govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-1_22-cv-00054-5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
KUSKOKWIM RIVER INTER-TRIBAL 
FISH COMMISSION, et al., 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
THE STATE OF ALASKA, et al., 
Defendants. 
 
 
 

 
ORDER ON INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 
Before the Court are Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ motions for attorney’s fees: 
1. At Docket 169 is Intervenor -Plaintiff Alaska Federation of Natives 
(“AFN”)’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Defendants the State of Alaska, the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game (“ADF&G”), and Doug Vincent-Lang, Commissioner 
of ADF&G (collectively, “the State” or “Defendants”) responded in opposition at 
Docket 185, to which AFN replied at Docket 186. 
2. At Docket 177 is Intervenor-Plaintiff Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission (“the Commission”) ’s Consolidated and Renewed Motion for 
Attorney’s Fees. Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 191, to which the 
Commission replied at Docket 197. 

 
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3. At Docket 181 is Intervenor -Plaintiffs Ahtna Tene Nené and Ahtna, 
Inc. (collectively, “Ahtna”)’s Motion for Supplemental Attorney’s Fees. Defendants 
responded in opposition at Docket 192, to which Ahtna replied at Docket 199. 
4. At Docket 182 is Intervenor -Plaintiffs Association of Village Council 
Presidents, Ivan M. Ivan, and Betty Magnuson (collectively, “AVCP”)’s Renewed 
and Supplemental Motion for Attorney ’s Fees and Costs. Defendants responded 
in opposition at Docket 193, to which AVCP replied at Docket 201. 
Oral argument was not requested on any of the motions and was not 
necessary to the Court’s determination. 
BACKGROUND 
 The facts of this case are more fully set out in the Court’s prior order at 
Docket 129. As relevant, the United States sued Defendants after Defendants 
opened fishing on the Kuskokwim River in conflict with federal orders prohibiting 
such fishing .1 The United States maintained that the State’s actions were 
preempted by federal law, specifically Title VIII of the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”). 2 In response, the State asserted that the 
Federal Subsistence Board, the entity that issued the federal orders, did not have 
the authority to regulate fishing on the Kuskokwim River and that the Board’s 
 
1 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 4-6. 
2 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 1-2 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 2371-2551 (1980) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126)). 

 
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creation and the appointment of its members violated the Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution .3 All four groups of Intervenor -Plaintiffs were permitted to 
intervene in support of the United States.4 
 On March 29, 2024, t he Court rejected the State’s arguments and granted 
summary judgment to the United States and Intervenor -Plaintiffs.5 The Court 
entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the State from reinstating its orders that 
conflicted with the federal orders issued pursuant to Title VIII of ANILCA on the 
Kuskokwim River within the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. 6 On April 3, 
2024, the State timely appealed the Court’s order.7 
On April 15, 2024, while the State’s appeal was pending, Intervenor-
Plaintiffs filed motions for attorney’s fees pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 3117, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), and District of Alaska Local Civil Rule 54.2.8 On 
April 18, 2024, the State moved to stay consideration of Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ 
motions for attorney’s fees until the resolution of the appellate proceedings.9 
 
3 Docket 73 at 8-9. 
4 Docket 29; Docket 37; Docket 47; Docket 96. 
5 Docket 129 at 27. 
6 Docket 129 at 29; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126. 
7 Docket 131. 
8 Docket 133 (AFN); Docket 135 (Commission); Docket 137 (Ahtna); Docket 138 (AVCP). 
9 Docket 142. 

 
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On May 9, 2024, the Court denied the State’s motion to stay as to the 
applicability of 16 U.S.C. § 3117 to Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ fee motions and directed 
Defendants to respond on that issue.10 The Court denied Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ fee 
motions as to the amount of any fee award without prejudice to the motions being 
renewed at the conclusion of the appellate proceedings.11 After further briefing, on 
June 6, 2024, the Court held that Intervenor-Plaintiffs may seek attorney’s fees 
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 3117 at the conclusion of the litigation. 12 
On August 20, 202 5, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s summary 
judgment and rejected the State’s “claims that the Katie John Trilogy was wrongly 
decided and has been overruled by Sturgeon II.”13 On September 15, 2025, the 
State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,14 which was denied on 
January 12, 2026.15 
In February 2026, Intervenor -Plaintiffs filed the present motions for 
attorney’s fees .16 AFN seeks a total of $494,423.17 in attorney’s fees: 
 
10 Docket 150 at 6. 
11 Docket 150 at 6-7. 
12 Docket 154 at 10. 
13 United States v. Alaska, 151 F.4th 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 544 
(Jan. 12, 2026). 
14 Docket 161. 
15 Docket 165. 
16 Docket 169; Docket 177; Docket 181; Docket 182. 

 
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$144,399.00 for District Court fees, $196,822.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and 
$153,202.17 for Supreme Court fees .17 The Commission seeks a total of 
$660,242.50 in attorney’s fees: $199,800.00 for District Court fees, $173,020.00 
for Ninth Circuit fees, and $287,422.50 for Supreme Court fees. 18 Ahtna seeks a 
total of $401,923.00 in attorney’s fees: $147,050.00 for District Court fees, 
$108,500.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and $146,373.00 for Supreme Court fees. 19 
AVCP seeks a total of $632,240.56 in attorney’s fees and costs: $302,602.50 for 
District Court fees, $174,200.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, $152,298.50 for Supreme 
Court fees, and $3,139.56 for Supreme Court costs.20 
DISCUSSION 
The State asserts that Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ requests for attorney’s fees are 
barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.21 Alternatively, the 
State asserts that the Court should significantly reduce each of Intervenor -
 
17 Docket 169 at 5. 
18 Docket 177 at 5. 
19 Docket 181 at 8. 
20 Docket 182 at 10. AVCP is not entitled to costs, because, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.1, 
“[a] bill of costs must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment or an 
applicable order. Otherwise, claims for costs are waived.” Here, any bill of costs was due no 
later than 14 days after the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari on January 
12, 2026. Docket 165. The parties’ Joint Notice and Stipulation did not extend that deadline, 
because it only addressed fees, not costs, and accorded the parties “45 days after final 
disposition of this matter by the United States Supreme Court.” Docket 162 at 3; see also 
Docket 167. 
21 Docket 185 at 6; Docket 191 at 6; Docket 192 at 6; Docket 193 at 6. 

 
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Plaintiffs’ requested fees because their “hourly rates are excessive” and their 
“hours spent are duplicative and unreasonable.” 22 The Court addresses each 
issue in turn. 
I. Sovereign Immunity 
The Eleventh Amendment generally protects states from suits brought by 
citizens in federal court , unless the state has “waive[d] its Eleventh Amendment 
defense,” Congress has “abrogate[d] the States' sovereign immunity ,” or the Ex 
parte Young doctrine applies.23 “Although the waiver must be unambiguous, . . . 
an express written waiver is [not] invariably required. On the contrary, . . . a state 
may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by conduct that is incompatible with 
an intent to preserve that immunity ,” such as “ conduct during the litigation [that] 
clearly manifests acceptance of the federal court's jurisdiction. ”24 For example, a 
state “waive[s] [its] Eleventh Amendment protection by voluntarily appearing and 
defending on the merits .”25 “To allow a state to assert sovereign immunity after 
listening to a court's substantive comments on the merits of a case would give the 
state an unfair advantage when litigating suits.”26 
 
22 Docket 185 at 6; Docket 191 at 6; Docket 192 at 6; Docket 193 at 6. 
23 Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir.), amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 
24 Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs., 179 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial of 
reh'g, 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000). 
25 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). 
26 In re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming waiver where “the State of 

 
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Here, the State asserts for the first time in this litigation that sovereign 
immunity applies.27 But as Intervenor -Plaintiffs correctly highlight, “the State 
waived its sovereign immunity by failing to raise the affirmative defense not just 
early in the litigation, but at any point in the litigation.” 28 The State was “ capable 
of disclosing early in the proceedings whether it object [ed] to having the matter 
heard in federal court. ”29 Timely disclosure of the defense would have allowed 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs an opportunity to “ request a prompt ruling on the Eleventh 
Amendment defense before the parties and the court have invested substantial 
resources in the case.”30 However, the State did not assert a sovereign immunity 
defense throughout this litigation despite ample notice that it could be liable for 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees under § 3117 based on past Title VIII 
litigation.31 The State failed to raise the issue of sovereign immunity in its 
 
Arizona made a tactical decision to argue the merits of the case,” and “[w]hen it perceived it was 
losing the argument, it attempted to try a new approach and claim immunity from suit”). 
27 The State asserts that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate Alaska’s sovereign 
immunity, because “Congress was not legislating within its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power when it enacted ANILCA.” Docket 185 at 7; Docket 191 at 7; Docket 192 at 7; Docket 193 
at 7. The Commission and AFN maintain that “Congress can waive state sovereign immunity in 
legislation passed pursuant to powers other than the Fourteenth Amendment.” Docket 197 at 5 
n.14; see also Docket 186 at 4. The Court need not reach this issue because it finds that the 
State waived its sovereign immunity defense. 
28 Docket 197 at 5 (emphasis omitted); see also Docket 186 at 5-7. 
29 Hill, 179 F.3d at 758. 
30 Id. 
31 See Docket 147-1 (Order on Att’y’s Fees at 1, John v. Alaska, Case No. A85-698 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 15, 1992)); Docket 147-2 (Order on Mot. for Award of Att’y’s Fees & Costs, Native Vill. of 
Quinhagak v. United States, Case No. A93-0023-CV-HRH (D. Alaska Oct. 24, 2000)); Docket 
147-3 (Order on Renewed & Suppl. Appl. for Award of Costs & Att’y’s Fees, John v. United 

 
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responses to Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ motions to intervene ,32 answers to Intervenor -
Plaintiffs’ complaints in intervention, 33 opposition to the motion for preliminary 
injunction,34 briefing for summary judgment, 35 motion to stay, 36 and opposition to 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ first motions for attorney’s fees.37 The State also did not raise 
sovereign immunity in its appeal to the Ninth Circuit 38 or in its certiorari petition to 
the Supreme Court.39 
The State’s conduct throughout this litigation “clearly manifests acceptance 
of the federal court's jurisdiction.” 40 “The Eleventh Amendment was never 
intended to allow a state to appear in federal court and actively litigate the case on 
 
States, Case No. A90-0484-CV-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 28, 2003)). 
32 Docket 23; Docket 43; Docket 94. The State did not oppose AVCP’s intervention. See 
Docket 36. 
33 Docket 40; Docket 46; Docket 50. 
34 Docket 17. 
35 Docket 73; Docket 122. 
36 Docket 142. 
37 Docket 151. 
38 Appellant’s Opening Br., United States v. Alaska, Case No. 24-2251, ECF No. 13 (9th Cir. July 
26, 2024). 
39 Pet. for Writ of Cert., Alaska v. United States, Case No. 25-320, ECF No. 1 (U.S. Sep. 15, 
2025). 
40 Hill, 179 F.3d at 759. 

 
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the merits, and only later belatedly assert its immunity from suit in order to avoid 
an adverse result.”41 
The State asserts that its participation in the merits phase of the litigation did 
not waive its sovereign immunity from Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s 
fees under § 3117. 42 However, as the Commission correctly notes, “the State 
made no mention of immunity” even after Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ original fee motions 
“expressly argued that the State was liable for fees under § 3117.”43 “The State 
then continued litigating the merits through the Ninth Circuit and in a certiorari 
petition to the Supreme Court .”44 The State does not identify any precedent 
holding that a request for fees presents a separate Eleventh Amendment issue 
when a state has waived its immunity by submitting to the jurisdiction of a federal 
court.45 To the contrary, in Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court held that attorney’s 
fees are “ancillary” to “prospective injunctive relief” when they constitute “expenses 
incurred in litigation seeking only prospective relief,” rather than “retroactive liability 
 
41 Id. at 763. 
42 Docket 185 at 7-8. 
43 Docket 197 at 6. 
44 Docket 197 at 6. 
45 See, e.g., Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. Land Use Comm'n, Case No. CV 11-00414 SOM-KJM, 
2018 WL 6705529, at *4 (D. Haw. Dec. 20, 2018) (“[T]his court is unaware of case law holding 
that, if a state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity and submits to the jurisdiction of a federal 
court, the state retains some additional sovereign immunity preventing the federal court from 
awarding attorney’s fees if the state is on the losing end of the litigation.”). 

 
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for prelitigation conduct.”46 After Hutto, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that “an 
award of attorney's fees ancillary to prospective relief is not subject to the strictures 
of the Eleventh Amendment.”47 
Here, Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ fee request s are for fees incurred in obtaining 
prospective relief in the same action in which the State actively participated . 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the State has waived any sovereign immunity 
defense it may have had and that the Eleventh Amendment does not separately 
bar Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ fee requests. Further, as this Court has previously ruled, 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees under 16 U.S.C. § 3117.48 
II. Reasonableness of Fees Requested 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court determined that courts should 
apply the lodestar method to determine reasonable attorney ’s fees.49 Courts 
calculate the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 50 “The party seeking an 
award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates 
 
46 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690, 695 (1978). 
47 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989). 
48 Docket 154 at 10. 
49 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a 
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a 
reasonable hourly rate.”). 
50 Id. 

 
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claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may 
reduce the award accordingly.”51 This standard is “generally applicable in all cases 
in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’” 52 
A. Hourly Rates 
The State asserts that the hourly rates charged by both Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ 
Alaska-based counsel and Supreme Court counsel are unreasonable. A 
reasonable hourly rate is determined by the “rate prevailing in the community for 
similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 
reputation.”53 The relevant community generally comprises “the forum in which the 
district court sits. ”54 Rates outside the forum apply “if local counsel was 
unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they 
lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle 
properly the case.” 55 Because Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Alaska-based counsel and 
Supreme Court counsel practiced in different legal markets and performed different 
types of work, the Court evaluates the reasonableness of those rates separately. 
1. Alaska-based Attorneys 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 433, n.7. 
53 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barjon v. Dalton, 
132 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
54 Id. 
55 Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

 
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All four Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ Alaska -based attorneys charged comparable 
hourly rates. AFN, represented by Cashion Gilmore & Lindemuth , was charged 
between $265 and $525 per hour in this case.56 The Commission, represented by 
Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Miller & Monkman, was charged between $300 and 
$400 per hour.57 Ahtna, represented by Landye Bennett Blumstein, was charged 
between $325 and $525 per hour.58 AVCP, represented by the Native American 
Rights Fund, was charged between $225 and $600 per hour.59 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs primarily rely on two sources of evidence to show that 
the rates charged by their attorneys are reasonable for the Alaska market. First, 
in addition to their own attorneys’ declarations asserting that their hourly rates are 
reasonable, Intervenor-Plaintiffs submit the Declaration of James Torgerson from 
Stoel Rives LLP, an attorney unaffiliated with this case, stating that “rates for senior 
litigation partners in the Anchorage market are often $700 per hour, sometimes 
more.”60 Second, Intervenor-Plaintiffs submit the State’s contract with Consovoy 
McCarthy PLLC showing that, even after receiving an “Alaska Discounted Rate,” 
 
56 Docket 170 at 3. 
57 Docket 178 at 4. 
58 Docket 181-1 at 3-5. 
59 Docket 182-2 at 7. 
60 Docket 138-5 at ¶ 7. 

 
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the State agreed to pay its own retained attorneys between $450 and $600 per 
hour in this case.61 
The State asserts that Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Alaska-based attorneys’ hourly 
rates are unreasonable and points to the Court ’s observation in 2022 in TD 
Ameritrade, Inc. v. Matthews that “federal and state courts in Alaska have found 
rates ranging from $275 to $400 per hour to be reasonable for Alaska attorneys, 
depending on their years of experience and the subject matter. ”62 Thus, in TD 
Ameritrade, the Court concluded that a fee award at the rate of $400 per hour was 
reasonable “[b]ased on [federal and state court cases in Alaska] , the Court's 
familiarity with rates typically charged in this District, the 2017 -2018 U.S. 
Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report TD Ameritrade cited, and the relatively 
straightforward nature of TD Ameritrade's lien claim .”63 In contrast to TD 
Ameritrade, this case was initiated in 2022 and litigated through late 2025, several 
years after the rate range identified in TD Ameritrade. Moreover, the stakes in this 
litigation were of enormous significance : as described by the Commission, the 
State’s emergency orders that led to the initiation of this litigation “posed an 
existential threat” to ANILCA’s rural subsistence priority. 64 In light of the 
 
61 Docket 197 at 11 (citing Docket 197-1 at 7); Docket 201 at 4 (citing Docket 201-1 at 6). 
62 TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Matthews, Case No. 3:16-cv-00136-SLG, 2022 WL 17752138, at *7 (D. 
Alaska Dec. 19, 2022). 
63 Id. at *7. 
64 Docket 177 at 2. 

 
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importance and complexity of this litigation , the consistency of the rates charged 
by counsel for the Intervenor -Plaintiffs, the supporting declarations submitted by 
counsel and Mr. Torgerson, and the State’s agreement to pay comparable rates to 
its own counsel in this litigation, the Court finds that the hourly rates charged by 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Alaska-based counsel are reasonable. 
2. Supreme Court Attorneys 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Supreme Court attorneys ’ hourly rates range from 
$1,253.75 to $2,650 per hour for partners and from $950 to $1,109.25 per hour for 
associates.65 The State asserts that these rates are not reasonable for two 
reasons. 
First, the State asserts that the rates for Supreme Court counsel should be 
determined based on the market rate in Alaska, because “rates outside of the local 
forum are only justified where ‘local counsel was unavailable . . . or unable to 
perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization 
required to handle properly the case .’”66 The State maintains that this exception 
does not apply here because several of the Alaska-based attorneys hired to 
represent the Intervenor-Plaintiffs have worked on matters at the Supreme Court 
level.67 However, this argument is undermined by the State’s own July 2022 
 
65 Docket 170 at 5; Docket 181-1 at 6; Docket 182-2 at 6-7; Docket 179 at 2. 
66 Docket 191 at 11 (quoting Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979). 
67 Docket 191 at 11-12 (“But that exception does not apply here, where the Sonosky partners 
that [the Commission] hired to work on this case include Ms. Leonard who has worked on 

 
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Request for Proposals (“RFP”) seeking counsel for this case and requiring, as 
“minimum prior experience,” that the “[l]ead attorney must have argued before the 
United States Supreme Court.” 68 The State’s decision to seek and retain outside 
counsel who meet that qualification demonstrates its own recognition that 
Supreme Court litigation requires a specialized level of expertise beyond general 
appellate experience and that prior work on Supreme Court matters is not 
equivalent to extensive experience arguing before that Court. 
Moreover, it is clear that “[a]s Supreme Court practice has become more 
specialized, it has become the industry standard for law firms to retain Supreme 
Court counsel for the Supreme Court phase of litigation.” 69 As AVCP notes, the 
State too “has a long history of retaining specialized Supreme Court counsel for 
cases of particular importance,” including in the Katie John cases.70 Accordingly, 
the Court concludes that it is appropriate to evaluate Supreme Court counsel’s 
rates based on the prevailing national market for specialized Supreme Court 
 
multiple matters at the Supreme Court level and Mr. Miller who has participated in multiple 
Supreme Court proceedings.” (cleaned up)); Docket 193 at 12 (“But that exception does not 
apply here, where several other AVCP attorneys have experience before the Supreme Court, 
including Ms. Kendall-Miller who litigated and argued the landmark case Alaska, ex rel. Yukon 
Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie, before the United States Supreme Court and 
Ms. Tarzwell, who represented Tribes in Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023).” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
68 Docket 201-2 at 4. 
69 Docket 177 at 9. 
70 Docket 201 at 7-8. 

 
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advocacy rather than the prevailing rates for general federal litigation counsel in 
Alaska. 
 Second, the State also asserts that even if Supreme Court counsel is subject 
to different rates, Intervenor -Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that 
those rates are “commensurate with market rates.” 71 The State correctly notes 
that “ the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence —in 
addition to the attorney's own affidavits —that the requested rates are in line with 
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 
comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 72 While “[a]ffidavits of the plaintiffs' 
attorney[s] and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and 
rate determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence,”73 “declarations 
filed by the fee applicant do not conclusively establish the prevailing market rate.”74 
“The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires 
submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and 
reasonableness of the . . . facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted 
affidavits.”75 
 
71 Docket 191 at 11. 
72 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); see Docket 191 at 8; Docket 193 at 8. 
73 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). 
74 Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. 
75 Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98. 

 
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 Each Intervenor-Plaintiff submitted a declaration detailing the basis for the 
hourly rates for Supreme Court counsel . AFN’s attorney Adam Unikowsky “has 
argued at least 13 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, and Jenner & Block LLP 
has had particular success in the Indian law arena.”76 The Commission’s attorney 
Carter Phillips “is widely recognized as one of the top Supreme Court litigators in 
the country,”77 and Sidley Austin “ remains one of the leading firms” in Supreme 
Court advocacy. 78 Ahtna’s attorney Paul Clement “has argued over 100 cases 
before the Supreme Court,” 79 and AVCP’s attorney Leonard Powell “has litigated 
seven United States Supreme Court cases on the merits” and “has also litigated 
dozens of . . . cases at the certiorari stage.” 80 The State has not meaningfully 
rebutted these declarations or otherwise submitted evidence demonstrating that 
the requested rates are inconsistent with prevailing market rates for attorneys of 
comparable Supreme Court expertise and experience. Nor has the State identified 
comparable Supreme Court practitioners charging materially lower rates. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the requested hourly rates for Supreme 
Court counsel are reasonable. 
 
76 Docket 170 at 5. 
77 Docket 177 at 9 (citing Docket 197-2 ¶ 7). 
78 Docket 177 at 9 (citing Docket 197-2 ¶ 3). 
79 Docket 181-1 at 6. 
80 Docket 182-2 at 5. 

 
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B. Hours Billed 
The State asserts that the hours billed by Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
unreasonable because (1) the work billed was duplicative of work done by the 
United States and the other Intervenor -Plaintiffs; (2) significant portions of 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ briefing were alternative arguments; (3) the hours billed were 
excessive at each stage of litigation; and (4) the attorneys block -billed and 
submitted vague or redacted billing entries.81 
1. Duplication 
The State asserts that Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ hours billed are unreasonable 
because their legal work was duplicative of work done by the United States and 
the other Intervenor -Plaintiffs. For example, t he State contends that “[a] t every 
stage of the case, [the Commission] was making the same arguments that were 
being made by the United States and the other Intervenors: namely, that Katie 
John was still good law and Sturgeon did not control. ”82 However, as the State 
correctly acknowledges, each Intervenor-Plaintiff, “of course, was entitled to make 
these duplicative arguments in support of its interests”—the State simply maintains 
that it should not be required to pay for all this duplicative work. 83 And yet, each 
Intervenor-Plaintiff had a distinct interest in this case—distinct from each other and 
 
81 See, e.g., Docket 185 at 11-19. 
82 Docket 191 at 13; see also Docket 185 at 11-12; Docket 192 at 12; Docket 193 at 13. 
83 Docket 185 at 12; Docket 191 at 13; Docket 192 at 13; Docket 193 at 13. 

 
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particularly distinct from the United States.84 As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, 
“[i]t is not unreasonable to have several plaintiffs sue for the same relief . . . ; the 
fact that each plaintiff hires her own counsel is not, in itself, double billing." 85 
“When a case goes on for many years, . . . [o]ne certainly expects some degree of 
duplication as an inherent part of the process. There is no reason why the lawyer 
should perform this necessary work for free. ”86 Therefore, the Court declines to 
reduce Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees on this basis.87 
2. Alternative Arguments 
The State asserts that significant portions of Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ briefs were 
alternative arguments that were never addressed by any court88 or “ easily 
dismissed by this Court.”89 However, “[l]itigants in good faith may raise alternative 
legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to reach 
certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what 
matters.”90 Therefore, absent any indication that Intervenor -Plaintiffs advanced 
 
84 Docket 12; Docket 19; Docket 38; Docket 89. 
85 Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004). 
86 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
87 But see infra Section II.B.3 (reducing Supreme Court fees by 10% due to excessive number 
of attorneys). 
88 Docket 185 at 12; Docket 192 at 13; Docket 193 at 14. 
89 Docket 191 at 14. 
90 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. 

 
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these arguments in bad faith , the Court declines to reduce Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees on this basis. 
3. Supreme Court Hours 
Next, the State asserts that Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ request for fees for work on 
the Supreme Court briefing is excessive because Intervenor-Plaintiffs “drafted ‘two 
briefs representing the unique perspectives of the intervenors,’ only to 
subsequently consolidate the two drafts into one brief in opposition.”91 Intervenor-
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they ultimately consolidated their efforts into a single 
joint opposition to the petition for certiorari, but they maintain that this coordination 
process was undertaken “to avoid repetition, advance judicial economy, and avoid 
over-papering the Court where at all possible.”92 The fact that multiple Intervenor-
Plaintiffs prepared draft briefing while determining whether and how to present a 
unified opposition does not render the work unreasonable, particularly where these 
parties represented distinct sovereign, tribal, and organizational interests were 
assessing how best to incorporate their differing perspectives into a single filing. 
The overlap between Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ and the United States’ oppositions also 
does not establish duplication warranting a fee reduction, particularly where the 
 
91 Docket 191 at 14 (citing Docket 178 at 6). 
92 Docket 178 at 6. 

 
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Intervenor-Plaintiffs could not assume that the “United States would continue its 
prior litigation strategy” “[f]ollowing the change in presidential administrations.” 93 
The State also relies on a 2006 declaration by the Commission’s Supreme 
Court attorney Mr. Phillips to assert that the hours spent by Intervenor-Plaintiffs in 
opposing the State’s petition for certiorari were excessive.94 In that declaration, 
submitted in unrelated fee litigation , Deal ex rel Deal v. Hamilton County 
Department of Education, Mr. Phillips stated that fees exceeding $150,000 for an 
opposition to certiorari were “grossly excessive” because oppositions are generally 
not time-intensive for experienced Supreme Court advocates. 95 The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee agreed with Mr. Phillips in that case 
and reduced the firm’s requested Supreme Court fees by 7 5%.96 The State 
contends that the same principles apply here and argues that the Intervenor -
Plaintiffs’ request is similarly unreasonable.97 
However, while the district court reduced the fees in Deal ex rel Deal, it did 
so because it concluded that the hours expended on the opposition to certiorari 
 
93 Docket 197 at 17. 
94 Docket 185 at 15-16 (citing Docket 185-1); see also Docket 191 at 16-17; Docket 192 at 15-
17; Docket 193 at 16-18. 
95 Docket 185-1 at 3-5. 
96 Deal ex rel Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., Case No. 1:01-cv-295, 2006 WL 2854463, 
at *15-17 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2006). 
97 Docket 185 at 15-16; Docket 191 at 16-17; Docket 192 at 15-17; Docket 193 at 16-18. 

 
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were inefficient where much of the work was performed by attorneys lacking 
substantial Supreme Court or subject-matter experience.98 By contrast, the court 
declined to reduce the fees requested by one attorney, Edward P. Lazarus, 
because he demonstrated significant Supreme Court expertise, and the court 
found both his hours and requested rate reasonable in light of that experience. 99 
Here, Intervenor-Plaintiffs have established that their attorneys, like Mr. Lazarus, 
possess substantial Supreme Court and subject -matter expertise, including 
extensive experience litigating before the Supreme Court and in matters involving 
Alaska Native subsistence rights and federal Indian law. 
The Court nevertheless agrees with the State that billing time for 24 
attorneys to prepare what was ultimately a 3 2-page opposition to certiorari is 
excessive.100 Although Supreme Court litigation warrants specialized counsel, the 
involvement of that many attorneys necessarily created some inefficiency and 
duplication. For this reason, the Court finds that a 10% reduction to the requested 
Supreme Court fees is warranted. 
 
98 Deal, 2006 WL 2854463, at *16 (“[I]f the Deals had retained Mr. Mayerson, a very capable 
and experienced litigator, for [the Supreme Court certiorari] phase of the litigation, his 
experience with the record and with IDEA cases would have saved enormous amounts of time 
in crafting an opposition to HCDE's petition for certiorari.”). 
99 Id. at *15-17. 
100 Docket 185 at 16; Docket 191 at 17; Docket 192 at 17; Docket 193 at 17. 

 
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4. Ninth Circuit Hours 
The State asserts that Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ requested fees for its Ninth 
Circuit work are also excessive. Specifically, the State notes that the Commission’s 
counsel of record Nathaniel Amdur-Clark “billed 257 hours to the Ninth Circuit 
appeal, which included 137 hours preparing for and attending oral argument.” 101 
The State contends that “[w]hile appellate arguments require close familiarity with 
the case, Mr. Amdur-Clark had already been counsel of record in the district court, 
making more than three weeks’ worth of attorney time preparing for seven minutes 
of oral argument grossly excessive.” 102 While the Court acknowledges “the 
importance and complexity involved in this case” and the “excellent results” 
produced, in part, by the Commission’s efforts, 103 the Court finds considerable 
merit in the State’s assertion that a fee award for 137 hours of preparation for 
approximately seven minutes of oral argument would be excessive. “Given that 
[the Commission] had already participated in extensive oral argument in the district 
court, and given the limited time allotted for the argument,” 104 the Court reduces 
the hours awarded for this task to 80 hours. 
 
101 Docket 191 at 18 (emphasis in original). 
102 Docket 191 at 18. 
103 Docket 197 at 15. 
104 Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 713 F. Supp. 2d 929, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 

 
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5. District Court Hours 
The State also requests a reduction in Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ fees because 
partners performed “ many tasks typically delegated to associates, such as legal 
research and writing first drafts of briefs and motions” and cites to Aung v. Watts105 
to assert that “ [c]ourts regularly reduce attorney’s fees awards where partners 
billed for associate-level work.”106 However, the fee award at issue in Aung arose 
under California Civil Code § 1717, and the district court expressly “applie[d] 
California law in determining the appropriate fees to be awarded .”107 Here, by 
contrast, the basis for attorney’s fees is a federal fee-shifting statute. Accordingly, 
federal law —not state law and certainly not California law —governs the 
reasonableness analysis. The State provides no other authority supporting a 
reduction on this basis, and the Court therefore declines to reduce the requested 
fees for this reason. 
Further, the State’s own anticipated outside -counsel costs confirm that the 
district court phase of this litigation was expected to require substantial attorney 
resources. The State’s June 2022 contract with Consovoy McCarthy provided for 
$50,000 in attorney’s fees,108 and its July 2022 RFP budgeted $250,000 for “the 
 
105 Case No. 2:24-cv-05501-SVW, 2025 WL 2659222, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025). 
106 Docket 191 at 18-19; Docket 192 at 18; Docket 193 at 19. 
107 2025 WL 2659222, at *2. 
108 Docket 201-1 at 1. 

 
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trial court litigation phase .”109 Those amounts did not include the legal work 
performed by Alaska Department of Law attorneys, who served as the State’s lead 
counsel before this Court. In light of the State’s own $300,000 budget for outside 
counsel before the district court —exclusive of the time spent on the matter by 
attorneys at the Alaska Department of Law —the Court finds that Intervenor-
Plaintiffs’ requested district court fees are reasonable. 
6. Block Billing, Vagueness, and Redactions 
The State asserts that Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ hours include several examples 
of block billing that “obscures any ability to discern how much time its attorneys 
spent on a particular task ,”110 warranting a reduction in the requested fees. The 
State identifies several examples of block billing such as AFN’s attorney Jahna 
Lindemuth’s 5.4 -hour entry stating “[c]ontact counsel regarding intervention; 
review edits from team; research; exchange calls and emails with team; edit 
declaration”;111 the Commission’s attorney Mr. Amdur-Clark’s 7.8 -hour entry for 
drafting, emails, and communications regarding the litigation; 112 AVCP’s attorney 
Erin Dougherty Lynch’s 15.4 -hour entry encompassing numerous revisions, 
 
109 Docket 201-2 at 3. 
110 Docket 185 at 17; Docket 191 at 19; Docket 192 at 18; Docket 193 at 19. 
111 Docket 185 at 17-18 (citing Docket 134-1 at 3). 
112 Docket 191 at 19-20 (citing Docket 136-1 at 9). 

 
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conferences, and appendix review tasks; 113 and multiple entries by Ahtna’s 
attorneys combining research, drafting, conferences, and revisions into single 
billing entries.114 The State also asserts that some of Intervenor -Plaintiffs’ billing 
entries “are unreasonably vague”115 or “have been redacted to such an extent that 
it is impossible to judge the reasonableness of the worked performed .”116 The 
State identifies billing entries it contends are impermissibly vague such as “Work 
on brief”117 and “Work on materials for participation in federal suit,”118 which do not 
identify the subject matter of the work performed or otherwise provide sufficient 
detail for the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the time expended. Finally, 
the State points to several heavily redacted entries submitted by Ahtna, including 
entries described only as “Research [redacted]” and “Review and analyze 
[redacted],” which obscure the nature of the work performed. 119 
Although the Court does not find that these deficiencies justify the full 
reductions sought by the State, the Court agrees that a n across-the-board fee 
reduction is appropriate to account for block billing, vague descriptions, and limited 
 
113 Docket 193 at 20 (citing Docket 138-4 at 6). 
114 Docket 192 at 19-20 (first citing Docket 137-1 at 11; and then citing Docket 181-1 at 16). 
115 Docket 185 at 18-19; Docket 191 at 21; Docket 193 at 20-21. 
116 Docket 192 at 20. 
117 Docket 193 at 20-21 (citing Docket 138-4 at 6). 
118 Docket 191 at 21 (citing Docket 136-1 at 1). 
119 Docket 192 at 20 (quoting Docket 137-1 at 12). 

 
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redactions that hinder review of the fee request. 120 The Court therefore applies a 
15% reduction to all of the requested fees on this basis. 
III. Calculation of Fee Awards 
Based on the foregoing, the Court calculates each fee award by first 
subtracting the itemized reductions identified above and then applying the 
applicable percentage reduction to the remaining subtotal. The resulting awards 
are as follows: 
AFN. AFN seeks $494,423.17 in attorney’s fees: $144,399.00 for District 
Court fees, $196,822.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and $153,202.17 for Supreme Court 
fees.121 After applying the relevant percentage reductions —15% to the District 
Court and Ninth Circuit fees, and 25% to the Supreme Court fees —AFN is 
awarded $404,939.48 in attorney’s fees. 
The Commission. The Commission seeks $660,242.50 in attorney’s fees: 
$199,800.00 for District Court fees, $173,020.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and 
$287,422.50 for Supreme Court fees. 122 The Court reduces that amount by 
 
120 See Fischer v. SJB–P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court 
may reduce hours to offset “poorly documented” billing); Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video 
Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s reduction of 
hours by 30% to account for block billing); In re Smith, 586 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We 
have recognized that ... the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage 
cuts ... in the number of hours claimed ... as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee 
application.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
121 Docket 169 at 5. 
122 Docket 177 at 5. 

 
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$22,800.00 (Mr. Amdur-Clark’s hourly rate of $400 per hour x 57 hours) for the 
reduction in Ninth Circuit oral-argument preparation time, resulting in a subtotal of 
$637,442.50. The Court then applies the relevant percentage reductions , 
resulting in a final award of $513,083.88 to the Commission. 
Ahtna. Ahtna seeks $401,923.00 in attorney’s fees: $147,050.00 for District 
Court fees, $108,500.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and $146,373.00 for Supreme Court 
fees.123 After applying the relevant percentage reductions , Ahtna is awarded 
$326,997.25 in attorney’s fees. 
AVCP. AVCP seeks $632,240.56 in attorney’s fees and costs: $302,602.50 
for District Court fees, $174,200.00 for Ninth Circuit fees, and $152,298.50 for 
Supreme Court fees, and $3,139.56 for Supreme Court costs .124 After excluding 
the requested costs and applying the relevant percentage reductions to the 
requested fees, AVCP is awarded $519,506.00 in attorney’s fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ motions for attorney ’s fees 
at Dockets 169, 177, 181, and 182 are each GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that 
Intervenor-Plaintiffs shall recover from the State as follows: 
• AFN shall recover $404,939.48; 
 
123 Docket 181 at 8. 
124 Docket 182 at 10. 

 
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• The Commission shall recover $513,083.88; 
• Ahtna shall recover $326,997.25; and 
• AVCP shall recover $519,506.00. 
The Clerk of Court shall enter an amended judgment accordingly. 
DATED this 12th day of June 2026, at Anchorage, Alaska. 
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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