govinfo:USCOURTS-txsd-1_26-cv-00096-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION 
  
ISLOM SALOKHIDDINOV,   §  
          “Petitioner,” §     
 §  
v. §  
 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, et al.,  
§ 
§ 
§ 
        Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00096 
          “Respondents.” §  
ORDER 
Before the Court is Petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” 
(Dkt. No. 1) (“Petition”), Petitioner’s “Motion for Immediate Release and Status of Case” (Dkt. No. 9) 
(“Original Motion”); the “Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (Dkt. No. 10) (“R&R”), and 
Petitioner’s “Motion for Immediate Release from Custody” (Dkt. No. 12) (“Second Motion”).  
The Magistrate Judge recommended this Court (1) dismiss without prejudice the Petition (Dkt. No. 
1) and (2) direct the Clerk of Court to close the case. Dkt. No. 10 at 6. When a party objects to a magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation, the Court reviews the matter de novo. United States v. Wilson , 864 
F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989). Even though Petitioner’s Second Motion (Dkt. No. 12) is not styled as an 
objection to the R&R, in an abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed the matter de novo. After such 
review, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 10).  
I. BACKGROUND  
Petitioner is a citizen of Tajikistan. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. On March 2, 2026, an Immigration Judge issued 
a final order of removal. See Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), Automated Case 
Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation, (last visited June 11, 2026) (“Automated Case 
Information”). Petitioner did not timely file an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) by the 
April 3, 2026 deadline. See id.  
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by 
Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). A court has “a continuing obligation to 
examine the basis for their jurisdiction[,]” MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th 
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Cir. 1990), and if it “determines…that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,” it must dismiss the action.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Ripeness is an “essential component [] of federal subject -matter jurisdiction.” Sample 
v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005).  
III. DISCUSSION  
Because Petitioner has not been detained for over six months since his removal order became final, 
see Dkt. No. 12 at 2, his claim is unripe.  
Once an alien has been ordered removed, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (“§ 1231”) requires the Attorney General 
to remove him from the United States within a period of 90 days. 8 U.S.C § 1231(a)(1). During this 90-day 
“removal period,” the alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).  
If an alien has not been removed within the 90-day period, detention shifts from § 1231(a)(2) to § 
1231(a)(6), under which the government “may” prolong detention “beyond the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6). But § 1231(a)(6) does not give the government license to detain indefinitely; in Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court read a limit into such detention. Id. at 701. Once it “exceeds 
a period reasonably necessary to secure removal” and removal “is no longer reasonably foreseeabl e,” 
detention under § 1231(a)(6) becomes constitutionally excessive. Id. To facilitate “uniform administration 
in federal courts,” the Supreme Court recognized a 6 -month “presumptively reasonable period of 
detention.” Id. at 701. If a petitioner seeks release from detention during the presumptively reasonable 6 -
month period, his claim is premature. Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011). 
Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively final on April 3, 2026: the day his appeal to 
the BIA was due.1 Dkt. No. 12 at 2. Because Petitioner is only 2 months into the initial 6-month period of 
presumptively valid detention, his claim under Zadvydas is premature, and the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider it.  
 That Petitioner was initially detained under a different, pre -final-order-of-removal statutory 
provision is immaterial. Here, the removal order has become final, and detention has accordingly shifted to 
§ 1231. That transition forecloses any claim for relief predicated on a pre -final-order-of-removal statute, 
and the Court declines to retroactively assess the propriety of detention under a statute no longer exercised. 
See Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d, at 543 (holding that petitioner could “no longer state a claim for relief 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)” once § 1231 became applicable); Agyei-Kodie, F.App’x, at 318 (“[petitioner] is 
 
1 A removal order becomes “administratively final” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) upon “(i) a determination by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is 
permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). 
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no longer detained pursuant to § 1226, and his claims challenging his detention under that statute are 
moot”).  
IV. CONCLUSION  
For these reasons, the R&R (Dkt. No. 10) is hereby ADOPTED and the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) is 
DISMISSED without prejudice.2 Petitioner’s Initial Motion (Dkt. No. 9) and Second Motion (Dkt. No. 
12) are both DENIED as moot. The Clerk of the Court is INSTRUCTED to close this case.  
 SIGNED this June 11, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 In his Second Motion, Petitioner provides that (1) Respondents arrested him without a warrant and (2) he was 
refused the interpreter of choice in a hearing before an IJ. Dkt. No. 12 at 1 -2. Because issues raised for the first time 
in objections to a magistrate judge’s report are deemed not properly before the district court, see United States v. 
Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992), the Court does not consider them.   
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