govinfo:USCOURTS-tnmd-3_25-cv-00884-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
JOSEPH DEION PAGE, #648286, 
P
etitioner, 
v.
 
S
EAN PHILLIPS, Warden, et al., 
R
espondents. 
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NO
. 3:25-cv-00884 
M
EMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Joseph Page, an inmate of the Morgan County Correctional Complex (MCCX) in East 
Tennessee, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1) 
and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 7). He also filed two 
motions to admit evidence (Doc. Nos. 4, 5), a motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 6), and a motion 
to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Tennessee for consolidation with Petitioner’s civil 
rights action pending there. (Doc. No. 10). 
Because Petitioner’s IFP application complies with Rule 3(a)(2) of the Rules Governing 
§ 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”)1 and demonstrates that he cannot reasonably afford the five-dollar 
filing fee, the IFP application (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED. 
T
he Petition is now before the Court for initial review. 
I. INITIAL REVIEW
Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to examine the Petition to ascertain as a preliminary 
matter whether “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 
1 These Rules apply to Section 2241 cases as well as Section 2254 cases. See Habeas Rule 1(b). PageID #: <pageID>
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not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Gov’g § 2254 Cases. The Court is not only 
“authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face,” 
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994), but “has a duty to screen out” such petitions. Allen 
v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243). 
The Petition before the Court lacks a signature, as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring that “[e]very pleading, written motion, or other 
paper” be signed “by a party personally if the party is unrepresented”), and it fails to seek any 
particular relief. The Court will nevertheless give it preliminary consideration. 
The Petition challenges the Tennessee Board of Parole’s January 6, 2025 decision denying 
Petitioner parole based on the result of disciplinary proceedings that he claims were 
unconstitutional. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated by 
the bias of the Disciplinary Board Chairperson, who told him, “Just shut the hell up Page, we all 
know you’re a liar and a snitch.” ( Id. at 6 –7). Petitioner claims that this statement by the 
Chairperson demonstrates that he was denied a “fair and impartial” hearing of his disciplinary 
charges (id. at 7), and that the tainted disciplinary proceedings resulted in parole being denied 
when it would otherwise have been awarded. 
Section 2241 authorizes the Court to entertain a habeas application from a person “in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c)(3). As opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petition under Section 2241 is generally “reserved 
for a challenge to the manner in which a sentence is executed, rather than the validity of the 
sentence itself.” Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. 
Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991)). A convicted state prisoner, after exhausting his state 
remedies, may use Section 2241 to raise “claims generally pertaining to the computation of parole PageID #: <pageID>
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or sentencing credits.” Benson v. Alexander, No. 2:24- CV-2958-MSN-TMP, 2026 WL 786711, 
at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2026) (citing Ali v. Tennessee Bd. of Pardon & Paroles, 431 F.3d 896 
(6th Cir. 2005); Greene v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001)). When it comes 
to challenging the imposition of prison discipline, a habeas challenge must be made under Section 
2254, and will only be cognizable if the disciplinary punishments “affect the fact or duration of 
[the prisoner’s] confinement”; if they do not, “they are not a proper subject for a habeas corpus 
action.” Lee v. Mackie, No. 2:15- CV-12, 2015 WL 1040272, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2015) 
(citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)); see also Greene, 265 F.3d at 371 (agreeing 
with the Seventh Circuit “that § 2254 was the correct vehicle for contesting loss of good time credit 
in prison disciplinary proceedings”) (quoting Walker v. O’Brien , 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
Here, the Petitioner does not claim that disciplinary punishments affected the duration of 
his sentence by reducing his good- time credits.2 Rather, it attacks those punishments insofar as 
they affected his ability to win early release on parole. Specifically, in answer to the Section 2241 
petition form’s prompt for the “Decision or action you are challenging (for disciplinary 
proceedings, specify the penalties imposed),” Petitioner responded only that he was challenging 
“[d]enial of parole due to unconstitutional disciplinary proceedings.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). 
 
2 The Court notes that, while Petitioner’s subsequently filed “Brief” refers to a loss of “six months of my 
earned good time credit” after allegedly being coerced into pleading guilty to misconduct by the 
Disciplinary Board Chairperson (Doc. No. 9 at 3), the Petition cannot be construed to assert that Section 
2254 claim. Even if it could, and even if Petitioner had properly exhausted his state remedies for such a 
claim, he would not be permitted to proceed in this district but would be required to litigate the claim in the 
Eastern District of Tennessee, where he is in custody and where his disciplinary proceedings were held. 
See Adams v. Lumpkin, No. CV H -20-3367, 2020 WL 6787138, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) ( finding 
the interests of justice best served by requiring that a challenge to “the forfeiture of good- time credits 
following a disciplinary hearing” be heard in the district of confinement, where “prison disciplinary hearing 
records and records concerning the calculation of [prisoner’s] good-time credits and his eligibility for 
release to mandatory supervision are presumed to be”). PageID #: <pageID>
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As alluded to above, Section 2241 may be used to challenge the constitutionality of a parole 
denial, but the exhaustion requirement applies. Seaton v. Kentucky, 92 F. App’x 174, 175 (6th Cir. 
2004); Adams v. Genovese , No. 1:17- cv-00098, 2018 WL 2560397, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. June 4, 
2018). The requirement of exhausting available state remedies before seeking habeas relief in 
federal court “is a strictly enforced doctrine designed to promote comity between the states and 
the federal government by giving the stat e an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Rayner v. Lee, No. 3:18-cv-01103, 2020 WL 58610, at 
*4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2020) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel , 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). It is 
Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate exhaustion. Deberry v. Adams, No. 1:22-CV-01240-STA-JAY, 
2025 WL 874800, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2025) (citing Rust v. Zent , 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th 
Cir. 1994)). 
Notably, Section 2241 petitioners must exhaust their remedies in the state trial and 
appellate courts. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) 
(noting that “[i]t is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts ” in their efforts to 
exhaust); see Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cnty, Ohio, 668 F.3d 804, 810 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (where state inmates seek relief under § 2241, they “must exhaust all available state 
court remedies before proceeding in federal court”). In this case, Petitioner claims to have pursued 
remedies before the Board of Parole, the BCCX Warden, and the Commissioner of the Tennessee 
Department of Correction. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2–4). He does not appear to have pursued a remedy 
in the Tennessee trial and appellate courts. Cf. Adams, 2018 WL 2560397, at *6 (describing 
petitioner’s pursuit of declaratory judgment in Davidson County Circuit Court regarding denial of 
his parole application, followed by appeal to Tennessee Court of Appeals). Where “such a remedy PageID #: <pageID>
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may be available, exhaustion is not deemed to be complete.” Seaton , 92 F. App’x at 175 (citing 
Brewer v. Dahlberg, 942 F.2d 328, 340 (6th Cir. 1991)).3 
In light of the Petition’s multiple defects, including especially its failure to demonstrate 
exhaustion of its claims in the courts of the state, it plainly appears that Petitioner is not entitled to 
relief in this Court. Accordingly, the Petition will be dismissed without prejudice. 
II. CONCLUSION 
 As explained above, upon initial review of the Petition it plainly appears that Petitioner is 
not entitled to habeas relief in district court at this time. Further proceedings in this Court are not 
warranted. 
This case is DISMISSED without prejudice to Petitioner’s ability to refile in federal court 
after fully exhausting his remedies in the state courts. In light of the dismissal, Petitioner’s pending 
motions (Doc. Nos. 4, 5, 6, 10) are DENIED as moot. 
Because “a plain procedural bar is present” in this case and jurists of reason could not find 
that it was incorrectly invoked or that Petitioner should be allowed to proceed further, no certificate 
of appealability shall issue. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); 
Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). For the same reasons, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this 
dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
____________________________________ 
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
3 The Tennessee Department of Correction Felony Offender Lookup Information database, 
https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (last visited June 5, 2026), reveals that Petitioner was again denied 
parole after a hearing on May 14, 2026. PageID #: <pageID>

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