govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_25-cv-04036-7

1 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
MICHAEL S. MCCLAIN, and ROSALEE 
JANETTE MCCLAIN, 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v. Case No. 25-4036-JWB 
 
 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the court on Defendants SG Communities’ and Megan Baugh’s 
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 116.) The moti on is fully briefed a nd ripe for decision.
1 (Docs. 117, 
118, 120, 125.) Defendants’ motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein. (Doc. 116.) 
I. Facts 
 
The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 111.) The 
court assumes their truth for the purposes of this order but is not required to accept legal 
conclusions—or legal conclusions couched as factual contentions—as true. Safe Streets Alliance 
v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff Michael McClain is a disabled 
military and law enforcement veteran. (Doc. 111 at 2.) Plaintiff Rosalee Janette McClain is also 
a disabled combat veteran. (Id. at 2–3.) Both Plaintiffs suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
 
1 Defendants bring to the court’s attention that many of the case citations employed by Plaintiffs in their response to 
the motion to dismiss are faulty and do not stand for the propositions of law for which they are cited. (Doc. 125 at 1–
7.) Defendants go on to invoke this court’s standing order on the use of artificial intelligence in documents filed with 
the court. D. Kan. Standing Order 26-01. This court ha s previously warned Plaintiffs about their use of artificial 
intelligence. See McClain v. Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick Cty. , No. 25-4036-JWB, 2025 WL 
3550614, at *7, n. 1 (D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2025). While the court has confirmed that many of Plaintiffs’ citations are 
inaccurate or lack important context, the court declines to enter a show cause order at this time as it perceives Plaintiffs’ 
errors as less egregious than those addressed in the court’s previous order. 

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(“PTSD”). (Id.) Plaintiff Rosalee McClain is a sexual assault survivor. (Id.) Defendant Board of 
County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kansas, is a county government. ( Id. at 3.) 
Defendant Jeffrey Easter is the Sedgwick County Sheriff. ( Id.) Defendants Samuel Humig and 
Cody Nail are deputy sheriffs in Sedgwick County. (Id. at 3–4.) Defendants Jeremy Langley and 
Tyra Olson are intensive supervision office rs employed by the Sedgwick County Board of 
Corrections. (Id. at 4–5.) Defendant Nicholas Sholander is a “corporal” at the Sedgwick County 
Adult Detention Facility (“ Sedgwick County Jail”). ( Id. at 5.) Defendant Jared Schecter is a 
“colonel” and administrator of the Sedgwick County Jail. ( Id.) Defendant SG Communities is 
Plaintiffs’ former landlord and the property management company in charge of the Maple Village 
Mobile Home Community in Goddard, Kansas. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Megan Baugh is employed 
by SG Communities and serves as the “property manager” of Maple Village. (Id.) 
In July 2022, Plaintiffs entered a lease2 with SG Communities for a “manufactured home” 
in Maple Village. (Id. at 6–7.) The payment due to SG Communities was $655 per month. ( Id. 
at 7.) Apparently, SG Communi ties overcharged Plaintiffs $10 per month, as they paid $665 for 
the first nine months of their residency at Maple Village. ( Id.) This amount ($90) was refunded 
to Plaintiffs in April 2025. ( Id.) Plaintiffs made 34 consecuti ve on-time payments to SG 
Communities without incident. (Id.) 
A provision of the lease agreement, and apparently all lease agreements at Maple Village, 
prohibited registered sex offenders from beco ming residents or visiting the complex. ( Id. at 8.) 
 
2 Plaintiffs describe the “transaction documents” as including a “Promissory Note, a Federal Consumer Leasing Act 
disclosure, and an Addendum A (Option to Purchase).” (Doc. 111 at 6.) The promissory note apparently reads: “This 
Promissory Note represents an unsecured obligation due and owing from Promisor to Payee, as partial payment for 
Payee’s transfer of Certificate of Title to the manufactured home to Promisor upon execution of this Promissory Note.” 
(Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs appear to believe that this for ecloses any use of “landlord-te nant eviction procedures” and 
requires “UCC Article 9 foreclosure or repl evin to seize the personal property.” ( Id. at 7.) In any event, the court 
does not believe this is material to Plaintiffs’ claims; the complaint goes on to describe the rental agreement and refers 
to it as a “lease agreement” throughout. (Id.) 

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Plaintiffs relied upon this provision when selecting where to live. ( Id.) Plaintiffs allege that 
“[p]rior to April 2, 2025, SG Communities, acting through Megan Baugh and with the 
authorization of [Defendant] Jeremy Langley, allowed Damon Sampson—a known registered sex 
offender—to reside at lot C4” at Maple Village. ( Id.) Sampson’s residence was not disclosed to 
Plaintiffs. ( Id.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Langley and Olson “used their official 
government authority as community corrections officers to sancti on and facilitate an occupancy 
without legal authorization under the lease . . . .” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Langley 
admitted on “body camera” that he authorized the placement, and Defendant Baugh likewise 
admitted that she “was making an excep tion to the sex offender rule.” ( Id.) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff Michael McClain “confronted the situation” regarding Damon 
Sampson’s residency at Maple Village. ( Id. at 10.) The situation ha d apparently “de-escalated” 
before law enforcement arrived. ( Id.) Defendants Langley and Olson were “already on scene.” 
(Id.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Olson “counseled” Sampson on “security measures” but did 
not address Plaintiffs’ alleged lease vi olation or “disabili ty concerns.” ( Id.) At one point with 
only Defendant Olson present, Defendant Langley “made an aggressive pointing gesture directed 
toward Plaintiff—constituting an aggressive command posture that triggered Plaintiff’s PTSD 
symptoms . . . .” ( Id.) Defendant Olson “took no action to intervene or de-escalate.” ( Id.) 
Defendants Humig and Nail arrived after this occurrence. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, they were 
both aware of the situation with Sampson but took no action “to address Sampson’s unauthorized 
presence, remove him, or enfo rce the lease covenant.” ( Id.) Plaintiffs assert that Defendants 
Humig and Nail also heard Defendant Baugh’s admission “that she was making an exception to 
the sex offender rule . . . .” ( Id.) According to Plaintiffs, “bot h deputies accepted the word of a 

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felon under active supervision whos e presence lacked legal author ization under the lease as the 
sole basis for arresting Plaintiff Michael McCl ain—a 100% disabled combat veteran and retired 
law enforcement officer with 24 years of servic e—who had done nothing more than object to an 
unauthorized sex offender living in his commun ity in violation of his written lease.” ( Id.) 
Plaintiffs claim this arrest violated several of Mr. Mc Clain’s rights. ( Id. at 11.) Additionally, 
Defendant Cody Nail allegedly lives in a community where SG Communities is also his landlord. 
(Id.) This “undisclosed financial relationship”, Plaintiffs argue, “taints his participation” and 
makes clear that “he was acting in the financial in terests of his landlord rather than enforcing the 
law neutrally.” (Id.) 
Mr. McClain was arrested on one charge of battery. ( Id.) He was released on his own 
recognizance the same day. (Id.) He was required to return to court on April 16, 2025. (Id.) He 
did so and was required to provide his address. (Id.) No charges had formally been filed as of this 
appearance. ( Id.) On May 27, 2025, Mr. McClain was arrested again. ( Id.) That same day, 
Plaintiffs were evicted, the landlord changed the locks on their home, and Mr. McClain was 
removed from the property. (Id.) This arrest was supported by multiple charges, including battery 
of a law enforcement officer, aggravated criminal threat, interference with judicial process, and 
simple battery. (Id.) Mr. McClain was kept under court-supervised bond conditions from the time 
of his arrest to January 27, 2026. (Id. at 12.) This date is one day after the discovery deadline in 
this case. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend this “raises a reasonable inference of coordination between the 
state criminal case and the federal litigation.” (Id.) 
Mr. McClain reached a plea agreement related to his charges on October 1, 2025. (Id.) He 
pled guilty to three counts of assault and paid a fina ncial assessment of $410. ( Id.) But on 
December 1, 2025, a new amended inform ation was filed against him. ( Id.) This information 

5 
 
named Kayla Shelton, Damon Sampson’s girlfriend, as a victim of the April 2, 2025, incident for 
the first time. ( Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiffs claim that this late inclus ion, plus the prosecution’s 
insistence on pleading guilty to three charges of assault stemming from one incident, “raises 
serious questions about the integrity of official records . . . .” (Id. at 13.) 
After his May 27, 2025, arrest, Mr. McClain was taken to the Sedgwick County Jail. (Id. 
at 13.) During his intake proces sing, he suffered a seizure. ( Id.) Mr. McClain was denied all 
medications while in custody, including medi cations required to treat his PTSD. ( Id.) He was 
later released by Defendant Shol ander “without resources, tran sportation assistance, or any 
accommodation for his known medical conditions, effectively abandoning a 100% disabled 
combat veteran in Wichita.” ( Id. at 14.) When Mr. McClain asked to make a telephone call, 
Defendant Sholander allegedly rebuffed the request by saying Plaintiff could but would be in jail 
longer. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs’ complaint then moves to cover allegedly retaliatory actions taken by Defendants 
after Mr. McClain’s arrest. ( Id.) “[B]efore, during, and after the April 2, 2025, incident,” Mr. 
McClain claims he engaged in numerous protected activities to include “reporting the sex offender 
and lease violation to SG Communities; contacting the Kansas Bureau of Investigation; filing ADA 
accommodation requests; submitting KORA requests; filing complaints with the Sedgwick County 
Undersheriff; filing comp laints with the Department of Ju stice; filing a housing discrimination 
complaint with HUD; and filing this federal civil rights action.” (Id.) 
Two days after the April 2, 2025, incident, Pl aintiffs were served a “30-Day Notice to 
Quit/Vacate” that was signed by Defendant Baugh. ( Id.) The notice cited community rules that 
prohibited threatening or in timidating and assault. ( Id.) The eviction was executed on May 27, 
2025. (Id. at 15.) 

6 
 
For these events, Plaintiffs raise several claims for relief. First, they claim violations of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to the First, Fourt h, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a failure to 
intervene claim. (Id. at 16–24.) Second, they allege a violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 19–21.) Third, Plaintiffs assert a violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). 
(Id. at 21–22.) Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim under the civil R acketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (“RICO”) Act. (Id. at 22–23.) 
Only two of these counts are alleged agains t Defendants SG Communities and Defendant 
Baugh: the FHA claim and the RICO claim. Therefore, the court only addresses those two claims 
below. (Id. at 21–23.) 
II. Standard 
 
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failur e to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a 
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face. Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from 
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Archuleta v. Wagner , 523 F.3d 
1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court’s 
consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla ., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). Given 
Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the co urt construes the pleadings libe rally, but it cannot act as their 
advocates or construct arguments on their behalf. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 
F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
III. Analysis 
 
A. Fair Housing Act 
 

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Plaintiffs plead that they are handicapped w ithin the meaning of the FHA. (Doc. 111 at 
21.) They also plead that SG Communities is a “covered entity” w ithin the meaning of the Act. 
(Id.) The gravamen of Plaintiffs ’ FHA claim is that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) 
by “failing to provide reasonable accommodations in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the 
rental when Plaintiffs required enforcemen t of the no-sex-offenders covenant as an 
accommodation for their documented disabilities.” (Id.) They claim SG Communities and Megan 
Baugh had no authority to “unilate rally waive” the “covenant” wit hout Plaintiffs’ consent. (Id.) 
They also claim that SG Communities violated § 3617 by evicting Plaintiffs in retaliation for 
raising concerns about the placement of a se x offender in the Maple Village community. ( Id. at 
22.) These allegations present two distinct claims, and the court analyzes them separately. 
1. Failure to Accommodate 
 
The FHA prohibits discrimination against “any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 
with such dwelling, because of a handicap of-- 
(A) that person; or 
 
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or 
made available; or 
 
(C) any person associated with that person.” 
 
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(2)(A)–(C). For purposes of this statute, discriminati on includes refusal to 
make reasonable modifications to a property that would afford a disabled person full enjoyment of 
the property, “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy a dwelling”, and failure to design and constr uct dwellings with certain accessible features. 
Id. at § 3604 (f)(3)(A)–(C). Plaintiffs’ allegations concern a provision of the lease agreement (the 

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no sex offender clause) and therefore fall under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B) which concerns failures 
to accommodate with respect to “rules, policies, practices, or services.” (See generally Doc. 111.) 
 To properly plead a claim under these provisions, Plaintiffs “must show: (1) that [they are] 
handicapped as defined by the FHA; (2) that De fendants knew or reasonably should have known 
of the claimed handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford 
Plaintiff[s] an equal op portunity to use and enjoy the dwel ling; (4) that the accommodation is 
reasonable; and (5) that Defendants re fused to make such accommodation.” Wren v. City of 
Cherryvale, Kansas, No. 22-CV-1180-JWB, 2022 WL 3682001, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2022) 
(citing Arnal v. Aspen View Condo Ass’n, Inc. , 226 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1183 (D. Colo. 2016)). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs ha ve failed to properly plead the last three elements of the test. 
(Doc. 117 at 9.) 
In support, they argue that “[t]he FHA doe s not require a landlord to enforce lease 
covenants against third parties as a disability accommodation.” ( Id.) (emphasis removed). 
Defendants cite cases that explain that the FHA only requires modifications of the landlord’s own 
“generally applicable” rule but does not require “[c]ompelling a landlord to initiate eviction 
proceedings against a neighbor . . . .” (Doc. 117 at 10) (citing Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of 
Olathe, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (D. Kan. 19 99)). Second, they argue that Plaintiffs have not 
pled that they ever made a fo rmal request for accommodation. ( Id. at 10–11.) Third, they argue 
that Plaintiffs’ “proposed accommodation” does not have a “nexus” to Plaintiffs’ disabilities. (Id. 
at 11.) Plaintiffs largely do not respond to these arguments. (See Doc. 118 at 9–11.) Additionally, 
they do not cite a single case in support of the arguments they do make. (Id.) Plaintiffs do attempt 
to distinguish their claim from Defendants’ argument by casting it as a “discriminatory terms-and-

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conditions claim” and “not a standalone failure to accommodate claim.” (Id. at 10.) After review, 
the court agrees with Defendants. 
As Defendants persuasively argue, attempting “to recharacterize the FHA theory as a pure 
‘terms and conditions’ claim under § 3604(f)(2), untethered from any fail ure-to-accommodate 
analysis, fails” for multiple reasons. (Doc. 125 at 9.) First, whatever sort of discrimination is 
alleged, it must be “because of” Plaintiffs’ handicap(s). 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); see also Cinnamon 
Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City , 685 F.3d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 2012). The court 
agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that tend to show that Defendants 
situated Damon Sampson at Maple Village “because of” Plaintiffs’ disabilities. (Doc. 125 at 9.) 
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish between a “terms-and-conditions” and “failure-to-
accommodate” claim is nonsen sical when examining the statute under which they sue. Section 
3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination “because of” a person’s disability. The FHA then goes on to 
specify kinds of discrimination that are cognizable under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). One 
such form of discrimination is refusal to make reasonable accommodations concerning the 
landlord’s “rules, policies, practices, or services.” Id. Therefore, it is impossible to separate out 
“terms-and-conditions” from “failu re-to-accommodate”, they are in terrelated elements of the 
FHA. 
Additionally, Defendants are corr ect that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a reasonable 
accommodation because “the thrust of a reasonable accommodation claim is that a defendant must 
make an affirmative change in an otherwise valid law or policy.” Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 
46 F.3d 1491, 1501–02 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs have not alleged this kind of accommodation. 
Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to use the FHA to enforce a provision of their lease. (Doc. 111 at 7–8.) 

10 
 
This is categorically different than a claim under the FHA and sounds in common law breach of 
contract rather than federal housing law. 
Finally, Defendants are also correc t that Plaintiffs have not pl ed that they made a formal 
request for accommodations which is required in order to show De fendants “refused to make the 
accommodation.” Summers v. City of Fitchburg, 325 F. Supp. 3d 203, 210 (D. Mass. 2018) (“The 
reasonable accommodation requirement applies when triggered by a request, and when the request 
is voluntarily withdrawn, it cannot be relied upon to prove that the defendant refused to make the 
accommodation.”) (citing Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Michigan, 628 F. App’x. 347, 351–52 (6th Cir. 
2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, because of the above defects 
in Plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendants’ motion to dismiss count IV as to the failure to accommodate 
claim is granted. 
2. Retaliation 
 
Retaliation under the FHA is a distinct claim, and is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which 
reads: “It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his 
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 
protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” To properly allege a retaliation claim 
Plaintiffs “must show that ‘(1) [they are] prot ected individual[s] under the FHA, (2) [they were] 
engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of [thei r] fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, 
threatened, intimidated, or interfered with [Plaintiffs] on account of [their] protected activity under 

11 
 
the FHA, and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate.’” 3 Hatfield v. 
Cottages on 78th Cmty. Ass’n , Nos. 21-4035, 21-4042, 21-4045, 2022 WL 2452379, at *8 (10th 
Cir. Jul. 6, 2022) (quoting Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead that the eviction was because of protected 
activity under the FHA. 4 (Doc. 117 at 12.) Instead, they posit, the eviction was due to a 
“documented criminal incident” and “[n]onpayment of rent” that the complaint itself notes. ( Id. 
at 12–14.) Plaintiffs largely do not respond to this argument and instead point to factual allegations 
outside the complaint. (Doc. 118 at 11–13.) The court agrees with Defendants. 
“[A]t the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff need only state a plausible claim.” 
O’Connor v. Collett’s Mountain Resorts, Inc. , No. 25-CV-487-DBB, 2026 WL 91584, at *3 (D. 
Utah Jan. 13, 2026) (holding in the context of ADA and FHA claims that at the motion to dismiss 
stage, a Plaintiff need only state a plausible claim (in lieu of a prima facie one) and “need not rebut 
a defendant’s proffered rationale for termination.”). Plaintiffs’ complaint lists several “protected 
activit[ies]” to include: “reporting the sex o ffender and lease violatio n to SG Communities; 
contacting the Kansas Bureau of Investiga tion; filing ADA accommodation requests; submitting 
KORA requests; filing complaints with the Sedgwick County Undersheriff; filing complaints with 
the Department of Justice; filing a housing di scrimination complaint w ith HUD; and filing this 
federal civil rights action.” (Doc. 111 at 22.) Plai ntiffs plead that Defend ants retaliated against 
 
3 The Tenth Circuit has not formally adopted this standard in a published opinion, however in the unpublished opinion 
cited here, the circuit substituted this four-part test for the alte rnative three-part test used by the district court in that 
case. Hatfield, 2022 WL 2452379, at *8, n. 5. That three-part test is the same one suggested by Defendants. See 
(Doc. 117 at 12.) The court therefore takes the same approach as the Tenth Circuit and substitutes what the court of 
appeals has at least suggested is the correct standard. Id. 
4 As noted above, Defendants analyze the retaliation claim under a different standard. (Doc. 117 at 12.) Additionally, 
some of their arguments are more appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage as they call for the court to 
consider and weigh facts outside the complaint through the McDonnell Douglas analysis. They argue that even if 
Plaintiffs can satisfy the prima facie test, the complaint’s only evidence of intent is “temporal proximity” and that that 
is insufficient in the face of a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for lease termination.” (Id. at 12–13.) 

12 
 
them by serving a notice to quit within two days of the April 2, 2025, incident, by filing for eviction 
within 11 days after “P laintiffs’ protected May 1, 2025 rent action while this federal case was 
active; and coordinating with law enforcement to ta rget Plaintiffs as docu mented in the Officer 
Safety Bulletin.” (Id.) But on Plaintiffs’ own pleaded facts, the court cannot characterize this as 
a “plausible” claim for re taliation under the FHA. O’Connor, 2026 WL 91584, at *3. As 
Defendants argue, Plaintiffs have not pled facts that show the actions taken against them were “on 
account of” their allegedly protected activity under the FHA. Hatfield, 2022 WL 2452379, at *8. 
Plaintiffs plead that the notice to quit, serv ed two days after the April 2 incident, cited 
“Crime Free Community Rules and Regulations Section E and Section F, alleging ‘Threatening or 
intimidating, assault.’” (Doc. 111 at 14.) This undercuts their ow n allegations that the notice to 
quit and eviction proceedings were in retaliation for exercising th eir FHA rights. Moreover, the 
“Officer Safety Bulletin” invoked by Plaintiffs “confirms the April 2 arrest ‘spurred evictions’”. 
(Id. at 15.) This also undercuts Pl aintiffs’ retaliation allegations; the admitted fact that Plaintiff 
was arrested (as pled “on a single battery charg e”), without more, renders conclusory Plaintiffs’ 
allegation that their eviction was because of protected activity under the FHA. (Id. at 11.) Other 
actions allegedly prompting retaliation fare no better, as Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that support 
the claim that Defendants “coordinat[ed] with law enforcement to target” them “as documented in 
the Officer Safety Bulletin.” (Doc. 111 at 22.) Without more, this is conclusory. The same goes 
for Plaintiff Rosalee Janette McClain’s allegati on that she was retaliated against because she 
“raise[d] concerns about the placement of a re gistered sex offender in violation of lease 
provisions . . . .” ( Id.) Plaintiffs plead no fa cts that make it plausible to believe that the 
“retaliation” occurred because Plain tiffs raised concerns. To be sure, if Plaintiffs’ allegations 
regarding the lease covenant and the placement of a registered sex offender in violation thereof are 

13 
 
true, they are understandably tr oubling; however, the allegations in the pleading suggest nothing 
more than a potential state law claim for breach of lease covena nts, not a federal claim for FHA 
retaliation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FHA retaliation claim must be dismissed. 
B. Civil RICO 
 
Plaintiffs invoke two different parts of the civil RICO statute: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d). Subsection (c) concerns part icipation in an enterp rise’s affairs through 
racketeering activity. Subsection (d) concerns cons piracy to violate the RI CO Act. To properly 
plead a claim under § 1962(c) Plain tiffs must plausibly allege “(1) investment in, control of, or 
conduct of (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Llacua v. Western 
Range Ass’n, 930 F.3d 1161, 1176 (10th Cir. 2019) ( quoting Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 
(10th Cir. 2006)). 
The RICO Act contains several detailed definitions that must be satisfied for the act to 
apply. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)–(10). Additionall y, courts have imposed pleading requirements 
specific to the RICO context. Specific to Plain tiffs’ claim, to “establish liability under § 1962(c) 
one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise 
that is not simply the same person referred to by a different name.” Llacua, 930 F.3d at 1176 
(citing Cedric Kushner Prom otions, Ltd. v. King , 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Plaintiffs plead that their facts satisfy these definitions and requirements. (Doc. 
111 at 22–23.) 
Defendants disagree and raise a host of arguments ag ainst application of the RICO Act. 
First, they argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations of “predicate acts” (used to establish a “pattern” of 
racketeering activity), are deficient for multiple reasons. (Doc. 117 at 4–6.) Next, they argue that 
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not distinguish between the RICO “person” and the enterprise with which 

14 
 
they are involved. ( Id. at 6.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled 
cognizable injuries under the statute. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs resist these arguments. (Doc. 118 at 
2–9.) The court considers the arguments in turn. 
1. Predicate Acts 
 
Courts have construed the statute’s phrase “pattern of racketeering activity” to require the 
commission of at least two predicate criminal acts. George v. Urban Settlement Serv. , 833 F.3d 
1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5 )). “But, ‘while tw o acts are necessary, 
they may not be sufficient’ to establish a pattern.” Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 
U.S. 479, 496, n. 14 (1985)). “According to the Supreme Court, a RICO pattern requires that the 
racketeering predicates relate to each other and amount to a threat of continued racketing activity.” 
Johnson v. Heath, 56 F.4th 851, 858–59 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 
U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). 
The Tenth Circuit has explained that the “relationship” standard is “not a cumbersome one” 
but nonetheless requires that the predicate acts “have the same or similar purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated events.” Id. at 859 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 and 
Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 761 (10th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
By contrast, the “continuity” standard is more “stringent.” Id. The continuity inquiry is 
fact-specific. Id. There are two kinds of con tinuity: closed or open-ended. Id. “Closed-ended 
continuity is a closed period of repeated racketeering conduct, while open-ended continuity 
consists of racketeering conduct that threatens future repetition.” Id. (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 
241). Open-ended continuity is shown by “racketee ring acts [that] involve d implicit or explicit 
threats of repetition, that they fo rmed the operations of an associ ation that exists for criminal 

15 
 
purposes, or that they were the defendants’ regular way of conducting a legitimate enterprise.” Id. 
at 859–60 (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241–42.) Closed-ended continuity “consists of a closed 
period of repeated, related racketeering acts that do not necessarily threaten future repetition.” Id. 
at 860. The Tenth Circuit “consider[s] two factors when determining the existence of closed-ended 
continuity—the duration of the re lated predicate acts and the exte nsiveness of the racketeering 
scheme.” Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated 
on other grounds by Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009)). Extensiveness is informed by 
a range of considerations, including “the number of victims, the number of racketeering acts, the 
variety of racketeering acts, whether the injuries were distinct, the complexity and size of the 
scheme, and the nature or char acter of the enterprise.” Id. (internal quotati on marks omitted). 
This is a totality of the circumstances approac h, and “no factor is required or dispositive.” Id. at 
861 (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1543 n. 9, 1544 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
Defendants here argue that Plaintiffs’ predicate acts are deficient because the complaint (1) 
does not meet the pleading standard under Rule 9(b) and (2) does not identify two predicate acts 
attributable to SG Communities and Megan Ba ugh. (Doc. 117 at 4–6.) Plaintiffs fail to 
substantively respond to these arguments and inst ead insist that two pred icate acts have been 
adequately pleaded. (Doc. 118 at 4–6.) The court agrees with Defendants. 
Plaintiffs’ complaint contains allegations of tw o predicate acts: wire fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 and obstruction of official pr oceedings in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. 
Defendants are correct that these predicates fail to satisfy the RICO Act’s requirements. The court 
will not address the Rule 9(b) pleading arguments raised by Defendants because the court holds 
that even assuming arguendo that the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b), the claim fails for other 
reasons. 

16 
 
First, Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs ’ burden is to identify two predicate acts 
attributed to each defendant. As another court explained in ZibalStar, L.C. v. Conte, No. 17-CV-
563, 2018 WL 1578019, at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2018): 
The Tenth Circuit's use of the word ‘each’ in Hickenlooper and George was not arbitrary. 
The language of § 1962(c) does not make it unlawful for an enterprise to conduct its own 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. In fact, Ԥ 1962(c) requires that the 
“person” conducting the enterprise's affairs be distinct from the “enterprise.”’ Rather, it is 
unlawful for a person to conduct the affair s of an enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering activity. Consequently, it is not enough to allege that a RICO enterprise 
conducted its affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity and that the several defendants 
are part of the enterprise. Instead, to state a RICO claim against a person under § 1962(c), 
the plaintiffs must allege that each defendant conducted the affairs of an enterprise through 
the defendant’s own pattern of racketeering activity. 
 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also In re HomeAdvisor, Inc. Litig., 491 F. Supp. 3d 
879, 893 (D. Colo. 2020). Given that Plaintiffs fail to so allege, and only attribute the wire fraud 
predicate to Amy Means (who is not a defendant but argued to be an agent of SG Communities), 
(see Doc. 118 at 5), this means there is only one predicate act alleged ag ainst SG Communities 
and none against Megan Baugh. This is insufficient. 
But even if the court construed Plaintiffs’ second predicate act of obstruction of an official 
proceeding (which is alleged solely against Sh eriff Easter) as applicable to Defendants SG 
Communities and Megan Baugh, it would still fail. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is inapplicable to any of the 
allegations in this lawsuit because “official pr oceedings” is a term defined by statute and only 
applies to proceedings in federal courts, Congress, federal agencies, or certain insurance regulatory 
contexts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A)–(D); see also Deck v. Engineered Laminates , 349 F.3d 
1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We must, however, disr egard two of the alle ged predicate acts. 
First, witness tampering is actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 only if it takes place “in an official 
proceeding,” which is defined in § 1515(a)(1) to include only federal proceedings.”). For these 
reasons, Plaintiffs’ RICO claim against Defendants SG Communities and Megan Baugh must fail. 

17 
 
2. Enterprise/Person Distinction 
 
Under § 1962(c) “the defendant person must be an entity distinct from the alleged 
enterprise.” Llacua, 930 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Brannon v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Okla. , 
153 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotat ion marks omitted). The RICO “person” 
and “enterprise” may not be “simply the same person referred to by a different name. Id. (quoting 
In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig. , 727 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, this is not an easy requirement to parse and is 
“heavily litigated.” Id. at 1182–83. Defendants point to cases from this court that have apparently 
dismissed claims of a similar variety to Plaintiffs’. (Doc. 125 at 2–3.) 
Plaintiffs posit that the “enterprise” in this case is a “seven-party association” made up of 
the Board of Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Defendant Easter, Defendants Humig and Nail, 
Defendant Langley, SG Communities, and Defendant Baugh. (Doc. 118 at 2.) SG Communities 
and Megan Baugh are alleged to be RICO “persons.” (Id.) This is clearly distinct from the cases 
that Defendants cite, where the question was merely whether a corporation and its employees could 
be considered the “enterprise” and the corporat ion itself could be considered the “person.” See 
Tronsgard v. FBL Fin. Grp. , 312 F. Supp. 3d 982, 995 (D. Kan. 2018) (“Defendants assert that 
plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the RICO ‘enter prise’ consists of the defendant corporation, its 
subsidiaries, and agents who carry out the primar y business of Farm Bureau by selling insurance 
products through the recruitment an d use of insurance agents.”); Multi-Media Intern., L.L.C. v. 
Promag Retail Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1035 (D. Kan. 2004) (“And as Defendant correctly 
points out, Defendant Promag canno t serve the dual role as a defend ant and the enterprise in an 
action based on § 1962(c).”). 

18 
 
Still though, Plaintiffs’ claim does fail to plead an ente rprise. The Supreme Court has 
“explained [] that ‘an enterpri se includes any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact’ . . . .” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 
452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). “From the terms of RICO , it is apparent that an association-in-fact 
enterprise must have at leas t three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 
associated with the enterprise, and longevity su fficient to permit these a ssociates to pursue the 
enterprise's purpose.” Id. at 946. Plaintiffs have not pled these characteristics and therefore cannot 
plausibly allege that their “seven-party association” is an enterprise for th e purposes of count V. 
This is an independent reason why Plaintiffs’ count V claims must fail. 
3. Cognizable Injury 
 
Defendants’ last argument also succeeds. Under the terms of the civil RICO statute, only 
those “injured in [their] busine ss or property by reason of a viol ation of section 1962 may sue.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Courts have interpreted th is to mean that certa in injuries are not 
“recover[able.]” Safe Streets Allian ce v. Hickenlooper , 859 F.3d 865, 888–89 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(“But a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional, pe rsonal, or speculative future injuries under § 
1964(c).”). Plaintiffs’ complaint helpfully lists their injuries as: “loss of their home and personal 
property; emergency displacement housing costs documented in Airbnb receipts . . . ; exacerbation 
of service-connected PTSD, TBI, and stroke; di sruption of VA-prescribed therapeutic housing 
stability; fear for personal safety; emotional distress; and all other damages to be proven at trial.” 
(Doc. 111 at 16.) The complaint also breaks out separate harms for Mrs. McClain who “suffered 
PTSD symptoms, anxiety, fear, loss of safety, and compounded distress arising from violations of 
her own rights and the violations of her husband’s rights.” (Id.) 

19 
 
These alleged harms are not c ognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). First, the claims of 
“exacerbation of PTSD, TBI, and stroke; disruption of VA-prescrib ed housing stability; fear for 
personal safety, [and] emotional distress” are all personal injuries and fall outside of the reach of 
§ 1964(c). Amaya v. Bregman, 149 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1320 (D.N.M. 2015) (“In ordinary usage, 
injury to business or property does not denote physical or emotional harm to a person. Indeed the 
Supreme Court has declared that Congress’ limitati on of recovery to business or property injury 
retains restrictive significance. It would for example exclude personal injuries suffered. To 
establish standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must proffer proof of a concrete financial loss.”) 
(cleaned up) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The same is 
true of all of the individually listed harms pertinent to Mrs. McClain. 
Plaintiffs’ remaining harm of “loss of th eir home and personal property” to include 
“emergency displacement housing costs” is a clos er call. (Doc. 111 at 16.) These are clearly 
harms to “property” which are covered by § 1964(c). See also Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn , 
604 U.S. 593, 601 (2025) (“In short, a plaintiff can seek damages for business or property loss 
regardless of whether the loss resulted from a pe rsonal injury.”). But the statute has “other 
constraints on civil RICO claims.” Id. at 612. The Supreme Court has “reiterated that § 1964(c)’s 
‘by reason of’ language demands ‘s ome direct relationship between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inves. Prot. Corp. , 503 U.S. 258, 268 
(1992)). “The key word is direct; foreseeability does not cut it.” Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs’ claims are anything but direct. Paragraphs 56 an d 57 of Plaintiffs’ complaint 
detail their view of causation. (Doc. 111 at 23.) Plaintiff claims that the enterprise began engaging 
in racketeering activity in June 2022 when an empl oyee at Maple Village tr ansmitted an offer to 

20 
 
Plaintiffs that they contend was fraudulent. (Id.) Plaintiffs argue that this pattern was “continuous” 
and commencing with the aforementioned email and “continuing through the concealment of the 
sex offender, the April 2, 2025 arrest, the reta liatory eviction, and the ongoing suppression of 
records through the date of this filing.” ( Id.) It should be clear that this is a very attenuated 
sequence of events, involving multiple parties that are not obviously connected, threaded together 
by only two events nearly three years apart. The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have 
recognized that “RICO claims [fail] to meet the proximate cause element [w hen] ‘[t]he cause of 
[the] asserted harms’ [is] ‘a set of actions [] entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation [].’” 
Safe Streets Alliance , 859 F.3d at 890 (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. , 547 U.S. 451, 
458 (2006)). Here, that is emphatically the case. The cause of the asserted harm (Plaintiffs loss 
of their home and property, and ensuing “displacement costs”) is Plaintiffs’ eviction, the cause of 
which is “entirely distinct” from the predicate acts (wire fraud and obs truction of official 
proceedings) that make up Pl aintiffs’ RICO claim. Id.; (Doc. 111 at 16, 23.) For this additional 
reason, Plaintiffs’ RICO claim cannot proceed.5 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants SG Communities’ and Megan Baugh’s motion to 
dismiss (Doc. 116) is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 10th day of June, 2026. 
 
s/ John W. Broomes 
JOHN W. BROOMES 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
 
 
5 Because Plaintiffs’ RICO claim under § 1962(c) fails, their conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) must fail as well. See 
Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing cases) (“If a plaintiff has no viable claim under § 1962(a), 
(b), or (c), then its subsection (d) conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.”). 

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