govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-4_23-cv-00074-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
NEW ALBANY DIVISION 
 
ANDREW CONLEY, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 4:23-cv-00074-TWP-KMB 
 ) 
WARDEN DENNIS REAGLE, ) 
 ) 
Respondent. ) 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORUPUS 
 This matter is before the Court on a Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, filed by Petitioner Andrew Conley. (Dkt. 1). Conley pled guilty in Indiana state 
court to one count of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole ("LWOP"), for a murder Conley committed when he was 17 years old. He contends that his 
guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that he received ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel. Because the Court concludes that Indiana state courts reasonably applied federal 
law in rejecting these claims, Conley's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied and a 
certificate of appealability will not issue. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Federal habeas review requires the Court to "presume that the state court's factual 
determinations are correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing 
evidence." Perez-Gonzalez v. Lashbrook , 904 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2018); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1). On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court summarized the relevant underlying 
facts as follows: 
 On Saturday, November 28, 2009, Conley was seventeen -
and-a-half-year-old when he murdered his ten- year-old brother, PageID #:
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Conner. The murder took place between 8:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. 
His mother and adoptive father were at work that evening until the 
early morning hours. As was not uncommon, Conley was 
responsible for watching Conner that evening. Conley's mother told 
him he would have to find a babysitter for Conner if he wished to 
go out with his friends. 
 Conley wanted to go out that evening, so Conley drove 
Conner to their grandmother's house in Rising Sun, Indiana, but she 
was not home. He next asked his uncle to watch Conner but was told 
no. After they returned home, Conley and Conner began wrestling. 
 At some point, Conley got behind his brother and choked 
him in a headlock with his arm until Conner passed out. Conner was 
bleeding from the nose and mouth. Conner was still breathing. 
Conley drug Conner into the kitchen, retrieved a pair of gloves, and 
continued to choke Conner from the front, around his throat. Conley 
choked Conner for approximately twenty minutes total. 
 Conley next got a plastic bag from a drawer in the kitchen 
and placed it over Conner's head. Conley used black electrical tape 
to secure the bag by wrapping the tape around Conner's head. 
Conner was still alive. In fact, Conner's last words were " Andrew 
stop." 
 Conley then drug Conner's body to the steps that lead to the 
basement, drug him down the steps by his feet, across the floor, and 
outside the home. Conley slammed Conner's head on the concrete 
multiple times to ensure Conner was dead and then placed his body 
in the trunk of his car. Conley cleaned himself up and put on new 
clothes. He put the bloody clothes in his closet and hid the bloody 
gloves in a chair. 
 Conley next drove to his girlfriend's house. While there they 
watched a movie, and he gave her a " promise ring." Conley's 
girlfriend testified at the sentencing hearing that Conley was 
"[h]appier than I'd seen him in a long time." Conley spent two hours 
at his girlfriend's house, while Conner's body remained in the trunk 
of the car. After leaving his girlfriend's house, Conley drove to an 
area behind the Rising Sun Middle School. Conley decided to drag 
Conner's body into the woods and covered the body with sticks and 
vegetation. 
 Conley returned home during the early morning hours on 
Sunday the 29th when no one was home. He cleaned up the blood 
in the house. When his father returned home around 2:30 a.m., 
Conley was acting normal. Conley said that Conner was at his 
grandmother's house and Conley also asked his father for some 
condoms. PageID #:
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 Conley's mother arrived home around 5:45 a.m., and Conley 
and his mother had popcorn, watched a movie together, and cracked 
jokes back and forth. His mother fell asleep. On two occasions that 
early morning, Conley went into his father's bedroom and stood over 
him with a knife. Conley said he had the intent to kill his father, but 
he decided not to. 
 Later that same Sunday, Conley watched football with his 
father. Following football, Conley left home and drove to the park 
in Rising Sun where Conner's body had been discarded, but he never 
went to the actual location. Instead, Conley spoke to two friends and 
told him that he had killed Conner. Thereafter, around 8:00 p.m., 
Conley drove his car to the Rising Sun Police Department and 
voluntarily reported he " accidentally killed his brother " or that he 
"believed" he had killed his brother. 
 The police contacted Conley's parents, and after consulting 
with his parents and waiving his right to counsel, Conley confessed 
to intentionally killing his ten-year-old brother. Conley was charged 
with murder and ultimately pleaded guilty, without a plea 
agreement. The penalty phase of the trial was conducted from 
September 15 to 21. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court 
sentenced Conley to life imprisonment without th e possibility of 
parole. 
 
Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 869–70 (Ind. 2012) (Conley I). Conley was represented during 
these proceedings by attorneys John Watson and Gary Sorge. Dkt. 8- 2 at 7, 50 (Post -Conviction 
Relief Proceedings ("PCR") Transcript, Vol. I). 
 On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Conley's sentence.
1 Conley raised 
four issues, all of which the Indiana Supreme Court rejected. It held: (1) the trial court properly 
admitted the expert testimony of Dr. James Daum during the state's rebuttal portion of the 
sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court properly weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
in determining Conley's sentence; (3) Conley's sentence was not inappropriate under Indiana 
Appellate Rule 7(B); and (4) the discretionary imposition of LWOP against Conley for a murder 
committed when he was 17 years old violated neither the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
 
1 The validity of the conviction itself was not challenged on direct appeal. PageID #:
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Constitution nor the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 880. Conley unsuccessfully sought rehearing of 
this decision and did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 In 2013, Conley filed a state post -conviction relief petition ("PCR petition"), which was 
denied in 2019. Conley appealed this denial to the Indiana Court of Appeals and, along with amicus 
curiae from the Indiana Public Defender Council, raised six issues: (1) whether the Indiana 
Constitution categorically bars LWOP sentences for offenses committed by juveniles; (2) whether 
Conley's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (3) whether Conley 's guilty plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (4) whether Conley's direct appeal counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance; (5) whether newly-discovered evidence made Conley's sentence unfair; and 
(6) whether the Indiana Court of Appeals could review Conley's sentence for appropriateness 
despite the Indiana Supreme Court's previous rejection of that argument. Conley v. State , 164 
N.E.3d 787, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (Conley II). The Conley II court held that it would not address 
the argument that LWOP for juveniles violated the Indiana Constitution because C onley had not 
raised that issue in his PCR petition. Id. at 805. It also held that the PCR court properly rejected 
Conley's claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 812. 
Furthermore, it held that the PCR court properly rejected the ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel and newly discovered evidence claims. Id. at 813-14. And it held that it was barred by res 
judicata from reconsidering whether Conley's sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate 
Rule 7(B). Id. at 814-15. 
 However, the Appellate court concluded that Conley received ineffective assistance from 
trial counsel with respect to his sentencing. It stated: 
Conley's trial counsel failed to adequately present mitigating 
evidence, especially with regard to Conley's age; the application of PageID #:
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Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)] and Graham [v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010)]; and Indiana's historical treatment of juveniles. 
Trial counsel also missed opportunities to present expert testimony 
on scientific evidence regarding the juvenile brain and diminished 
culpability of juveniles; and missed opportunities to zealously 
present evidence and challenge the State's evidence regarding 
Conley's mental health. 
 
Id. at 817. The Indiana Appellate court remanded so that Conley could receive a new sentencing 
hearing. Id. 
 The Indiana Supreme Court granted the State of Indiana's petition to transfer, thus vacating 
the Conley II decision. Conley v. State, 169 N.E.3d 854 (Ind. 2021); Ind. App. R. 58(A). On March 
23, 2022, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief in its entirety. 
Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276 (Ind. 2022) (Conley III). The Indiana Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed Conley II with respect to whether Conley's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to being advised to 
plead guilty, whether he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and whether newly 
discovered evidence warranted reconsideration of his sentence. Id. at 282 n.1. Conley III also 
expressly held that reconsideration of the appropriaten ess of Conley's sentence under Indiana 
Appellate Rule 7(B) was barred by res judicata. Id. at 288-89. 
 Conley III also addressed whether trial counsel was ineffective with respect to sentencing, 
and after thorough discussion of the issue it concluded counsel were not ineffective. Specifically, 
(1) counsel were not ineffective for not presenting evidence and specific argument about Conley's 
age and brain development; (2) counsel w ere not ineffective for not calling certain witnesses on 
Conley's behalf; (3) counsel w ere not ineffective for not refuting the State's expert pathologist 
testimony regarding the na ture of the crime; (4) counsel w ere not ineffective regarding how the 
State's mental health expert Dr. Daum was challenged; (5) counsel were not ineffective for failure PageID #:
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to investigate. Id. at 283-288. The Indiana Supreme Court denied rehearing, and Conley did not 
file a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 Conley, by counsel, filed the present habeas corpus action on May 8, 2023. (Dkt. 1). Conley 
argues that trial counsel w ere ineffective by (1) providing faulty advice with respect to pleading 
guilty; (2) failing to present evidence and legal argument regarding Conley's age and brain 
development; (3) failing to present evidence rebutting the State's expert pathologist testimony 
regarding the nature of the crime; (4) failing to adequately challenge Dr. Daum's testimony; (5) 
failing to obtain jail records that would have been relevant to Conley's mental health; and (6) 
failing to call any of the 14 character witnesses Conley asserts should have been called to testify 
at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 21-22. Conley also asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 22. 
 After the Respondent filed a response, Conley was given six extensions of time to file a 
reply. (Dkts. 14, 19). The Court denied Conley's seventh motion for an extension of time, noting 
in part not only the numerous extensions already granted, but that over three months had passed 
since the filing of the seventh motion (which had sought only a three -day extension of time) and 
still no reply had been filed. (Dkt. 21). This action is ripe for resolution. 
II. APPLICABLE LAW 
 
 A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in 
custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States. " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( "AEDPA") directs how the Court 
must consider petitions for habeas relief under § 2254. "In considering habeas corpus petitions 
challenging state court convictions, [the Court 's] review is governed (and greatly limited) by 
AEDPA." Dassey v. Dittmann , 877 F.3d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (c leaned up). "The PageID #:
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standards in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) were designed to prevent federal habeas retrials and to ensure 
that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Id. (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 A federal habeas court cannot grant relief unless the state court's adjudication of a federal 
claim on the merits: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 "AEDPA review provides an important but limited safeguard: It protects against extreme 
malfunctions in the state courts ' adjudication of constitutional claims." Klein v. Martin, 607 U.S. 
213, 220 (2026) (cleaned up). To obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner must "show far more 
than clear error." Id. (cleaned up). Rather, a petitioner must show " that the state court blundered 
so badly that every fairminded jurist would disagree with the decision. " Id. "For purposes of § 
2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of 
federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). "If this standard is difficult to meet, 
that is because it was meant to be." Id. at 102. "What matters under § 2254(d)(1) . . . is whether a 
decision is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, [the Supreme Court's] holdings, 
not whether the state court's opinion satisfies the federal court's opinion-writing standards." Klein, 
607 U.S. at 221. "The bounds of a reasonable application depend on the nature of the relevant rule. 
The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case- by-case 
determinations." Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc) ( cleaned up). A PageID #:
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federal court should not readily grant habeas relief if a state court has correctly cited and 
synthesized applicable precedent. Klein, 607 U.S. at 223. 
 "The decision federal courts look to is the last reasoned state -court decision to decide the 
merits of the case, even if the state's supreme court then denied discretionary review." Dassey, 877 
F.3d at 302. " Deciding whether a state court 's decision 'involved' an unreasonable application of 
federal law or 'was based on ' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas 
court to train its attention on the particular reasons —both legal and factual —why state courts 
rejected a state prisoner 's federal claims, and to give appropriate deference to that decision[.] " 
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018) (cleaned up). "This is a straightforward inquiry when 
the last state court to decide a prisoner 's federal claim explains its decision on the merits in a 
reasoned opinion." Id. "In that case, a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons 
given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable." Id. 
 In this case, the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision in Conley II is the last reasoned state-
court decision with respect to whether Conley received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
providing advice to plead guilty, and whether his guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary. Although the Indiana Supreme Court originally granted transfer as to the entirety of the 
Conley II opinion, in its Conley III opinion it summarily affirmed Conley II on this issue, which 
amounted to a denial of transfer and reinstatement of Conley II 's analysis as Court of Appeals 
precedent on these issues. See Korakis v. Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, 225 N.E.3d 760, 761 (Ind. 2024). 
The Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Conley III is the last reasoned state-court decision with 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
A criminal defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of 
showing (1) that counsel's performance fell below objective standards for reasonably effective 
representation and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984); Resnick v. United States, 7 F.4th 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2021). If a petitioner 
cannot establish one of the Strickland prongs, the Court need not consider the other. Groves v. 
United States, 755 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2014). To satis fy the first prong of the Strickland test, 
the petitioner must direct the Court to specific acts or omissions of his counsel. Wyatt v. United 
States, 574 F.3d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court must then consider whether in light of all of 
the circumstances counsel's performance was outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. Id. On the prejudice prong, a petitioner "must show that but for counsel's errors, there 
is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different." Per rone v. United States , 
889 F.3d 898, 908 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). 
 1. Advice Regarding Guilty Plea 
Conley argues trial counsel provided faulty advice with respect to his guilty plea. A guilty 
plea "cannot be 'knowing and voluntary' if it resulted from ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 967 (7th Cir. 2013). A petitioner who has pled 
guilty can establish prejudice only by demonstrating "that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Perron v. United States , 889 F.3d 898, 
908) (7th Cir. 2018). The Seventh Circuit has specifically held that "[a]n attorney's inaccurate PageID #:
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prediction of his client's sentence" does not by itself constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
United States v. Fuller, 312 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2002). 
The Conley II opinion begins by correctly reciting the two- part standard for a finding of 
ineffective assistance under Strickland, and that an ineffective assistance claim will fail if a 
defendant cannot show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice to the defendant. 
Conley II, 164 N.E.3d at 806. The opinion then briefly addresses the issue as follows: 
First, Conley argues that defense counsel misadvised Conley by 
advising him to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial on a defense 
of guilty but mentally ill. The PC Court rejected this argument, and 
we find no support for this argument in the record. Rather, the record 
is clear that Conley insisted on pleading guilty and the State would 
not agree to a plea of guilty but mentally ill. 
 
Id. 
 Although this discussion does not clearly indicate whether the Court of Appeals resolved 
the issue based on reasonable performance by counsel or lack of prejudice against Conley, that 
does not mean that the Court unreasonably applied Strickland to this claim. As discussed above, 
the purpose of a federal habeas corpus action is not to critique a state court's opinion writing, but 
to gauge the reasonableness of its application of federal law to a petitioner's claims. See also 
Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2006) (where state court correctly states Strickland 
standard, imprecise language in opinion does not necessarily mean it applied an incorrect 
standard). 
 Turning to the record before the Indiana Court of Appeals, counsel Watson testified at the 
PCR hearing that "the circumstances of that death were not good, in terms of how we thought a 
jury would perceive them." Dkt. 8-2 at 38. He believed that "his only chance of, perhaps, avoiding 
the life without parole was a plea." Id. Mr. Watson's recollection also was "that Andrew wanted to PageID #:
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plead guilty from start to finish . . . ." Id. at 39. Mr. Watson denied promising Conley that he would 
not be sentenced to LWOP if he pled guilty. Id. at 45. 
 Counsel Sorge testified at the PCR hearing, "I remember distinctly that very early on, when 
I met with Andrew, he wanted to plead guilty. He was remorseful, he wanted to plead guilty." Id. 
at 52. Mr. Sorge advised Conley against pleading without a plea deal, at least before counsel was 
able to explore the possibility of an agreement with the prosecution. Id. Mr. Sorge did try to 
negotiate a plea agreement for Conley to plead guilty but mentally ill, but counsel did not "think 
the State would have gone along with it." Id. at 61. Ultimately, Conley was "adamant" that he 
wanted to plead guilty. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Sorge believed the prosecution's case was 
"overwhelming" and that it would do more harm than good to Conley to go through a guilt phase 
of trial "where the outcome was inevitable" and that it would expose the trial judge to more 
negative information than if Conley pled guilty. Id. Mr. Sorge also denied that Conley was 
promised that he would not be sentenced to LWOP if he pled guilty. Id. at 69. 
 During his deposition taken before the PCR hearing, Conley expressed unhappiness that 
counsel did not "allow" him to plead guilty sooner. PCR Ex. A, Vol. 2 at 239. He also testified, "I 
honestly never thought I should go to a jury trial," at least as to his guilt or innocence, though he 
did express that he would have liked to have had a jury for his sentencing. Id. at 248-50. But a jury 
trial for sentencing was not an option for Conley after he elected to plead guilty. See Ind. Code § 
35-50-2-9(d) (providing that sentencing in an LWOP proceeding is to be conducted by the judge 
if a defendant pleads guilty). During the change of plea hearing, Mr. Watson directly asked Conley 
whether he understood that he had a right to a jury trial on the question of whether he should be 
sentenced to LWOP, and that he would waive that right and be sentenced by the judge instead if 
he pled guilty; Conley said he understood and was "comfortable" with that. Trial Tr. pp. 246- 47. PageID #:
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"[A] defendant is normally bound by the representations he makes to a court during" his plea 
colloquy. Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 In light of the above evidence, a "fairminded jurist" could readily agree with Conley II 's 
holding that Conley did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland with respect 
to any advice given about pleading guilty. Although not expressly stated in Conley II , the record 
reasonably supports the conclusion that trial counsel did not perform deficiently on this point. The 
record indicates counsel were faced with a client who was "adamant" about wanting to plead guilty, 
and the prosecution wa s unwilling to consider the possibility of agreeing to a plea of guilty but 
mentally ill. Conley suggests it would have preferable for a guilt -phase trial to be held, at which 
mitigating evidence could have been "frontloaded" in anticipation of sentencing, even if a guilty 
finding was almost certain. But , that would be a matter of tactics and strategy, to which courts 
ordinarily must defer. See Powell v. Fuchs , 4 F.4th 541, 550 (7th Cir. 2021). Also, Conley has 
cited no authority suggesting that "frontloading" is a constitutionally- mandated tactic. Counsel 
reasonably believed instead that there was a high risk of disclosing more negative information 
during the guilt phase of a trial than if they proceeded directly to sentencing. They also reasonably 
believed that the best chance for Conley to avoid an LWOP sentence was to plead guilty, but they 
never promised him that he would avoid such a sentence. That Conley ultimately was sentenced 
to LWOP does not mean they provided faulty advice. T he Indiana Court of Appeals did not 
unreasonably conclude that counsel were not ineffective on this claim. 
 2. Evidence and Legal Argument Related to Juvenile Brain Development 
 Next, Conley contends his attorneys were ineffective by presenting "no evidence about 
brain development in children as it relates to their immaturity and culpability" and failed to make 
arguments to the trial judge based on the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. PageID #:
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551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) . Roper barred use of the death penalty 
against persons who committed a capital offense before turning 18; Graham barred imposition of 
an LWOP sentence against a juvenile who committed a crime other than homicide. As the Indiana 
Supreme Court noted in Conley III , neither Roper nor Graham directly applied to Conley, who 
committed homicide and was sentenced to LWOP, not death. Conley III, 183 N.E.3d at 283- 84. 
Thus, it would be difficult to fault counsel for not making an argument to the trial judge based on 
these cases. 
 Moreover, in Conley III the Indiana Supreme Court held that Conley was not prejudiced 
by any failure by counsel to discuss those cases, or present evidence or argument directly related 
to juvenile brain development. Id. at 284. It recognized that "'youth matters in determining the 
appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.'" Id. (quoting Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012)). And, in fact, the trial judge acknowledged and discussed 
Conley's age when sentencing him. Appellate Appendix p. 161-62. However, the judge gave that 
factor only "some" mitigating weight, in light of Conley nearly being 18 when he murdered his 
brother, his normal cognitive functioning, and that he could make rational decisions. Id. The 
Conley III opinion also noted that in Conley I , Conley's argument that his sentence was 
inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) was rejected, after that opinion considered and 
discussed Miller at length as applied to Conley's case. Id. at 284 (citing C onley I, 972 N.E.2d at 
875-76). Miller, in turn, had held that mandatory imposition of LWOP against a juvenile offender 
was unconstitutional (Conley's LWOP sentence was discretionary, not mandatory), after thorough 
discussion of Roper and Graham. The Conley III opinion thus held that " we do not find a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel presented 
additional evidence about juvenile brain development." Conley III, 183 N.E.3d at 284. Conley III PageID #:
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further observed that Conley I is "an important guidepost for juvenile LWOP cases where, even 
considering the notable differences between juveniles and adults, the juvenile's crimes are so 
reprehensible and heinous that an LWOP sentence would be appropriate." Id. at 284. 
 In Conley III, the Indiana Supreme Court fully considered the implications of trial counsel's 
failure to directly present evidence or argument related to juvenile brain development during 
Conley's sentencing. It reasonably applied Strickland, Graham, Roper, and Miller in finding no 
ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. There is no basis for this Court to second-guess that 
determination on habeas review. See also Walker v. Cromwell, 140 F.4th 878, 882 (7th Cir. 2025) 
(noting that Supreme Court case law "offers mixed signals on cases . . . where a juvenile homicide 
offender is sentenced to life without parole as a matter of judicial judgment and discretion."). 
 3. Failure to Directly Rebut Pathologist's Testimony 
 During Conley's sentencing hearing, the prosecution presented testimony by pathologist 
Dr. Dean Hawley regarding Conner's cause of death. Dr. Hawley testified that Conner could still 
have been alive when Conley put a plastic bag over his head. Trial Tr. at 439. At his PCR hearing, 
Conley presented testimony of an expert – Dr. George Nichols – who questioned some of Dr. 
Hawley's findings, specifically as to whether Conner might have been alive when Conley put the 
plastic bag over his head. See Dkt. 82-2 at 98. Conley asserts trial counsel were ineffective for not 
retaining at the time of sentencing an expert who could have refuted Dr. Hawley's testimony. 
 The Indiana Supreme Court in Conley III held both that counsel performed reasonably on 
this point, and that even if Mr. Nichols or someone else had testified similarly at the sentencing 
hearing, there was no prejudice to Conley. Conley III, 183 N.E.3d at 285-86. At a bare minimum, 
Conley III 's finding of a lack of prejudice under Strickland was a reasonable conclusion. Dr. 
Nichols's testimony, or testimony like his, could only at most have cast doubt on whether Conley PageID #:
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managed to kill Conner before or after he put the plastic bag over his head. But, w hether or not 
Conner actually was dead when Conley put the plastic bag over his head, it surely indicates that 
Conley thought he was not yet dead at that time. Even if Conn er was dead, it wa s indeed one of 
four violent acts that Conley committed during the course of the evening, as correctly noted by the 
trial judge at sentencing: two strangulations/chokings, the plastic bag, and bashing Conner's head 
on concrete. It is reasonable to think that if testimony like Dr. Nichols's had been presented at the 
sentencing, it would have made little to no difference in the trial judge's sentencing decision. The 
Court cannot disagree with Conley III's observation "about the horrific nature of the crime 
regardless of whether Connor was alive when the bag was placed over his head." Conley III , 183 
N.E.3d at 286. 
 4. Alleged Failure to Adequately Challenge Dr. Daum's Testimony 
 At sentencing, the prosecution presented the testimony of Dr. Daum to rebut that of 
Conley's expert, Dr. Edward Connor, regarding Conley's mental health. Dr. Connor testified that 
he believed Conley suffered from schizoaffective disorder (bipolar type), and that he did not have 
any personality disorders. Trial Tr. pp. 604-05. Dr. Daum disagreed with Dr. Connor's diagnosis 
and further agreed with the prosecutor that "a more plausible explanation . . . is that there's evidence 
of psychopathic personality [which] would not be a mental illness[.]" Id. at 980-81. There was no 
direct objection to this questioning, and Conley asserts trial counsel were ineffective with respect 
to not challenging this testimony or obtaining a different expert to rebut Dr. Daum. 
 In Conley III, the Indiana Supreme Court found that counsel did not perform deficiently, 
because they moved " to strike Dr. Daum, made appropriate objections, and effectively cross -
examined Dr. Daum. Accordingly, we do not find that counsel's performance was deficient. " 
Conley III, 183 N.E.3d at 286. The record supports this determination as reasonable fact finding PageID #:
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and a reasonable application of federal law. See Trial Tr. pp. 930-38 (motion to strike discussion 
and ruling); 938, 944, 948, 950, 953-54, 956, 957 (objections to direct testimony); 960-72 (cross-
examination); 974, 977, 978, 982 (objections to re -direct testimony). And Dr. Connor already 
presented testimony favorable to Conley regarding his mental health; Conley does not identify 
what additional expert testimony could have been adduced at his sentencing hearing that could 
have made a difference in his sentencing. 
 Moreover, as Conley III suggested, counsel's tactics seemed to be effective. The trial court's 
sentencing statement acknowledged that Dr. Daum "indicated that Defendant exhibited some 
characteristics of a psychopath" but that he "was not able to render a specific diagnosis because he 
did not personally examine the Defendant." Appellate Appendix p. 153. Furthermore, when 
discussing Conley's mental health as a mitigating circumstance and deciding to give it "some" 
weight, the trial court did not mention Dr. Daum's testimony. Id. at 156-60. Thus, not only is it 
unclear what more trial counsel should have done to challenge Dr. Daum's testimony, there does 
not appear to have been any prejudice to Conley in that regard. Conley III did not unreasonably 
apply federal law in resolving this issue. 
 5. Jail Records and Personnel Testimony 
 During his PCR proceedings, Conley presented evidence that there were certain records 
from the Dearborn County Juvenile Center and the Switzerland County Jail, where Conley was 
detained before trial, that were not obtained by trial counsel. PCR Ex. 6 & 7. These records contain 
documentation of Conley's mental health problems, including suicidal ideations, while in those 
facilities. He also claims personnel at these facilities could have provided corroborating testimony 
regarding Conley's mental health. Conley asserts trial counsel were ineffective for not obtaining 
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 The Conley III opinion found that these records, at most, were merely cumulative of other 
evidence that was presented during sentencing. Conley III, 183 N.E.3d at 287- 88. It noted that 
Conley did present evidence " that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder and depression; that 
he suffered from a mental disease or defect that affected his ability to control himself; that he felt 
remorse for the crime; and that he did not have a psychopathic personality. " Id. at 287. 
Additionally, the Court observed that Conley's own e xpert, Dr. Connor, testified at the PCR 
hearing that these records "simply corroborated what he had already known and considered. 
Therefore, given the cumulative effect of these jail records, counsel's decision not to request them 
was objective reasonable." Id. at 287-88. 
 The Court notes that it might be more important to know whether the jail records could 
have changed the mind of someone who testified at sentencing in a negative way about Conley's 
mental health, as opposed to whether it confirmed a diagnosis, such as Dr. Connor's, that was 
favorable to the finding of a mitigator. But Conley does not direct the Court to any such testimony 
in the PCR record. The Court cannot search for such evidence for him. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 
U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (holding appellate court violated party-presentation principle by granting habeas 
corpus relief on a basis not argued by petitioner). Conley's perfunctory one -paragraph argument 
regarding the jail records falls significantly short of showing a reasonable probability of a different 
result at sentencing if the records had been obtained before sentencing. That is, he does not explain 
why or how this evidence would have changed the trial judge's sentencing decision to acknowledge 
and give Conley's mental health problems "some" mitiga ting weight, but no more than that. This 
is inadequate for purposes of granting federal habeas corpus relief from a state-court decision. See 
Thornell v. Jones , 602 U.S. 154, 166- 68 (2024) (holding state habeas petitioner who presented 
additional evidence of mental health problems during post-conviction proceedings was not entitled PageID #:
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to relief, where petitioner did not show how the new evidence would have "fixed" the state 
sentencing court's consideration of but giving little mitigating weight to petitioner's mental health). 
 6. Failure to Present Additional Character Witnesses 
 At Conley's PCR hearing, he presented testimony from over a dozen witnesses who could 
have testified at his sentencing hearing as to his good character or could have testified as to concern 
over his mental health shortly before the murder. He contends that trial counsel were ineffective 
for not calling these persons to testify in support of him at the sentencing hearing. 
 On this issue, the Indiana Supreme Court stated, "it is not clear if or how such evidence 
would have helped Conley. . . . [M]any of the witnesses called to testify at the post -conviction 
hearing had also been called at the sentencing hearing; the bulk of the testimony from the witnesses 
on post-conviction was about how shocked they were that Conley killed his brother." Conley III, 
183 N.E.3d at 284-85. The Court also noted that trial counsel had called several character witnesses 
during sentencing, and "[t ]he fact that counsel did not call every person Conley knew or present 
cumulative evidence regarding how his crime was out of character does not constitute deficient 
performance." Id. at 285. Also, as to prejudice, "Conley has failed to meet his burden to show that 
the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had called additional witnesses." 
Id. 
 This Court cannot say these conclusions were an unreasonable application of Strickland . 
At sentencing, trial counsel called two teachers, a principal, Conley's childhood Cub Scout leader, 
the owner of a restaurant where Conley worked for three years, and Conley's grandmother to testify 
in support of Conley's character. Trial Tr. pp. 820-67. Having reviewed the testimony of Conley's 
proffered witnesses at the PCR hearing, this Court also can confirm that the vast majority of their 
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some variation of shock and surprise at the murder and remembering Conley as a good student or 
person. 
 It is true that "testimony of additional witnesses cannot automatically be categorized as 
cumulative and unnecessary" when considering a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to call 
such witnesses. Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580, 585 (7th Cir.1984). On the other hand, it is not 
ineffective assistance for trial counsel at sentencing to not present "mitigation evidence [that] 
'would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented.'" Laux v. Zatecky, 890 F.3d 666, 676 
(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009)). At a minimum, Conley has 
failed to demonstrate how Conley III unreasonably concluded that he was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel's failure to call these additional witnesses. Conley's "sentencing profile" would barely have 
been altered by the presentation of these witnesses. See Laux , 890 F.3d at 675 (noting that 
"Strickland cases, especially in the mitigation evidence context, are not easy for [habeas] 
petitioners to win."). 
 B. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Plea 
 Finally, Conley alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because he was misadvised about the consequences of his plea "and for which he got nothing while 
surrendering a lot . . . ." Dkt. 1 at 22. This, and a citation to Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 
(1938), is the full extent of Conley's argument on this point. 
 In Conley II, the Indiana Court of Appeals first stated the proper standard for assessing the 
validity of a guilty plea as outlined by Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52 (1985), and as applied by 
various Indiana state cases and Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2. Conley II, 164 N.E.3d at 812. It then found: 
The record of the guilty plea hearing and the sentencing hearing 
reflect that trial counsel and the sentencing court advised Conley of 
his right to a jury trial and his right to trial by jury during the 
sentencing phase. At the evidentiary hearing, Attorne ys Sorge and PageID #:
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Watson testified that: (1) Conley insisted on pleading guilty and 
forgoing a jury trial; (2) trial counsel made the strategic decision that 
entry of a guilty plea was Conley's best chance at avoiding a 
sentence of LWOP; and (3) trial counsel advised Conley 
accordingly. Accordingly, we cannot say the PC Court's denial of 
this claim is clearly erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 As previously indicated in this Order, in discussing whether Conley received ineffective 
assistance of counsel with respect to advising him to plead guilty, Conley II 's findings are not 
unreasonable. And they amount to a not unreasonable application of Hill's standards for a valid 
guilty plea. To the extent Conley wishes to collaterally challenge the plea because he ended up 
receiving no benefit from it, "a plea's validity may not be collaterally attacked merely because the 
defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 
175, 186 (2005).
2 
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
 
 "A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a federal district 
court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal." Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017). Instead, 
a state prisoner must first obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). "A 
certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 
the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In deciding whether a certificate of 
 
2 Mr. Conley also suggests in his petition that it was improper for the prosecution, in closing argument at sentencing, 
to note the actual time Mr. Conley might serve in prison if sentenced to the maximum possible term of 65 years instead 
of LWOP, after accounting for credit time opportunities. He claims trial counsel should have objected to this argument 
but failed to do so. Respondent did not directly respond to this contention. However, Mr. Conley did not raise this 
argument before the Indiana Court of Appeals or Indiana Supreme Court. Dkts. 7-3 (Appellant's Brief for Conley II), 
7-14 (Appellant's Response in Opposition to Petition to Transfer). Therefore, the argument is procedurally defaulted 
because it was never presented to a state court for resolution and it does not appear that it could now be raised in state 
court. See, e.g., Resnover v. Pearson , 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that procedural default "occurs 
when a claim could have been but was not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court 
reviews the habeas petition, be presented to the state court."). Moreover, Mr. Conley cites no authority indicating it is 
inappropriate for a prosecutor or judge to take into account the actual time a defendant might serve, after considering 
the possibility of credit time, when arguing for or fashioning a particular sentence. PageID #:
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appealability should issue, " the only question is whether the applicant has shown that jurists of 
reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 
could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. " 
Buck, 580 U.S. at 115 (cleaned up). 
 Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District 
Courts requires the district court to " issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 
final order adverse to the applicant." Despite the complexities involved with sentencing someone 
such as Conley to an LWOP sentence, his habeas arguments were largely perfunctory and lacking 
legal analysis. It is apparent that Conley at this point is merely seeking repeated bites of the apple 
when it comes to his senten ce. It is a harsh sentence, to be sure, but one that has been affirmed 
repeatedly by multiple state-court judges in detailed and thoughtful opinions, and is subject to only 
very narrow challenge under AEDPA. Jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court 's 
resolution of Conley's claims and nothing about the claims deserves encouragement to proceed 
further. Therefore, the Court concludes that a certificate of appealability shall not issue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Conley has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has 
not shown that the Indiana state courts in Conley II and Conley III made unreasonable factual 
findings or unreasonably applied federal law when rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel and of an unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary guilty plea. His petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED and a certificate of appealability 
SHALL NOT ISSUE. 
 Final judgment shall issue by separate entry. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. PageID #:
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 Date: 6/11/2026 
 
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