govinfo:USCOURTS-vtd-2_22-cv-00215-7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF VERMONT 
 
BURLINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) 
      ) 
  Plaintiff,  ) 
      ) 
 v.     ) Case No. 2:22-cv-215 
      ) 
MONSANTO CO., SOLUTIA, INC., ) 
and PHARMACIA LLC,   ) 
      ) 
  Defendants.  ) 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 The Burlington School District (“BSD” or “Plaintiff”) 
commenced this action after discovering polychlorinated 
biphenyls (“PCBs”) at Burlington High School (“BHS”). Defendants 
Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia LLC (collectively 
“Monsanto” or “Defendants”) are allegedly successors to the old 
Monsanto company, which was the primary manufacturer of PCBs in 
the United States for several decades. The Complaint asserts a 
claim for damages resulting from PCB contamination at BHS.  
 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to exclude 
all testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Wendy Pearson and Robert 
Wanat. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. 
Background 
 The Complaint alleges that PCBs are toxic and dangerous 
chemical compounds that were manufactured, marketed, and sold by 
Monsanto in the United States from approximately 1929 to 1977.  
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BHS was constructed in the 1960s, and testing recently revealed 
the presence of PCBs in its buildings. The BSD concluded that 
because of PCB contamination, BHS had to be demolished.  
 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to exclude 
the testimony of two experts: Wendy Pearson and Dr. Robert 
Wanat. Ms. Pearson is a licensed engineer who has worked at 
Matson & Associates for over 25 years. Plaintiff initially 
retained Dr. Jack Matson to serve as an expert, but health 
issues prevent him from doing so. Plaintiff reports that “Ms. 
Pearson conducted extensive research and assisted directly in 
the preparation and drafting of Dr. Matson’s expert report in 
this case, and adopted the findings in his report as her own in 
light of his health issues.” ECF No. 162 at 6. Ms. Pearson has 
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in civil engineering and 
environmental science and engineering. She has also conducted 
peer-reviewed research relating to environmental contamination, 
chemical manufacturing industry standards and practices, and 
chemical releases from manufacturing and industrial facilities. 
Her expected testimony will include analysis of the standards 
and practices relevant to the manufacture and distribution of 
PCBs, and to the chemical engineering analysis of polymers and 
plasticizers.  
 Dr. Wanat holds an M.S. and a Ph.D. in chemistry from 
Cornell University. He has more than 30 years’ experience 
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working for major chemical companies overseeing research and 
development of various chemical products. Since 2018, he has 
owned his own consulting company which specializes in the 
development, manufacture, and application of polymers, plastics, 
materials, and adhesives. Dr. Wanat is expected to testify about 
Monsanto’s own documents, including past technical bulletins and 
studies about products containing PCBs, and place them in 
technical context. 
Discussion 
 “Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation 
upon a trial judge to ensure that any and all [expert] testimony 
. . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Witnesses may testify as experts if they are 
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Rule provides that a witness 
who is qualified may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the Court that it is 
more likely than not that:  
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts 
or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion 
reflects a reliable application of the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case. 
 
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Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The proponent of the expert testimony bears 
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.” 
United States v. Pollok, 139 F.4th 126, 140 (2d Cir. 2025) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
I. Monsanto’s Knowledge 
 Defendants first argue that opinions about what Monsanto 
should have known should be excluded. Their contention is that 
these witnesses’ testimonies about the environmental impacts of 
PCBs – based in part on information from Monsanto’s own archives 
– are “mere pronouncements” based on “subjective or speculative 
opinions,” ECF No. 142 at 9, and would constitute a subjective 
interpretation “based on nothing more than a review of decades-
old documents,” id. at 10. Plaintiff submits that rather than 
offering subjective statements or speculation about Monsanto’s 
state of mind, these witnesses will assist the jury by placing 
the documents in question into historical, technical, and 
scientific contexts. 
 Dr. Matson’s report, which Ms. Pearson has adopted as her 
own (ECF No. 142-2 at 3), reviews the state of the science 
related to PCBs over several decades, beginning in the 1930s. 
The report cites both Monsanto’s own records and studies 
conducted by scientists outside of Monsanto. Dr. Matson also 
explains the chemical nature of PCBs and what was known about 
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their dangers. To the extent the report offers any opinions 
about Monsanto’s knowledge at a given time, those opinions are 
substantially supported by the reviewed documentation. In other 
words, Dr. Matson was not speculating about what Monsanto knew. 
 Dr. Matson does offer opinions about what Monsanto could 
have done to expand its knowledge. Those opinions are based on 
studies that were known in the scientific community and, in 
certain instances, by Monsanto itself. Again, to the extent Dr. 
Matson contends that Monsanto possessed certain knowledge, his 
opinions are supported by documentary evidence. Insofar as Dr. 
Matson opines on what Monsanto should have known, he explains 
his conclusions with concrete examples of information available 
to Monsanto at the time.  
 Defendants contend that Dr. Matson’s focus on Monsanto’s 
testing of paint products is not relevant here, since 
Plaintiff’s claims reportedly focus on other materials such as 
building caulk. Dr. Matson provides historical evidence to 
suggest that Monsanto was aware of dangers in those other 
materials and could have conducted further testing based on that 
knowledge. That evidence is complex, and Ms. Pearson’s expertise 
will assist the jury in understanding how it fits into the 
historical and scientific contexts. 
 In short, the Court finds that Dr. Matson’s conclusions, 
and Ms. Pearson’s expected testimony, are not based on 
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speculation. Nor do they constitute merely subjective 
narrations. Instead, they appear to be supported by a 
substantial documentary record that provides a foundation for 
their opinions. See Stults v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 
No. C 11-4077-MWB, 2014 WL 12603223, at *3 (N.D. Iowa July 18, 
2014) (“To the extent that an expert adequately demonstrates a 
basis for an opinion about what the defendants knew or should 
have known from such information that was within the defendants’ 
possession, then such an opinion may be admissible at trial, if 
the proper foundation is laid.”); Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash 
Venture LLC, 755 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2014) (without 
directly addressing a real estate developer’s knowledge or state 
of mind, “[a] business expert can however testify about the 
state of knowledge prevalent in a business that he has 
studied”); Gillis v. Cmty. Prods., LLC, No. 5:22-CV-00080-DAE, 
2024 WL 3548775, at *11 (W.D. Tex. July 9, 2024) (“To offer 
expert testimony on what Defendant either knew or should have 
known, Plaintiffs will first need to lay an appropriate 
foundation.”); see also City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 2023 WL 
4014294, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 15, 2023).
1 
 
1 Defendants rely in part on the exclusion of Dr. Matson’s 
testimony in Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co., No. CV 14-12041, 
2017 WL 1347671, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2017), aff’d, 877 F.3d 
58 (1st Cir. 2017). In that case, both the district court and 
the First Circuit cited In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended 
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 
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 Dr. Wanat’s report is similarly supported. He will testify 
about chemical evaporation generally, and with respect to PCBs 
specifically. He will also reference Monsanto’s documents, 
including patents and technical bulletins. As with any experts, 
his trial testimony will need to be supported by a proper 
foundation. See id. At this stage in the case, the Court will 
not exclude the testimony of either Ms. Pearson or Dr. Wanat on 
the question of what Monsanto should have known about PCBs 
during the relevant time periods. 
II. Standard of Care 
 Defendants next argue that Ms. Pearson’s and Dr. Wanat’s 
opinions regarding industry standards cannot be admitted because 
they are not supported by sufficient facts, are not based on any 
methodology, and constitute improper legal conclusions. 
Defendants characterize Ms. Pearson’s opinions as “subjective 
speculation” based only on Monsanto’s “corporate position 
statements” and “vague commentary from various associations and 
organizations regarding ‘corporate social responsibility.’” ECF 
 
F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2013), which explained that 
“[Defendant’s] knowledge (or lack thereof) is not a proper 
subject for expert testimony, and it must be established (if at 
all) by other evidence.” The Court agrees that any testimony 
about Defendants’ knowledge must be supported by other evidence. 
 
 
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No. 142 at 12-13. Defendants submit that “Dr. Wanat grounds his 
opinions on even less than Ms. Pearson.” Id. at 13. 
 Dr. Matson’s report cites several sources, including 
industry groups and individual corporate leaders, espousing a 
need for manufacturers to know whether their products are safe 
and to safeguard public health. He also cites Monsanto’s own 
statements about a duty to protect both its consumers and the 
planet. Ms. Pearson intends to testify that Monsanto defined its 
own standard of care and failed to live up to that standard. Dr. 
Wanat’s report is more limited, citing Monsanto’s adherence to 
American Conference of Government Hygienists thresholds. 
 The Court questions whether the materials cited by Dr. 
Matson establish a standard of care, or whether they instead 
constitute general statements of corporate responsibility. 
Regardless of the distinction, the Court finds no reason at this 
time to exclude the testimony of either Ms. Pearson or Dr. 
Wanat, particular insofar as their testimonies are based on 
Monsanto’s own statements about its responsibilities. Cf. A.O.A. 
v. Rennert, No. 4:11 CV 44 CDP, 2025 WL 2606548, at *18 (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 9, 2025) (allowing Dr. Matson to testify about 
corporate social responsibility to the extent his “opinion also 
relate[s] to his standard-of-care opinion”). If Monsanto was 
asserting a duty to take certain precautions, and did not adhere 
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to either its own standards or those within the industry, such 
information may be considered by the finder of fact. 
 Defendants’ final argument is that testimony about the 
standard of care consists of improper legal conclusions and 
“stand[s] in the shoes of the jury.” ECF No. 142 at 14. 
Defendants particularly object to any testimony offering 
opinions on whether Monsanto violated a standard of care or 
acted reasonably. “[A]lthough an expert may opine on an issue of 
fact within the jury’s province, he may not give testimony 
stating ultimate legal conclusions based on those facts.” United 
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991). “The 
best way to determine whether opinion testimony contains legal 
conclusions is to determine whether the terms used by the 
witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the 
law different from that present in the vernacular.” United 
States v. Barile, 286 F.3d 749, 760 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 Courts have held that a witness may testify about a 
defendants’ adherence to industry safety standards. See, e.g., 
Jay v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 608 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1261 
(S.D. Fla. 2022) (holding that witness “may opine as to whether 
Defendant violated its own safety standards and industry 
standards, which are not legal conclusions and are beyond the 
expertise of an average lay juror”); In re Juul Labs, Inc. 
Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-MD-02913-WHO, 
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2022 WL 1814440, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) (“That an 
expert testifies that a defendant violated industry standards or 
even identified regulations does not mean that the expert is 
making an impermissible legal conclusion; admissibility depends 
upon the context of the opinion (when it comes in and what it 
comes in for) as well as the claims at issue in particular 
cases.”).  
 Whether an expert may opine on conduct being “reasonable” 
depends on context. If the term “reasonable” tracks an element 
of a cause of action, it constitutes an impermissible legal 
conclusion. See Barile, 286 F.3d at 760 (“To determine when a 
question posed to an expert witness calls for an improper legal 
conclusion, the district court should consider first whether the 
question tracks the language of the legal principle at issue or 
of the applicable statute, and second, whether any terms 
employed have specialized legal meaning.”); see also Rutherford 
v. City of Mount Vernon, 698 F. Supp. 3d 574, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 
2023) (assessing whether expert’s expected testimony “track[s] 
the elements of Plaintiff’s claim” to determine whether the 
expert impermissibly opines on an ultimate legal issue). If not, 
and if the testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, such 
testimony may be admitted. See, e.g., Neural Magic, Inc. v. Meta 
Platforms, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 3d 138, 175 (D. Mass. 2023) 
(allowing expert to opine as to the reasonableness of measures
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taken to protect proprietary information, but not as to whether 
those measures met statutory requirements). 
 Here, Plaintiff submits that Dr. Wanat will use the term 
“reasonable” in its “ordinary, non-legal sense.” ECF No. 162 at 
16. Defendants have not identified an element of a pending cause 
action that would render the term “reasonable” an impermissible 
legal conclusion. Consequently, based on the information and 
briefing now before it, the Court declines to bar such 
testimony. 
Conclusion 
  For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to 
exclude the expert testimony of Wendy Pearson and Robert Wanat 
(ECF No. 142) is denied. 
 
 DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 7 th 
day of April 2026. 
      /s/ William K. Sessions III 
      Hon. William K. Sessions III 
      U.S. District Court Judge 
 
 
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