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Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-ohnd-1_20-cr-00561-0

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2021-10-18

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:38:56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
 
 
UNITED STATES, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
JASON JARVIS, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
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OPINION & ORDER 
[Resolving Doc. 337] 
 
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: 
 
In this drug case, Defendant Jason Jarvis moves to suppress evidence recovered 
when police searched his person after a traffic stop.
1 Defendant argues that the traffic stop 
was pretextual and the police officer lacked probable cause for the search. Defendant also 
argues the search lacked reasonable suspicion. The Government opposed.2 
On October 7, 2021, the Court GRANTED Defendant’s motion to suppress during 
the motion hearing.3 This opinion provides the Court’s reasoning for granting the motion. 
I. Background 
Around midnight on February 18, 2020, Mansfie ld Police Officer Lieutenant Carroll 
initiated a traffic stop of an automobile that was missing a rear-view mirror.4 Defendant Jarvis 
was driving the vehicle.5 
 
1 Doc. 337. 
2 Doc. 344. 
3 Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceeding as to Jaso n Jarvis, United States v. Jarvis, No. 1:20-cr-00561 (N.D. 
Ohio, Oct. 7, 2021). 
4 Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
5 Id. 
Case: 1:20-cr-00561-DAR Doc #: 377 Filed: 10/18/21 1 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

GWIN, J. 
 
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When Lt. Carroll approached the vehicle, he inquired about the vehicle and insurance 
information.6 Lt. Carroll asked if Defendant Jarvis had a valid driver’s license and Jarvis stated 
that he was licensed but did not have the license with him.7 Jarvis provided his social security 
number.8 Defendant also attempted to provide L t. Carroll with an insurance form on his 
phone.9 
Lt. Carroll then asked Defendant Jarvis to exit the vehicle. 10 He advised Defendant 
that he would conduct a pat-down for officer safety.11 An exchange ensued during which Lt. 
Carroll twice asked whether he could place his hands in Defendant Jarvis’s pockets. 12 Lt. 
Caroll claims he asked Defendant “if he minded” if Lt. Carroll placed his hands in 
Defendant’s pockets.13 Defendant Jarvis claims Lt. Carroll asked if he could place his hands 
in Defendant’s pockets. 14 Defendant replied “no” both times. 15 Lt. Carroll then reached 
inside Defendant Jarvis’s left pocket and re covered a plastic bag containing suspected 
methamphetamine.16 
II. Discussion 
A. The Traffic Stop Was Supported by Probable Cause. 
Fourth Amendment protections extend to the temporary detention of persons during 
a police traffic stop.17 Such temporary detention must be reasonable.18 The decision to stop 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See Doc. 337 at 3–4. 
15 Doc. 337 at 3–4; Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
16 Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
17 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996). 
18 Id. at 810. 
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GWIN, J. 
 
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an automobile is reasonable wh ere the police have probable ca use to believe that a traffic 
violation has occurred.19 
Defendant Jarvis was driving a vehicle w ithout a rear-view mirror. Ohio Revised 
Code Section 4513.23 makes it a misdemeanor offense to operate a motor vehicle that is not 
equipped with a rear-view mirror.20 After Lt. Carroll observed th e missing rear-view mirror 
there was probable cause to stop the automobile. 
B. Removing Defendant Jarvis From the Vehicle Was Lawful. 
During a lawful traffic stop, an officer is permitted to remove an occupant from the 
vehicle pending the completion of the stop without an additional level of suspicion that the 
occupant poses a safety risk.21 
Therefore, Defendant Jarvis was lawfully removed from the vehicle. 
C. The Search of Defendant Jarvis Exceeded the Scope of Permissibility. 
Upon ordering Defendant Jarvis to exit the vehicle, Lt. Carroll informed Defendant 
that Lt. Carroll would pat him down for “officer safety.”22 Protective searches must be 
strictly “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be 
used to harm the officer or others nearby.”23 If the protective search goes beyond what is 
necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid and its fruits will be 
suppressed.24 If, however, an officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and 
 
19 Id. 
20 Ohio Rev. Code § 4513.23. 
21 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). 
22 Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
23 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
24 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65–66 (1968). 
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GWIN, J. 
 
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feels a contraband object whose “contour or mass makes its identity immediately 
apparent,” seizure of that object would be justified.25 
Lt. Carroll’s continued exploration of Defendant Jarvis’s pocket—including reaching 
inside the pocket after the pat down showed that the pocket did not contain a weapon—
was unrelated to the officer safety justification for the search.26 Lt. Carroll did not report or 
testify to feeling any object resembling a weapon. 
Further, the incriminating character of the object was not immediately apparent to 
Lt. Carroll. The quantity and form of the drugs were not so self-identifying that Lt. Carroll 
would have known there was a baggie containing drugs until he reached inside the 
pocket.27 Lt. Carroll reported originally thinking he felt marijuana, but it was unclear from 
his testimony whether he thought that from plain feel or only after he had reached inside 
the pocket.28 
Lt. Carroll’s search inside of Defendant Jarvis’s pocket exceeded any officer safety 
justification for the original pat-down and was not justified by the “plain feel” exception. 
D. Defendant Jarvis Did Not Consent to Search. 
The government bears the burden, by a pr eponderance of the evidence, to show 
through “clear and positive testimony” that Defendant Jarvis validly and voluntarily 
consented to the search.29 Not any type of consent will suffice; instead, only consent that is 
 
25 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993). 
26 Id. at 378. 
27 Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceeding as to Jason Jarvis, United States v. Jarvis, No. 1:20-cr-00561 (N.D. 
Ohio, Oct. 7, 2021). 
28 Id.; Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
29 United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). 
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GWIN, J. 
 
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“unequivocally, specifically, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress and 
coercion” is satisfactory.30 Here, no such consent was given. 
Defendant Jarvis claims Lt. Carroll asked if he could search Defendant. 31 Lt. Carroll 
claims he asked Defendant Jarvis if he “minded” if Lt. Carroll searched him. 32 B o t h 
Defendant Jarvis and Lt. Carroll claim Defendant responded “no”. 33 This confusion and 
discrepancy means any response Defendant Jarvis gave does not constitute unequivocal and 
specific consent to be searched.34 
Further, Defendant Jarvis became “loud” and “agitated” as Lt. Carroll reached into his 
pocket.35 This protestation confirms that Defenda nt’s response of “no” did not constitute 
consent to search.36 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTED Defendant Jarvis’s motion to 
suppress. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: October 18, 2021 s/ James S. Gwin 
JAMES S. GWIN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
30 United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 143 (6th Cir.1992) (internal citation omitted). 
31 Doc. 337 at 3–4. 
32 Doc. 344 at 6. 
33 Doc. 337 at 3–4; Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
34 United States v. Tomlinson, 190 F. Supp. 3d 834, 841 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (finding a defendant’s response to the 
officer’s question, “Mind if I take a look?” to be am biguous because a reasonable person could have understood the 
defendant to be communicating his consent or opposition to the search). 
35 Doc. 344-1 at 8. 
36 See Gale v. O'Donohue, No. 17-12172, 2019 WL 1897130, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2019) (finding that if 
defendant did not intend to consent, the officer’s commencement of the search was the time to make that clear), aff’d, 824 
F. App’x 304 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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