govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_25-cv-01184-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CURTIS O’NEIL MOORE, )
)
Plaintiﬀ, )
)
v. )
) 1:25-cv-1184
WHEELIHAN MOTOR GROUP,
INC., and HARLEY-DAVIDSON
MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )
AM
ENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
Lin
dsey A. Freeman, United States District Judge
It is hornbook law that a state-court defendant may only remove a lawsuit to
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction if “the citizenship of each plaintiﬀ” is
“diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68
(1996); see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 267 (1806) (Marshal l, C.J.). A
straightforward application of that rule to this case demands that this Court remand the
case back to state court . The plaintiﬀ, Curtis O’Neil Moore (“Moore”), a domiciliary of
North Carolina, brought a state-law tort lawsuit in North Carolina state court against
1 This Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order supersedes the Court’s Memorandum
Opinion and Order issued on April 24, 2026, Dkt. 21, to substitute the correct state court
for remand. Beyond modifying the remand court from the Alamance County Superior
Court to the Guilford County Superior Court, the Court’s analysis is unchanged between
the original Memorandum Opinion and Order and this Amended Memorandum Opinion
and Order.

Wheelihan Motor Group, Inc. (“Wheelihan”), a business domiciled in North Carolina,
and Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc. (“Harley- Davidson”), a business domiciled
in Wisconsin. See Dkt. 1 -3 (“State Court Complaint”) ¶¶ 1-4. Because Moore and
Wheelihan are both domiciliaries of North Carolina, this Court lacks original jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) over Moore’s state-law claims.
Harley-Davidson nonetheless removed Moore’s lawsuit from state court by
invoking the diversity jurisdiction of this Court. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 9-16. Harley -Davidson
claims that because it removed this lawsuit to federal court before Moore could serve
either defendant, this case may be removed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1441(b)(2)
through a growing trend called “snap removal.” See Dkt. 14 at 2, 5-6; see also Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 14-
16. To justify this argument, Harley -Davidson also appears to assert that snap removal
may be invoked absent complete diversity of citizenship. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 7, 10, 13
(acknowledging that both Moore and Wheelihan are North Carolina domiciliaries). In
fact, Moore and Harley- Davidson focus the entirety of their brieﬁng on whether, as a
matter of ﬁrst impression in this District, th e Court should endorse the practice of snap
removal. See generally Dkts. 10, 14.2

2 While some background on snap removal is necessary to resolve this dispute, the Court
takes no position on whether 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) permits snap removal, and nothing in
this Memorandum Opinion and Order should be construed as endorsing either side of
the split on th at issue. The Court leaves resolution of the snap removal question for
another day, when it is properly before the Court in a case exhibiting complete diversity
of citizenship.

Remand, however, is easily granted here . In short, snap removal is irrelevant to
this case because it may not be invoked (if it may be invoked at all) unless the lawsuit
presents complete diversity of citizenship when the complaint is ﬁled. Plaintiﬀ Moore
and Defendant Wheelihan are both citizens of North Carolina ; therefore, the case lacks
complete diversity. Because the Court lacks original jurisdiction, the action may not be
removed to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). T he Court thus GRANTS Moore’s
motion to remand back to state court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Moore, a resident of North Carolina, sustained serious injuries after he was
involved in a motorcycle accident near Burlington, North Carolina . See State Court
Complaint ¶¶ 23-30. Moore alleges that the accident was caused by certain defects with
the motorcycle driven by the other rider involved in the crash. Id. ¶¶ 26, 31-33. That
motorcycle was allegedly manufactured by Harley-Davidson and sold by Wheelihan. Id.
¶¶ 22, 31. Moore subsequently brought a lawsuit in Alamance County Superior Court
for negligence and breach of warranty under North Carolina law. Id. ¶¶ 63-103. He sued
Wheelihan and Harley -Davidson, domiciliaries of North Carolina and Wisconsin,
respectively. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
Moore ﬁled his initial complaint in state court on December 17, 2025. See Dkt. 1-2.
The operative amended complaint was ﬁled the next day. See State Court Complaint .
Before Moore could eﬀectuate service of process as to either Defendant, Harley-Davidson

removed Moore’s lawsuit to this Court on December 27, 2025. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 4. In its notice
of removal, Harley -Davidson candidly recognizes that “Wheelihan is a domestic
corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of North Carolina
with its principal place of business in High Point, North Carolina.” Id. ¶ 13. But it asserts
that “[r]emoval is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 because although this action
was ﬁled in a state court located in a forum state, the forum defendant rule [contained in
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)] does not bar removal.” Id ¶ 14. In Harley-Davidson’s view, that is
the case because “no defendant has been properly joined and served at the time of
removal.” Id.
Moore moved to remand the case back to state court, see Dkt. 10, and the parties
briefed the merits of that motion , see Dkts. 10-1, 14. For the reasons stated below, the
Court grants Moore’s motion.
ANALYSIS
Harley-Davidson may not remove this case based on diversity jurisdiction because
it lacks complete diversity of citizenship. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht , 524 U.S. 381,
388 (1998). Both Moore and Wheelihan are domiciliaries of North Carolina, defeating
diversity of citizenship. Because, absent complete diversity, this Court would not have
possessed original jurisdiction over this dispute had Moore ﬁled it in federal court,
Harley-Davidson’s arguments for removal must be rejected. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see
also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) . The removal statute does not

expand the original subject-matter jurisdiction duly conferred upon this Court by
Congress. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson , 587 U.S. 435, 441 (2019) (removal is
proper only if the “action could have been brought original ly in federal court”) .
Invocation of so-called snap removal accordingly does nothing to help Harley-Davidson.
See M & B Oil, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2023) (satisfying
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) “cannot create jurisdiction”) ; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2) (imposing limitations on removal of “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely
on the basis” of diversity jurisdiction (emphasis added)).
As the party claiming federal jurisdiction, Harley -Davidson bears the burden of
establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d
148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). The Court must strictly construe removal jurisdiction and resolve
all doubts in favor of remand. See Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 336 (4th
Cir. 2008). And the Court must remand the case back to state court if it determines that
Harley-Davidson has failed to carry its burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
As explained above, the parties spill signiﬁcant ink arguing about whether this
Court should endorse snap removal as a matter of ﬁrst impression . But snap removal
does not bear on whether Harley -Davidson could properly remove this case to federal
court because jurisdiction fails at an antecedent step : lack of complete diversity. The
Court is mindful that the Supreme Court recently reminded the lower courts that the

parties “frame the issue for decision,” and courts should avoid lawyering on their behalf
so as not to run afoul of the principle of party presentation. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S.
7, 9 (2025) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). But while the parties did not key
into the speciﬁc jurisdictional defect present in this lawsuit, the Court is duty- bound to
assure itself that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, and it must raise the issue sua sponte if
necessary. See Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.
2004). Further, Moore’s failure to identify that Wheelihan’s domicile deprives this Court
of jurisdiction cannot waive that defect. Id. The Court therefore departs from the parties’
brieﬁng to resolve Moore’s motion to remand.
The Court begins with a review of diversity jurisdiction and removal, explaining
how original subject-matter jurisdiction interacts with the removal statute. It concludes
with an analysis of Harley- Davidson’s arguments for removal, detailing why snap
removal provides no basis for creating jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.
I. The Removal Statute Requires Complete Diversity for a Defendant to Remove
from State Court.
Removal is not proper absent complete diversity of citizenship. The federal courts
“are courts of limited jurisdiction” and thus possess “only that power authorized by the
Constitution and statute.” Kokk onen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). The lower federal courts , in turn, possess only the jurisdiction that the
Constitution permits and Congress confers upon them. Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD
Fin. Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2020). The Constitution expressly provides that

“[t]he judicial Power shall extend … to Controversies … between Citizens of diﬀerent
states.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. And s ince the Judiciary Act of 1789, “Congress has
constantly authorized the federal courts to exercise [original] jurisdiction based on the
diverse citizenship of the parties.” Lewis, 519 U.S. at 68. As early as 1806, however, Chief
Justice Marshall construed the then -operative diversity jurisdiction statute to require
what came to be known as “complete diversity.” See Strawbridge, 3 Cranch at 267. To
satisfy that requirement “no plaintiﬀ can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”
M & B, 66 F.4th at 1109 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has reaﬃrmed that
construction as to every subsequent diversity -jurisdiction statute. Lewis , 519 U.S. at 62;
see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger , 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“Over the years
Congress has repeatedly re- enacted or amended the statute conferring diversity
jurisdiction, leaving intact [the] rule of complete diversity.”).
The complete diversity requirement is critical to this case because “[o]nly state-
court actions that originally could have been ﬁled in federal court may be removed to
federal court by” a defendant. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants … .” (emphasis
added)). And “[a] case falls within the federal district court’s ‘original’ diversity
jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete.” Schacht, 524
U.S. at 388.

It is undisputed that Moore’s lawsuit lacks complete diversity, see Dkt. 1 ¶ 13,
because both Moore and Wheelihan are domiciliaries of North Carolina.3 This Court thus
lacks original jurisdiction over Moore’s state -law claims because he could not have
originally ﬁled this lawsuit in federal court. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 388. That conclusion
should end this Court’s inquiry. But, appearing to misconstrue the contours of the novel
“snap removal” theory it invokes, Harley-Davidson claims that it may remove this case
to federal court even without complete diversity of citizenship. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 13. As
explained below, the Court disagrees.
II. Snap Removal, to the Extent it is Permissible, May Not be Invoked Absent
Complete Diversity.
Harley-Davidson argues that removal was proper here because diversity exists as
to it (a Wisconsin domiciliary) and Moore (a North Carolina domiciliary), and diversity
was complete because “ [a]t the time of removal, Wheelihan, the [North Carolina]
defendant, had not been properly joined and served.” Dkt. 14 at 4 (quotation modiﬁed).
In support of that novel theory of diversity, Harley- Davidson cites “inapposite caselaw
regarding ‘snap removals.’” See In re Levy, 52 F.4th 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
The Court is not persuaded that Harley-Davidson’s authority supports the weight of its

3 A corporation is a domiciliary of the states in which it: (1) is incorporated; and (2) has
its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation’s principal place
of business is its corporate “nerve center,” typically its headquarters. Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 80- 81 (2010) . It is undisputed by Harley -Davidson that Wheelihan, a
corporation, is incorporated and headquartered in North Carolina. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 13.

argument because “snap removal cannot cure lack of complete diversity.” M & B , 66
F.4th at 1110.
Some background on snap removal is necessary to dispel Harley-Davidson’s
misapprehensions. The general removal statute permits removal based on diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). But that statute imposes an
additional procedural limitation on removal when a defendant seeks to remove to federal
court based on diversity. See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc. , 902 F.3d 147,
152 (3d Cir. 2018). The text of the statute restricts the right to remove “if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) . This limitation, often called the “forum
defendant” or “home state defendant” rule, precludes defendants sued in the state courts
of their (or their co-defendants’) domicile from removing to federal court. See Hanson v.
Depot LBX, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 3d 56, 59 (W.D. Va. 2024).
Harley-Davidson’s arguments center on the language “properly joined and
served.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) . C ourts across the country have fractured about
whether that phrase should be construed to allow a defendant in a diversity action to
remove a case to federal court, so long as it does so before the forum-state defendant has
been formally served in the state-court action—so called “snap removal.” Recently, three
courts of appeal have endorsed the practice. See Encompass, 902 F.3d at 151-54; Gibbons v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 704-07 (2d Cir. 2019); Tex. Brine Co., LLC v. Am. Arb.

Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 485- 87 (5th Cir. 2020). T he other courts of appeal have not
squarely weighed in on the question, 4 and district courts across the country (including
within the Fourth Circuit) have splintered on the issue. See Valerie M. Nannery, Closing
the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 541, 552-56 (2018) (describing the split in
the district courts) ; see also, e.g., Hanson, 756 F. Supp. 3d at 68- 69, 75 (holding that snap
removal is permissible and collecting cases on either side of the split); Androus v. Androus,
747 F. Supp. 3d 904, 906-10 (E.D. Va. 2024) (holding that snap removal is not permissible
and collecting cases on either side of the split).
Harley-Davidson’s reliance on snap removal jurisprudence is misguided, though,
because § 1441(b)(2) cannot be invoked without complete diversity of citizenship. See M
& B , 66 F.4th at 1110. Indeed, if § 1441(b)(2) operated as Harley -Davidson urges, the
forum defendant rule would expand the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Unfortunately for
Harley-Davidson, the general removal statute “confers on state-court defendants a right
to federal jurisdiction,” it does not “supply that jurisdiction.” Univ. of N.C. Hosps. at Chapel
Hill v. United Healthcare of N.C., Inc., No. 1:25-cv-107, 2026 WL 710539, at *3 n.4 (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 13, 2026) (emphasis in original); see also Burrell v. Bayer Corp., 918 F.3d 372, 378 (4th
Cir. 2019) (a defendant is only entitled to removal under § 1441 if the plaintiﬀ’s “c laims
could have been brought in federal court originally, based on some independent source

4 The Sixth Circuit appears to have endorsed snap removal in dicta, see McCall v. Scott, 239
F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001), but it has never formally weighed in on the split.

of federal jurisdiction”); Roxbury Condo. Ass’n Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224,
227 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Section 1441 is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional statute,” and
removal jurisdiction “is therefore wholly derived from original federal jurisdiction”).
Harley-Davidson’s position cannot be squared with the text of § 1441. Section
1441(a) limits removal to instances where “the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added) . T o the extent removal is
arguably based on diversity, the forum defendant rule in § 1441(b)(2)—on which Harley -
Davidson relies —is similarly limited to those instances when a “civil action” is
“otherwise removable … on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) .” As
previously noted, however, a case lacks “original jurisdiction ”—and is thus not
removable based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332—w hen the case lacks
complete diversity. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 388. “Snap removal or not, an absence of complete
diversity makes a federal forum unavailable.” M & B , 66 F.4th at 1110 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(a), 1447(c)).
Harley-Davidson’s arguments regarding timing and service do not change th at
basic jurisdictional fact. To comport with Harley-Davidson’s arguments, the general
removal statute would have to permit pre-service removal based on “minimal diversity”
(i.e., when “the citizenship of any plaintiﬀ diﬀers from that of any defendant”). See Navy
Fed, 972 F.3d at 352. While it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to expand the
federal courts’ jurisdiction in that manner, see Lewis, 519 U.S. at 68 n.3, “Congress (so far)

has declined to extend federal- diversity jurisdiction to this constitutional limit,” Navy
Fed., 972 F.3d at 352. This Court, therefore, will not embrace an interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 that relies upon “minimal diversity” in the face of the plain text of the removal
statute and the case law construing diversity jurisdiction to require complete diversity.
See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 388.
Additionally, Harley-Davidson’s proposed rule—which assesses diversity at the
moment of removal —is at odds with the Supreme Court’s observation that “[t]he
existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the
complaint is ﬁled.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo -Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989) .
Because diversity is ordinarily assessed upon the complaint’s ﬁling, the mere fact that
“the resident defendant has not been served with process does not justify removal by the
non-resident defendant.” See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939) . In short,
“service does not matter in evaluating the diversity of the parties.” M & B , 66 F.4th at
1109.
The Court is not alone in concluding that snap removal does not apply in the
absence of complete diversity. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have reversed district courts’
erroneous decisions, under misapplication s of snap removal, to exercise removal
jurisdiction over disputes between minimally diverse parties. See Levy, 52 F.4th at 246; M
& B , 66 F.4th at 1110. T he Seventh Circuit has also recognized the impropriety of
misusing snap removal to get around complete diversity, dismissing the nondiverse

defendant on appeal to cure the jurisdictional defect. See Rao v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 153 F.4th 541, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2025). Other district courts within the Fourth Circuit
have reached conclusions in line with M & B, Levy, and Rao. See, e.g., Lawhorne v. Walgreens
Boots All., Inc., No. 3:19-cv-16, 2019 WL 3046106, at *4 (W.D. Va. July 11, 2019); Cook v. Bob
Evans Farms, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1017, 2012 WL 407261, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 8, 2012).
Harley-Davidson does not cite a single case supporting the proposition that
anything less than complete diversity is suﬃcient to invoke snap removal. And all the
case law endorsing snap removal that it cites involved parties exhibiting complete
diversity. In Encompass, an insurance company domiciled in Illinois sued a restaurant
domiciled in Pennsylvania in Pennsylvania state court. See 902 F.3d at 149. In Gibbons ,
ﬁfteen plaintiﬀs domiciled in states other than Delaware sued two pharmaceutical
companies domiciled in Delaware in Delaware state court. See 919 F.3d at 704; see also id.
at 705 n.2 (“The parties do not contest that the plaintiﬀs in all ﬁfteen actions now before
this Court are diverse from Defendants.”). And in Texas Brine, a Texas-domiciled limited
liability company sued a New York-domiciled corporation and two Louisiana-domiciled
individuals in Louisiana state court. See 955 F.3d at 485. The list could go on.
Harley-Davidson fails to carry its burden to establish that removal based on snap
removal is appropriate where complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. Remand is
thus appropriate.

14
CONCLUSION
Moore and Harley- Davidson put the cart before the horse by arguing about
whether snap removal was proper in this case. The forum-defendant rule is procedural,
rather than jurisdictional, so “it cannot confer jurisdiction where it does not exist.” Levy,
52 F.4th at 247. The parties here lack complete diversity, so the Court does not have
original jurisdiction, and removal is accordingly improper. Therefore , for the reasons
stated above, the Court GRANTS Moore’s motion to remand the case back to the Guilford
County Superior Court.
It is SO ORDERED.
This the 11th day of June, 2026.
__________________________________

LINDSEY A. FREEMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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