govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_24-cv-00357-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
LAURIE VALENTINE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
 
RIVERSIDE RADIOLOGY AND 
INTERVENTIONAL 
ASSOCIATES, et al., 
 
Defendant. 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
: 

Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison 
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. 
Jolson 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Laurie Valentine was a registered nurse at Riverside Radiology and 
Interventional Associates for nearly 18 years. Ms. Valentine suffers from an 
autoimmune disorder affecting her eyes. In October 2021, she was prescribed 
chemotherapy IV treatment which would require her to periodically take off work. 
She advised her employer of her need for intermittent time off and a month later 
she was accused of violating Riverside’s clock-in policy. In January 2022, she was 
terminated. 
Ms. Valentine sued Riverside, Premier Imaging Ventures, LLC dba 
LucidHealth, and John Does #1–10. After discovery, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment. (Mot., ECF No. 42.) Ms. Valentine responded (Resp., ECF No. 
46), and Defendants replied (Reply, ECF No. 47). For the reasons below, 
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 1 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2 
 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Ms. Valentine’s Work History 
Ms. Valentine was hired by Riverside as a registered nurse in October 2004. 
(Valentine Depo., 11:11–14, ECF No. 41-1.) She worked at several different 
locations throughout her tenure, eventually landing at Riverside’s Dublin, Ohio 
location as a Lead RN. (Id., 14:15–24.) 
Julie Boynton became Ms. Valentine’s direct supervisor around 2011. (Id., 
13:5–13.) Ms. Valentine and Ms. Boynton shared an “excellent working 
relationship” for years. (Id., 24:15–18.) Ms. Boynton applauded Ms. Valentine’s 
performance, stating she was impressive, a great teacher, competent, honest, 
trustworthy, reliable, and had Riverside’s best interests in mind. (Boynton Depo., 
32:1–13.) In fact, Ms. Valentine consistently received above average performance 
evaluations. (Resp., PAGEID # 386.) For example, between August 2019 and July 
2020, Ms. Valentine was evaluated in 11 categories, and she received a top score in 
several, including work quality and productivity. (Boynton Depo., 45:14–17; 49:6–
18.) As for attendance, Ms. Boynton rated Ms. Valentine as meeting requirements 
for being “on time for work” and “start[ing] and end[ing] work at the assigned 
times.” (Id., 56:18–58:22.) Until she was fired in 2022, Ms. Valentine had no 
disciplinary record or attendance issues. (Resp., PAGEID # 388.) 
B. Ms. Valentine’s Autoimmune Disorder 
Around 2004, Ms. Valentine began to experience symptoms of what was later 
diagnosed as an autoimmune disorder affecting her eyes. (Valentine Depo., 38:6–
39:5.) She had her first eye surgery in 2005 (id., 39:2–40:2), and approximately 12 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 2 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
3 
 
more outpatient procedures between 2005 and 2018. (Id., 40:20–41:14.) Ms. 
Valentine took time off work for each procedure. (Id., 41:23–42:16.) 
In 2018, Ms. Valentine suffered a corneal ulceration related to her 
autoimmune disorder. (Id., 25:1–6.) She used FMLA leave and additional leave once 
her FMLA leave was exhausted. (Id., 41:4–5.) Fortunately, Ms. Valentine recovered 
and returned to work full-time. (Id., 25:1–6.) 
C. Ms. Valentine’s October 2021 FMLA Eligibility 
In October 2021, Ms. Valentine provided Ms. Boynton and the human 
resources manager (Julie Landholt) with notice that she would be starting an IV 
chemotherapy treatment for her autoimmune disorder. (Id., 25:1–28:16; Mot., 
PAGEID # 312.) During that initial conversation, Ms. Valentine said she would 
need either FMLA leave or paid time off (“PTO”), but that she was unsure which 
she would use. (Valentine Depo., 28:13–16; Resp., PAGEID # 389.) According to Ms. 
Valentine, Ms. Boynton responded with hesitation, stating, “I don’t know if I can let 
you do that because we’re short staffed.” (Valentine Depo., 25:17–18.) Ultimately, 
Ms. Boynton and Ms. Landholt both told Ms. Valentine that she was required to 
first use PTO before FMLA. (Id., 35:6–10.) 
 Ms. Valentine and Ms. Boynton met again on November 8, 2021, as 
evidenced by Ms. Boynton’s note: 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 3 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
4 
 
 
(ECF No. 46-1.) 
Ms. Valentine never applied for FMLA, she used PTO instead. (Valentine 
Depo., 30:10–14, 33:5–14.) She had sufficient PTO to cover the time she needed for 
her chemotherapy and her request to use it was granted. (Id., 32:2–5, 37:20–24.) 
D. Ms. Valentine’s Termination 
On November 24, 2021, an employee told Ms. Boynton that Ms. Valentine 
was late for work. (Boynton Depo., 94:6–95:1.) A week or so later, Ms. Boynton was 
doing payroll and noticed that Ms. Valentine clocked in at 7:28 am for her 7:30 shift 
on November 24. (Id., 104:25–105:12.) But because she had been told that Ms. 
Valentine was late that day, she investigated further by obtaining timekeeping 
records from Defendants’ mobile timekeeping app, PaychexSmartTime (“Paychex”). 
(Id., 113:15–19.) Those Paychex records reflected that Ms. Valentine had clocked in 
33 times from outside the office, even though Defendants prohibited employees from 
clocking in before they were physically in the office. (Id., 148:21–149:4.) 
Ms. Boynton presented the results of her investigation to Daniel Howell, the 
director of radiology services. (Howell Depo., 16:6–22, ECF No. 41-3.) Mr. Howell 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 4 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
5 
 
then decided to terminate Ms. Valentine (Id., 31:17–23); she was terminated on 
January 28, 2022. (Valentine Depo., 46:23–51:2.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving 
party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 
12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving 
party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 
U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 
A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant 
probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as 
to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir. 
1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that 
summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact 
to find for the nonmoving party). 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 5 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
6 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Defendants move for summary judgment on all Ms. Valentine’s claims: Count 
I for FMLA interference; Count II for FMLA retaliation; and Count III for disability 
discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law. Ms. Valentine abandoned Count III in 
her Response (Resp., PAGEID # 385), so Defendants’ Motion as to Count III is 
GRANTED. The Court turns next to Counts I and II. 
A. Count I: FMLA Interference 
Ms. Valentine argues that Defendants committed FMLA interference by 
(1) encouraging her to use PTO in lieu of FMLA leave, and (2) not properly notifying 
her of her right to use FMLA leave. 
An employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the 
attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 
To establish a prima-facie FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) 
she was an FLMA-eligible employee; (2) the defendant was an “employer” as defined 
under the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) she gave the employer 
notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied or interfered with 
the FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. Nuttall v. Progressive Parma Care 
Ctr., LLC, No. 21-4199, 2022 WL 2952586, at *2 (6th Cir. July 26, 2022) (citing 
Edgar v. JAC Prod., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
“[T]he mere occurrence of interference with an employee’s FMLA rights is not 
a per se FMLA violation.” Allen v. Butler Cnty. Comm’rs, 331 F. App’x 389, 394 (6th 
Cir. 2009). Rather, the statute “provides no relief unless the employee has been 
prejudiced by the violation[.]” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 6 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
7 
 
89 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)); see also id. (citations omitted) (“The 
employer is liable only for compensation and benefits lost ‘by reason of the 
violation,’ for other monetary losses sustained ‘as a direct result of the violation,’ 
and for ‘appropriate’ equitable relief, including employment, reinstatement, and 
promotion.”); see also Edgar, 443 F.3d at 507 (“[T]he FMLA is not a strict-liability 
statute.”). Because Ms. Valentine was not harmed by Defendants’ alleged FMLA 
interference, the Court starts and ends there. 
Ms. Valentine first told management of her potential need for leave in 
October 2021, but she was unsure at that time whether she would use FMLA or 
PTO. Ms. Boynton and Ms. Landholt both told Ms. Valentine that she was required 
to first use PTO before FMLA. Fortunately for Ms. Valentine, she had enough PTO 
to cover the time she needed off and she used it without issue. 
Even if that conversation amounted to improperly encouraging her to use 
PTO without telling her of her right to use FMLA, Ms. Valentine did not suffer any 
harm. She was granted leave and did not miss any medical treatments because of 
work. Had she elected to use FMLA leave, Defendants could legally require Ms. 
Valentine to use PTO concurrently, so the result would have been the same. See 
Allen, 331 F. App’x at 393 (“This Court … recognized that § 825.207(a) allows 
employers to run paid leave and unpaid FMLA leave concurrently.”). 
Accordingly, Ms. Valentine’s FMLA interference claim fails as a matter of 
law. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on Count I. 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 7 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
8 
 
B. Count II: FMLA Retaliation 
An FMLA retaliation claim “arises when an employer takes an adverse 
employment action against the employee for exercising or attempting to exercise a 
right protected by the FMLA.” Milman v. Feiger & Feiger, P.C., 58 F.4th 860, 866 
(6th Cir. 2023); see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). The burden-shifting test articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) applies to FMLA retaliation 
claims. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508. So once a plaintiff satisfies the four elements of a 
prima facie FMLA retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the employer to proffer a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for discharging the employee. Id. If the 
employer articulates a reason, then the employee has the burden of showing that 
the articulated reason is pretext for discrimination. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power 
Service Co., 272 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2001). 
1. Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) 
she engaged in FMLA-protected activity; (2) the employer knew she was exercising 
her FMLA rights; (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; 
and (4) “there was a causal connection between the protected FMLA activity and 
the adverse employment action.” Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citations omitted). Defendants do not contest the first three elements. 
To satisfy the fourth element at the prima facie stage, “all the plaintiff must 
do is put forth some credible evidence that enables the court to deduce that there is 
a causal connection between the retaliatory action and the protected activity.” 
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 8 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
9 
 
omitted). Ms. Valentine argues a causal connection exists for several reasons: (1) 
the temporal proximity between when she said she needed FMLA leave and when 
Ms. Boynton initiated an investigation into her time clock violations; (2) the 
investigation was launched after a single incident of her clocking in before she 
arrived at the office despite working at Riverside for 18 years without a disciplinary 
record; and (3) Defendants’ did not ask her for an explanation before initiating an 
investigation and terminating her employment. (Resp., PAGEID # 401.) 
Ms. Valentine alerted Defendants about her potential need for FMLA in 
October and again in early November. Less than a month later, Ms. Valentine was 
late for work, and an investigation was initiated. Despite no disciplinary history, 
she was terminated. At the prima facie stage, Ms. Valentine has satisfied her 
“minimal” burden to show a causal connection between the retaliatory action and 
the protected activity. Seeger, 681 F.3d at 283; see Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth 
Services, 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] temporal connection coupled with 
other indicia of retaliatory conduct may be sufficient to support a finding of a causal 
connection.”). 
2. Defendants’ Non-Discriminatory Reason 
The burden shifts next to Defendants to proffer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory rationale for discharging the employee. They have done so – after an 
investigation, Ms. Boynton identified 33 occasions when Ms. Valentine clocked in 
off-site in violation of company policy. 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 9 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
10 
 
3. Pretext 
The burden now shifts back to Ms. Valentine to show that Defendants’ 
articulated reason is in reality a pretext to mask discrimination. She can meet this 
burden by “showing that the employer’s proffered reasons (1) have no basis in fact; 
(2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the 
action.” Seeger, 681 F.3d at 285. This three-prong inquiry is not to be applied 
formulaically. See Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2009). 
Rather, “[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for 
the stated reason or not?” Id. Although the inquiry can be distilled “into a number 
of component parts,” at bottom, “summary judgment is proper if, based on the 
evidence presented, a jury could not reasonably doubt the employer’s explanation.” 
Id. 
Ms. Valentine makes two arguments in support of a finding of pretext. First, 
under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, she argues Mr. Howell unknowingly relied on 
Ms. Boynton’s discriminatory animus when he made his decision to terminate her, 
so she was not really terminated for the stated reason. Second, she argues the 
Defendants did not honestly believe in the stated reason for her termination. 
a) Cat’s Paw Liability 
 “The primary rationale for the cat’s paw theory of liability is that, because a 
company’s organizational chart does not always accurately reflect its 
decisionmaking process, an employee of lower rank may have significant influence 
over the decisionmaker.” Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 378 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (citation modified). “As a result, a biased low-level supervisor … might 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 10 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
11 
 
effectuate the termination of an employee … by selectively reporting or even 
fabricating information in communications with the formal decisionmaker.” Id. 
(citation modified). 
Ms. Valentine argues Mr. Howell was improperly influenced by a biased Ms. 
Boynton. But Mr. Howell relied on the Paychex GPS data when he made his 
decision to terminate Ms. Valentine. (See Howell Depo., 31:21–23 (“This was solely 
based on the GPS information. I didn’t take any other information into account in 
making my decision.”).) Ms. Valentine has identified no evidence that Ms. Boynton 
selectively withheld information from Mr. Howell that could have reasonably led 
him to excuse Ms. Valentine’s 33 violations of company policy.1 Nor is there any 
evidence that Ms. Boynton fabricated the GPS data. Instead, Mr. Howell made an 
independent evaluation of the situation, relying on the Paychex GPS data. 
Accordingly, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Ms. Boynton masked 
her discriminatory animus and improperly persuaded Mr. Howell to terminate Ms. 
Valentine. 
b) Honest Belief 
Ms. Valentine makes two arguments against Defendants’ use of the honest 
belief defense: (1) Defendants did not honestly believe their non-discriminatory 
reason for terminating her and instead did so because they were concerned about 
 
1 Although Ms. Valentine argues that Ms. Boynton should have provided Mr. 
Howell with the GPS data for other employees, there is no evidence that any other 
employee clocked in from off-site. 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 11 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
12 
 
staffing; and (2) Ms. Boynton’s investigation was unreliable because she did not 
interview Ms. Valentine and the GPS data was flawed. Both arguments fail. 
“The ground rules for application of the honest belief rule are clear. A 
plaintiff is required to show ‘more than a dispute over the facts upon which the 
discharge was based.’” Seeger, 681 F.3d at 285 (citing Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 
258 F.3d 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2001)). “[T]he key inquiry is whether the employer 
made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse 
employment action.” Id. (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 
1998)). So long as “the employer held an honest belief in its proffered reason, the 
employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found 
to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Id. at 285–86 (citation modified). But 
“an employer’s invocation of the honest belief rule” is not an automatic shield. Id. at 
286. An employee can overcome an honest belief defense by producing evidence that 
suggests “an error on the part of the employer that is too obvious to be 
unintentional.” Id. at 286 (citing Smith, 155 F.3d at 807). 
Ms. Valentine has produced no evidence to create a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether Defendants honestly believed that she improperly 
clocked in for work on 33 occasions. She argues in conclusory fashion that if a jury 
were to find that Ms. Boynton improperly suggested PTO instead of FMLA leave 
because of staffing concerns, the jury could also find that Defendants did not 
honestly believe in their non-discriminatory reason for termination. But to show 
that Defendants were more concerned with a staffing shortage than her repeated 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 12 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
13 
 
violations of company policy, Ms. Valentine must “put forth more than a ‘scintilla’ of 
evidence.” Walden v. General Elec. Int’l, Inc., 119 F.4th 1049, 1056 (6th Cir. 2024) 
(citation omitted). “Conjecture and conclusory accusations will not suffice,” rather, 
Ms. Valentine “must present significant probative evidence putting the material 
facts in doubt.” Id. at 1056–57 (citation modified). She has not done that. 
Even if a staffing shortage motivated Ms. Boynton to suggest PTO instead of 
FMLA leave, that does nothing to address Ms. Valentine’s 33 violations of company 
policy. Nor has Ms. Valentine produced evidence to suggest Defendants’ response to 
her violations was disproportionate or was motivated by her FMLA eligibility. 
Turning to the quality of the investigation, Ms. Valentine concedes that “an 
employer’s belief may be honest without perfect investigation.” (Resp., PAGEID # 
406.) And she’s right – courts “do not require that the decisional process used by the 
employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 807. Nor 
is a court to “micro-manage the process used” by an employer in reaching its 
decision. Id. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Valentine critiques Ms. Boynton for acting without input 
from payroll or human resources and argues the investigation was “a witch hunt 
more than a fair investigation.” (Resp., PAGEID # 408.) But the investigation was 
launched because on a day that Ms. Valentine was late for work, she clocked in on 
time, while off-site. (Id., PAGEID # 391.) After finding an apparent error in the 
payroll records, Ms. Boynton secured GPS data from Paychex – that information 
revealed that Ms. Valentine had clocked into work when she was not in the office 33 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 13 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
14 
 
times. And Ms. Valentine’s attempt to undermine the accuracy of that data does 
nothing to address whether Defendants honestly and reasonably believed in its 
accuracy. 
Ms. Valentine next complains that Defendants did not ask for her side of the 
story. Failure to afford an employee the opportunity to respond to the allegations 
against her may undermine an honest-belief defense, but it is not decisive. Lilly v. 
Norfolk S. Corp., 556 F. Supp. 3d 802, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2021). And it is not decisive 
here. Ms. Valentine admitted it was against company policy to clock in off-site. 
(Valentine Depo., 49:10–12 (“It was a well-known fact that you don’t clock in until 
you’re in the building, and [Ms. Boynton] did repeat that in every staff meeting.”).) 
So when the GPS data revealed she did so 33 times, it was reasonable not to ask for 
an explanation. Nor is it clear what Ms. Valentine could have said at the time of her 
termination to rebut the data considering the only evidence attacking its accuracy 
comes from an expert report. (See ECF No. 46-3.) Ms. Valentine needed to produce 
evidence of an error “too obvious to be unintentional” (i.e., one that would have been 
obvious at the time), not merely dispute the facts upon which Defendants based her 
termination. If the data required an expert to challenge its accuracy, it wasn’t 
obvious enough to alert Defendants to seek Ms. Valentine’s explanation. 
Defendants made a reasonably informed and considered decision before 
terminating Ms. Valentine, so the honest belief defense applies; Ms. Valentine has 
failed to show that Defendants’ non-discriminatory reason for termination was a 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 14 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>
15 
 
pretext to mask discrimination. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of 
Defendants as to Count II. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 
42) is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison 
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
Case: 2:24-cv-00357-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 48 Filed: 06/11/26 Page: 15 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight