govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_23-cv-04091-4

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
DONNA L. HUFFMAN, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 23-4091-JWB 
 
 
FOREST RIVER, INC.,
1 
 
 Defendant. 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the c ourt on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 142.) 
The motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 143, 144, 162, 163, 168.) The motion is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated herein. 
I. Facts 
The facts set forth herein are taken from the second amended complaint (“SAC”)
2 and are 
material to the issues on summary judgment and unc ontroverted or, if controverted, viewed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff.3 
This lawsuit stems from allegations that Plaintiff’s recreati onal vehicle (“RV”) 
manufactured by Forst River was defective. Forest River is an Indiana company that manufactures 
 
1 Although this case initially had multiple defendants, the only remaining defendant to this action is Forest River, Inc. 
(“Defendant” or “Forest River”). (Docs. 51, 60.) 
2 Before proceeding, the court makes a brief observation. In Plaintiff’s response, the record citations listed in her 
objections are, in many instances, impossible to discern. For example, she cites to “SJ Guide at EX 53,” “FACT 33,” 
“Ex 1, trans P 235 at 20-21,” and “Ex 1, p 112 at L 12 -113 L 3, P 162 L 2, 200 4-10” to name a few. (Doc. 162.) 
The court cannot locate an exhibit 53 or exhibit 1 nor does Forest River have a fact numbed “33” within their statement 
of uncontroverted facts. (Doc. 144.) Accordingly, any citations that the court could not decipher or locate were not 
considered. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“Judges are not like pigs, 
hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). 
3 Due to the time expended by the parties revising the pretrial order, the magistrate judge exercised her discretion to 
temporarily suspend its entry. (Doc. 141.) As noted below, the parties are ordered to resume their work in finalizing 
the pretrial order so that it may be entered. 

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RVs and sells through independent authorized dealerships across the country. (Docs. 144 ¶¶ 27.) 
Forest River also enters into and services warra nty contracts in connection with the manufacture 
of those RVs. Forest River does not manufacture an RV as a single unit; rather, it builds in stages, 
with numerous other third-party manufacturers supplying the components that make up the RV’s 
systems. (Id. ¶ 20.) Forest River completed manufacture of the RV at issue and delivered it to RV 
Retailer Texas, LLC d/b/a Motor Home Specialists (“MHS”), an independent Texas dealership. 
MHS and Forest River signed an agreement where they agreed that MHS is not an agent of Forest 
River, and its actions are not imputed to Forest River. ( Id. ¶¶ 11, 24; see Doc. 144-5 at 68–77.) 
Before selling the RV to Plaintiff, MHS submitte d two warranty claims to Forest River—one for 
a toilet tank level sensor and ge nerator fuel line, and one for a water line—both of which Forest 
River attempted to reso lve. (Doc. 144 ¶ 25; see Docs. 163-1; 163-2; 163-3; 163-4; 162-10.) 
According to Forest River, MHS took liberties w ith the RV by altering its parts prior to selling it 
to Plaintiff. (Doc. 144 ¶¶ 14–17.) MHS is no longer a party. (Doc. 60.) 
In 2020, Donna Huffman (“Plaintiff”), a Kans as resident, decided to purchase a new 
Mercedes Sprinter Isata 3 RV manufactured by Forest River. She saw an advertisement from 
MHS, negotiated the purchase over the phone, and executed the purchase agreement via docu-sign 
on July 14, paying a $2,000 deposit and agreeing to financing. (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 32–34; see Doc. 162-
2.) Plaintiff contends she docu- signed the sales agreement from her home in Kansas; however, 
she lists Corpus Christi, Texas, as her address. (Doc. 162-2.) The RV was scheduled for delivery 
on July 20 and Plaintiff left Kansas on July 19 to pick it up in Alvarado, Texas. On July 21, once 
at the MHS dealership, Plaintiff signed the Forest River warranty registration form and completed 
the application for Texas title, on which she again identified a Corpus Christi, Texas, address. 
(Docs. 144 ¶¶ 3–5; 9-1.) On July 22, Plaintiff picked up the RV. At no point before or during the 

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sale did Forest River have any contact with Plaint iff, make any representations to her, or solicit 
her to purchase the RV. (Doc. 144 ¶¶ 11–13; Plaintiff’s Depo., Doc. 144-1 at 48:2–12.) 
As part of the purchase, Plaintiff received a limited warranty, which covered Forest River’s 
own workmanship and expressly excluded the chassi s, tires, batteries, generators, appliances, 
audio/video equipment, and other third-party components. Additi onally, the warranty explicitly 
requires that prior to an action to enforce an ex press or implied warranty, Forest River must be 
given written notice and an opportunity to remedy. The limited warranty further requires that any 
legal action to enforce it be commenced within ni nety (90) days after th e warranty period ends. 
But, as will be discussed in more detail below, the parties provide two limited warranty documents 
with two materially different warranty periods. The first, provided by Fore st River, purports to 
last for one year or 12,000 miles. (See Doc. 144-5 at 5 (“Warranty One”).) The second, provided 
by Plaintiff, alternatively lasts for two years or 24,000 miles. ( See Doc. 162-8 at 3 (“Warranty 
Two”).)4 However, the court notes that Plaintiff’s exhibit, which is a Forest River warranty claim 
form, mentions a “warranty expiration date” of July 21, 2022—which coincides with the warranty 
period indicated in Warranty One. (Doc. 163 at 1.) 
Upon arrival to take possession of the RV, Plaintiff allege dly encountered a series of 
problems. The first problem listed by Plaintiff is the “Generator and Fuel line.” (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 44–
45.) But in support, Plaintiff cites to a document indicating that, on July 20, 2020, an MHS 
mechanic reinstalled the generator fuel line afte r MHS submitted a warranty claim form. (Docs. 
162-12; 163-5.) The next problem listed by Plai ntiff was the “Toilet & Tank sensors were not 
installed.” (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 46–51.) And again, Plaintiff stat es that “[Forest River] paid MHS to 
 
4 Throughout this order, because Warranty One and Warranty Two are identical other than what is defined as the 
warranty period, when the court refers to the “limited wa rranty” or “Forest River’s limited warranty,” it means any 
term in the warranty other than the length of the warranty period. 

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replace and install the RV tank se nsor,” in response to MHS s ubmitting a warranty claim form. 
(Id. ¶¶ 48; Doc. 163-5.) The next alleged proble m was the “Shower [ ] Due to Broken Plumbing 
and Leaking.” (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 52–53.) As evidence, Plaintiff cites to a document indicating that, on 
July 21, 2020, an MHS mechanic fixed the show er and ensured it was “leak free” after MHS 
submitted a warranty claim form. (Doc. 162-10 at 3–4.) The uncontroverted facts indicate that all 
of these alleged problems were resolved prior to Plaintiff leaving the lot with her RV. 
After leaving the lot, Plaintiff appears to have had more problems with the RV. The first 
occurred on August 9, 2020, and involved an electrical fuse on the refrigerator. (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 77–
79.) Plaintiff submitted a warranty claim directly to Forest River, the only time Plaintiff submitted 
a warranty claim. (Docs. 163; 144 ¶ 25.) The warranty form appears to indicate that Forest River 
approved the entire $197 expense associated with replacing the electrical fuse; however, Plaintiff 
contends that no payment has ever been receiv ed. (Docs. 163; 162 ¶ 77.) The second problem 
was reported on August 11, 2020, when the motorized st eps to get into the RV stopped working. 
(Doc. 162 ¶¶ 54–63.) Plaintiff inform ed Forest River of this probl em by email. (Doc. 162-24.) 
Through a series of emails between Forest River representative Danielle Sodeman and Plaintiff 
seeking to troubleshoot the motor for the RV’s retr actable steps, Forest River eventually shipped 
replacement parts to Yingling’s, an authorized Ka nsas dealership, and arranged warranty repairs. 
(Docs. 163-1–163-4.) Plaintiff goes on to state that “[t]he step was repaired.” (Doc. 162 ¶ 61.) 
The next problem complained about by Plaintiff occurred much later in June of 2023. That 
problem involved the hydraulic leveling jack system which she claims leaked fluid. ( Id. ¶¶ 64–
67.) However, Plaintiff does not mention making a warranty claim with Forest River and merely 
attaches as evidence of this problem a receipt wherein it appears she paid approximately $375 for 
the hydraulic system to be repaired. (Doc. 162-13.) Plaintiff goes on to vaguely mention a slew 

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of other problems that, as best the court can discern, includes (1 ) television wires that were not 
connected, (2) the tire pressure monitoring system —which Plaintiff does not allege to have had 
any problems, only that it was subject to a national recall, (3) shower clips, (4) window shades on 
passenger side will not close, and (5) “plastic tire exte nders.” (Doc. 162 ¶¶ 68–76, 80–83.) 5 
Notably, Plaintiff does not allege having submitted a warranty cl aim on any of these alleged 
problems nor does she list any repairs being paid fo r in relation to them. In total, Forest River 
received three warranty claims: two pre-delivery MHS claims described above, and one submitted 
by Plaintiff for a refrigerator fuse. (Doc. 144 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff contends that these warranty claims 
were not properly resolved but fails to provide admissible evidence of ever having a claim denied 
or even informing Forest River of her dissatisfaction with the completed repairs. 
Plaintiff also discovered that while the RV’s window sticker identified it as a 2020 model, 
the title reflected it wa s manufactured in 2018. ( Compare Docs. 162-3 with 162-4.) In August 
2020, Plaintiff sought roadside assistance and an extended warranty from Forest River but was 
informed that their “records do not show anything that would warra nt an extension of roadside 
assistance or an extended warranty.” (Docs. 162-27; 162 ¶ 40.) 
As a result, Plaintiff filed suit on June 22, 2023, and Forest River removed the case to 
federal court on October 13, 2023. (Docs. 1-1; 1.) Plaintiff amended her complaint a second time 
on June 21, 2024. (Doc. 53.) In her SAC, she a sserts multiple claims against Forest River, 
including breaches of four different contracts, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and violations 
of multiple provisions of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”). 6 She seeks 
 
5 While Plaintiff mentions an extensive list of broken or unrepaired problems with the RV ( see Doc. 53 at 6–9), she 
does not provide any admissible evidence in her response to Forest River’s summary judgment motion substantiating 
any of these problems nor does she claim that she submitted any warranty claims, much less that any such claims were 
denied. Accordingly, the defects Plaintiff mentions in her SAC cannot support her breach of warranty claim. 
6 To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of “other customers,” she may not do so because she proceeds 
pro se and is an unlicensed attorney. (See, e.g., Docs. 53 at 24; 162 at 35.) 

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compensatory damages, statutory penalties, restitution or replacement of the RV, enforcement of 
the warranty, loss of value, and incidental and punitive damages. (Id. at 24.) On January 30, 2026, 
Forest River filed the instant summary judgment motion. (Doc. 142.) On March 24, Plaintiff filed 
a response (Doc. 162) and Forest River replied (Doc. 169). The court is now prepared to rule. 
II. Standard 
Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existe nce of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; 
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). “A fact is material if, under the governing law, it could have 
an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is genuine if a rational jury 
could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 
952 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jones v. Norton , 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 
2015)). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to create a dispute as to an issue of material fact. 
See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The court views the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the li ght most favorable to the nonmoving party. LifeWise 
Master Funding v. Telebank , 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004). In considering a motion for 
summary judgment, the facts set forth in the motion must refer “with particularity to those portions 
of the record upon which” the moving party relies. D. Kan. R. 56.1(a). “All material facts set 
forth in the statement of the movant will be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party.” Id. To properly dispute 
a proposed statement of material fact, the opposing party must “refer with particularity to those 

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portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies.” D. Kan. R. 56.1(b)(1). Failure to 
properly controvert a proposed fact that is properly supported will re sult in a determination that 
the fact is admitted. Coleman v. Blue Cross Bl ue Shield of Kansas, Inc ., 287 F. App’x 631, 635 
(10th Cir. 2008) (finding that th e “district court was co rrect to admit all facts assert ed in [the 
movants] summary judgment motion that are not controverted by a readily identifiable portion of 
the record.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Pro Se Standard. Generally, pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their 
filings. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Here, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff—an attorney with 
a suspended license due to her di sability—ought to be en titled the usual liber al construction of 
pleadings afforded pro se litiga nts. Forest River points to precedent showing that licensed 
attorneys representing themselves ought not be afforded the same deference as pro se litigants. 
(Doc. 143 at 5–6.) In response, Plaintiff argues she is entitled to “som e liberal construction” 
because she is not currently practicing, but points to no authority. (Doc. 162 at 24.) Recently, the 
Tenth Circuit held that a pro se plaintiff was not entitled to lib eral construction because she had 
legal training. See Cohen v. Hartman, No. 23-1364, 2024 WL 4234967, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 
2024). The same is true here: Plaintiff has legal training. Accordingly, the court will not afford 
Plaintiff’s pleadings the liberal construction typically extended to pro se litigants. Even if the court 
were to construe her pleadings liberally, however, it would still reach the same conclusions. 
III. Analysis 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
 Forest River first argues that the court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over it. (Doc. 
143 at 6–13.) This argument, however, is materially identical to the argument Forest River made 
in its prior motion to dismiss, (Doc. 57 at 11–15), an argument that this court rejected. In that prior 

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order, the court explained that follo wing the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021), the Tenth Circuit held that a 
forum state can exercise personal jurisdic tion over an out-of-state defendant that 
has injured a resident plaintiff in th e forum State if (1) the defendant has 
purposefully directed activity to market a product or service at residents of the 
forum State and (2) the plain tiff’s claim arises from essentially the same type of 
activity, even if the activity that gave rise to the claim was not directed at forum 
residents. In that circumstance, we say that the activity giving rise to the claim 
“relates” to the defendant’s activity in the forum State. 
 
Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, 21 F.4th 1224 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Ford, 592 U.S. at 366 & n.5). 
Applying this standard to the allegations in the instant matter, the court held that (1) “Forest River 
has purposefully directed activity at residents of Kansas by serving the area with the sale of their 
RVs through the dealers and by entering into warranty cont racts with Kansas residents and 
performing those warranty obligations in Kansas ” and (2) “Plaintiff’s claims arise out of 
essentially the same activity—Forest River’s issuance of the warranties and servicing of the same 
at third-party locations in Kansas.” (Doc. 60 at 9–10.) Forest River makes no argument addressing 
those holdings. First, Fore st River failed to address Ford or Hood—the two decisions on which 
this court’s decision primarily rest ed. More importantly, however, Forest River fails to identify 
sufficient facts nor identifies any extraordinary circumstance on which the court should revisit that 
ruling. A motion for summa ry judgment is not a vehicle for re litigating issues already decided, 
and the court declines the invitation. Accordingly, “Forest River is subject to personal jurisdiction 
in Kansas.” (Doc. 60 at 11.) 
B. Breach of Contract Claims 
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint appears to include four breach of contract claims, which 
rest on the following alleged agreements: (1) a “s ticker contract” reflecting features Forest River 
represented to be included on the RV (“Contract A”); (2) Forest River’s express limited warranty 

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(“Contract B”); (3) the roadside assistance warranty (“Contract C”); and (4) an oral promise by a 
Forest River representative to cover certain expenses Plaintiff incurred (“Contract D”). (Doc. 53 
¶¶ 39–42.) Plaintiff alleges the sticker contract was breached because the RV lacked the 
represented features and Forest River declined to cure. She alleges that the express warranty was 
breached when Forest River failed to perform re pairs. As for the roadside assistance warranty, 
Plaintiff alleges it was breached when Forest River disregarded its terms. Finally, she alleges that 
Forest River breached an oral promise, made by a Forest River employee, by refusing to pay repair 
expenses that the employee had agreed to cover. 
As an initial matter, Forest River failed to sufficiently address and otherwise failed to move 
for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims premised on Contracts A, C, and D in their summary judgment 
motion.7 Forest River argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims are barred because they 
relate to components that are not covered under the terms of Forest River’s limited warranty. (Doc. 
143 at 14–17; see Doc. 144-5 at 5.) However, from what the court can discer n from Plaintiff’s 
complaint, it appears she is alleging breach of contracts independent, at least in part, of Forest 
River’s limited warranty. ( See Doc. 53 at 6–14.) Because there is no pretrial order, the court is 
left with the allegations in the SAC which clearly identify four separate breached contracts. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims premised on Contracts A, C, and D remain. 
As for the claim premised on Contract B, Forest River argues that the components Plaintiff 
alleges to be defective are either expressly excluded from the limited warranty’s coverage or were 
the responsibility of the independent dealership MHS, not Forest River. (Doc. 143 at 14–17.) 
 
7 The only arguable reference to thes e additional contract claims is Forest River’s argument that any other 
representations or omissions were made by MHS. (Doc. 143 at 15–16.) This argument appears to be directed at 
Plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract regarding Contract A. However, ther e is no evidence indicating what the 
“sticker contract” said or who placed it on the RV. As fo r Contracts C and D, Forest River fails to even discuss 
Plaintiff’s allegations involving the roadside assistance wa rranty or any oral promises made by Forest River 
employees. 

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Forest River points to the limited warranty’s express exclusion language: “Warrantor makes no 
warranty with regard to, but not limited to, the chassis . . . any mechanical parts or systems of the 
chassis, axles, tires, tubes, batteries and ga uges, optional generators , routine maintenance, 
equipment and appliances, or a udio and/or video equipment,” as well as the owner’s manual’s 
additional excluded items such as the refriger ator, water heater, range, microwave, propane 
regulator, converter, smoke detector, and hitch/leveling jacks. (Docs. 144-5 at 5; 144 ¶¶ 22–23.) 
Forest River then catalogs the components forming the basis of Plaintiff’s claims that it contends 
fall within those exclusions. (Docs. 143 at 15; 144 ¶ 24.) Forest River additionally contends that 
certain allegedly defective items were “robbed” or altered by MHS after delivery from Forest River 
and before sale to Plaintiff and that MHS, therefore, bears responsibility for any such 
modifications. (Docs. 143 at 15–16; 144 ¶¶ 14–16, 24.) Finally, Forest River asserts that of the 
warranty claims it received pursuant to the li mited warranty, all three were resolved—two pre-
delivery claims submitted by MHS and one post-delivery claim submitted by Plaintiff. Ultimately, 
Forest River argues that the warranty’s exclusions must be enforced as written. 
Plaintiff’s response is difficult to follow, but it advances what the court understands to be 
three arguments. (Doc. 162 at 32–35.) First, Plai ntiff contends that the limited warranty, by its 
terms in paragraphs 2 and 10, covers def ects in “materials and workmanship.” ( Id. at 32.) She 
argues that even where particular components are excluded from cove rage, Forest River’s 
workmanship in manufacturing the RV—such as the installation, wiring, plumbing, etc.—remains 
within the scope of the warranty. Second, Plaintiff disputes Fore st River’s assertion that MHS 
“robbed” various parts from the RV, contending that the allega tion is conclusory and lacks 
admissible evidence. (Id. at 34.) Third, Plaintiff disputes Forest River’s characterization that only 
three warranty claims were submitted and that all three were “resolved.” (Id.) 

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The court agrees with Forest River that the exclusion language in the limited warranty is 
enforceable as written. See Marksberry v. FCA US LLC , 606 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1082 (D. Kan. 
2022) (“Plaintiff cannot pick and choose what la nguage to read from the Warranty.”). But the 
court need not resolve whether each particular component or workmanship issue Plaintiff identifies 
falls inside or outside the limi ted warranty’s coverage, because Pl aintiff’s Contract B claim fails 
for a more fundamental reason: she has not come forward with evidence on summary judgment 
that Forest River breached the warranty as to any submitted claim, and she did not submit warranty 
claims at all for the bulk of the defects she now asserts.
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The limited warranty does not operate as a fr eestanding promise that Forest River will 
detect, diagnose, and remedy every defect in the RV. How could it without knowing the problems 
exist? By its terms, the warranty obligates Plain tiff to submit warranty cl aims in writing and to 
deliver the RV to an authorized warranty servi ce provider so that Forest River has notice of a 
claimed defect and an opportunity to remedy it. Those terms are enforceable. See Marksberry, 
606 F. Supp. 3d at 1085–86 (granting summary judgment where the plai ntiff failed to satisfy a 
condition precedent contained in the warranty); Arnold v. CNH Indus. Am., LLC , No. 21-2341-
DDC, 2023 WL 6312266, at *16 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2023) (“Because plaintiff never reported the 
defect during the warranty period, defendant never had a chance to fulfill its end of the contract. . 
. . No reasonable factfinder could find that defendant breached the Express Warranty”). To survive 
summary judgment on a breach-of-warranty theory, Pl aintiff must come forward with evidence 
 
8 It is uncontroverted that the limited warranty expressly requires Plaintiff to submit a claim. (Doc. 144 ¶ 25.) While 
Plaintiff objects to this fact (Doc. 162 ¶ 25), she points to no evidence in support thereof. The text of the limited 
warranty states as follows: “No action to enforce express or implied warran ties shall be commenced without prior 
written notice to the manufacturer and/or Warrantor at the address listed above of the alleged defect or nonconformity 
or the authorized repair facility’s failed repair attempt and MANUFACTURER, AT ITS DIRECT OPTION, SHALL 
HAVE A FINAL OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY.” (Doc. 144-5 at 10.) 

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that, for the defects she claims, she gave Forest River notice and an opportunity to cure, and that 
Forest River failed to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). She has wholly failed to carry this burden. 
The record establishes only three instances in which a warranty claim was submitted under 
the terms of the limited warranty. (Doc. 14 4 ¶ 25.) Two of those—the toilet tank level 
sensor/generator fuel line and the broken water line—were submit ted by MHS prio r to delivery, 
and the undisputed evidence is that Forest River addressed each through MHS’s authorized repairs 
before Plaintiff ever took po ssession of the RV. (Docs. 162- 10 at 3–4; 162-12; 163-5.) To the 
extent Plaintiff was displeased with the workmans hip of the repairs, she failed to resubmit a 
warranty claim, and thus there could be no breach. 
The third claim was submitted by Plaintiff for a refrigerat or fuse and was approved by 
Forest River for the full $197.81 expense. (Doc. 163.) Plaintiff even provides evidence that Forest 
River mailed the reimbursement check to Plaintiff’s Corpus Christi, Texas, address as well as 
email correspondence wherein Forest River asks Plaintiff if she would like a new check issued to 
which Plaintiff never responds. (Docs. 162-28 at 1; 162-27 at 1.) Although Plaintiff disputes 
whether she ever received the $197 payment, her dispute is not over whether Forest River honored 
the warranty claim itself. On this record, such a dispute does not create a triable issue on whether 
Forest River breached the limited warranty. Simil arly, when the motorized step failed in August 
2020, Plaintiff notified Forest River, and although Forest River informed her that a warranty claim 
was not in their records for that issue, they ultimately shipped replacement parts as a “goodwill 
gesture” to Yingling’s in Kansas, paid for the repair, and Plaintiff herself concedes that “[t]he step 
was repaired.” (Docs. 162-27 at 1; 162 ¶ 61; see Docs. 163-1–163-4.) Plaintiff has identified no 
admissible evidence that any submitted warranty cl aim was denied, refused, or left unremedied. 
As to those defects, there is no genuine dispute that Forest River performed under the warranty. 

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As for the remaining defects Plaintiff alle ges—the hydraulic leveling jack system, the 
unconnected television wires, the tire pressure monitoring system, the shower clips, the passenger-
side window shades, the “plastic tire extenders,” and the various other items she vaguely catalogs 
throughout her response and SAC—Pl aintiff has not put forward any record evidence that she 
submitted a warranty claim, delivered the RV to an authorized warranty service provider, or 
otherwise placed Forest River on written notice of the claimed defect and afforded it the 
opportunity to remedy that th e warranty requires. ( See Doc. 162 ¶¶ 64–76, 80–83.) Indeed, the 
only documentation Plaintiff offers for the hydrau lic leveling jack syst em is a 2023 receipt 
showing that she paid an unrelated mechanic approximately $375 for a repair—not a warranty 
claim submitted to Forest River. (Doc. 162-13.) She otherwise provides no admissible evidence. 
Without evidence that the conditions precedent of the limited warranty we re satisfied, no breach 
of that warranty can lie as to those alleged defects. See Marksberry, 606 F. Supp. 3d at 1085–86. 
Plaintiff cannot defeat su mmary judgment by asserting in conclu sory fashion that defects exist; 
she must show that she invoked the warranty’s protections and that Forest River refused to honor 
them. She has not. The court holds that defendant deserves summary judgment against Plaintiff’s 
claim for breach of the limited warranty. 
In summary, Forest River’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I is granted in part 
and denied in part. Summary judgment is gran ted as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim 
premised on Contract B and is denied as to Pl aintiff’s breach of contra ct claims premised on 
Contract A, Contract C, and Contract D, which Forest River’s motion did not adequately address. 
C. Tort Claims 
Plaintiff brings three tort claims: fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence. (Doc. 53 at 14–
17.) Her fraud claim concerns the RV’s hydraulic leveling jack system, which she alleges Forest 

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River built with an old part that caused leaks and rendered the system inoperable. (Id. ¶¶ 59–69.) 
Her misrepresentation claim alleges the sticker identified the RV as a 2020 model when it was in 
fact manufactured in 2018—a discrepancy Plaintif f says she did not disc over until she received 
the title. ( Id. ¶¶ 70–78.) Her negligence claim alleges Forest River breached duties to build the 
RV free of defects, to deliver it with wo rking features, and to perform repairs. ( Id. ¶¶ 79–85.) 
Forest River moves for summary ju dgment on the grounds that all three claims are barred by the 
economic loss doctrine. (Doc. 143 at 17–18.) 
The economic loss doctrine states that a buyer of defective goods cannot sue in tort where 
the injury consists only of damage to the goods themselves. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866–76 (1986); see also BHC Dev., L.C. v. Bally Gaming, Inc. , 985 
F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (D. Kan. 2013) (the doctrine ba rs recovery of purely economic losses in 
tort “in circumstances governed by the law of contracts”). The doctrine rests on the principle that 
contract law is the proper vehicle for allocating the risk of product failure, while tort law is reserved 
for personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself. See Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. 
v. Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 988 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). And the doctrine applies 
to components that are part of a larger product, with Kansas courts holding that “when component 
materials become indistinguishable parts of a fi nal product, and there is harm resulting from a 
defective component of the product, the product itself has caused the harm.” Id. At bottom, the 
doctrine seeks to prevent a party in litigation from asserting a tort remedy in a circumstance that 
is governed by contract law. 
In response to Forest River’s argument, Plaintiff points to this court’s prior order denying 
a motion to dismiss Plaintif’s tort claims on th e basis that they are barred by the economic loss 
doctrine. (Doc. 60 at 11.) In that order, the c ourt allowed Forest River to reassert the issue at 

15 
 
summary judgment. On summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations of her 
complaint; she “must set forth specific facts show ing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. To avoid the economic loss do ctrine at this stage, it was Plaintiff’s 
burden to come forward with record evidence that her tort claims seek recovery for something 
other than damage to the RV itself (or a component that is part of that RV)— i.e., for personal 
injury or damage to other property. She has not done so. The damages identified in her response 
and in her SAC—loss of use, loss of value, repair costs, and the cost of components that allegedly 
failed or were missing—all relate to the RV itself. (Docs. 53 at 24; 162 at 35–36.) And in any 
event, Plaintiff has pointed to no admissible evid ence to support those allegations. Plaintiff has 
identified no personal injury, no damage to property other than the RV, and no losses traceable to 
anything outside the bargained-for product itself. Her request to extend the warranties, whatever 
its merit, is a request for contract-based equitable relief, not an indication that her damages exceed 
economic loss. (Doc. 162 at 35.) 
Each of Plaintiff’s tort claims arise from the same set of facts that gave rise to her contract 
and warranty claims—the alleged failure of the RV and its com ponents to perform as Plaintiff 
expected. As best the court can discern, the fraud claim concerns th e hydraulic leveling jack 
system Forest River allegedly bu ilt with an old part ; the misrepresentation claim concerns the 
model-year representation on the window sticker; and the neglig ence claim concerns Forest 
River’s alleged duties to build the RV free of defects, to deliver it with working features, and to 
perform warranty repairs. (Doc . 53 ¶¶ 59–85.) These are precisely the kinds of cl aims that the 
economic loss doctrine commits to the law of contracts. See Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1259–60; BHC 
Dev., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. Plaintiff bargained fo r an RV and for the limited warranty that 
accompanied it; the law of contracts—and the wa rranty’s own terms—is the proper vehicle for 

16 
 
redress. In summary, the damage claimed by Plaintiff was economic loss as no property other than 
the RV allegedly sustained damage. Accordi ngly, Forest River’s motion for summary judgment 
on Plaintiff’s tort claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence is granted. 
D. KCPA Claims 
Plaintiff’s KCPA claims fall into three ca tegories. First, she alleges deceptive acts—
misrepresentations regarding the RV’s characteris tics, value, quality, an d warranty coverage in 
violation of K.S.A. §§ 50-626(b)(1). (Doc. 53 ¶¶ 86–94.) Second, she alleges willful concealment 
of material facts, including mechanical defects, the RV’s true age, missing features, and warranty 
benefits in violation of K.S.A. §§ 50-626(b)(2). (Id. ¶¶ 95–98.) Third, she alleges unconscionable 
acts under K.S.A. § 50-6279 because (1) the price of certain equipment “grossly exceeded the price 
at which similar property or services were read ily obtainable in similar transactions by similar 
consumers” and (2) she was unable to receive a material benefit from the RV transaction given the 
periods it was inoperable due to features that allegedly never worked. (Id. ¶¶ 99–101). 
 Forest River moves for summary judgment un der two theories. First, that Plaintiff 
purchased the RV in Texas and the KCPA requires a transaction be made in the state of Kansas to 
impute liability. (Doc. 143 at 18–19.) Second, that Plaintiff cannot show Forest River committed 
a deceptive or unconscionable act as required for her KCPA claims. (Id. at 19–20.) 
As to the first argument, the KCPA only applies to a “consumer transaction” and the Kansas 
legislature has defined “consumer transaction” as the “sale, lease, assignment or other disposition 
for value of property or services within this state . . . to a consumer; or a solicitation by a supplier 
 
9 Plaintiff cites to K.S.A. § 50-637(a)(2) and (a)(3) in her complaint when alleging her unconscionability claims under 
the KCPA. (Doc. 53 ¶¶ 99–101). These sections do not exist. Rather, § 50-637 refers to the powers granted to a 
court-appointed receiver, which has no relation to the facts of this case. As such, the court believes that based on the 
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, she meant to cite to K.S.A. § 50-627(b)(2) and (b)(3), which track almost verbatim 
the language from those statutes. (Id.) Forest River seems to have assumed the same thing. (Doc. 143 at 21–23.) 

17 
 
with respect to any of these dispos itions.” K.S.A. §§ 50–624(c); 50–626(a); 50–627(a); 
Montgomery v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P ., 2007 WL 3274833, at *6 (D. Ka n. 2007) (“The KCPA is 
not intended to serve as a nationwide basis for liability against Kansas companies”). In the instant 
matter, Plaintiff points to the RV sales agreem ent (Doc. 162-2) between her and MHS that she 
docu-signed while physically located in Kansas, the warranty work that was completed by Forest 
River in Kansas, and the related parts that were ma iled by Forest River to Plaintiff at her Kansas 
address and says this is sufficient to find that th e transaction occurred in Kansas for purposes of 
the KCPA. (Docs. 162 at 36–37; 163-1; 163-2; 163-3; 163-4.) However, the court need not resolve 
that issue because Plaintiff’s KCPA claims fail on independ ent grounds: she has not produced 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Forest River engaged 
in a deceptive or unconscionable act in connection with the RV purchase. 
Moving to Forest River’s second argument, under the KCPA, no supplier shall engage in 
“any deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” K.S.A. § 50-626(a). 
“[W]hether a deceptive act or practice has occurred under the [KCPA] is not a question of law for 
the court, but rather a question of fact for a jury to decide.” Manley v. Wichita Bus. Coll., 701 P.2d 
893, 897 (Kan. 1985). But “summary judgment is appropriate on [K CPA] claims where there is 
no evidence of deceptive conduct.” Dana v. Heartland Mgmt. Co., 48 Kan. App. 2d 1048, 1063 
(2013); see Udell v. Kansas Counselors, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1145 (D. Kan. 2004) (granting 
summary judgment on KCPA deception claim where “the record is completely devoid of evidence 
from which it can be reasonably inferred that [defendant] engaged in any deceptive conduct”). 
With those standards in mind, the record before the court would not allow a reasonable 
jury to find that Forest River was involved in deceptive conduct as part of the RV transaction. 
First, the sale of the RV was a transaction be tween Plaintiff and MHS, an independent Texas 

18 
 
dealership. (Docs. 162-2; 144-3 at 4–13; Plaintiff’s Depo., Doc. 144-1 at 48:2–12.) Forest River 
had no contact whatsoever with Pl aintiff prior to or during the sa le, and Plaintiff has adduced no 
evidence that Forest River had any knowledge of the circumstances under which Plaintiff was 
purchasing the RV from MHS. Cf. Marksberry, 606 F. Supp. 3d at 1082–83 (granting summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s KCPA cla im, holding no genuine issues of fact regarding defendant’s 
deceptive conduct because the warranty terms were clearly conveyed to the plaintiff). Because 
Forest River had no knowledge of the RV transaction prior to its consummation, then it could not 
have knowingly represented that the RV had uses and benefits that it did not have, that the RV was 
original or new when it was not, that the RV had benefits or characteristics that it did not, nor was 
of a particular standard that differed from reality, as required by K.S.A. §§ 50-626(b)(1)(A), (1)(C), 
(1)(D), and (1)(F). And Plaintiff has put forth no facts from which the court could find that Forest 
River had any such knowledge. So, Forest River is entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiff’s 
claims under K.S.A. §§ 50-626(b)(1)(A), (1)(C), (1)(D), and (1)(F). To the extent Plaintiff alleges 
deceptive conduct by Forest River involving post-sale interactions involving the warranty, there is 
no evidence in the record from which the court could say a genuine dispute of material fact exists. 
See Dana , 48 Kan. App. 2d at 1063. To the contra ry, this dispute revolves around which 
warranty’s terms are controlling and the scope of that warranty—not deceptive conduct. 
Next, certain subsections of § 50-626—under which Plaintiff also brings her claims (Doc. 
53 ¶¶ 95–97)—additionally require that the defendant act “knowingly” or “willfully.” Namely, 
claims under § 50-626(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(8) demand willfulness as an essential element, which 
is an act “performed with a designed purpose or intent on the part of a person to do wrong or to 
cause injury to another.” Dana, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 1063. In other words, “the use of ‘willful’ in 
the KCPA includes an intent to harm the consumer.” Unruh v. Purina Mills, LLC, 221 P.3d 1130, 

19 
 
1139 (Kan. 2009). Accordingly, it is not enough for Plaintiff to show that Forest River gave 
information that later proved to be inaccurate; rather, she must present evidence that Forest River 
“had a designed purpose to do wrong,” that is, knowing the information was false. Tufts v. Newmar 
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1179 (D. Kan. 1999). Plaintiff has failed to shoulder this burden. As 
Forest River correctly points out, the record is devoid of evidence showing that they willfully used 
a falsehood or ambiguity regarding a material f act about the RV, willfully failed to state or 
concealed a material fact about the RV, willfully made a false statement involving consumer rights 
or remedies, nor made a false statement that repairs to the RV were needed. Rather, the record 
reflects that Forest River actively participated in efforts to address problems with the RV. Forest 
River shipped replacement parts to Plaintiff’s Kansas address and to authorized Kansas service 
providers, and three warranty claims were submit ted and processed pursua nt to Forest River’s 
limited warranty.10 (Docs. 163-1; 163-2; 163-3; 163-4.) A manufacturer that is actively engaged 
in attempting to remedy a product’s failures is not, by that conduct, deceiving the consumer within 
the meaning of § 50-626. Nor is a manufacturer who disagrees about the scope of a warranty 
engaged in deceptive conduct. So, Forest River is entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiff’s 
claims brought under K.S.A. §§ 50-626(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(8), and (b)(9). 
Plaintiff’s claims under K.S.A. § 50-627 fare no better. Under the KCPA, “[n]o supplier 
shall engage in any unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” 
K.S.A. § 50-627(a). Dissimilar to deceptive acts claims that are often underlain with fact 
questions, “whether an action is unconscionable under the KCPA is a legal question for the court.” 
Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reed, 314 P.3d 852, 864 (Kan. 2013); see Shigo v. Clark, No. 
 
10 While Plaintiff objects to Forest River’s assertion that th ey resolved each of Plaintiff’s warranty claims (Doc. 162 
¶ 25), she does not appear to controvert the assertion that they at least attempted to remedy them. Specifically, Plaintiff 
attaches an exhibit of what appears to be a log indicating that the warranty claims were processed. (Doc. 162-10.) 

20 
 
21-2079-DDC, 2022 WL 2966320, at *6 (D. Kan. July 27, 2022). Under Kansas law, an 
“unconscionable act or practice requires both supplier deception and unequal bargaining power.” 
Via Christi, 314 P.3d at 867. 
Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy ei ther element. As discusse d above, she has presented no 
evidence of deceptive bargaining conduct attributab le to Forest River—a threshold failure that 
alone defeats the unconscionability claim. See State ex rel. Stovall v. DVM Enters., Inc., 275 Kan. 
243, 251, 62 P.3d 653, 658 (2003) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff because 
unconscionability requires both deceptive bargaining conduct and unequal bargaining power). Nor 
has Plaintiff presented any evidence demons trating unequal bargaini ng power. Plaintiff’s 
argument that the RV ’s sale price grossly ex ceeded the fair market value is unsupported by 
evidence in the records. She provides no evidence of other RV sales, or even what the fair market 
value is. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff cannot carry her summary judgment burden on her 
claim that defendant violated K.S.A. § 50-627(b)(2). The same holds true of Plaintiff’s allegations 
under § 50-627(b)(3). Her argument that she was unable to receive a material benefit from the RV 
given that for periods of time it was inoperable is unsupported. Plaintiff provides no evidence 
indicating that Forest River “knew or had reason to know” that the RV would be inoperable for 
periods of time after its purchase. See K.S.A. § 50-627(b). And contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, 
the fact that Forest River had a limited warranty does not support the allegation that Forest River 
had knowledge that an RV sold by an independent Texas dealership would not provide a material 
benefit due to needed repairs. 
Plaintiff raises one additional unconscionability theory, contending that Forest River was 
subject to a federal consent order (Doc. 162-18) and a $35 million fine relating in part to its failure 
to notify purchasers and dealers of a safety recall involving the tir e pressure monitoring system. 

21 
 
(Doc. 162 at 39.) Plaintiff invokes K.S.A. § 50- 653, which provides that a consent judgment or 
order entered by the attorney general or a district attorney serves as prima facie evidence that the 
defendant engaged in an act or practice in viol ation of the KCPA. Even assuming the consent 
order is admissible and relevant, it does not s upport Plaintiff’s unconsci onability claim. The 
consent order relates to a nationa l recall notification ob ligation—not to the sale of, or warranty 
service for, Plaintiff’s particular RV. Plai ntiff does not connect th e consent order to any 
unconscionable conduct directed at he r in the course of her consumer transaction. Plaintiff also 
attempts to anchor certain KCPA claims on arguments and defenses made by Forest River during 
this litigation—including its assertion of warrant y exclusions as defenses and its production of 
warranty documents in discovery. (Doc. 162 at 39–40.) This litig ation conduct, however, is not 
evidence of unconscionable acts in connection with a consumer transaction. The KCPA requires 
that the challenged conduct be “in connection with” the underlying consumer transaction. K.S.A. 
§ 50-627(a). Post-sale litigation strategies, however aggressive, are not acts taken “in connection 
with” the sale or warranty of the RV. 
For these reasons, no genuine dis pute of material fact exists as to whether Forest River 
committed a deceptive or unconsc ionable act within the mean ing of the KCPA. Summary 
judgment is therefore granted on all of Plaintiff’s KCPA claims.11 Because Plaintiff’s request for 
injunctive relief under the KCPA—which appears to be seeking permanen t enforcement of the 
limited warranty—is not an indepe ndent cause of action but stands or falls with the underlying 
KCPA claim, summary judgment is likewise entered against Plaintiff on her request for injunctive 
 
11 Forest River’s summary judgment motion asserts that “Plain tiff’s allegations and claims in Counts 20, 22, and 32 
among others relate to actions allegedly taken by Forest River within this litigation.” (Doc. 143 at 23.) The court is 
at a loss to identify those counts in Plaintiff’s SAC. Th e court presumes Forest River may be referencing a draft 
pretrial order that was circulated among the parties but was never entered. (See Doc. 141.) To the extent Forest River 
intended to reference claims in the SAC, it is directed to cite to the SAC in any future filings. In any event, the court’s 
analysis above identifies all of Plaintiff’s claims in the SAC. 

22 
 
relief. See Marksberry, 606 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 (granting summary judgment on injunctive relief 
request where it “is not an inde pendent cause of action, and it stands or falls with the KCPA 
claim.”) 
IV. Conclusion 
 THEREFORE, Defendant’s motion for summ ary judgment (Doc. 142) is GRANTED IN 
PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s breach 
of contract claim resting on Contract B, he r tort claims for fraud, misrepresentation, and 
negligence, and claims brought under the KCPA. 
 FURTHER, the parties are ORDERED to resubmit their drafts of the pretrial order to the 
magistrate judge within se ven (7) days after entry of this order. In the pr etrial order, Plaintiff’s 
only surviving claims are her three breach of contract claims alleging breaches of Contracts A, C, 
and D. 
 FURTHER, pursuant to District of Kansas Rule 40.2(e), the jury trial location is MOVED 
and will now be held in Courtroom 238, Wichita, Kansas. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 11th day of June, 2026. 
 _s/ John W. Broomes_________________ 
 JOHN W. BROOMES 
 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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