govinfo:USCOURTS-txwd-5_25-cv-01311-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 
 
 
MATTHEW MUTCH, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
TRANSUNION LLC, EXPERIAN 
SERVICES CORP., AMERICAN EX-
PRESS COMPANY, NELNET, INC., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Case No. SA-25-CV-01311-JKP 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 Before the Court is Defendants Trans Union and E xperian Services Corp.’s Joint Motion 
to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 28. Plaintiff Matthew Mutch did not 
respond to this Motion. Upon consideration, the Motion is GRANTED. All causes of action 
against Defendants Trans Union and Experian Services Corp . are DISMISSED. The Clerk of 
Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendants Trans Union and Experian Services Corp . as De-
fendants. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendants Trans Union and Experian Services Corp. are credit reporting agencies which 
collect, compile, and sell information about consumers’ credit and financial history to lenders 
and other authorized users. Mutch filed this suit alleging Trans Union and Experian Services 
Corp. (the CRA Defendants) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 
1681e(b), by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure accuracy of information reported , 
§ 1681i(a) by failing to conduct reasonable reinvesti gation of disputed information, and §§ 

2 
 
1681n and 1681o by acting in willful and/or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA. ECF No. 
16, pp. 16-18, 21-23. 
All Defendants followed this Court’s Standing Order procedure and notified M utch in 
writing of their intent to file Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) and providing 
their perceived bases for such dismissal. See ECF Nos. 9, 16, 22. Pursuant to this Court’s Stand-
ing Order, M utch filed an Amended Complaint to cure any deficiencies. ECF Nos. 1 6, 22. De-
fendants then filed independent Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim contending the 
Amended Complaint did not cure the disclosed grounds for dismissal. ECF Nos. 24 (Nelnet’s 
Motion to Dismiss), 28 (the CRA Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss). On the same day the CRA De-
fendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, Mutch filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amend-
ed Complaint. ECF. No. 30 . Mutch presumed this Motion for Leave would be granted , thereby 
mooting the Motions to Dismiss. See ECF No. 31. However, Mutch’s Motion for Leave to File a 
Second Amended Complaint was denied, and the Motions to Dismiss remained live motions. 
Mutch did not resp ond to the CRA Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ( ECF No. 28 ); however, he 
did respond to Defendant Nelnet’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24). 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Failure to Respond 
When a party fails to respond to a motion, “the court may grant the motion as unop-
posed.” W.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7(d)(2). The Court may apply this terminal Local Rule to dispositive 
motions. Suarez v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 5:15 -CV-664, 2015 WL 7076674, at 
*2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2015); Hernandez v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. , No. EP -12-CV-282, 2012 
WL 12887898, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2012). However, at its discretion, a Court may address 
the motion on the merits “in the interests of thoroughness.” Suarez, 2015 WL 7076674, *2. Un-

3 
 
der the circumstances of this case, the Court declines to apply Local Rule 7(d)(2), which would 
allow granting this dispositive motion as unopposed. Instead, the Court will examine the merits 
of the Motion to Dismiss. 
Motion to Dismiss 
To provide opposing parties fair notice of the asserted cause of action and the grounds 
upon which it rests, every pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the cause of ac-
tion which shows the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To satisfy this requirement, the Complaint must plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 -
558, 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The focus is not on whether the plaintiff will ulti-
mately prevail, but whether that party should be permitted to present evidence to support ade-
quately asserted causes of action. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. Thus, to warrant dismissal 
under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a Complaint must, on its face, show a bar to relief or demonstrate 
“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th 
Cir. 1986). Dismissal “can be based either on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence 
of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Frith v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 9 F. 
Supp.2d 734, 737–38 (S.D.Tex. 1998). “ Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could 
prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th 
Cir. 1999) Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996). 

4 
 
 
In assessing a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the Court’s review is 
limited to the Complaint and any documents attached to the Motion to Dismiss, which are also 
referred to in the Complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claims. Brand Coupon Network, 
L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp. , 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). When reviewing the Com-
plaint, the “court accepts all well -pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favora-
ble to the plaintiff.” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit , 369 F.3d 464, 467 
(5th Cir. 2004)(quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d at 324). 
A complaint should only be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) after affording eve-
ry opportunity for the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless it is 
clear amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Hitt v. City of 
Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 –09 (5th Cir. 1977); DeLoach v. Woodley, 405 F.2d 496, 496 -97 
(5th Cir. 1968). Consequently, when it appears a more careful or detailed drafting might over-
come the deficiencies on which dismissal is sought, a Cour t must allow a plaintiff the oppor-
tunity to amend the Complaint. Hitt, 561 F.2d at 608–09. A court may appropriately dismiss an 
action with prejudice without giving an opportunity to amend if it finds that the plaintiff al-
leged his best case or amendment would be futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; DeLoach, 405 F.2d 
at 496–97. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Causes of Action under 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) (“reasonable procedures) and § 1681i 
(“reasonable investigation”) 
 
 In this Motion to Dismiss, the CRA Defendants contend that “[t]o prevail on either a 15 
U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“reasonable procedures”) or a 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (“reasonable reinvestiga-
tion”) cause of action under the FCRA, the Plaintiff must first demonstrate an inaccuracy in the 

5 
 
CRA Defendants’ reporting, and “‘[t]he offensive information in the credit report must be shown 
to be inaccurate, prior to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the reporting procedures. ’” ECF 
No. 28, pp. 5-6. The CRA Defendants contend Mutch failed to assert a viable cause of action 
against them because he “does not specify what inaccurate information CRA Defendants report-
ed, or how such inaccuracies resulted from a failure to maintain reasonable procedures or con-
duct a reasonable reinvestigation. ” Id. at p. 6. The CRA Defendants contend Mutch’s pleading 
statements asserting they “ violated the FCRA by reporting unidentified ‘factual inaccuracies ’ 
that include, but are not limited to, ‘tradeline data related to American Express and Nelnet, (2) 
obsolete addresses and personal identifiers, and (3) unauthorized credit inquiries lacking a per-
missible purpose’” are insufficient to assert a viable cause of action , and Mutch “fails to allege 
any inaccuracy with the requisite specificity or what the accurate reporting should be” in order to 
prove his case. Id. 
 The purpose of the FCRA is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasona-
ble procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit ... information in a man-
ner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, rele-
vancy, and proper utilization of such information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) ; Watkins v. Experian 
Info., Sols., Inc., No. 6:13-CV-00239, 2014 WL 12879669, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2014), re c. 
adopted, 2014 WL 12879668 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2014). Among the obligations imposed by the 
FCRA is the requirement that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer 
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the infor-
mation concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). In addi-
tion, “if the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer ’s file 
at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer ... the agency shall, free of charge , 

6 
 
conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate 
and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 
The elements of a cause of action under § 1681e(b) claim are: (1) the CRA prepared a 
consumer report that contained inaccurate information” (2) the inaccuracy was due to the CRA’s 
failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) cognizable 
injury; and (4) causation linking the CRA’s failure to that injury. Saunders v. Equifax Info. Servs. 
LLC, No. 16-CV-00525, 2017 WL 3940942, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) . Thus, the founda-
tional requirement for these asserted causes of action under the FCRA is the inaccuracy of the 
data appearing on the subject consumer credit report. Washington v. CSC Credit Services Inc. , 
199 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2000) ; Knox v. Equifax Info. Services LLC , No. 3:19 -CV-02581, 
2020 WL 4339016, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2020). Accordingly, as a prerequisite to recovery, a 
plaintiff must allege, and eventually demonstrate, the factual inaccuracy of the information about 
their credit and financial history that the CRA collected and sold . Garcia v. Equifax Info. Ser-
vices, LLC , 3:25 -CV-3543, 2026 WL 1483496, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2026) ; Duren v. 
Westlake Servs. LLC, 2025 WL 2821247, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2025) . A credit entry is in-
accurate within the meaning of the F CRA if (1) the entry is patently incorrect, or (2) is mislead-
ing in such a way and extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions. Ostiguy 
v. Equifax Info. Services, LLC , 5:16 -CV-790, 2017 WL 1842947, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 4, 
2017), aff’d sub nom., 738 Fed. Appx. 281 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sepulvado v. CSC Credit 
Svcs. Inc. , 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998) ); Davidson v. Texan Credit Corp. , 2025 WL 
1914397, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2025) , rec. adopted, 2025 WL 1625353 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 
2025). Additionally, to be actionable under the FCRA, an “alleged inaccuracy reported by the 

7 
 
consumer reporting agency must first be ‘sufficiently objectively verifiable.’” Reyes v. Equifax 
Info. Servs., L.L.C. , 140 F.4th 279, 288 (5th Cir. 2025) ; Garcia, 2026 WL 1483496, at *2 . If a 
plaintiff does not plead facts specific to the alleged inaccuracy in the defendant ’s reporting, the 
plaintiff fails to assert a viable FCRA cause of action because the alleged inaccurate entry would 
not be “objectively verifiable.” Id.; Davidson, 2025 WL 1914397, at *5. The FCRA does not im-
pose strict liability for inaccurate entries ; “mere imprecision does not render information inaccu-
rate.” Sepulvado, 158 F.3d at 896; Davidson, 2025 WL 1914397, at *5. 
Courts reviewing the sufficiency of pleading for an alleged violation of the FCRA require 
enough facts to describe a specific inaccuracy, rather than a general statement that the infor-
mation was inaccurate or a general statement that errors appeared on the report even in cases 
with pro se plaintiffs. See OmiagboPhilips v. Digital Fed. Credit Union, 4:23-CV-240, 2024 WL 
898914, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 897600 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2024); 
Ostiguy, 2017 WL 1842947, at *5 . To survive a Motion to Dismiss, a p laintiff must allege the 
specific inaccuracy noted in the credit report to support the requirement that the notation is “ob-
jectively verifiable.” Reyes. In cases similar to this one, this specificity requires an allegation of 
the amount of the debt disputed and the specific tradeline improperly reported. See e.g., 
OmiagboPhilips, 2024 WL 898914, at *4 (finding insufficient allegation that , without factual 
support, plaintiff stated only that he noticed “errors” on his consumer report ); Reeves v. Nelnet 
Loan Servs., No. 17 -cv-3726, 2018 WL 2200112, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2018); Pressley v. 
Cap. One, 415 F.Supp.3d 509, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2019)(finding plaintiff did not describe “the alleg-
edly false and misleading information that appears in the accounts”) ; But see, Paul v. Trans Un-
ion, LLC, No. 20-cv-794, 2021 WL 3503393, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 2021), rec. adopted, 2021 

8 
 
WL 3487485 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2021) (finding sufficient the allegation that defendant incorrect-
ly reported plaintiff owed $1,517.88 that he did not actually owe).1 
The issue here is whether Mutch plead enough facts to satisfy the foundational pleading 
standard for FCRA-violation causes of action, which requires Mutch to state the information the 
CRA Defendants reported about Mutch that he alleges was incomplete or contained inaccurate 
credit information. 
In the Amended Complaint, Mutch asserts he submitted a written dispute “identifying 
specific factual inaccuracies appearing in [his] credit file, including but not limited to: (1) trade-
line data related to American Express and Nelnet, (2) obsolete addresses and personal identifiers, 
and (3) unauthorized credit inquiries lacking a permissible purpose.” ECF No. 16, p.6 . With 
these factual allegations, Mutch fails to plead the “specific factual inaccuracies” that he allege s 
he disputed and reported to the CRA Defendants for reinvestigation, and he fails to provide any 
information beyond a general statement of inaccuracy or error of entries in his credit report. 
While Mutch alleges generally that there were inaccuracies in his credit report, without more de-
tail regarding the alleged errors, his allegations are not objectively verifiable and are conclusory 
statements that do not rise above the level of mere speculation. For this reason, the Amended 
Complaint fails to provide sufficient detail to give rise to these causes of action for violation of 
the FCRA asserted against the CRAs. To survive this Motion to Dismiss, Mutch was required to 
provide some factual detail of the alleged inaccuracies in the tradeline data related to American 
 
1 The Court is careful to note the plaintiff need not “prove” the first element at this stage of the litigation; the plain-
tiff need only allege facts which provide some specificity of the alleged errors or inaccuracies. Several opinions in-
advertently recite the legal standard as the plaintiff must “prove” or “establish,” rather than “allege.” The Court also 
notes that many cases cited by the CRA Defendants are decisions upon summary judgment or trial, at which time the 
plaintiff must provide evidence to prove the cause of action. These cases are not applicable to the pleading standard 
applied to determination of a Motion to Dismiss. 
 

9 
 
Express and Nelnet, obsolete addresses and personal identifiers, and unauthorized credit inquir-
ies. See OmiagboPhilips, 2024 WL 898914, at *4; Ostiguy, 2017 WL 1842947, at *5. 
For this reason, the CRA Defendants ’ Motion to Dismiss th ese causes of action will be 
granted. 
B. Causes of Action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (“willfulness provision ”); 15 U.S.C. § 
1681o (“negligence provision”) 
 
The FCRA provides that “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any require-
ment imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1681n. I n the alternative, “[a]ny person who is negligent in failing to comply with any 
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that con-
sumer.” Id. § 1681o. “Willfully” means either knowingly or with reckless disregard. Safeco Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58-59 (2007). To state a cause of action based upon a CRA De-
fendant’s willfulness, a Plaintiff must allege: (1) the CRA Defendant had a practice or policy that 
was objectively unreasonable in light of the FCRA’s statutory language; and (2) how the CRA 
Defendant ran a risk of violating the FCRA that was substantially greater than the risk associated 
with a reading that was merely careless. Id. Plaintiff must show that CRA Defendants acted in a 
manner that made it highly probable harm would follow. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69. Accordingly, to 
assert a plausible cause of action under these provisions, a plaintiff must plead facts pertaining to 
the requisite mental state or the support for negligence . Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 
(5th Cir. 1986) ; Sanders v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. , No. 5 -24-CV-01093, 2025 WL 
2792766, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2025), re c. adopted, 2025 WL 2785062 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 
25, 2025) ; Sanchez v. Glob. Lending Services , No. 4:23 -CV-01101, 2024 WL 1076827, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 1122061 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2024). 

10 
 
The Amended Complaint fails to plead facts capable of supporting a finding on knowing 
and intentional noncompliance or negligence. See Sanchez, 2024 WL 1076827, at * 4 ; Sanders, 
2025 WL 2792766, at *2. Therefore, these causes of action will be dismissed. 
Opportunity to Amend 
The Court recognizes a complaint or cause of action should only be dismissed under Fed-
eral Rule 12(b)(6) after affording every opportunity for the plaintiff to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, unless it is clear amendment would be futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; 
Hitt, 561 F.2d at 608–09; DeLoach, 405 F.2d at 496-97. Pursuant to the Court’s Standing Order 
procedures, the Court provided Mutch ample opportunity to amend the Complaint to overcome 
the noticed deficiencies on which dismissal is hereby granted. See Hitt, 561 F.2d at 608–09. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, Defendants Trans Union and Experian Services Corp.’s Joint Mo-
tion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. ECF No. 28. All causes 
of action against Defendants Trans Union and Experian Services Corp. are DISMISSED. 
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendants Trans Union and Experian 
Services Corp. as Defendants. 
 
 It is so ORDERED. 
 SIGNED this 9th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
JASON PULLIAM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

Passage view · GavelSight