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govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_25-cv-03436-1

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · 2026-06-11

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:11:30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 : 
JANE DOE 
 : 
 
 v. : Civil Action No. DKC 25-3436 
 
 : 
NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION, 
et al. : 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 Plaintiff “Jane Doe” filed an employment discrimination 
complaint and seeks to proceed under a pseudonym and seal 
identifying information. (ECF No. 2). She has also moved to seal 
certain papers in the court file. (ECF Nos. 13, 22). For the 
following reasons, the motion to proceed under a pseudonym will be 
denied and Plaintiff will have seven days in which to notify the 
court whether she withdraws the complaint. If she does not dismiss 
the entire action she may move to redact or seal portions of the 
complaint but must publicly file a complaint that contains her 
name. The motions to seal will be granted in part and denied in 
part. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint 
“name all the parties” and that an action “be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a); 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(1). As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit has explained, there is a “general presumption 

2 
 
of openness of judicial proceedings.” James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 
233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, a district court may allow 
a litigant to proceed under a pseudonym in certain rare and 
extraordinary circumstances. Id. Five non-exhaustive factors are 
balanced to determine whether the circumstances warrant permission 
to proceed using a pseudonym: 
[(1)] whether the justification asserted by 
the requesting party is merely to avoid the 
annoyance and criticism that may attend any 
litigation or is to preserve privacy in a 
matter of sensitive and highly personal 
nature; [(2)] whether identification poses a 
risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to 
the requesting party or even more critically, 
to innocent non-parties; [(3)] the ages of the 
persons whose privacy interests are sought to 
be protected; [(4)] whether the action is 
against a governmental or private party; and, 
relatedly, [(5)] the risk of unfairness to the 
opposing party from allowing an action against 
it to proceed anonymously. 
 
Id. (enumeration of factors added). 
 Plaintiff asserts that she is “a Black physically disabled 
woman and former Director of Product Management at the National 
Apartment Association.” (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 3). Her complaint purports 
to assert claims of disability discrimination and retaliation 
arising from her termination. In her motion to proceed under a 
pseudonym, which she did not file under seal, she identifies her 
disabilities although the precise medical and mental health 

3 
 
information that is in sealed attachments to the complaint is not 
detailed. 
Plaintiff’s disabilities and medical information are of a 
highly personal nature, and thus perhaps deserve some 
confidentiality. It is not, however, appropriate to achieve that 
result by allowing her to proceed without public disclosure of her 
name. Instead, judicious redaction of public documents and sealing 
where necessary can achieve the proper balance. 
 First, Plaintiff’s papers are internally inconsistent. 
Plaintiff states that her “public profile as a Black disabled 
executive” heightens the risk of harm “if her name and medical 
circumstances become widely accessible online.” (ECF No. 2, at 
1). If Plaintiff already has a public profile that includes 
knowledge of her disability, her general concern about an invasion 
of her privacy is misplaced. 
 Defendants already know her identity and, of necessity, her 
disabilities, and her alleged fear of retaliation is speculative. 
As stated above, she already has a “public profile as a Black 
disabled executive,” meaning her general concern of retaliation 
from similar details in this case is unsupported. Plaintiff has 
not substantiated her claim that public revelation of her identity 
would cause retaliatory harm from a specific source. See Doe v. 
Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 274-75 (4
th Cir. 2014) (finding 

4 
 
speculative harm is not a basis for proceeding anonymously); (ECF 
No. 2-1, at 1). Plaintiff has not demonstrated extraordinary 
circumstances sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 
transparent proceedings. See Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 274; cf. 
Doe v. Darden Rests., Inc., 736 F.Supp.3d 297, 302-03 (D.Md. 2024) 
(granting anonymity where the alleged harasser physically 
assaulted and lived near the plaintiff); Doe S.E.S. v. Choice 
Hotels Int’l, Inc, No. 24-cv-3776-DKC, 2025 WL 1399235, at *2 
(D.Md. May 14, 2025) (granting anonymity for a victim of sex 
trafficking who feared her trafficker and those connected to him). 
The remaining factors are either neutral or weigh against 
Plaintiff. She is not a minor and she is suing a private party, 
not the government. See Doe v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 394 
(E.D.Va. 2004) (“[C]ourts in general are less likely to grant a 
plaintiff permission to proceed anonymously when the plaintiff 
sues a private individual than when the action is against a 
governmental entity[.]”). The final factor cuts in both 
directions. Defendants are already aware of Plaintiff’s identity, 
(ECF No. 2, at 1), and do not claim it would be unfair to them to 
allow Plaintiff to proceed anonymously in their response to 
Plaintiff’s motion, (ECF No. 32), pointing in favor of anonymity. 
Where liability has not yet been established, however, allowing a 
party to proceed anonymously risks lending an unsubstantiated aura 

5 
 
of credibility to the anonymous party’s claims. See James, 6 F.3d 
at 241. 
On balance, proceeding pseudonymously is not warranted in 
this case. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym and 
seal her identifying information will be denied. Plaintiff must 
notify the court within seven days whether she withdraws 
(dismisses) the complaint. Alternatively, she may move to seal or 
redact sensitive medical information from the complaint. If she 
wishes to take that route, a motion to seal with the proposed 
redactions must be filed within the same seven days. In any event, 
a complaint with her name included must be filed on the public 
docket. 
Plaintiff has filed two motions to seal: one seeking to seal 
ECF Nos. 9 and 10, (ECF No. 13), and one seeking to seal an 
additional twenty-six exhibits, (ECF No. 22). Defendants did not 
oppose either motion. The first motion will be granted, and the 
second will be granted in part and denied in part. 
 When ruling on a motion to seal, the court balances the 
public’s general interest in transparent judicial proceedings 
against competing interests specific to the case. See Pub. 
Citizen, 749 F.3d at 265-66; In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 
234 (4
th Cir. 1984). Typically, a litigant’s interest in preserving 
the privacy of their sensitive medical information outweighs the 

6 
 
public’s general interest in transparent proceedings. See Rock v. 
McHugh, 819 F.Supp.2d 456, 475 (D.Md. 2011). Nevertheless, the 
court may, at its discretion, tailor the sealing to preserve the 
public’s right to access court records without exposing a 
litigant’s or non-party’s sensitive medical information. Id. at 
476. 
Plaintiff’s first motion to seal, (ECF No. 13), seeks to seal 
two documents that describe her medical history in detail, (ECF 
Nos. 9, 10). Redactions alone are impractical for these documents, 
because they are entirely about her medical history. Plaintiff’s 
interest in preserving her privacy outweighs the public interest 
in the proceedings. The first motion to seal, (ECF No. 13), will 
be granted. 
The second motion, (ECF No. 22), identifies twenty-six 
exhibits that Plaintiff seeks to file under seal. Most should be 
unsealed in full.
1 Some of the exhibits contain public information 
such as magazine articles, (ECF Nos. 23-20; 23-21), a job posting, 
(ECF No. 23-17), and unanswered messages to former coworkers, (ECF 
No. 23-15). Others include information providing foundational 
context to her claim, such as Plaintiff’s offer letter from NAA, 
 
1 Plaintiff will have an opportunity to withdraw any documents 
rather than allow them to remain on the docket unsealed. Local 
Rule 105.11 (“If the motion [to seal] is denied, the party making 
the filing will be given an opportunity to withdraw the 
materials.”). 

7 
 
(ECF No. 23-2), and correspondence with the EEOC and state 
agencies, (ECF Nos. 23-8, 23-9, 23-11). Still others contain 
information from NAA internal systems or meetings, (ECF Nos. 23-
18; 23-19; 23-22; 23-23), records of conversations Plaintiff had 
with third parties about professional opportunities, (ECF Nos. 25; 
23-24; 23-25)
2, and documents related to her termination and its 
impact on her, (ECF Nos. 23-3; 23-4; 23-10; 23-12; 23-13; 23-16). 
None of these documents contain information that outweighs the 
public’s interest in access to information, and they will be 
unsealed in their entirety. 
A few of these documents present situations where an 
individual’s interest in privacy outweighs the presumption of 
access. Two are documents that contain only Plaintiff’s private 
medical and financial information. (ECF Nos. 23-14; 23-26). 
Plaintiff also includes three statements from non-parties.
3 Two 
former coworkers have provided “witness statements” describing 
their own negative experiences with Defendants, including 
 
2 One of Plaintiff’s exhibits was inadvertently not filed with 
the others and was instead filed at ECF No. 25. 
 
3 Each of the witness statements is accompanied by a document 
styled as the non-party witness’ motion to seal their statement, 
citing to Local Rule 105.11 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) in support. 
(ECF Nos. 23-5, at 8-9; 23-6, at 4; 23-7, at 4). Neither Plaintiff 
nor the non-parties explain why the non-parties have standing to 
move to seal documents in this case. Because Plaintiff also moved 
to seal these documents, however, the non-parties’ motions are 
superfluous. 

8 
 
sensitive details about other coworkers. The third statement is 
from Plaintiff’s former partner, who describes the family 
emergency that was taking place at the time Plaintiff used the 
corporate credit card. All three of these statements, (ECF Nos. 
23-5; 23-6; 23-7), will remain sealed in their entirety, as the 
non-parties’ interest in privacy outweighs the presumption of 
access to this information. See Rothman v. Snyder, No. 20-cv-
3290-PJM, 2020 WL 7395488, at *4 (D.Md. Dec. 17, 2020) (allowing 
documents to remain sealed in their entirety in part because they 
“contain private information of nonparties”). 
The motion to seal these twenty-six documents, (ECF No. 22), 
will be granted in part and denied in part. ECF Nos. 23-5, 23-6, 
23-7, 23-14, and 23-26 will remain sealed, and the remaining 
documents will be unsealed: ECF Nos. 23-2, 23-3, 23-4, 23-8, 23-
9, 23-10, 23-11, 23-12, 23-13, 23-15, 23-16, 23-17, 23-18, 23-19, 
23-20, 23-21, 23-22, 23-23, 23-24, 23-25, and 25. 
Accordingly, it is this 11
th day of June, 2026, by the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that: 
1. The motion to proceed under pseudonym and seal 
Plaintiff’s identifying information filed by Plaintiff Jane Doe 
(ECF No. 2) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED; 
2. Within seven days, Plaintiff must notify the court 
whether she withdraws (dismisses) this case. If she does not 

9 
 
withdraw the complaint, she must file a complaint that contains 
her name; 
3. The motion to seal exhibits filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 
13) BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED; 
4. The motion to seal exhibits filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 
22) BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED IN PART with respect to 
ECF Nos. 23-5, 23-6, 23-7, 23-14, and 23-26, and DENIED IN PART 
with respect to ECF Nos. 23-2, 23-3, 23-4, 23-8, 23-9, 23-10, 23-
11, 23-12, 23-13, 23-15, 23-16, 23-17, 23-18, 23 -19, 23-20, 23-
21, 23-22, 23-23, 23-24, 23-25, and 25; 
5. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 23-5, 23-6, 23-7, 23-14, and 23-26 will 
remain sealed in their entirety; 
6. Plaintiff will have seven (7) days to withdraw any of 
the remaining documents she wished to seal under ECF No. 22 before 
they are unsealed; and 
7. The clerk will transmit copies of the Memorandum Opinion 
and this Order to Plaintiff Jane Doe and counsel for the parties. 
 
 /s/ 
 DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 
 

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