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govinfo:USCOURTS-vtd-2_22-cv-00215-8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
BURLINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:22-cv-215
)
MONSANTO CO., SOLUTIA, INC., )
and PHARMACIA LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
The Burlington School District (“BSD”) commenced this
action after discovering polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) at
Burlington High School. Defendants Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc.,
and Pharmacia LLC (collectively “Defendants”) are allegedly
successors to the old Monsanto company, which was the primary
manufacturer of PCBs in the United States for several decades.
On April 16, 2026, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion
to clarify and amend the summary judgment ruling by striking one
sentence from the Opinion and Order. The sentence at issue
contains previously-undisputed statements of fact and is not
material to the Court’s ruling. In addition to their request for
an amended Opinion and Order, Defendants ask the Court to allow
them to now dispute those statements of fact. For reasons set
forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted.
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Factual Background
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims on
November 5, 2025. ECF No. 134. On April 16, 2026, the Court
denied the motion. ECF No. 204. In the Factual Background
section of its Opinion and Order, the Court included the
following sentence: “Between 1955 and 1977, Monsanto’s profits
from PCB sales were approximately $850 million dollars, which
would be equivalent to over $4.6 billion today.” Id. at 10.
That sentence was based upon assertions set forth in BSD’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts, submitted in support of
its opposition to the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 171-1
at 32. In paragraph 111 of its factual statement, BSD stated:
“Between 1955 to 1977, Monsanto’s profits from PCB sales were
approximately $850 million, which would be worth over $4.6
billion today. Ex. A (Rose) at 21.” Id. In response, Defendants
stated those facts were “Undisputed.” ECF No. 190-1 at 61.
Defendants now ask for leave to change that response. They
also ask the Court to strike those factual statements from its
Opinion and Order. Defendants explain that the numbers in
question come from a May 28, 2025 ruling by the State of
Washington Superior Court in Rose et al. v. Pharmacia LLC, Doc.
18-2-58239-3 SEA (“Rose”). The Rose decision concluded: “[t]he
evidence at trial showed that . . . Monsanto’s profits for PCB
sales were approximately $850 million, which would be worth over
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$4.6 billion today.” ECF No. 213-1 at 20. The Rose court
apparently assumed that the $850 million figure was in 1977
dollars. Defendants and BSD agree that this assumption was an
error, as the $850 million number had already been updated to a
more current dollar value. Accordingly, the $4.6 billion figure
was improperly calculated and incorrect.
BSD does not object to amendment of this Court’s April 16,
2026 Opinion and Order to the extent the reference to $4.6
billion is deleted. BSD does object to deletion of the reference
to $850 million. Neither figure was material to the Court’s
summary judgment ruling.
Defendants currently contest both figures. They claim that
when characterizing BSD’s statement of fact as “undisputed,”
they intended to concede only that Rose was the source of the
numbers – not that the numbers themselves were accurate.
Defendants therefore request leave to amend their response to
paragraph 111 of BSD’s Statement of Additional Facts to read:
“Undisputed that the 5/25/2025 Rose Order contains that figure.
Disputed as to the amount of Monsanto’s profits from PCB sales.”
ECF No. 213 at 2.
BSD has reportedly asked Defendants to stipulate to the
$850 million profit figure for the purpose of trial. ECF No.
215-1 (email correspondence among counsel). Defendants have thus
far declined. Id. BSD also informs the Court that it intends to
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file an “estoppel motion” arguing that Defendants are estopped
from challenging the findings in the Rose decision. ECF No. 215
at 8.
Discussion
BSD argues that the pending motion should be denied for
several reasons, including Defendants’ failure to cite a rule
governing their request for amendment and revision. BSD also
contends that Defendants have not met the standard for
reconsideration. The Court does not construe the pending motion
as one for reconsideration, as the motion does not seek any
substantive changes to the summary judgment decision. Indeed, if
Defendants’ motion is granted, the only impact on the Opinion
and Order will be the deletion of a single factual sentence.
Given that revision of Defendants’ fact response, and any
corresponding amendment to the Court’s decision, will have no
substantive impact on summary judgment, the Court turns to the
potential impact on trial. BSD submits that Defendants’ response
constituted a judicial admission that remains binding throughout
the case. Defendants argue a factual concession at summary
judgment does not carry over to trial. The Court agrees with
Defendants’ position on this point, as it is consistent with
summary judgment practice within the Second Circuit. See, e.g.,
Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, No. 16-CV-3345 (VEC)(SN), 2018 WL
4266015, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2018) (“That these facts were
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deemed admitted at summary judgment does not preclude Defendant
from challenging Plaintiff’s evidence at trial.”).
Statements of material fact, and responses to those
statements, are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
and Local Rule 56. Neither Rule states that an admission of
fact, or a statement that a fact is undisputed, constitutes a
judicial admission for the purpose of trial. Some Local Rules
within this Circuit explicitly state that such responses are
strictly limited to the summary judgment process. See, e.g.,
Cortes v. City of New York, No. 14CV03014LDHRML, 2019 WL
5592853, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2019) (citing Local Rule 56.1
which states that, unless controverted, each factual statement
by the moving party “will be deemed to be admitted for purposes
of the motion”) (emphasis supplied)); Ramgoolie, 2018 WL
4266015, at *7 (“under Rule 56.1(c), facts are deemed admitted
for the purposes of the motion”). Consequently, “district courts
in this circuit routinely remind litigants that their Local Rule
56.1 statements may be deemed admitted for the purposes of a
summary-judgment motion, but not trial.” Cortes, 2019 WL
5592853, at *4; see Marrero v. Air Brook Limousine, No. 13 CIV.
2791 CM, 2014 WL 1623706, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014) (“all
statements of fact contained in defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement
are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion (albeit not
for trial)”).
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To be considered a binding judicial admission, “a statement
must have sufficient formality or conclusiveness.” In re Motors
Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Because a response to a
factual submission at summary judgment is limited to that
proceeding, it does not possess the “conclusiveness” required to
constitute such an admission. See Lovati v. Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A., No. 1:19-CV-04799 (ALC) (HJR), 2025 WL 3677013,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Rule 56.1 statements do not
extend beyond the summary judgement context and as such are not
judicial admissions binding at trial.”). In sum, a factual
concession at summary judgment does not constitute a stipulation
of fact for use at trial.
BSD cites a series of cases for support, none of which are
directly on point. In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law v.
Martinez, the Supreme Court considered a ruling on cross-motions
for summary judgment. 561 U.S. 661, 673-74, 678 (2010). The
Court did not address whether the parties’ factual stipulations
would have been binding at trial. In Hoodho v. Holder, the
Second Circuit considered a concession of removability in the
context of federal immigration regulations. 558 F.3d 184, 192
(2d Cir. 2009) (“we hold that an IJ does not err by accepting an
alien’s concession of removability when that concession is not
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plainly contradicted by record evidence”). And in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Sureway Worldwide, LLC, the district court
denied a request to retract a concession at summary judgment
where the issue was material, and the retraction would cause
“obvious prejudice” to the opposing party. No. 03 CV 4159 (ILG),
2008 WL 11411299, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2008)
(“consideration of the new information provided by Global would
permit the injection of a questionable issue of fact where
American has otherwise met the standard for summary judgment”).
Here, the proposed changes are neither material nor
prejudicial. It is undisputed that the cited dollar values
played no role in the Court’s consideration of the legal issues
presented at summary judgment. Furthermore, striking those
values from the Opinion and Order and allowing Defendants to
amend their response will cause no prejudice, since the response
was not a judicial admission to which Defendants would be bound
at trial. Finally, the parties agree that the $4.6 billion
number in the Rose decision, cited in BSD’s Statement of
Additional Material Facts, was incorrect, and that the Court may
strike that figure from its Opinion and Order.
In light of these considerations, Defendants’ motion is
granted. They may amend their response to paragraph 111 of BSD’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts within 14 days of this
Opinion and Order to reflect that both the $850 million and $4.6
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billion figures are disputed. The Court will issue an amended
summary judgment ruling striking the entire sentence in
question, including references to both figures.1
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to
clarify and amend (ECF No. 213) is granted.
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 11 th
day of June 2026.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
Hon. William K. Sessions III
U.S. District Court Judge
1 The Court offers no opinion on BSD’s argument that Defendants
are estopped by rulings in the Rose decision. BSD has informed
the Court that it will present that issue in a future motion.
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