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govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00115-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois · 2026-06-11

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:16:25

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
BART M. GRISSOM, ) 
#B89136 and #310364, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-00115-JPG 
 ) 
SHERIFF RICHARD WATSON, ) 
DOCTOR GREEN, ) 
C/O WILLIAMS, ) 
SGT. BROWN, ) 
and C/O LADANTE, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
GILBERT, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Bart Grissom, an inmate who is currently in the custody of the Illinois Department 
of Corrections and incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations arising from the alleged use of excessive force 
against him and subsequent denial of medical care by the defendan ts at St. Clair County Jail. 
(Doc. 1, pp. 1-11). He seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Id. 
The Complaint is before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which 
requires screening of prisoner comp laints and dismissal of portions that are legally frivolous or 
malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek money damages from an immune defendant. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). The factual allegations in the pro se Complaint are liberally construed 
at this stage. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009). Page ID
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The Complaint 
 Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 5-10): When he 
entered St. Clair County Jail on August 20, 2025, Pl aintiff requested medi cal treatment for his 
injured shoulder during booking. Id. at 5. Plaintiff explained that he could not move it, and he 
suspected a torn rotator cuff. He also informed a nurse and o fficers at booking that he needed 
fusion surgery on his left ankle. Plaintiff said he received a recommendation for the procedure in 
2000, but he could not afford it. The nurse put him in to see the doctor. Id. 
Plaintiff remained in booking from noon until 8:00 p.m. on August 20, 2025. Id. at 6. 
C/O LaDante and C/O Williams were working there at the time. When C/O LaDante asked 
Plaintiff to step out of his cell, Plaintiff again asked for medical attention from a doctor or nurse. 
Instead of helping him, C/O LaDante and C/O Williams hit him several times and dragged him 
into the hallway. Id. at 5-6. C/O LaDante ordered Plaintiff to “do as he says, or he will “knock 
[Plaintiff] the fuck out.” Id. C/O LaDante then instructed C/O Williams to “take [Plaintiff’s] legs 
out.” Id. at 6. After knocking him to the floor, the officers stomped on his ring finger and pinky 
finger until both fingers broke. They pulled his “surgically repaired knee” over his back and head. 
Id. Sergeant Brown then ran down the hall with a taser gun, placed his knee onto the back of 
Plaintiff’s head, and busted Plain tiff’s nose against the floor, caus ing blood to flow everywhere. 
An officer then placed a knee to his lower back, which he broke four years earlier. 
After assaulting Plaintiff, the officers t ook him to the nurses’ station, where a nurse 
instructed them to take Plaintiff to a hospital for treatment. C/O Bush drove Plaintiff to 
St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Shiloh, Illinois, where he was diagnosed with a broken nose, two broken 
fingers, and a hematoma. Treatment of his injuries took ten hours. Drainage of the hematoma 
required insertion of a needle up his nose to dr ain the blood. Although Plaintiff told his medical Page ID
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providers that he needed left ankle fusion surg ery and treatment of his shoulder injury, they 
declined to evaluate or treat either injury because they were not authorized to do so. Id. at 7. 
After returning to the Jail, Plaintiff was housed in the infirmary for two weeks. He was 
then transferred to the gym, where he was housed with forty other inmates. These inmates had 
access to only one toilet, one sink, and no beds. He was forced to sleep on the floor, where he was 
bitten by spiders and insects. Plaintiff could not walk up or down stairs to access food, medication, 
or showers because of his ankle injury. He comp lained, but was ignored. The “Jail” took x-rays 
of his two fingers and confirmed both were broken. “They” did nothing to treat the fractures, and 
his fingers are now crooked. They failed to treat his broken nose, and it healed improperly. His 
nose is also crooked. In addition, Plaintiff suffered from headaches, memory loss, and nightmares. 
He never received treatment for these injuries, his ankle, or his shoulder. Major Grimes explained 
that treatment would be delayed until he transferre d to prison. Plaintiff claims that these acts 
“may” have been in retaliation for filing a lawsuit against “them” in February 2024. Id. at 7. 
Preliminary Dismissals 
Plaintiff identifies two defendants in the Complaint and makes no allegations against them: 
Sheriff Richard Watson and Doctor Green. If a plai ntiff fails to include the name of a defendant 
in his statement of claim or make any allegations against them, that defendant cannot be said to 
have notice of which claims, if any, are directed against the party. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In other 
words, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not enough to state a claim. Collins 
v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Defendants Watson and Green will be 
dismissed from this action without prejudice. 
Plaintiff mentions the following individuals in the statement of his claim but does not 
identify them as defendants in the Complain t: booking nurse, booking officers, C/O Bush, Major Page ID
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Grimes, other nurses, outside me dical providers, St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, and St. Clair County 
Jail. The Court will not treat these individuals or entities as defendants, and all claims against 
them are considered dismissed without prejudice. See F
ED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title 
of the complaint “must name all the parties”). 
Discussion 
The Court deems it appropr iate to organize the pro se Complaint into the following 
enumerated counts: 
Count 1: Defendants LaDante, Williams, and Brown used excessive force against 
Plaintiff on or around August 20, 2025, in violation of his rights under the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Count 2: Defendants LaDante, Williams, and Brown delayed or denied medical 
treatment for Plaintiff’s ankle and shoulder injuries on or around August 20, 
2025, in violation of his rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Count 3: Defendants delayed or denied medical care for Plaintiff’s assault-related 
injuries following his return from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital on or around 
August 20-21, 2025, in violation of his rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Count 4: Defendants subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional living conditions when 
they housed him with forty other in mates in the gymnasium on or around 
September 2025, in violation of his ri ghts under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Count 5: Defendant “may” have retaliated against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against 
them in February 2024, in violation of his rights under the First 
Amendment. 
 
Any claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein should be considered 
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.
1 
 
 
1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Page ID
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Counts 1 through 4 
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, if Plaintiff was a pretrial 
detainee when the events giving rise to this action occurred. To articulate a claim in this context, 
a pretrial detainee must generally set forth a llegations suggesting that each defendant acted 
purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly in response to conditions posing an excessive 
risk to his health or safety and that each de fendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable. See 
Kingsley v. Henderson , 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (Fourteenth Am endment excessive force claim); 
Miranda v. County of Lake , 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) (Fourteenth Amendment medical care 
claim); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019) (Fourteenth Amendment conditions of 
confinement claim). 
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 are instead governed by the Eighth Amendment, if Plaintiff was a 
convicted prisoner at the time his claims arose. To bring a claim in this context, a prisoner must 
allege that each defendant acted with deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to his health or 
safety. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009) (Eighth Amendment excessive force 
claim); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment medical care claim); Farmer 
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim). 
The allegations satisfy both standards for the excessive force claim (Count 1) and denial of 
medical care claim (Count 2) against C/O LaDante, C/O Williams, and Sergeant Brown. When 
Plaintiff requested medical care fo r his injured ankle and shoulder, these officers allegedly beat 
him for requesting treatment. Counts 1 and 2 surv ive screening against all three defendants, and 
the applicable legal standard for these claims can be determined during discovery. Counts 1 and 
2 shall be dismissed without prejudice against all other defendants. Page ID
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Counts 3 and 4 shall also be dismissed. Pl aintiff identifies no de fendants in connection 
with either claim. He only refers to the “jail,” alleging that “they” ignored his requests for medical 
treatment and his complaints about his living conditions after returning from the hospital. These 
vague allegations are not enough to establish personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation 
by any particulate defendant. Accordingly, Counts 3 and 4 are dismissed without prejudice against 
all defendants. 
Count 5 
Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the acts described in his Complaint “may” have been in 
retaliation for filing a lawsuit ag ainst “them” in February 2024. (Doc. 1, p. 7). This vague 
allegation falls short of satisfying the pleading standards described in Twombly and Rule 8. The 
retaliation claim shall also be dismissed without prejudice against all defendants. 
Disposition 
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A, and the following claims are subject to further review: 
x COUNTS 1 and 2 against C/O LaDONTE, C/O WILLIAMS, and SERGEANT 
BROWN. 
 
IT IS ORDERED that all other claims and defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This includes COUNTS 3, 4, and 5 
against ALL DEFENDANTS. 
Because one or more claims arise from the denial of medical care, the Clerk’s Office 
is DIRECTED to ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 
With regard to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants 
LADANTE, WILLIAMS, and BROWN, in their individual capacities: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Page ID
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Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summ ons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of 
Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and 
this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. 
If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk 
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect 
formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of 
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS ORDERED that, if a Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided 
by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if 
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending 
the forms as directed above or for formally effe cting service. Any documentation of the address 
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file 
or disclosed by the Clerk. 
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropria te responsive pleading to the 
Complaint (Doc. 1) and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant 
to SDIL-Local Rule 8.1, Defendant s should only respond to the issues stated in this Merits 
Review Order. 
IT IS ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes 
the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintif f will be required to pay the full amount of the 
costs, whether or not his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(f)(2)(A). 
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk of Court 
and each opposing party of any address changes; th e Court will not independently investigate his Page ID
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whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days after a transfer or other 
change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will delay the transmission of court 
documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. F
ED.R .CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 6/11/2026
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
Once identified, the Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit 
and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. Af ter service has been achieved, Defendants will 
enter their appearances and file Answers to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days
from the date they are served with this lawsuit to receive the Answers, but it is entirely possible 
that it will take 90 days or more. When all Defendants have file Answers, the Court will enter a 
Scheduling Order containing important informat ion on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. 
Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to 
give the Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before 
Defendants’ attorneys have filed appearances will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need 
not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so. Page ID
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