govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_06-cr-00490-6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 
 : CRIMINAL ACTION 
 v. : 
 : NOS. 06-155-03, 06-490-2 
LEROY FIELDS : 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
SURRICK, J. MAY 9, 2025 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On April 18, 2008, the Court entered judgment against Defendant Leroy Fields on seven 
criminal counts to which Fields entered pleas of guilty in two separate cases. In the first case, No. 
06-155-3, Fields entered pleas of guilty to: conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by 
threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); interfering, and aiding the interference, with 
interstate commerce by threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; and using a 
firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In the second case, 
No. 06-490-2, Fields entered pleas of guilty to: conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce 
by threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); interfering, and aiding the interference, 
with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); using and carrying a 
firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 2; and being a 
convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
On May 17, 2016, Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in both criminal cases 
seeking to vacate his convictions under Section 924(c) based on Johnson v. United States , 576 
U.S. 591 (2015) and Davis v. United States, 588 U.S. 445 (2019). Separately, on May 11, 2020, 
Fields filed a timely pro se amendment to his Section 2255 motion seeking appointment of counsel 
to challenge his conviction based on Rehaif, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), which clarified the necessary 

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elements to prove a felon-in-possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government 
responded on April 22, 2021. On May 8, 2024 Defendant filed a Notice of Governing Authority 
noting recent Third Circuit precedent in United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2023) 
and United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136, 151 (3d Cir. 2020). 
For the following reasons Defendant’s Section 2255 Motion, and his request for 
appointment of counsel to pursue relief under Rehaif, will be denied. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner sentenced by a federal court is permitted to “move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence” where: (1) the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court 
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(a). If the Court determines that the sentence was not authorized by law, was unconstitutional, 
or is otherwise open to collateral attack, it may vacate the judgment, resentence the prisoner, or 
grant the prisoner a new trial as appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Whether Defendant’s Section 924(c) Convictions Should Be Vacated Under 
Johnson And Davis. 
 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Armed Career 
Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 576 U.S. at 593. Under that Act, a defendant convicted 
of being a felon in possession of a firearm is subject to enhanced punishment if he had at least 
three previous convictions for a “violent felony.” Id. The definition of “violent felony” under the 
Act includes “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 

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924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court held that this component of the definition, referred to as the 
“residual clause,” was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 593, 606. 
Here, Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), not the provision at issue in 
Johnson, § 924(e). Section 924(c) criminalizes anyone who “during and in relation to any crime 
of violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” through the “elements clause” and the 
“residual clause.” Section 924(c)’s residual clause, while different from that addressed in Johnson 
for “violent felony” under § 924(e), is similar. Recognizing that the provisions “bear more than a 
passing resemblance,” in Davis the Supreme Court held that Section 924(c)’s residual clause is 
also unconstitutionally vague. 588 U.S. at 451–52. A predicate crime must therefore satisfy the 
elements clause for a conviction under § 924(c) to remain valid. 
Therefore the key question is whether the predicate crimes for Defendant’s Section 924(c) 
convictions are valid “crimes of violence” as defined by the elements clause. 
1. Completed Hobbs Act Robbery Convictions Are Valid Predicate 
Offenses Under Section 924(c). 
 
 Defendant argues that Hobbs Act robber ies do not qualify as “crime[s] of violence” under 
the elements clause of Section 924(c). However, t he Third Circuit —agreeing with the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits —has found that “a completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a 
crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).” Stoney, 62 F. 4th at 113-14 (3d Cir. 2023). Therefore, 
Defendant’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery are valid predicate offenses under Section 924(c). 

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2. Defendant’s Section 924(c) Conviction s Base d Both on Hobbs Act 
Robbery, And Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery, Remain 
Valid. 
Defendant contends that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of 
violence” under Section 924(c) because it lacks an overt act requirement and does not require the 
use or attempted use of force. Courts in this circuit have generally agreed. See United States v. 
Hung Ngoc Vuong, No. 12-111, 2024 WL 1773387, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2024) (collecting 
cases and explaining that “Hobbs Act conspiracy, like attempted Hobbs Act robbery, is generally 
acknowledged to not qualify as a § 924(c) predicate crime of violence”) . However, where a 
Section 924(c) conviction is based both on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and 
completed Hobbs Act robbery, the conviction will stand. See Wilson, 960 F.3d at 151 (holding 
that any error in instructing the jury that conspiracy could serve as a predicate offense was harmless 
since the jury convicted on both charges, leaving “no reasonable possibility” the § 924(c) 
conviction rested solely on conspiracy); s ee also Hung Ngoc Vuong, 2024 WL 1773387, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2024) (denying defendant’s motion under § 2255 “[b]ecause the record reflects 
that Vuong’s § 924(c) conviction was predicated on both conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 
and a completed Hobbs Act robbery.”). 
In Case No. 06-155-03 the Second Superseding Indictment references both conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act robbery and completed Hobbs Act robbery as predicate offenses for the Section 
924(c) conviction in Count IV. The charge in Count IV references the conduct that occurred “[o]n 
or about October 1, 2005,” which is the date of the completed Hobbs Act robbery described in 
Count III, to which Defendant also pled guilty. Therefore, the language in Count IV demonstrates 
that Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction was based on a completed Hobbs Act robbery. 
Likewise, in Case No. 06-490-2 the Indictment references both conspiracy to commi t 
Hobbs Act robbery and completed Hobbs Act robbery in the Section 924(c) count. A gain, the 

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language in the i ndictment shows that the offense was predicated on a completed Hobbs Act 
robbery. (See Indictment, ECF No. 12 at Count V (referencing conduct that occurred“[o]n or about 
July 2, 2006,” which is the date of the completed Hobbs Act robbery in Count III, to which 
Defendant also pled guilty) ; see also PSR ¶ 31 (stating that during the robbery on July 2, 2006, 
Fields pointed a loaded gun at an employee’s head.) 
The record establishes that the crimes of completed Hobbs Act robbery served as sufficient 
predicate offenses to support Defendant’s Section 924(c) convictions. 
B. Defendant’s Request for Appointment of Counsel And Challenge to His 
Section 922(g) Conviction Under Rehaif. 
 
Defendant seeks leave to amend his initial Section 2255 Motion by adding a claim to 
challenge his conviction under Section 922(g) based on Rehaif. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court 
clarified that, when seeking a felon- in-possession conviction, the Government “must prove both 
that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant 
category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 588 U.S. at 237. Here, Defendant seeks 
the appointment of counsel to assist in his Rehaif challenge, which he claims can entail 
complexities such as issues of waiver, procedural default, and retroactive application. 
1. Appointment of Counsel Is Warranted When Defendant Has Presented 
A Nonfrivolous Claim And Appointment Would Benefit The Petitioner 
And Court. 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B)) whenever “the court determines that the interests 
of justice so require, representation may be provided for any financially eligible person who - . . . 
(B) is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28.” In determining whether the 
interests of justice require the appointment of counsel the district court must first decide if the 
petitioner has presented a nonfrivolous claim and if the appointment of counsel will benefit the 
petitioner and the court. Taylor v. Mason, No. 22- 5054, 2025 WL 521840, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 

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18, 2025). Factors influencing a court ’s decision include the complexity of the factual and legal 
issues in the case, as well as the pro se petitioner’s ability to investigate facts and present claims. 
Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992), superseded 
on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (internal quotations omitted). Courts have held, 
for example, that there was no abuse of a district court ’s discretion in failing to appoint counsel 
when no evidentiary hearing was required and the issues in the case had been narrowed, or the 
issues were “straightforward and capable of resolution on the record.” See id. (collecting cases). 
2. Defendant Cannot Establish a Nonfrivolous Claim Under Rehaif 
Because He Cannot Show Actual Prejudice Or Innocence. 
Since Fields did not raise the Rehaif issue until he filed his § 2255 petition, we must first 
determine whether this claim is subject to default. As a general rule “claims not raised on direct 
appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” 
See Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Fields can also overcome def ault by 
showing actual innocence. United States v. De Castro, 49 F.4th 836, 845 (3d Cir. 2022). 
“Cause may exist where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not 
reasonably available to counsel.” Unites States v. Vilella, No. 16-285-2, 2020 WL 6136139, at * 
7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2020). Most courts in the Third Circuit have found that arguments under 
Rehaif are not sufficiently novel to overcome default in the § 2255 context because the issue “was 
percolating in the courts for years.’” Lyons, 2024 WL 3470846, at * 13 (quoting Vilella, 2020 WL 
6136139, at * 7 and collecting cases). However, Justice Alito noted in his Rehaif dissent that the 
majority overturned a “long- established interpretation . . . adopted by every single Court of 
Appeals to address the question.” Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 238-39 (Alito, J., dissenting). Since Fields’ 
sentencing occurred more than a decade prior to the ruling in Rehaif, he may be able to show cause. 

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Nevertheless, we need not resolve the issue because, even if Fields could show that cause exists , 
he cannot establish actual prejudice stemming from his procedural default or actual innocence. 
To establish prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner “ must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for [the] errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have instead insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Here, the 
undisputed presentence report shows Fields was previously convicted as an adult of charges related 
to two violent robberies he committed in 1994 at age 17. PSR ¶ 89. The counts of conviction 
included felony charges of robbery and aggravated assault. Id. He was sentenced to 5 to 10 years 
in state prison, and served more than six years before being paroled on February 8, 2001. He then 
violated parole and was reincarcerated for two more years, until December 11, 2003, PSR ¶¶ 89-
90, less than three years before the crime at issue here. Given that Fields served much more than 
one year in prison, on multiple occasions, he cannot show that he was unaware of his felon status. 
See United States v. Roberts , No. 15-387, 2020 WL 6700918, at *4 (finding no prejudice to 
overcome default of Rehaif claim where defendant had seven prior felony convictions and spent 
over three years in prison); see also Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 504 (2021) (finding no 
reasonable probability defendant would have changed plea had district court correctly advised of 
Section 922(g) elements where defendant had multiple prior felony convictions). 
Given Fields’ past felony convictions and the time spent in prison prior to his felon- in-
possession conviction, he cannot show actual innocence to overcome default. See Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (to show actual innocence in order to overcome default 
requires showing “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted”) ; see 
also United States v. Correa, 2020 WL 5517466, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020) (Kenney, J.) 
(finding the defendant could not show actual innocence, as his “Presentence Investigation Report, 

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to which he did not object, shows that before possessing the firearm on or about March 27, 2008, 
Correa plead guilty to and was convicted of four felony offenses under Pennsylvania law.”). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 and his Supplemental Motion for Purposes of Rehaif v. United States And Appointment of 
Counsel Motion, will be denied. An appropriate order follows. 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ R. Barclay Surrick 
 R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J. 
 

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