govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-7_24-cv-00037-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
SOUTHERN DIVISION AT PIKEVILLE 
  
DONNA HICKS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:24-CV-37-KKC 
Plaintiff,   
V. OPINION AND ORDER 
FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, LLC  
D/B/A FERGUSON PLUMBING 
SUPPLY,  
  
Defendant. 
*** *** *** 
This matter is before the Court on Plainti ff Donna Hicks’ Motion to Alter, Amend, or 
Vacate. (R. 31.) Now that this matter is fully briefed, it is ready for review. For the following 
reasons, Hicks’ motion is denied.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Hicks’ motion relates to the Court’s De cember 17, 2025 Order granting Defendant 
Ferguson Enterprises, LLC’s (“Ferguson”) motion for summary judgment. (R. 29.) A detailed 
account of the facts is set forth in the Cour t’s prior Order. (R. 30.) Relevant here, Hicks 
brought a negligence claim against Ferguson , arising from an alleged fall suffered at 
Ferguson’s business. (R. 1 at 2.) At the clos e of discovery, Ferguson moved for summary 
judgment on all counts. (R. 26.) The Court’s December 17, 2025 Order granted summary 
judgment in Ferguson’s favor. (R. 29.) Hicks then timely filed the present motion. (R. 31.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Motions for reconsideration generally are construed as motions to alter or amend the 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).” Waid v. Snyder, No. 18-1960, 2019 
U.S. App. LEXIS 4839, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2019); see also Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. 
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Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990) (construing a motion for reconsideration as a 
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment). The purpose of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e) is to allow a distri ct court to correct its own mistakes. White v. New 
Hampshire Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982). 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) permits the court to alter or amend a final judgment if there is 
“(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in 
controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
558 F.3d 461, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 
479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006)). Granting a Rule 59(e) motion is an extraordinary remedy that lies 
in the court’s discretion. See Huff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co ., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(“The grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is within the informed discretion of the district 
court, reversible only for abuse.”). Importantly, “A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an 
opportunity to re-argue a case.” Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998). 
III. ANALYSIS 
In her motion, Hicks asserts that the Court committed a clear error of law in 
dismissing her claims. (R. 33 at 1.) Hicks’ Moti on advances two main arguments as to why 
the Court should reconsider its previous Order: (1) the lack of handrails on the side entrance 
posed an unreasonable risk of injury; and (2) th e “Danger Fall Hazard” sign at the nearby 
loading dock is evidence that Ferguson kn ew of the unreasonable risk. (R. 31 at 2.) In 
response, Ferguson asserts that Hicks’ motion fails to meet any of the Rule 59(e) criteria. (R. 
32 at 1–2.)  
As a threshold matter, Hicks’ disagreements with the Court’s analysis do not 
constitute a proper basis for relief under Rule 59(e), because her motion is largely an attempt 
to relitigate issues or advance arguments that could have been raised previously. Indians, 
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146 F.3d at 374. Hicks’ arguments about the handrail and fall sign are similar if not identical 
to the arguments raised at summary judgment. Specifically, her Response to Ferguson’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment lays out a nearly identical argument to the one in her present 
Motion:    
. . . More importantly, what can also be seen in that photograph is that 
Ferguson did recognize a risk at the lo ading dock itself as a sign denoting 
"Danger Fall Hazard" can also bee [sic] seen in that photo when zoomed in (see 
Exhibit 2). Moreover, Ferguson's building has two further entrances located on 
the street facing side of the building (see Exhibit 3 and 4), each of which, are 
located at the same height from the ground as the loading dock and dock 
entrance. Each of these entrances however, employ both handrails and a ramp 
for elderly or otherwise infirm patrons such as Ms. Hicks and her husband who 
was with her at the time of her fall. As such, the only reasonable conclusion 
that can be drawn from the two street  facing entrances is that Ferguson 
necessarily recognized or foresaw a d anger for patrons entering and exiting 
their building, lest they would not have installed handrails and ramps on what 
are for all intents and purposes entrances identical to that at issue. 
(R. 27 at 8–9.) This contention was already considered and resolved in the Court’s December 
17, 2025 Order. ( See R. 29 at 7.) Because Hicks seeks to relitigate issues already resolved, 
her motion for reconsideration fails on this basis alone.   
 Even when addressing the merits of Hicks’ arguments, she does not satisfy the Rule 
59(e) standard. She argues that Ferguson, by installing a handicap accessible ramp and 
handrails on the two front entrances, recognized the unreasonable risk inherent in the side 
entrance step that did not have handrails. (R 31 at 2.) Hicks also asserts that it “appears 
evident” that Ferguson knew of the unreasonable risk. ( Id.) She then concludes that the 
Court’s determination that the side entranc e was not an unreasonably dangerous condition 
is “incorrect.” (R. 31 at 2.)  
Even if the Court were to question Ferguson’s decision to not place a handrail on the 
side entrance, Hicks has not shown how that would amount to a clear error of law under Rule 
59(e). Hicks provides no evidence that Ferguson knew that its choice not to install handrails 
on the side entrance would pose an unreasonable risk of injury. In fact, Hicks herself states 
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that Ferguson installed the handrails on the fr ont entrances “in order to comply with the 
building code.” (Id.) This statement is consistent with Ferguson’s Statement of Undisputed 
Facts and the record as a whole. (R. 26-2 at 8.) Maintaining compliance with building code 
by installing handrails on the front entranceways is not evidence that the side entranceway 
without handrails creates an unreasonably dangerous condition. Nor does Hicks present 
evidence that building code required a ramp or handrails to be installed on the side entrance. 
None of these assertions prove how the Court’s determination regarding the side entrance is 
a clear error of law.  
 Hicks also asserts that the Court’s Opinio n fails to address the fact that there is a 
“Danger Fall Hazard” sign on the loading dock. (Id. ) Hicks argues that the sign near the 
loading dock, which is the same height as the side entrance, is proof that Ferguson knew the 
steps without a handrail posed an unreasonable risk. ( Id.) This argument fails for similar 
reasons as the first.  
 Hicks asserts that the loading dock and the side entrance are “at the same height from 
the ground.” (Id.) However, a garage door opening on a loading dock is easily distinguishable 
from a building’s side entrance. A loading dock has no step to get to ground level because it 
is not meant for ingress and egress; there is less to signal that a drop would be present; and 
the drop from the loading dock that does not have a step is much greater than that of the side 
entrance. (Id.)
 Further, the Court already considered the condition of the side entrance in 
combination with the safety measures put in place on the other entrances in its analysis and 
did not disregard them as Hicks suggests. ( See R. 33 at 4; see also  R. 29 at 2, 5.) Citing this 
fact about the fall sign does not present newly discovered evidence or raise a clear error of 
law for which a motion for reconsideration may be granted.   
 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented in Hicks’ moti on do not alter the Court’s previous 
determination because the Court did not make a clear error of law when it granted summary 
judgment in Ferguson’s favor. If Hicks wishes to challenge the Court’s determination that no 
reasonable jury could find the side entrance to be an unreasonably dangerous condition, the 
proper course of action is to seek appellate review. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS 
that Hicks’ Motion for Reconsideration (R. 31) is DENIED.  
This 11th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
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