govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_25-cv-02309-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
TRUSTEES OF THE MID-ATLANTIC : 
REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 
PENSION FUND, et al. : 
 
 v. : Civil Action No. DKC 25-2309 
 
 : 
MODERN ACCENT WALLS L.L.C. 
 : 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case 
brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) is the motion for entry of partial default judgment and 
final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) and 54(b) filed 
by Plaintiffs Board of the Construction Industry Advancement 
Program (“CIAP”), Eastern Atlantic States Regional Council of 
Carpenters (“Council of Carpenters”), Trustees of the Carpenters 
Contractor Trust Fund (“CCT Fund”), Trustees of the Eastern 
Atlantic States Carpenters Technical Centers (“Training Fund”), 
Trustees of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council of Carpenters 
Annuity Fund (“Annuity Fund”), Trustees of the Mid-Atlantic 
Regional Council of Carpenters Health Fund (“Health Fund”), 
Trustees of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council of Carpenters 
Pension Fund (“Pension Fund”), and Trustees of the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters International Training Center Fund (“ITC 
Fund”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 13). The issues 

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have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed 
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the 
motion for entry of partial default judgment and final judgment 
will be granted. 
I. Background1 
This case stems from the relationship between associations 
representing carpenters and the companies that hire them. The 
Pension Fund, Health Fund, Training Fund, and Annuity Fund are 
multimember employee benefit plans, or Benefit Funds, that are 
organized under ERISA. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–4, 22). The CIAP is “a 
program established pursuant to the terms of a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement covering work in the unionized carpentry 
industry.” (Id. ¶ 5). The CCT Fund and ITC Fund are labor-
management cooperation committees established and maintained 
according to their respective Trust Agreements. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7). 
The Council of Carpenters is an unincorporated labor organization, 
as defined in the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). (Id. 
¶ 8). Modern Accent Walls L.L.C. (“Defendant”) is a Maryland 
limited liability company. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiffs identified 
Defendant’s address as 9375 Chesapeake Street, Suite 205, La Plata, 
 
1 The facts herein are as alleged in the complaint or as 
provided in authentic documents integral to the complaint. 

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MD 20646, (id. at 2), and its Chief Executive Officer as Philip 
McPhail, (id.). 
On August 9, 2024, Defendant signed a Short Form Collective 
Bargaining Agreement with the Council of Carpenters, thereby 
binding itself to “every applicable current collective bargaining 
agreement” between the Council of Carpenters and members of the 
contractor associations, as well as “[t]he Agreements and 
Declarations of Trust” governing “fringe benefit Funds.” (ECF No. 
13-4, at 82). One such collective bargaining agreement was the 
agreement between the Council of Carpenters and the Construction 
Contractor’s Council. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 11). Defendant was therefore 
bound to that collective bargaining agreement and “accept[ed] the 
terms and provisions of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust of 
each of the Funds” above. (ECF No. 13-4, at 71 § 17.8). 
Each Fund is governed by its own Agreement and Declaration of 
Trust (“Trust Agreement”). These Trust Agreements require 
employers, including Defendant, to make payments to their 
respective Funds as established in the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. (Id. at 9 § 3(a), 15 § 4, 20 § 4, 25, 31 § 7.2, 38 § 
1). The Trust Agreements of the Funds also require that employers 
submit to audits conducted by the trustees of the Funds to ensure 
their contributions are compliant with each respective collective 

4 
 
bargaining agreement. (Id. at 9-10 § 4, 15 § 4, 20-21 § 4, 26 § 
1, 32 § 7.4, 38 § 2). 
Despite multiple requests by Plaintiffs to submit to an audit, 
Defendant “has repeatedly refused to cooperate in a payroll audit 
to be conducted by the certified public accounting firm of Calibre 
CPA Group, PLLC.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 19). 
 On July 16, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against 
Defendant seeking the following relief across three counts: 
injunctive relief to compel a payroll audit (Count I), damages in 
the amount owed to Benefit Fund Plaintiffs (Count II), and damages 
for working assessments and other payments owed to non-ERISA 
Plaintiffs (Count III). (Id. ¶¶ 15-32). 
 On July 17, 2025, a summons was issued to Defendant at its 
business address, 9375 Chesapeake Street. (ECF No. 5). Pursuant 
to the summons, Defendant had twenty-one days after service to 
respond to the lawsuit. (Id.). On July 29, 2025, a private 
process server served the summons and complaint on Wayne 
Fastnaught, Vice President of Modern Accent Walls L.L.C., at the 
address on the summons. (ECF No. 7). 
After Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ complaint 
within the prescribed twenty-one days, Plaintiffs filed a motion 
for clerk’s entry of default on August 21, 2025. (ECF No. 9). A 
copy of that motion was mailed to Defendant at 9375 Chesapeake 

5 
 
Street. (ECF No. 9-3). On October 28, 2025, the clerk entered an 
Order of Default against Defendant. (ECF No. 10). The clerk 
mailed a Notice of Default on that same date, stating that 
Defendant had thirty days to file a motion to vacate the order. 
(ECF No. 11). That notice was returned as undeliverable on 
December 31, 2025. (ECF No. 12). On February 17, 2026, the clerk 
remailed the Order Entering Default and Notice of Default to Mr. 
McPhail at 9375 Chesapeake Street. This mail was returned as 
undeliverable on March 4, 2026. (ECF No. 15). On March 25 and 
26, 2026, the clerk remailed the Order Entering Default and Notice 
of Default to Mr. McPhail at two different addresses: 7397 Yellow 
Rose Court, Hughesville, MD 20637, and 13375 Chesapeake Street, 
Suite 205, La Plata, MD 20646 (a potential business location 
obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel), respectively. Neither of these 
mailings were returned undeliverable. 
 Separately, on January 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Entry of Partial Default Judgment as to Count I of the complaint, 
seeking an injunction to compel a payroll audit before proceeding 
with the damages claims. (ECF No. 13). That same date, Plaintiffs 
served their motion via electronic and first-class mail to Modern 
Accent Walls, L.L.C. at 9375 Chesapeake Street. (ECF No. 13-5). 
On February 20, 2026, Plaintiffs remailed their Motion for Entry 
of Partial Default Judgment to Mr. McPhail at 7397 Yellow Rose 

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Court. (ECF No. 14). On March 26, 2026, Plaintiffs remailed the 
Motion for Entry of Partial Default Judgment to Mr. McPhail at 
13375 Chesapeake Street. (ECF No. 16). Defendant has not 
responded. 
II. Standard of Review 
Default judgment is “appropriate when the adversary process 
has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” 
S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.Supp.2d 418, 421 (D.Md. 2005) (citing 
Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). If the 
plaintiff’s claim is not for a sum that can be “made certain by 
computation,” it must “apply to the court for default judgment.” 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). 
By its default, a defendant admits to the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as to liability. Ryan v. Homecomings 
Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4
th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nishimatsu 
Constr. Co. v. Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5 th Cir. 
1975)). The Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard must therefore be 
applied to “consider whether the unchallenged factual allegations 
constitute a legitimate cause of action.” Balt. Line Handling Co. 
v. Brophy, 771 F.Supp.2d 531, 541, 544 (D.Md. 2005) (quoting 10A 
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2688 (3
d ed. 
1998)). 

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Where there is more than one claim of relief in an action, 
the court may “direct entry of a final judgment as to . . . fewer 
than all[] claims . . . only if the court expressly determines 
that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 
III. Analysis 
By virtue of the default entered against it, Defendant admits 
to Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations as to liability. If the 
factual allegations presented by Plaintiffs present a plausible 
claim for relief in Count I, entry of partial default judgment is 
warranted. Moreover, entry of final default judgment on Count I 
is appropriate if there is no just reason for delay. Because 
Plaintiffs state a plausible claim to compel an audit, and there 
is no just reason for delay, Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of final 
default judgment on Count I will be granted. 
A. Partial Default Judgment 
Plaintiffs’ allegation that they possess a right to request 
an audit from Defendant is well supported by the relevant 
agreements, statute, and case law. Under the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement signed by Defendant and the Council of Carpenters, 
Defendant was bound to the Trust Agreements governing Plaintiffs’ 
plans. (ECF No. 13-4, at 82). Each Agreement included a clause 
requiring that employers submit to audits as requested by the 
plans. (Id. at 9-10 § 4, 15 § 4, 20-21 § 4, 26 § 1, 32 § 7.4, 38 

8 
 
§ 2). This right to conduct an audit is consistent with the duty 
ERISA imposes on plan fiduciaries “to furnish all participants 
with various documents informing them of their rights and 
obligations under the plan,” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension 
Fund v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985) (citing 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1022, 1024(b)), as well as the obligation ERISA 
imposes on employers “to maintain records on employees and to 
furnish to benefit plans the information needed for the plans’ 
fulfillment of their reporting duties,” id. at 573 (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 1059). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have a right to request 
and conduct an audit of Defendant. 
Defendant has failed to participate in this litigation and 
has been found to be in default. (ECF No. 10). Therefore, 
Defendant has admitted that it has not responded to Plaintiffs’ 
requests for an audit. Its failure to submit to the requested 
audit is a violation of the Trust Agreements and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. Because Defendant has failed to comply with 
Plaintiffs’ audit request, Plaintiffs state a plausible claim for 
relief. 
There being no alternative remedy, equitable relief is 
appropriate here. Under ERISA, the court possesses the authority 
to award “equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). It is appropriate to order Defendant to 

9 
 
comply with Plaintiffs’ lawful request for an audit. Plaintiffs 
may thereby learn if Defendant was making appropriate 
contributions to their Funds and take action to pursue Counts II 
and III if necessary. See, e.g., Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp., 
659 F.Supp.2d 182, 185 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting partial default 
judgment against the defendant to compel an audit so that the 
plaintiffs can determine damages owed on other counts). 
B. Rule 54(b) Final Judgment 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Plaintiffs move for entry of final 
judgment on Count I. Although they offer no analysis regarding 
the propriety of final judgment here, their motion will be granted 
because the relevant factors tilt decidedly in their favor. 
Rule 54(b) permits entry of final judgment on fewer than all 
claims when the judgment is indeed final and there is “no just 
reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980). A final judgment occurs 
where a decision is made “upon a cognizable claim for relief,” and 
that decision is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim 
in the course of a multiple claims action.’” Id. at 7 (quoting 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). The 
grant of partial default judgment is a final judgment; the only 
remaining question is whether there is no just reason for delay. 

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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
listed the following factors to be considered in determining 
whether there is no just reason for delay: 
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and 
unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need 
for review might or might not be mooted by future 
developments in the district court; (3) the possibility 
that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider 
the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or 
absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in 
a set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; 
(5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and 
solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, 
frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. 
 
Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335-36 
(4
th Cir. 1993) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 
521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. 
at 8). Rule 54(b) is the “exception rather than the norm,” and 
final judgment should be granted sparingly to prevent “piecemeal 
appeals of a case.” CapitalSource Fin., LLC v. Delco Oil, Inc., 
608 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (D.Md. 2009) (quoting Braswell Shipyards, 
2 F.3d at 1335). 
 Final judgment is appropriate in this case because the 
Braswell factors indicate that there is no just reason for delay. 
First, the relationship between the adjudicated claim (Plaintiffs’ 
right to conduct an audit) and the unadjudicated claims 
(Defendant’s potential liability for unpaid contributions to the 
Funds) weighs in favor of final judgment. Plaintiffs must conduct 

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an audit before the merits of their other claims can be determined. 
Second, the possibility that the need for review might be mooted 
by future developments in the case in this court is low, weighing 
in favor of final judgment. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims depend 
on the results of the audit but will not undercut their right to 
the audit. Third, the reviewing court would not be obliged to 
consider this issue a second time, weighing in favor of final 
judgment. Again, whether Defendant is ultimately liable for 
delinquent contributions does not affect Plaintiffs’ right to an 
audit. Fourth, the fact that “[t]here are no counterclaims which 
would result in a set-off against the judgment” also supports entry 
of final judgment. Bobb v. FinePoints Priv. Duty Healthcare, LLC, 
794 F.Supp.3d 343, 363 (D.Md. 2025). Fifth, no miscellaneous 
factor weighs against entry of final judgment. Because there is 
no just reason for delay, final judgment under Rule 54(b) is 
appropriate. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of 
partial default judgment and final judgment will be granted, and 
Defendant will be ordered to submit to an audit of its wage and 
payroll records. A separate order will follow. 
 
 /s/ 
 DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 

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