govinfo:USCOURTS-txwd-5_25-cv-00525-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 
 
 
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN MICHAEL BURLESON, ER-
IC SNYDER, AND DOES 1-10, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Before the Court is Plaintiff Transamerica Life Insurance Company’s (“Transamerica”) 
second Motion for Default Judgment, ( ECF No. 28 ). In Transamerica’s Motion, Transamerica 
moves for default judgment against Defendant Shawn Michael Burleso n, who has not appeared 
in this action. Upon consideration, the Court will grant -in-part and hold in abeyance in part 
Transamerica’s Motion for Default Judgement, (id). 
BACKGROUND 
Following sufficient service of summons upon Defendant Shawn Michael Burleson 
(“Burleson”) and Defendant Eric Snyder , and their failure to file an answer or otherwise appear, 
Transamerica obtained a Clerk’s Entry of Default and filed its initial Motion for Default Judg-
ment against Burleson. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18. 
On January 28, 2026, the Court denied the initial Motion for Default Judgment, stating: 
Though Transamerica appears to be entitled to a default judgment, it would never-
theless be improper to enter judgment against Defendant Shawn Michael Burleson 
at this time because there is another defendant, Defendant Eric Snyder, that filed 
an Answer, ( see ECF No. 10 ), and Transamerica is requesting the defendants be 

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held jointly and severally liable, (see ECF No. 1). 
 
. . . 
 
Because there is another defendant in this case who has answered—Eric Snyder—
and because the claims against the defendants are seeking joint and several liabil-
ity, it would be improper to enter a default judgment against Defendant Shawn 
Michael Burleson now. Because Transamerica obtained a Clerk's Entry of Default 
as to the defaulting party, Defendant Shawn Michael Burleson, it is thus protected 
with regard to having to proceed any further as to Defendant Shawn Michael Bur-
leson. Before a joint and several j udgment may be entered against him, however, 
Transamerica must first obtain a judgment against the answering defendant, De-
fendant Eric Snyder. The Court further notes Transamerica also names “Does 1 –
10” in its Complaint, but it does not appear these individuals have been served. 
 
ECF No. 22 at 2 –3 (footnotes omitted). Thereafter, Transamerica filed a Joint Stipulation of 
Dismissal, dismissing its claims against Defendant Eric Snyder. ECF No. 25. Transamerica also 
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to the Defendants Does 1–10. ECF No. 24. 
 Now before the Court is Transamerica’s second Motion for Default Judgment against 
Burleson, (ECF No. 28). Burleson did not file an answer, and the Court now considers the Mo-
tion for Default Judgment as unopposed. See W.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7(d)(2). 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides the conditions upon which a default may be 
entered against a party, as well as the procedure to seek the entry of default judgment. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55. A movant must satisfy three procedural requisites to secure a default judgment. New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown , 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). First, a party must properly serve 
the defendant, and default occurs when the defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend against 
the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Nex t, an entry of default must be entered when the default is 
established “by affidavit or otherwise.” Id.; New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141. Finally, upon 
satisfaction of the first two requirements, a party must move for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 55(b); New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141. 

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Still, standing alone, a defendant’s default does not entitle a plaintiff to a default judg-
ment, as the decision whether to grant a default judgment is within the district court’s discre-
tion. Lewis v. Lynn , 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). “Default judgments are a 
drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules” and are available “only when the adversary 
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pel-
ican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n , 874 F.2d 274, 2 76 (5th Cir. 1989). Any doubt as to whether to 
enter a default judgment must be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. Lindsey v. Prive 
Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998); John Perez Graphics & Design, LLC v. Green Tree 
Inv. Grp., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-4194, 2013 WL 1828671, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2013). 
At the third procedural requisite, the Motion for Default Judgment, courts apply a two -
part process to determine whether a default judgment should be entered. Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Defend Louisiana PAC, No. CV 21-00346, 2022 WL 2911665, at *6 (M.D. La. July 22, 2022). 
First, a court must consider whether the entry of default judgment is procedurally war-
ranted, that is, whether default judgment is appropriate under the circumstanc-
es. Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. Several factors are relevant to this inquiry, including the following: 
(1) whether there are material issues of fact; (2) whether there has been substantial 
prejudice; (3) whether the grounds for default have been clearly established; (4) 
whether the default was caused by excusable neglect or good faith mistake; (5) the 
harshness of the default judgment; and (6) whether the court would think itself 
obliged to set aside the default on a motion by Defendant. 
 
Id. Second, courts assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims to determine whether 
there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for a default judgment. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. 
Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. More-
lia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015). In doing so, courts are to as-
sume, that due to its default, the defendant admits all well -pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s com-

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plaint. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd., 515 F.2d at 1206 . However, a “defendant is not held to ad-
mit facts that are not-well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id. Consequently, at this sec-
ond step, the court must review the plaintiff ’s Complaint to determine whether the plaintiff as-
serts a viable claim for relief. Id.; J & J Sports Productions, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d at 814. 
Finally, the court must determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive 
in the case. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd., 515 F.2d at 1206 ; RLI Ins. Co. v. 2 G Energy Sys., 
LLC, 581 F. Supp. 3d 817, 823 (W.D. Tex. 2020). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Initial Procedural Requisites 
First, the record reveals Burleson failed to file an Answer after sufficient service and ex-
piration of the appropriate deadline to do so and ha s otherwise failed to appear in this action. See 
ECF Nos. 6. As a result, at the request of Transamerica, the Clerk of Court entered a Clerk’s En-
try of Default against Burleson. ECF No. 9. Upon satisfaction of the first two requisites, 
Transamerica filed its instant second Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 28. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfied all procedural requisites to seek default judgment against 
Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. 
II. Substantive Merits of Default Judgment 
A. Step One: Whether Default Judgment Is Appropriate 
Federal Rule 55 permits a default judgment as the consequence of a defendant’s failure to 
answer should other circumstances also support this harsh remedy. Lacy v. Sitel Corp. , 227 F.3d 
290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000); Bonanza Intern., Inc. v. Corceller, 480 F.2d 613, 614 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Here, the record reveals Burleson had ample notice and opportunity to file an answer or 
otherwise appear as required by Rule 55. Such failure to respond to a court order constitutes suf-

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ficient grounds for a default judgment. McGrady v. D’Andrea Electric, Inc. , 434 F.2d 1000 (5th 
Cir. 1970); Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co. , 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
392 U.S. 928 (1968). 
Because Burleson failed to file any responsive pleadings, there are no material facts in 
dispute and the grounds for default are “clearly established.” See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893; see 
also Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206; RLI Ins. Co., 581 F. Supp. 3d at 824 –25 (W.D. Tex. 
2020). Burleson’s failure to respond threatens to prejudice Transamerica’s undisputed interest. 
See id. Nothing before the Court indicates Burleson’s silence is the result of a good faith mistake 
or excusable neglect. 
For these reasons, the Court finds default judgment is procedurally warranted. 
B. Step Two: Whether There is a Sufficient Basis in the Pleadings for the Judgment 
Due to the entry of default, Burleson is deemed to have admitted the allegations outlined 
in the Complaint. See Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206. Nonetheless, the Court must review 
the pleadings to determine whether Transamerica plead a sufficient basis for its claim s for relief 
under Federal Rule 8. See id. 
1. Money Had and Received 
A plaintiff seeking recovery under a theory of money had and received must prove the 
“defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to him.” Matter of 
Okedokun, 968 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 
1951)). 
Transamerica has set forth facts now deemed as true based upon Burleson’s failure to an-
swer. Transamerica’s Complaint asserts : Burleson received $92,500 which was not due and ow-
ing under an annuity following the death of David James Jaggers; Burleson wrongfully exercised 

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dominion and control over the $92,500; and used the $92,500 for his own personal use, and, 
thereby, directly benefited from the receipt and retention of the $92,500. See ECF No. 1 . Thus, 
Transamerica has shown Burleson is liable for money had and received. 
2. Fraud 
The elements of a Texas common law fraud claim are: (1) a material representation was 
made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made the speaker knew it 
was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) 
the speaker made the representation with the intent that it should be acted upon by the party; (5) 
the party acted in reliance upon the representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered inju-
ry. Shakeri v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. , 816 F.3d 283, 296 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Eagle Props., 
Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 723 (Tex. 1990)). 
Transamerica has set forth facts now deemed as true based upon Burleson’s failure to an-
swer. Transamerica’s Complaint asserts : Burleson misrepresented to Transamerica that Mr. Jag-
gers was living on January 2, 2019; Burleson knowingly and intentionally concealed from 
Transamerica that Mr. Jaggers died on December 16, 2018; Burleson intended for Transamerica 
to rely on the representation so life -contingent monthly payments would continue; and 
Transamerica reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation to its de triment, causing it to contin-
ue making the monthly payments up to and through February 18, 2022 , despite Mr. Jaggers’ 
death years prior. See ECF No. 1. Thus, Transamerica has shown Burleson is liable for fraud. 
Based upon these alleged facts deemed as true, the Court concludes Transamerica plead 
and proved a sufficient basis for the asserted money had and received and fraud causes of action. 
C. Form of Relief 

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Having found that the Motion should be granted and judgment should be entered in favor 
of Transamerica, the Court must determine the appropriate form of relief. 
Transamerica seeks $92,500 in actual damages; $30,312.02 in attorney’s fees and costs, 
pre-judgment interest, and post -judgment interest. See ECF Nos. 28, 28 -1. TransAmerica holds 
the burden to establish its entitlement to recovery. Freeman, 605 F.2d at 857. 
I. Actual Damages 
While damages are normally not to be awarded without a hearing or a demonstration by 
detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts, if the amount of damages can be determined 
with mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing 
is unnecessary. United States v. Rod Riordan Inc. , No. MO:17-CV-071-DC, 2018 WL 2392559, 
at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2018) (citing United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th 
Cir. 1979); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
Transamerica asserts “the company unknowingly issued posthumous Periodic Payments . 
. . from December 21, 2018 through February 18, 2022 totaling $92,500.00,” and that “it is enti-
tled to actual damages in the amount of $92,500.00.” ECF No. 28 at 4, 9. This conclusory asser-
tion is the extent of the evidence that Transamerica brings forth to prove up its damages. This is 
insufficient. See Rod Riordan Inc. , 2018 WL 2392559, at *3 (“Normally, damages are not to be 
awarded without a hearing or a demonstration b y detailed affidavits establishing the necessary 
facts.”) (emphasis added). There is no evidence Transamerica incurred the requested damages. 
Accordingly, Transamerica has not adequately supported its damages amount. Due to this defi-
ciency, the Court will hold this aspect of Transamerica’s Motion in abeyance. 
II. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

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Under Texas law, “[w]hen a claimant wishes to obtain attorney ’s fees from the opposing 
party, the claimant must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable and neces-
sary.” Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP , 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex. 2019). 
Texas courts typically evaluate reasonableness and necessity using the two -step lodestar meth-
od. Id. at 501. First, courts calculate the lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended by the reasonable hourly rate for such work. Id. Then courts apply the Arthur Ander-
sen factors1 to determine whether the lodestar should be adjusted. Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & 
Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp. , 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)). The party seeking attorneys’ fees 
must provide, “at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed 
those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount 
of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person per-
forming such services.” Id. at 502. 
 Transamerica wholly fails to brief the reasonableness and necessity of its request for at-
torney’s fees. See ECF No. 28 . In addition, while Transamerica provides an exhibit, Exhibit A, 
“a copy of a report from [the] firm’s accounting software,” this document is heavily redacted. 
ECF Nos. 28 -1 at 3, 28-2. The billing entry redactions prevent the Court from determining the 
“particular services performed.” See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502. Many do not contain the 
subject matter of the task or what was done. Courts applying federal law have disallowed or re-
duced such inadequate requests. See, e.g., Fralick v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund , 
2011 WL 487754, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011); Cookston v. Freeman, Inc. , 1999 WL 
 
1 They are (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required 
to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood ... that the acceptance of the particular employment will pre-
clude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) 
the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or 
uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 
945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). 

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714760, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 1999). The Court similarly finds the billing entries inadequate 
under Texas law. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502. Finally, to the extent Transamerica seeks 
“costs,” it does not distinguish attorney’s fees from costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Accordingly, 
the Court will also hold this aspect of Transamerica’s Motion in abeyance. 
III. Opportunity to Supplement 
Regarding Transamerica’s request for damages, attorney ’s fees, and costs, the Court will 
allow a limited opportunity to seek these in a supplement to the second Motion for Default 
Judgment. The Court WARNS Transamerica that it must be precise and carefully provide 
evidence in a clear and consistent manner in support of such. The Court notes that 
Transamerica should have known to do this and thus the Court is hesitant to allow it now but will 
nevertheless allow Transamerica an opportunity to file a supplement to its second Motion for De-
fault Judgment which specifically points out its request and support for damages, fees, and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART AND HOLDS IN ABEY-
ANCE IN PART Transamerica’s Motion for Default Judgement, ( ECF No. 28 ). The Motion is 
GRANTED as to Transamerica’s money had and received and fraud causes of action. 
The Court will HOLD IN ABEYANCE Plaintiff's requests for damages, fees, and costs, 
as well as the request for entry of final default judgment. A supplement to the Second Motion for 
Default Judgment is due no later than July 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. Failure to file a supplement 
will result in the Court denying Plaintiff’s requests for damages, fees, and costs, and entering fi-
nal default judgment. 
 It is so ORDERED. 
 
 
 

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 SIGNED this 8th day of June, 2026. 
 
JASON PULLIAM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 

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