 
the detectives, Wilson immediately moved into an alleyway before sprinting away from the police, 
discarding a firearm and attempting to scale a fence. (Gov’t Ex. 3 0:30–1:30; see also ECF No. 46 
at 32:9–33:14.) Durham made a momentary pause for at most twenty seconds to allow the officers 
chasing Wilson to pass before he began sprinting in a different direction. (ECF No. 34 at 4–5.) His 
flight thereafter was so reckless that when he was stopped by a detective, he tripped with such 
force it caused the firearm he concealed to fly free of his waistband and onto the road—in full 
view of the officers and their BWCs. (Gov’t Ex. 4 0:25–0:45.) However, a “single act of flight [is] 
ambiguous” and does not on its own justify a seizure. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 130 n.3 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
Given that ambiguity, the prosecution and defense focus their dispute on whether 
Defendants were in a “high-crime area” at the time. ( Compare ECF No. 48 at 14; with ECF No. 
49 at 9–10.) Defendants believe the Court should determine Defendants were not in a high- crime 
area, based on a crime hot-spot map created by the Crime Center tracking shooting incidents and 
gun recoveries across Paterson . (Gov’t. Ex. 1.) This map places the location Defendants were PageID:
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seized outside any colored zone, as essentially no gun crimes had been recorded before Defendants 
had been arrested. ( Id. at 1.) In response, the Government directs the Court to consider the 
testimony of the detectives and their understanding that the “intersection of Union Avenue and 
Jasper Street was a high-crime area.” (ECF No. 49 at 10.) 
Here the Court is faced with two credible, contradictory pieces of evidence as to whether 
Defendants were in a high -crime area at the time they were stopped. There is no set standard for 
what constitutes a high- crime area, and the credible testimony of law enforcement may serve as 
evidence that the suspects were in a high-crime area. See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 
213, 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (highlighting that it is unsettled “whether under the flight ‘plus’ analysis 
of Wardlow . . . the government is required to prove the existence of objective criteria for what 
constitutes a high crime area and that the stop occurred in such an area” ) (Smith, J., concurring). 
The credible testimony of officers is valuable here because “an officer is in the position to know 
the routines and patterns of a geographic area, and whether it is more prone to crime. This 
knowledge may not be reflected on arrest records and log sheets, as arrests are not the only indicia 
of crime.” Id. However, such testimony also poses a unique problem for the Court because it is 
self-justifying—the objective test for whether a seizure violated the Fourth Amendment cannot 
turn on an officer ’s subjective beliefs about the danger of an area which may “easily serve as a 
proxy for race or ethnicity ,” unless carefully examined by the Court. United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) . The danger in relying exclusively on law 
enforcement intuitions when determining whether an area is high-crime is well-documented. Ben 
Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition- Based High-Crime Areas, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 345 
(2019). Statistical analyses of cases where courts accepted “bare testimony that an area is high 
crime without additional proof,” suggests that officers’ testimony is “only weakly correlated with PageID:
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actual crime rates,” because officers may feel pressured to use an alleged “high crime area as cover 
to bolster the appearance of constitutional validity in their weakest stops.” Id. at 396. 
When Courts credit law enforcement testimony that designates “ entire neighborhoods or 
communities,” as high-crime it undermines the assumption in Wardlow that only high crime areas 
are geographically constrained . Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138; see also United States v. 
Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (limiting a finding of a high-crime area to places where 
certain factors were met); United States v. Weaver , 9 F.4th 129, 156 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Blind 
acceptance of police testimony on [high- crime areas] creates an unjustified risk of arbitrary and 
discriminatory policing .”) (Raymond, J., concurring). Excessively large high- crime areas risk 
lowering an entire populace’s Fourth Amendment protections in ways not commensurate with the 
risk actually posed to citizens by crime. 
To avoid this outcome, other Circuits have adopted three factors for Courts to consider in 
determining whether to credit a high-crime designation: (1) “the nexus between the type of crime 
most prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case ;” (2) 
“limited geographic boundaries of the area or neighborhood being evaluated; ” and (3) “temporal 
proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the stop or search at 
issue.” See Wright, 485 F.3d at 53–54; see also United States v. Swain, 324 F. App’x 219, 222 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (applying Wright); United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(same). 
The Government points to the detailed testimony of Detective Lauture to support its 
position that the intersection of Union Avenue and Jasper Street (where El Fogón is located) is a 
high-crime location. (ECF No. 49 at 10.) Detective Lauture credibly testified he had been a part of 
a “long-term investigation” of a segment of the Bloods s treet gang who “resided at the time on PageID:
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Jasper Street.” (ECF No. 46 at 126: 3–128:9.) As part of that investigation, he observed many 
crimes at that intersection specifically, namely “[a] lot of drugs, hand- to-hand transactions 
[occurred] on the corner of Jasper and Union.” (Id. at 128:1–5.) Although drug transactions do not 
implicate the exact patterns of behavior associated with illegal possession of guns, both involve 
concealing contraband and involve the same types of suspicious behavior such as blading the body 
and obscuring an individual known to b e carrying the illegal items. (Id. at 23:12–24:5, 82:4–8.) 
Therefore, there is a “nexus” between the patterns of criminal activity in the area and the suspicious 
behavior of the suspects . Wright, 485 F.3d at 53. The prosecution’s position, and Detective 
Lauture’s testimony, both support an alleged high- crime area of an appropriate scope which 
accurately ties the geography of the high- crime area to a “very specific location [], like an 
intersection where illegal deals are made,” in order to accurately identify patterns of criminal 
behavior while “respect[ing] the liberty of people ‘go[ing] about their daily business.’” Weaver, 9 
F.4th at 157 (Lohier, J. , concurring) (quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138) . 
Unfortunately, Detective Lauture’s testimony provides no time frame for when he observed this 
criminal activity. (ECF No. 46 at 126:3–128:15.) At best, the Court can surmise this observation 
occurred sometime within the six years Detective Lauture had been part of the New Jersey Division 
of Criminal Justice. (ECF No. 46 at 11.)4 
 
4 Defendants argue that the Court should not credit the testimony of Detective Molina on this issue 
of whether Durham was seized in a high crime area, citing his expansive view of the scope of such 
an area. (ECF No. 48 at 9–10.) Although the Government adopts the more limited scope of the 
alleged high-crime area advanced by Detective Lauture, it requests the Court consider Detective 
Molina’s testimony as supporting evidence. (ECF No. 49 at 10–11.) Applying the Wright factors, 
485 F.3d at 53–54, the Court finds Detective Molina’s testimony does not have sufficient nexus to 
this crime, and is not appropriately cabined to a specific geographic area. The Court, therefore, 
will only consider Detective Lauture’s testimony and the C rime Center map when determining 
whether Durham fled in a high-crime area. PageID:
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This contrasts with the Crime Center hotspot map proffered by Defendants; a third-party 
analysis of the shooting incidents and other gun crimes committed within the city of Paterson, 
which shows that no relevant crimes occurred on that corner in the previous year . (Gov’t Ex. 1.) 
This hotspot map has a clear nexus to the crime at hand, as it tracks gun crime and recoveries 
specifically. ( Id. at 1.) Similar to Detective Lauture ’s testimony, it also localizes the crime to 
specific streets and intersections rat her than declaring entire cities or neighborhoods high- crime. 
(Compare id., with ECF No. 46 at 126:3–128:15.) Although it does not flatly contradict Detective 
Lauture’s analysis, as they address different kinds of crime, it may suggest the nature of the 
neighborhood has changed since the Detective investigated it previously, because the hotspot map 
tracks relevant crimes that occurred in the year prior to Defendants’ arrest and therefore speaks to 
the same temporal period. (Gov’t Ex. 1; see also ECF No. 46 at 195:22–196:1.) In light of these 
two credible, albeit inconsistent, pieces of evidence, the Court does not find Defendant s were 
located in a high-crime area at the time they were seized. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds neither Defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when considering the totality of the circumstances. When suspects flee the police, no seizure has 
occurred, and therefor e there is no basis to suppress any evidence gathered during the pursuit. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625 (holding there was no basis to suppress cocaine “discarded” while the 
suspect was pursued by the police). Furthermore, “if the seizure occurred after suspicious behavior 
such as flight, this factors into [the court’s] analysis of whether there was reasonable suspicion to 
justify the seizure.” United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2009). For this reason, there 
can be no basis to suppress Wilson ’s firearm from evidence because it was discovered when he 
attempted to discard it while fleeing the Detectives. PageID:
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There is more ambiguity as to whether Durham ’s weapon was similarly discarded or lost 
during his pursuit as it was lost specifically when Durham was tripped by an officer—the act which 
brought him under the control of the police. Under Torres v. Madrid, any “use of force with intent 
to restrain,” is a seizure, even when the suspect is not brought under the full control of the police. 
592 U.S. 306, 317 (2021) (emphasis in original). Unlike the suspect in Hodari D. and his co-
defendant, Durham did not voluntarily discard the gun during the pursuit. 499 U.S. at 625. 
Therefore, even if the officer was not intending to collect evidence when he tripped Durham, that 
act affected a seizure and the Court must suppress the gun if the seizure itself was unlawful. United 
States v. Perkins , 871 F. Supp. 801, 803 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff ’d, 91 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Abandonment must be voluntary in fact; it is not voluntary if it is the result of a preceding Fourth 
Amendment violation or other illegal police conduct ”); see also United States v. Hernandez , 7 
F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n abandonment is not voluntary when it results from a Fourth 
Amendment violation.”). 
Even so, there is no question that the officer ’s seizure of Durham was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. At the time the officers seized Durham , they had observed: (1) Durham 
congregate outside a liquor store near midnight with a group of other men (ECF No. 46 at 125:17–
126:2); (2) Durham move to shield one of the other men from the view of the police (id. at 141:6–
24); (3) Wilson, the man Durham attempted to shield, flee into an alley as officers approached (id. 
at 82:4–85:4) ; (4) Durham himself break int o a headlong flight within seconds of seeing the 
officers exit their vehicles (Gov’t Ex. 4 at 0:00–0:45); (5) Durham clutch an object around his 
waist as he ran (id.); and (6) Wilson discard a weapon during the course of his pursuit (Gov’t Ex. 
3 at 0:30–1:30; see also ECF No. 46 at 32:9–33:14); see, e.g., United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 
552, 561 (3d Cir. 2006) ( finding “the lateness of the hour . . . supports the inference of criminal PageID:
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activity” alongside other factors); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight—wherever 
it occurs . . . is certainly suggestive of [wrongdoing].”); United States v. Samuels , 131 F. App ’x 
859, 862–863 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion for a seizure where suspect 
was grabbing a visible bulge at their waist); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F. App’x. 157, 161 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“The collective knowledge doctrine allows imputation of one law enforcement 
officer’s knowledge to another officer.”). 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Defendants were not seized until they were 
physically apprehended by law enforcement. Further, the Court finds the firearms recovered after 
Defendants were seized may not be suppressed because Wilson ’s firearm was voluntarily 
discarded during the pursuit, and the seizure of both Defendants was justified by reasonable 
suspicion. Therefore, neither firearm will be suppressed. 
B. Violations of the BWC Policy do not Warrant Suppression of Validly Obtained 
Evidence. 
Defendants also argue, apart from their Fourth Amendment Arguments, the guns found on 
their person should be suppressed as evidence because the officers did not activate their BWCs 
when initially engaging Defendants. (ECF No. 48 at 9–10.) However, the Supreme Court is clear 
that in federal criminal cases, federal law alone determines whether evidence should be suppressed. 
See, e.g., Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (“In determining whether there has 
been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers . . . [t]he test is one of federal law, neither 
enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may 
have colorably suppressed.”); see also Virginia v. Moore , 553 U.S. 164, 174 (2008) (“A State is 
free to prefer one search -and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible 
options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones PageID:
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unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional .”). Furthermore, even were the Court to apply New 
Jersey law for law enforcement conduct, the Attorney General’s guidance document would not be 
the right reference point. Instead, the Court would look to New Jersey ’s BWC statute, which 
defines both when law enforcement officers are to employ their BWCs, and the consequences for 
failing to do so. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-118.5 (New Jersey Body Worn Camera Statute) . Here, 
the statute does not permit the suppression of otherwise validly obtained evidence . Instead, it 
provides a “rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured in 
favor of a criminal defendant.” Id. § 40A:14-118.5q (2); see also State v. Seligman, 329 A.3d 1090, 
1099 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025) (holding “nothing in the text of the statute . . . warrants 
automatic suppression of evidence otherwise lawfully seized” ). Because the state is imposing a 
greater degree of protection on Defendants than contemplated by the Fourth Amendment regarding 
BWCs, the Court cannot apply those standards when deciding whether to suppress evidence 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment alone. 
The Government argues the officers ’ decision not to activate their BWCs when they 
initially engaged Defendants should instead be read as proof the officers had not seized Defendants 
at the time. (ECF No. 49 at 3 –4.) Essentially, according to the Government , because “[p]olice 
officers are . . . required to activate their cameras when conducting an investigative seizure,” the 
fact that they didn ’t “supports the inference that Durham was not subject to seizure.” (Id. at 4.) 
This argument would make the officers the legal arbiter of when suspect s were seized, 
contradicting the well -established principle that, “[a] seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment 
purposes when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave .” Shuman 
ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)). It is the suspect ’s reasonable perceptions that determine PageID:
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when they have been seized, not the subjective intent of the officers. Therefore, the Court considers 
the timing of when the officers activated their BWCs irrelevant to whether the later-acquired guns 
should be suppressed. 
C. The Government ’s Claim Durham L ied in His Certification Is Without 
Foundation. 
Alongside Defendants’ Motion to Suppress, Durham included a certification of the facts as 
he now understands them . (See ECF No. 34 -2.) Durham’s certification is consistent with all the 
facts and extrinsic evidence available to the Court. (See id.) Nevertheless, the Government argues 
Durham has affirmatively lied to the Court by providing a perspective which differs from “Det. 
Lauture’s credible testimony .” (ECF No. 49 at 5. ) To support this contention, t he Government 
provides three “exaggerations” Durham supposedly made, including that he and Wilson were 
approached by a police convoy consisting of “ approximately 14 law enforcement personnel , in 
approximately five unmarked cars,” that the officers used their vehicles to “block[] the egress from 
the parking lot,” and that seeing the police “follow[] and apprehend[]” Wilson as he tried to leave 
caused Durham to believe he too was being detained . (Id. at 6.) However, each of these claims is 
“accurate,” as the Government itself concedes. (Id.) The Court will not decide that a witness is 
lying based on his inclusion of factually accurate information in his certification. (Id.) It is unclear 
what relief the government seeks in making this request . ( Id. at 5.) The Court has considered 
Durham’s certification and found that it was outweighed by other evidence. See Part III.A.1, supra. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Durham’s Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 34) is DENIED. 
An appropriate order follows. PageID:
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Date: June 12th, 2026 s/ Brian R. Martinotti ______ 
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID:
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