govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-4_23-cv-04405-2

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
LOMELI GOMEZ ROBLES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER PIERCE, 
Respondent. 
 

 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEALABILITY 
 
 
 
Petitioner, a California state prisoner currently housed at Ironwood State Prison,1 has filed 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his 
state court conviction. ECF No. 1. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 17, 2018, a Santa Clara County jury found Petitioner guilty of seven counts 
of forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1)); two counts of 
oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10 (Cal. Penal Code § 288.7(b)); 
two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 (Cal. Penal Code 
§ 288.7(a)); three counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 (Cal. Penal 
Code § 269(a)); and two counts of a lewd act on a child 14 or 15 years old (Cal. Penal Code § 
288(c)(1)). Exh. 1 (“CT”) at 759-774, 776; Exh. 3 (“RT”) at 4803, 4816-4618, 4823. On April 
24, 2019, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term of 125 years to life, plus 59 
years and 8 months, consisting of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for two counts of 
 
1 In accordance with Habeas Rule 2(a) and Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Warden Christopher Pierce as respondent because 
he is Petitioner’s current custodian. 

 
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sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under age 10 (Cal. Penal Code § 288.7(a)), two 
consecutive terms of 15 years to life for two counts of oral copulation/sexual penetration with a 
child under age 10 (Cal. Penal Code § 288.7(b)), three consecutive terms of 15 years to life for 
three counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child under age 14 (Cal. Penal Code § 269(a)), 
seven consecutive terms of eight years for the forcible lewd act convictions (Cal. Penal Code 
§ 288(b)), one consecutive three year term for one lewd act conviction on a child age 14-15 (Cal. 
Penal Code § 288(c)(1)), and a consecutive term for a separate lewd act conviction (Cal. Penal 
Code § 288(c)(1)). ECF No. 1-3 at 9-10; CT 817-826; RT 5417-5422. 
On January 31, 2022, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. People v. 
Robles, C No. D079453, 2022 WL 278655, at *1-*4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2022). On April 20, 
2022, the California Supreme Court denied review. Answer, Ex. 10 [ECF No. 17-30 at 2]. 
Petitioner filed the instant petition on May 25, 2023. ECF No. 1. The Court screened the 
petition and found that it stated the following cognizable claims: (1) the state court erred in 
admitting the victim’s police interview in its entirety; (2) the state court erred in admitting the 
expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; (3) the state court erred in 
admitting Doe’s grandmother Maria Medina’s conditional examination transcript; (4) the state 
court erred in admitting pictures of the victim at different ages; and (5) cumulative error. See 
generally ECF No. 9. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why federal habeas relief 
should not be granted. Id. On September 4, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part 
Respondent’s motion to dismiss; dismissed Claim Nos. 1 and 4 for lack of federal habeas 
jurisdiction; dismissed Claim No. 3 as unexhausted; and ordered Respondent to show cause why 
federal habeas relief should not be granted with respect to Claim No. 2. ECF No. 14. 
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition. ECF Nos. 15-17 (“Answer”). Petitioner 
has not filed a traverse, and the deadline to do so has passed. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 

 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 The following factual and procedural background is taken from the California Court of 
Appeal’s opinion:2 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Background 
 
Doe was born in December 1998 and turned 20 years old during 
Robles’s trial. Robles, who was 26 years older than Doe, began a 
relationship with Doe’s mother (Mother) when Doe was about two 
years old. Doe’s half-sister (Sister) was born in 2003 and is the child 
of Mother and Robles. 
 
Doe 
 
Robles began molesting Doe when she was seven years old. Doe then 
was living with Robles, Mother, and Sister in an apartment on Rancho 
Drive in San Jose, California. Robles molested Doe more than 10 
times when she was seven by rubbing her vagina skin -to-skin; 
digitally penetrating her vagina; and touching her chest. Robles would 
tell Doe to be “quiet” when molesting her, and at times would 
physically restrain her when she attempted to stop him or get away. 
 
Doe was scared, confused, and felt “stuck” when Robles sexually 
abused her. Many times during the abuse Robles would “nervously 
laugh[ ]” while reassuring Doe everything was going to be “okay” and 
not to “worry.” The abuse typically occurred when Mother wa s 
working at night. After abusing Doe, Robles would act “normal” 
around the home as if nothing had happened. 
 
The molestation of Doe continued when she was eight and nine years 
old. The family was still living on Rancho Drive. During this time 
frame, Doe estimated Robles touched her vagina skin -to-skin more 
than 15 times; digitally penetrated her vagina; and rubbe d her chest. 
On occasion, Doe experienced a “burning” sensation in her vagina 
due to Robles touching her. 
 
When Doe was eight years old, a social worker interviewed her at 
school after Doe disclosed to a teacher that Robles had hit Mother. 
Doe denied Robles hit or touched her inappropriately, telling the jury 
she did not then disclose the sexual abuse by Robles because she was 
afraid of him. 
 
When Doe was about 10 years old, the family moved into a one -
bedroom apartment at the Thornbridge Apartments in San Jose. While 
aged 10, Doe estimated Robles touched her vagina skin -to-skin and 
 
2 The Court has independently reviewed the record as required by AEDPA. Nasby v. Daniel, 853 
F.3d 1049, 1052–54 (9th Cir. 2017). Based on the Court’s independent review, the Court finds 
that it can reasonably conclude that the state court’s summary of the prosecution case and the 
defense case is supported by the record, unless otherwise indicated in this order. 

 
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digitally penetrated her vagina more than 20 times; “lick[ed]” and 
“suck[ed]” her vagina more than 15 times; fondled, and put his mouth 
on her breasts at least five times; and penetrated her vagina with his 
penis about 10 times, which, because of her age, would only go inside 
her “just slightly.” After some incidents of abuse, Doe would go into 
the bathroom and “stare” in the mirror, telling herself she was 
“disgusting.” 
 
On one occasion when she was 10, Robles molested Doe while she 
slept on the living room floor next to her maternal grandmother, Maria 
(Grandmother), who was visiting from Mexico. Doe and 
Grandmother were “very close.” As Grandmother slept, Robles 
kissed Doe on the lips while she sat on the couch. Doe pushed him 
away and immediately went and laid next to Grandmother. 
 
Robles followed Doe, using her blanket to partially cover himself 
while the two laid on the floor near Grandmother. He began rubbing 
Doe’s “side area” with his hand. Panicked, Doe nudged Grandmother, 
hoping she would awaken. Doe next crossed her legs, put her hands 
over her chest, and made eye contact with Robles. He smiled and 
turned over. Doe fell asleep. However, during the night she was 
awakened by Robles touching her vagina over her pajamas. As Doe 
resisted, she saw Grandmother move. Robles stopped and turned onto 
his side. 
 
The next morning, Doe witnessed a confrontation between 
Grandmother, Robles, and Mother, after Grandmother accused 
Robles of inappropriately touching Doe. Robles told Grandmother 
she was “crazy,” called her a “liar” for making this accusation, and 
demanded she immediately leave the family home and never return. 
Grandmother complied. 
 
Between the ages 11 and 13, Doe estimated Robles digitally 
penetrated her vagina more than 50 times; licked her vagina more than 
20 times; touched her breasts; and penetrated her vagina with his 
penis between five to 10 times. She recalled one incident dur ing this 
time period when Robles burst into the bathroom when she was naked 
and about to shower, lifted her onto the sink, and digitally penetrated 
her vagina. 
 
She recalled another incident during this same period when he 
touched her vagina skin -to-skin after she got home from a friend’s 
birthday party at Chuck E. Cheese. In another incident, Robles 
digitally penetrated her vagina, then licked her vagina, after s he had 
come home from school. Doe recalled this specific incident because 
as she and her friends were walking home from school, one of them 
saw Robles hiding in some “bushes,” watching Doe. 
 
Doe and her family moved out of the Thornbridge apartment when 
she was 13 years old, after she graduated from the eighth grade. 
Robles continued to sexually abuse Doe, and told Doe he would harm 
her and Mother if Doe disclosed the abuse. He also told Doe i f she 
disclosed, he would claim she had initiated the sexual contact. 
 
When she was 13, Doe and Sister started visiting Robles at his 
parents’ home in the city of Santa Nella, California, where Robles had 

 
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moved after he and Mother separated. Robles continued to sexually 
abuse Doe during overnight visits at Santa Nella, including when 
Sister was in the bedroom asleep. 
 
When Doe was 14 and 15 years old, she estimated Robles penetrated 
her vagina with his penis more than 30 times; put his mouth on her 
breasts 15 to 20 times; and digitally penetrated and licked her vagina 
more than 20 times. The sexual abuse occurred when D oe and Sister 
would spend the weekend at the Santa Nella home. Doe did not want 
to go on these overnights, but accompanied Sister —who missed her 
father and was then unaware of the sexual abuse of Doe —to ensure 
her safety. Doe recalled an incident at Santa Nella when she was about 
to shower. Robles entered the bathroom and began touching her “all 
over.” During the incident, Doe saw Robles’s cellphone hidden in a 
bathroom “vent.” Doe became angry and confronted Robles after she 
saw naked images of herself on his cellphone. 
 
Between the ages of 15 and 17, Robles molested Doe less frequently. 
Doe sometimes would go to Santa Nella without Sister. She went 
because Robles told her he was “lonely” and because he threatened to 
hit her and kill Mother if she did not go. 
 
On January 3, 2016, 17 -year-old Doe and Sister went to the Santa 
Nella home for the weekend. During the night while Sister ostensibly 
was asleep, Robles began molesting Doe, who resisted. Laughing, 
Robles then told Doe he had naked photographs and videos o f her, 
and threatened her, saying, “‘You’re going to pay for this.’” Not 
wanting to awaken Sister, Doe “silently cr[ied].” 
 
The following day, Robles drove the two girls back to their mother’s 
home in San Jose. Once home, Doe went into Mother’s bedroom, 
panicked, and for the first time disclosed Robles’s sexual abuse. Sister 
also disclosed she had overheard Robles say, “‘You’re going to pay 
for it’” and “‘Giselle, I have nude photos and videos of you.’” Mother 
was in “shock” and cried after her daughters’ disclosures. 
 
Grandmother 
 
As discussed post, Grandmother was deemed unavailable at trial, and 
portions of her conditional statement were read to the jury. 
Grandmother testified that during a visit with Doe’s family in 2010 or 
2011, while she was sleeping on the living room floor with both 
granddaughters, she was awakened by Robles and saw him grab 
Doe’s breast. Although pretending to be asleep, Grandmother heard 
Doe tell Robles, “I’m going to tell my mom,” and Robles make a 
“shushing sound” for Doe to keep quiet. Robles then left the room. 
 
Grandmother estimated Robles returned about 30 minutes later. In the 
meantime, Grandmother had changed positions with Doe to protect 
her from Robles. Over her clothes, Robles grabbed Grandmother’s 
vagina and buttocks. Grandmother responded by slapping his face and 
telling him he had “made a mistake.” 
 
The following day, Grandmother confronted Robles about his 
inappropriate touching of Doe (and her). Robles responded, “What 
I’m raising is for me.” Grandmother told Mother that Robles “touches 

 
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[Doe] too much” and it needed to stop. Grandmother, however, did 
not report Robles to the police because she was afraid of him and he 
said nobody would believe her. At Robles’s request, Grandmother left 
the family home that morning. 
 
Investigation 
 
Mother took her daughters to the police station on January 4, 2016, 
the same day Doe first disclosed the sexual abuse by Robles. The two 
girls separately prepared handwritten statements for police: Doe, 
describing the sexual abuse by Robles, and Sister, describing Robles’s 
statements to Sister from the night before. 
 
Officer Jose Rodriguez of the San Jose Police Department 
interviewed Doe on January 12, 2016. As discussed post, a minimally 
redacted version of the video recording was played for the jury. 
 
On February 1, 2016, at the request of police Doe made a pretext 
phone call to Robles, which was recorded and also played for the jury. 
[FN 1] During the call Doe told Robles she was having nightmares 
and needed his help. Robles responded he wanted to talk to Doe, but 
not over the phone because “maybe they are monitoring ... and 
listening to me.” He repeatedly denied “raping” her, admitted he was 
“scared about all of this,” but if they talked in person he could 
“clarify” things for her. 
 
FN 1: The transcript of the phone call is in the appellate record. 
 
A few days later, Robles text -messaged Doe, asking if could contact 
her. The next day he sent another message asking if they could meet 
in person so he could “‘explain everything,’” and requesting she not 
tell Mother about his messages. 
 
Trial Court Proceedings 
 
In November 2017, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an 
amended information charging Robles with seven counts of forcible 
lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. 
(b)(1); [FN 2] counts 1-7); two counts of oral copulation or sexual 
penetration of a child under the age of 10 (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 
8 & 9); two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under 
the age of 10 ( id., subd. (a); counts 10 & 11); four counts of 
aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 (§ 269; counts 
12-15); and two counts of committing a lewd act on a child 14 or 15 
years old (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 16 & 17). 
 
FN 2: Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are 
to the Penal Code. 
 
The jury found Robles guilty as charged, except it deadlocked on 
count 15, aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14. 
The trial court declared a mistrial on that charge and later dismissed 
it pursuant to the People’s motion. In April 2019, the court sentenced 
Robles to an indeterminate term of 125 years to life, consecutive to a 
determinate term of 59 years and 8 months. 

 
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People v. Robles, C No. D079453, 2022 WL 278655, at *1-*4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2022). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPAˮ). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(a). 
 A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 
basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state courts’ adjudication 
of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 
constitutional error at issue “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001). A state court decision is “contrary 
to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 
law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result 
different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable 
application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue 
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 
application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

 
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 Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 
as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 
may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 
precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 
(2003). 
The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 
state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991);3 Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 
1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner raised this claim in his federal habeas action in the state 
court on direct appeal and in his petition for review. Answer, Exs. 5, 9 [Dkt. Nos. 17-25, 17-29]. 
The state appellate court denied the claim in a reasoned decision, Robles, 2022 WL 278655, and 
the state supreme court summarily denied the claim, Answer, Ex. 10. The Court therefore reviews 
the state appellate court’s reasoned decision when considering Petitioner’s claim on federal habeas 
review. 
B. Petition 
Petitioner argues that the expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Syndrome (“CSAAS”) was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because its 
sole purpose was to lend weight to the victim’s allegations; it necessarily made the victim’s 
testimony more credible to the jury because it “came from a witness with impressive credentials 
and experience, who had neither a personal nor professional stake in the outcome, and who had 
testified regarding what he represented were the behaviors of abused children;” and because the 
case turned primarily on the credibility of victim’s testimony. ECF No. 1-3 at 43-70. 
 
3 Although Ylst was a procedural default case, the “look through” rule announced there has been 
extended beyond the context of procedural default. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2005). The look through rule continues as the Ninth Circuit held that “it is a common 
practice of the federal courts to examine the last reasoned state decision to determine whether a 
state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal 
law” and “it [is] unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to disrupt this practice without making 
its intention clear.” Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.), amended, 733 F.3d 794 
(9th Cir. 2013). 

 
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The state appellate court denied this claim as follows: 
 
II. CSAAS Evidence 
 
Robles next contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting CSAAS 
evidence. We disagree. 
 
Additional Background 
 
During motions in limine, the People sought to admit expert testimony on CSAAS 
and requested the court use CALCRIM No. 1193. [FN 6] The prosecutor argued this 
evidence was relevant because Doe’s disclosures were “piecemeal,” “conflicted,” 
and “delayed.” The defense moved to exclude the CSAAS evidence, claiming it was 
not probative, was highly prejudicial, and was not deemed reliable by the relevant 
scientific community, as found by courts from other jurisdictions. 
 
FN 6: CALCRIM No. 1193 currently provides: “You have heard testimony 
from _____ <insert name of expert> regarding child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome. [¶] _____’s <insert name of expert> testimony 
about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the 
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any 
conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged]. [¶] You may 
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not _____’s <insert name 
of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of 
someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of 
(his/her) testimony.” 
 
The trial court admitted the CSAAS testimony, recognizing that, while some states 
(i.e., New Jersey, as discussed post) have limited or excluded CSAAS evidence, “it 
is very much the State of California law that this testimony is still appropriate.” Based 
on the offers of proof in this case, the court found there was “very clearly a delayed 
disclosure” and “arguably inconsistent disclosures” by Doe, and she feared reprisal 
if disclosure was made. The court ruled the CSAAS evidence would be admitted after 
Doe’s testimony was complete. 
 
The court, however, also ruled the People’s expert would not be able to rely on 
statistics to show, for example, that “nine out of every ten reports” of sexual abuse 
are true, thereby supporting the veracity of Doe’s testimony. The court also ruled it 
would admonish the jury regarding the use of CSAAS evidence, including “re -
reading parts or all” of the instruction dealing with this evidence. 
 
During trial, defense counsel renewed his objection to expert testimony on CSAAS, 
claiming for the first time this evidence was irrelevant because the jurors during voir 
dire had each agreed that “children respond differently to sexual assault because 
they’re individuals, and that there’s not one way they’ll respond.” Counsel thus 
argued there was no need for expert testimony on CSAAS because “there are no 
myths to dispel.” In upholding its prior ruling, the court recalled the questions to the 
jurors during voir dire on this subject matter were in connection with whether they 
could be challenged for cause, which it found was for a different purpose than 
admitting the CSAAS evidence. 
 
The People called licensed psychologist Blake Carmichael to testify on the 
characteristics of children who have been impacted by sexual abuse. After Dr. 
Carmichael was designated as an expert but before he testified on CSAAS, the court 
admonished the jury as follows (using CALJIC 10.64): [FN 7] 

 
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“So, members of the jury, evidence will be presented to you by Dr. 
Carmichael concerning [CSAAS]. This evidence is not received and must not 
be considered by you as proof that the alleged victim’s claim is true. 
[CSAAS] research is based upon an approach t hat is completely different 
from that which you must take to this case. 
 
“The syndrome research begins with the assumption that a molestation has 
occurred and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to 
that experience. As distinguished from that research approach, you are to 
presume the defendant innocent. [¶ ] The People have the burden of proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] You should consider the evidence 
concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the limited purpose of 
showing, if it does, that the alleged victim’s reactions, as demonstrated by the 
evidence, are not inconsistent with her having been molested.” 
 
FN 7: The record shows the court preferred the CALJIC instruction on 
CSAAS over its CALCRIM counterpart. 
 
Dr. Carmichael testified CSAAS was based on an article published in the early 
1980’s that identifies behaviors of sexually abused children, including to dispel 
“misconceptions and myths that people still hold about kids and, after they have been 
sexually abused, how they should act or might act.” Dr. Carmichael conducted no 
investigations in this case, including interviewing witnesses or reading police reports 
and transcripts; he did not know the parties, the nature of the charge or charges 
against Robles, or anything about this case including its facts; and he was not 
testifying to indicate whether or not Doe had in fact been sexually abused. Instead, 
he told the jury his role was merely to “educate people ... about this population of 
kids and the field of psychology in general” as it related to child sex abuse. 
 
Dr. Carmichael stated there are five recognized aspects of CSAAS: (1) secrecy; (2) 
helplessness; (3) entrapment or accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicting, and/or 
unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction or recanting. He noted there was no 
“checklist” or “tool” to use to determine when a child has been sexually abused, and 
therefore not all five components are necessarily present in a given situation. 
 
Dr. Carmichael opined that most children are sexually abused by someone with 
whom they have a preexisting relationship. As a result, he noted some abused 
children are apprehensive to disclose the abuse, and may not do so for “long periods 
of time,” because they are told by the abuser to keep it a secret; the abuser threatens 
them or their family members with potential harm if they disclose; or they worry 
about the consequences —including to their family —once disclosure is made. He 
also opined that the “major ity of kids delay disclosures” of sexual abuse, and some 
may wait to do so until after they turn 18 years old. 
 
In addition, if a child is repeatedly sexually abused over the course of months or 
years, Dr. Carmichael noted “some of those events kind of start blurring together and 
they get jumbled up,” making it “very difficult” for the abused child to recount each 
instance of abuse. He explained that is why the “consistency of telling [of the abuse] 
will oftentimes be quite inconsistent.” He also noted sometimes an abused child will 
engage in “‘incremental disclosure,’” which is a “process” of disclosure and not “a 
one-time event”; and other times the child will deny being sexually abused even 
when asked directly, because the child is not yet “comfortable” talking about it. 
 

 
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Guiding Principles 
 
The Supreme Court in People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 ( McAlpin), 
held that expert testimony on “the common reactions of child molestation victims,” 
known as CSAAS, “is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the 
defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident —e.g., a delay in 
reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation.” “‘Such 
expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions 
about child sexual abuse, an d to explain the emotional antecedents of abused 
children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’” (Id. at p. 1301; see also People v. 
Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 472 ( Munch) [noting “courts have long 
recognized the well-established relevance, necessity, reliability, and importance” of 
CSAAS evidence].) 
 
As the trial court here admonished the jury, CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to 
prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused.” ( McAlpin, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300; see People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393.) 
Nor is an expert “allowed to give an opinion on whether a witness is telling the truth 
. . . . ” (People v. Long (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 865, 871.) We apply an abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing the decision of a trial court to admit expert 
testimony. (McAlpin, at p. 1299.) 
 
Analysis 
 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting CSAAS evidence 
due to Doe’s behavior in waiting almost 10 years to report the sexual abuse; her 
denial of being sexually abused when confronted by a social worker during a school 
interview; and her inconsistent description and omission of certain instances and 
details of abuse in statements she made during the recorded interview in January 
2016, and at Robles’s November 2016 preliminary hearing, when events ostensibly 
were “fresher” in her mind than her trial testimony years later. That the prosecutor in 
the instant case may not have expressly stated these particular behaviors, as evidence 
that was potentially inconsistent with a finding of abuse, is not determinative; “[i]t is 
sufficient if the victim’s credibility is placed in issue due to the paradoxical behavior, 
including a delay in reporting a molestation.” ( People v. Patino (1994) 26 
Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745 (Patino).) Clearly, that was the case here. 
 
Moreover, the record shows the trial court handled the admission of CSAAS 
evidence carefully and correctly. Prior to Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, the court 
admonished the jury that it was to consider CSAAS testimony only for the limited 
purpose of showing, if it all, Doe’s responses as demonstrated by the evidence were 
not inconsistent with her having been sexually abused; and that it was the People’s 
burden to prove Robles’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Patino, supra, 26 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1744 [bec ause CSAAS testimony is inadmissible to prove a 
molestation occurred, “[i]t can be highly prejudicial if not properly handled by the 
trial court”].) 
 
Despite Supreme Court authority admitting CSAAS testimony, Robles cites 
decisions from out -of-state courts excluding or limiting CSAAS evidence. We, 
however, are bound by stare decisis to follow California law, including the McAlpin 
decision admitting CSAAS testimony. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [trial and appellate courts must follow binding Supreme 
Court authority].) Moreover, as courts have recently observed, “the vast majority of 
jurisdictions [outside California ] have rendered decisions that are consistent with 
McAlpin.” (See, e.g., Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 472.) 
 

 
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As he did in the trial court, Robles primarily relies on State v. J.L.G. (N.J. 2018) 190 
A.3d 442 (J.L.G.), to support his claim of error on this issue. There, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court had remanded the matter for hearing to better assess the defendant’s 
claim CSAAS evidence was inadmissible. In the remanded hearing, four experts 
testified, and the parties introduced numerous scientific studies. ( Id. at p. 446.) The 
J.L.G. court held CSAAS expert testimony was no longer admissible except for the 
aspect o f delayed disclosure, deeming such evidence unreliable from a scientific 
standpoint. (Ibid.) 
 
Here, unlike the situation in J.L.G., the CSAAS evidence was not being used as 
scientific proof to support a finding that Doe had in fact been sexually abused by 
Robles. To the contrary, Dr. Carmichael unambiguously testified that it was up to the 
jury to determine whether Doe had been sexually abused by Robles; and that his (i.e., 
Dr. Carmichael’s) testimony was limited to educating jurors on certain 
misconceptions and myths regarding the behaviors of sexually abused children that 
may not be apparent to laypeople. (See Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 470-471 
[rejecting a similar argument of the defendant based on J.L.G. and concluding 
“J.L.G. involves an aberrant view of CSAAS,” was “‘overly dismissive of the 
“accommodation” aspect of CSAAS,’” and relied on a journal article that was 
inconsistent with the general view held by child abuse experts, which article was 
subsequently challenged by th ose experts for poor statistical analysis].) [FN 8] We 
conclude J.L.G. does not guide our analysis on this issue. 
 
FN 8: Robles also relies on other cases from outside our jurisdiction to 
support his claim CSAAS evidence is inadmissible. One such case is Franklin 
v. Henry (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 1270. But that case arose in a different 
context and the court did not actually hold CSAAS evidence is never 
admissible. (Id. at p. 1273.) Although not cited by Robles, the Ninth Circuit 
more recently stated, “[W]e have held that CSAAS testimony is admissible 
in federal child -sexual-abuse trials, when the testimony concerns gen eral 
characteristics of victims and is not used to opine that a specific child is 
telling the truth.” (Brodit v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 985, 991; see 
also Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 470 [“Ninth Circuit decisions are 
consistent with McAlpin.”].) In any event, we do not follow these out-of-state 
decisions when they conflict with California law. (See Munch, at pp. 468-469 
[following McAlpin and rejecting the defendant’s reliance on out -of-state 
authorities that may disagree with it].) 
 
Robles also argues CSAAS evidence should be excluded because myths and 
misconceptions about child sexual abuse victims are no longer prevalent, including 
among the jurors in this case based on their jury questionnaires. We disagree. 
 
McAlpin recognized a “‘jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the 
opinion in order to justify its admission; if that were the test, little expert opinion 
testimony would ever be heard. Instead, [Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a) 
[FN 9] ] declares that even if the jury has some knowledge of the matter, expert 
opinion may be admitted whenever it would “assist” the jury. It will be excluded only 
when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when 
“the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that [people] of ordinary 
education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.” ’” (McAlpin, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1299 -1300.) Robles has not shown that Dr. Carmichael’s 
testimony “‘would add nothing at all’” to the jury’s understanding of commonly held 
misconceptions about child sexual abuse. (Id. at p. 1300.) 
 
FN 9: Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a) provides: “If a witness is 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to 

 
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such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond 
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of 
fact.” 
 
Nor do we agree with Robles that CSAAS evidence was unnecessary in this case 
because the jury questionnaires allegedly indicated none of the jurors had any 
preconceived notions about how victims of child sexual abuse should or should not 
act, as allegedly confirmed during voir dire. Rather, the jury questionnaires pertained 
to whether jurors were subject to challenge for cause, as correctly noted by the trial 
court. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 225, 229.) And Robles identifies no requirement 
that admission of CSAAS evidence is conditioned on the People demonstrating that 
one or more jurors does or does not hold preconceived notions about child sexual 
abuse. As we have explained, CSAAS evidence is admissible to assist the jury in 
understanding an area outside of their common knowledge. (See McAlpin, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at pp. 1299-1300.) 
 
Finally, we reject Robles’s contention that the admission of CSAAS evidence 
violated his rights to a fair trial and due process. Generally, a trial court’s compliance 
with the rules of evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights. (People 
v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 -835.) Because we have concluded there was no 
evidentiary error with respect to the court’s decision to admit CSAAS evidence, we 
further conclude the admission of this evidence did not violate Robles’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial or due process. (See People v. Cage (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 256, 284 [“because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
[the challenged evidence], there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional 
rights”]; see also People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 174 [admission of 
CSAAS evidence did not violate due process]; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1744-1745 [same].) 
Robles, 2019 WL 2082396, at *2-*3. 
1. Legal Standard 
The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 
constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 
the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 
(9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court “has not 
yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a 
due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 
1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic 
materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)). 
Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for 
granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. 
Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The due process inquiry in federal habeas 

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review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the 
trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 
F.2d at 990. But the admission of evidence violates due process only if there are no permissible
inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
2. Analysis
The state court’s denial of this claim on the merits did not result in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. Nor did the denial result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that CSAAS testimony is admissible in child sexual abuse trials 
“when the testimony concerns general characteristics of victims and is not used to opine that a 
specific child is telling the truth.” Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
record contradicts Petitioner’s claim that the CSAAS testimony’s sole purpose was to make the 
victim more credible. Rather, the CSAAS testimony was admitted to describe and explain a 
general characteristic of sexual assault victims: specifically, why sexual assault victims may have 
inconsistent memories or provide inconsistent testimony over time. The CSAAS testimony was 
relevant because, as the state appellate court observed, the victim had denied any sexual abuse 
during a school interview when younger, and because there were inconsistencies between the 
statements the victim made during the January 2016 recorded interview and at the November 2016 
preliminary hearing. Robles, 2022 WL 278655, at *9. And, in fact, the defense relied on these 
inconsistencies to challenge the victim’s credibility. RT at 2456-65, 4012-14, 4018, 4024-25. 
The state appellate court reasonably concluded that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was not 
prejudicial. While the prosecution’s questioning elicited Dr. Carmichael’s opinion regarding 
behavior by sexual assault victims similar to the behavior exhibited by the victim, Dr. Carmichael 
clearly informed the jury that he was not speaking about the victim. In addition, at the beginning 
and end of his direct examination, Dr. Carmichael emphasized that he had no knowledge regarding 

 
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the case, and that he was not there to tell the jury whom to believe. RT 2730-31, 2760. 
Furthermore, as the state appellate court noted, the trial court handled the admission of CSAAS 
evidence carefully and correctly. The trial court admonished the jury immediately prior to Dr. 
Carmichael’s testimony that his testimony should not be considered proof that the victim’s 
testimony was true, and could be used, if used at all, only to weigh the inconsistencies in her 
testimony: 
 
So, members of the jury, evidence will be presented to you by Dr. Carmichael 
concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. This evidence is not 
received and must not be considered by you as proof that the alleged victim’s claim 
is true. Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome research is based upon an 
approach that is completely different from that which you must take to this case. 
 
The syndrome research begins with the assumption that a molestation has occurred 
and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to that experience. 
As distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume the defendant 
innocent. 
 
The People have the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You 
should consider the evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the 
limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim’s reactions, as 
demonstrated by the evidence, are not inconsistent with her having been molested. 
RT 2732-33. Juries are presumed to follow a court’s limiting instructions with respect to the 
purposes for which evidence is admitted. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Petitioner has not offered any evidence to suggest that the jury did not follow the trial court’s 
limiting instructions. Finally, a jury could have reasonably found the victim credible despite the 
inconsistencies in her testimony as she provided consistent testimony regarding numerous 
incidents of sexual abuse over a ten-year period, part of which was corroborated by the testimony 
of her grandmother and her sister. 
Federal habeas relief is denied on this claim. 
C. Certificate of Appealability 
 The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 
that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 
appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a). A judge shall grant a certificate of 
appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. 

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Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the 
showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that 
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 
or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Petitioner has not made such a 
showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows. 
1. In accordance with Habeas Rule 2(a) and Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Warden Christopher Pierce as 
respondent because he is Petitioner’s current custodian. 
2. The Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and DENIES a
certificate of appealability. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. The Clerk shall
close the file. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 11, 2026 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 

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