govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-02047-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
MICHEAL PLONKA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
SILVER STAR PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This case is before the Court on the parties’ joint motion to approve a settlement 
agreement (Doc. 23), which the parties filed with the Court under seal (Doc. 26). 
In December 2024, Defendant Silver Star Protection Group hired Plaintiff Micheal 
Plonka as a security guard. Plaintiff physically worked for Defendant from April to May 2025 
but remained an active employee until October 2025. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant 
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by failing to pay him all earned overtime 
premiums and retaliating against him for reporting unlawful wage practices. It also purports to 
assert claims under the Illinois Minimum Wage Act and the Illinois Wage Payment and 
Collection Act, and common law claims for conversion, unjust enrichment/quantum merit (in the 
alternative), and spoilation of evidence. The proposed settlement agreement contains a broad 
release that covers all claims brought in this case. 
It is well-established that a party may not bargain away his rights under the FLSA to 
certain wage payment rates; this would defeat the statute’s purpose of guaranteeing those wage 
rates. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 
324 U.S. 697, 703–04 (1945). There is the same danger where parties settle claims; the end result 
may effectively circumvent the FLSA’s requirements. For this reason, FLSA cases can only be Page ID
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settled under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) or by a 
stipulated judgment after a Court scrutinizes the proposed settlement for fairness. Lynn’s Food 
Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 1982), cited with approval by 
Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986); see Koch v. Jerry W. 
Bailey Trucking, Inc., 51 F.4th 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2022); Gratton v. Cielo, Inc., No. 23-CV-1647-
BHL, 2024 WL 3594653, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 31, 2024). 
Since the Department of Labor is not involved in this case, it can only be settled by a 
stipulated judgment after Court scrutiny of the proposed settlement. In its review of the proposed 
settlement, the Court will examine (1) whether the proposed settlement brings resolution to a 
bona fide dispute as opposed to simply accomplishing a waiver of statutory rights, (2) whether 
the proposed settlement is a reasonable compromise of the issues in dispute, (3) whether the 
proposed settlement was obtained fairly and not by overreaching by the defendant, and (4) any 
other matter relevant to the fairness of the settlement. See Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1354. 
The Court has considered all the factors and finds that the settlement is fair. There are 
numerous bona fide disputes between the parties. Defendant disputes liability, the extent of 
compensatory damages, and the availability of liquidated and punitive damages. The settlement 
is a reasonable resolution of the issues in dispute. It provides Plaintiff with all unpaid overtime 
and backpay that he claims he is owed and includes an award of liquidated damages based on 
that amount. The only compromise reflected in the settlement relates to Plaintiff’s retaliation-
based damages. All parties are represented by experienced counsel who appear to have 
negotiated this settlement at arm’s length and in good faith. For these reasons, the Court 
approves the amount negotiated to compensate Plaintiff. Page ID
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However, the Court will reduce the attorney’s fee award. The settlement agreement 
provides Plaintiff’s counsel with $10,485 in attorney’s fees and costs.1 An affidavit submitted by 
Plaintiff’s counsel breaks down the fees as follows: 
Timekeeper Role Hours Rate Total 
Travis Lampert Attorney 11.6 $575 $6,670.00 
Yousef Ahmad Attorney 3.8 $475 $1,805.00 
Ahmed Mallah Pa ralegal 1.8 $195 $351.00 
Ashley Feeny Paralegal 1.5 $195 $292.50 
Jenna Morgan Paralegal 1.2 $195 $234.00 
Rossana Galeano Paralegal 2.3 $195 $448.50 
Sarah Rochford Paralegal 0.7 $195 $136.50 
Sharon Morales Pa ralegal 0.1 $195 $19.50 
Kevin Gilman Filing Clerk 0.7 $125 $87.50 
 To evaluate an attorney’s fee award in the settlement of an FLSA case, the Court uses the 
lodestar method. Koch, 51 F.4th at 753. The lodestar method involves “multiplying the number 
of hours the attorney reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” 
Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court can then 
adjust the total amount based on various factors specific to the litigation, including but not 
limited to the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the length of his relationship 
with the client, and the “undesirability” of the case. Id. at 742 n.1. 
 
1 Plaintiff’s counsel alleges that the lodestar value of the attorney’s fees is $10,044.50, and they are entitled to 
reasonable litigation expenses of $485. There is a $44.50 difference between the attorney’s fees and costs awarded 
in the settlement agreement and the attorney’s fees and costs alleged by Plaintiff’s counsel. Page ID
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A reasonable hourly rate is presumed to be an attorney’s actual billing rate for 
comparable work. Jeffboat, LLC v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 553 F.3d 487, 489–
90 (7th Cir. 2009); Mathur, 317 F.3d at 743. If a fee applicant is “unable to provide evidence of 
her actual billing rates,” the Court must “look to other evidence, including ‘rates similar 
experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work.’” Mathur, 317 
F.3d at 743 (quoting Spegon v. Cath. Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999)). The 
fee applicant bears the burden of proving his market rate. Id. at 742; Jeffboat, 553 F.3d at 489. 
The only evidence that the hourly rates are reasonable is lead attorney Travis Lampert’s 
self-serving affidavit that alleges the rates charged are reasonable, and his statement in a 
telephone status conference that these amounts were charged pursuant to a contractual agreement 
that is used by the firm with all clients whom the firm represents on a contingency basis. This 
evidence is of limited probative value regarding the reasonableness of the rates. “An attorney’s 
self-serving affidavit alone cannot satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of establishing the market rate 
for that attorney’s services.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 556. To the extent the affidavit is probative, it 
provides no information about the experience level of Mr. Ahmad, the firm’s paralegals, or the 
firm’s filing clerk. In addition, although the rates come from a contract that Plaintiff signed, the 
contract was a contingency agreement. Accordingly, the rates are only paid if the firm obtains an 
award, and the rates are either paid out of the award or paid by the defendant in connection with 
the award. In other words, these rates are not charged to clients, and do not establish the market 
rate. 
Given the limited information that has been provided, and the minimal probative value of 
that information, the Court will apply its own knowledge regarding the market value of legal Page ID
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services. Based on that experience, the Court finds that the rate of Mr. Lampert is reasonable, but 
the rates of attorney Yousef Ahmad, the firm’s paralegals, and the firm’s filing clerk are 
unreasonable. 
 Mr. Lampert is a seasoned attorney that has been practicing for eleven years and has 
substantial experience in wage-and-hour and employment cases. This experience allowed him to 
work with Plaintiff to determine whether he had a colorable claim against Defendant. The Court 
is satisfied that a rate of $575 per hour is reasonable for Mr. Lampert’s legal work in this case. 
Mr. Ahmad is an associate with limited experience. He did not file a notice of appearance 
in this case, and the hours that he expended were limited to conducting research on Plaintiff’s 
claims. The Court finds that a rate of $225 per hour is reasonable for Mr. Ahmad’s legal work in 
this case. 
The Court has no information on the level of experience of the firm’s paralegals and 
filing clerk. It believes that a reasonable rate for these individuals is $125 per hour for the firm’s 
paralegals and $90 per hour for the firm’s filing clerk. 
Now that the Court has determined the reasonable hourly rates of each timekeeper, it 
must analyze whether all the hours were reasonably expended. The Court can disallow hours as 
not reasonably expended if they are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Stark v. 
PPM Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2004). The affidavit provided by Mr. Lambert does 
not provide detailed information about the tasks performed by each individual. However, the 
Court received more detailed information from Mr. Lambert in a telephone status conference. 
Based on the information provided, the Court is satisfied that the hours included in the fee award 
were reasonably expended by counsel and support staff. Page ID
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Applying the new rates, the attorney’s fee award is reduced to $8,538.00. Plaintiff is also 
entitled to $485 in reasonable costs, which includes the filing fee ($405) and service expenses 
($80). Thus, the Court approves an attorney’s fees and costs award of $9,023.00.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the joint motion for approval of the 
settlement agreement (Doc. 23). It APPROVES the settlement agreement (Doc. 26) except that 
attorney’s fees and costs are approved in the amount of $9,023.00 rather than the requested 
$10,485.00. It DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment of dismissal of this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 10, 2026
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge Page ID
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