govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-05464-0

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
 
A.D., 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
AUBREY DRAKE GRAHAM et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 26-5464 (SDW) (JBC) 
 
 
WHEREAS OPINION 
 
 
June 11, 2026 
 
 
WIGENTON, District Judge. 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon pro se Plaintiff A.D.’s Complaint 
(“Compl.” (D.E. 1)), Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application” (D.E. 1-1)), 
Motion to Proceed by Pseudonym (D.E. 2), and Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel (D.E. 3), 
and this Court having reviewed Plaintiff’s submissions; and 
WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without 
paying the filing fee—that is, in forma pauperis —so long as the plaintiff demonstrates that he or 
she is “unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and 
WHEREAS when a litigant petitions the Court to proceed without the prepayment of fees, 
the Court has an obligation to screen the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or 
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and PageID:
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WHEREAS the legal standard for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
is the same as that applied under Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 
506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege 
sufficient facts for the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
WHEREAS Plaintiff’s IFP Application indicates that his total monthly income is 
$1000.00 and their total monthly expenses are around $60.00, including home maintenance and 
food. ( See generally IFP Application.) This Court will therefore allow Plaintiff to proceed in 
forma pauperis. Further, the Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, as it contains only 
vague, confusing factual allegations. (See generally Compl.) 
WHEREAS district courts have authority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants. 
See § 1915(e)(1) (“[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 
counsel”). Section 1915 provides district courts “broad discretion” in determining whether the 
appointment of counsel is warranted. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). Before 
exercising that discretion, the court must first consider the merits of the claim. Id. at 155 (quoting 
Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981) ). H ere, the Complaint does not allege 
sufficient facts for this Court to assess whether Plaintiff’s claims have merit in law or fact. ( See 
generally Compl.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel is denied. 
WHEREAS to proceed by pseudonym, a party must demonstrate a reasonable fear of 
severe harm and that interest must outweigh the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. Doe 
v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 
358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008)). Potential embarrassment or economic harm is insufficient. Id. Here, PageID:
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Plaintiff alleges they will be “exposed (maybe maliciously) to over 5 billion people, or more.” 
(D.E. 2.) Because the possibility that Plaintiff’s identity may become publicly known does not 
establish a reasonable fear of severe harm, the Motion to Proceed by Pseudonym is denied. 
Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP Application is GRANTED, and the Complaint, Motion to 
Appoint Pro Bono Counsel and Motion to Proceed by Pseudonym are DENIED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to am end their Complaint. An appropriate 
order follows. 
 
 
 /s/ Susan D. Wigenton 
 SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J. 
 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Parties 
James B. Clark, U.S.M.J. PageID:
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