govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_26-cv-22203-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
DANIEL WALKER OSORIO, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN, KROME SERVICE 
PROCESSING CENTER, et al. 
 
 Defendants. 
_____________________________________________/ 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon P etitioner Daniel Walker Osorio ’s 
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. [1]. Respondent 
filed a Response in Opposition to the Petition , ECF No. [ 6]. No reply has been filed 
and the time to do so has passed. Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, 
the pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the reasons explained 
below, the Petition is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Petitioner is a Cuban citizen, currently detained at the Krome Processing 
Center in Miami, Florida , who has been in the custody of the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since December 30, 2025. ECF No. [1] 
at 1, 5; ECF No. [6] at 2, 4. 
On March 31 , 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. ECF No. [1]. 
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his continued detention pursuant to 
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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Id. at 6–7. Petitioner seeks immediate 
release from custody with or without bond. Id. at 7. 
Respondents filed their Response to the Petition. ECF No. [6]. Respondents 
argue that the Petition should be denied because “(1) Petitioner’s detention post final 
order of removal is lawful pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and (2) any claim under 
Zadvydas is premature as the length of Petitioner’s detention does not exceed the 
presumptively reasonable detention period of six months.” Id. at 2. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive 
detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may 
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
The Court has jurisdiction over a Petitioner’s habeas claim that the length of his 
detention violates due process. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (Ҥ 2241 habeas corpus 
proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to 
post-removal-period detention.”). Petitioner is subject to a final removal order , ECF 
No. [6 -7], and, thus, his detention is governed by Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Section 
1231(a)(1) requires the Government to effectuate an alien’s removal within a ninety -
day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). During this removal period, the 
Government must detain the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal 
period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”). The government may detain an 
alien beyond the ninety -day removal period only for a length of time “reasonably 
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necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 
U.S. at 689. 
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered the petitions of two resident aliens 
who challenged the constitutionality of their detentions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6), which permits the Government to detain an alien subject to a final order of 
removal beyond the 90 -day statutory removal period set forth in § 1231(a)(1). Id . at 
682. Although no country was willing to accept either alien once they were ordered 
removed, the Government continued to detain them after the expiration of § 
1231(a)(1)’s 90-day removal period. Id. at 684- 86. The Supreme Court held that a 
detainee may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the reasonableness 
of their continued detention when the Government is unable to effectuate removal 
within the 90-day removal period. Id. at 687. 
The Supreme Court further held that “once removal is no longer reasonably 
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute” because “[a] 
statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 
problem.” Id . at 690, 699. In so ruling, the Supreme Court explained that it is 
presumptively reasonable for the Government to detain an individual for a period of 
six months while it effectuates that individual’s removal. Id. at 701. That said, after 
this six-month period, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold 
continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute” and grant the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, “conditioned on any of the various forms of 
supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 699–700. 
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Accordingly, to state a valid claim under Zadvydas, a petitioner must show (1) 
“post removal order detention in excess of six months,” and (2) “a good reason to 
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 
future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft , 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, the 
burden shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 
showing.” Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“After this 6–month period, once the 
alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 
in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 
sufficient to rebut that showing.”). 
Here, the first prong is not met given that Petitioner had been in custody for 
less than six months when he filed the Petition. See ECF No. [1]; Akinwale, 287 F.3d 
at 1052 (“This six-month period thus must have expired at the time Akinwale’s § 2241 
petition was filed in order to state a claim under Zadvydas .”). As of the filing of his 
Petition, Petitioner had been in custody for 3 months and 1 day. See ECF No. [1] at 4; 
ECF No. [6] at 4. Thus, the first prong of the Zadvydas analysis is not met . Further, 
even if Petitioner was able to satisfy the first prong, Petitioner’s claim still fails 
because Respondents have shown that his removal is likely in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. See ECF No. [6] at 4 ( stating that, “[o]n March 5, 2026, Petitioner 
was served with a Notice of Removal to Mexico” ); ECF No. [6] -[17]. Accordingly, his 
detention does not violate due process. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 
Petitioner the Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1], is DENIED 
WIHTOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 11th day of June, 
2026. 
 
 
________________________________________ 
JACQUELINE BECERRA 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
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