govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01935-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
DR. ASHLEY BECKER, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
vs. 
 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 
SOUTHWESTERN ILLINOIS 
COLLEGE, COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
DISTRICT NO. 522,1 
 
 Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge: 
Plaintiff Dr. Ashley Becker began her employment as the Dean of Business, Health 
Sciences, and Homeland Security at Southwestern Illinois College in January 2021 (Doc. 
1, para. 16). In the spring of 2024, the College’s Board of Directors declined to renew her 
contract and her employment ended in approximately June 2024 (Doc. 1, para. 16, 203 –
04). Dr. Becker initiated this lawsuit in October 21, 2025 against Southwestern Illinois 
College—with a detailed and thorough 47 -page complaint—alleging sex discrimination 
(Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III) in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Doc. 1). The College responded to Dr. Becker’s 
 
 
1 The common name under which the community college operates is Southwestern Illinois College. The 
Court will refer to the college by its common name throughout this Order. 
 
2 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §636(c) (see Doc. 16). Page ID
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complaint with a motion to dismiss (Doc. 17), which is currently before the Court.3 
For the reasons outlined below, the motion to dismiss is denied. The College will 
be ordered to file an Answer to Dr. Becker’s Complaint. 
A. DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(B)(1) FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The College first argues that this matter should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Dr. Becker failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies (Doc. 17, pp. 3–4). This argument fails for two reasons. First, as 
the Supreme Court explained, Title VII’s charge -filing requirement is not jurisdictional. 
Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (“Title VII's charge-filing requirement is 
a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the 
adjudicatory authority of the courts.”). Second, Dr. Becker demonstrated that she did, in 
fact, receive a Right to Sue letter from the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 
on July 23, 2025 (Doc. 18-1), and she filed suit within 90 days (Doc. 1). 
B. DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
The College next argues that all three counts of Dr. Becker’s complaint should be 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (Doc. 17, pp. 4 –8). In 
deciding whether the complaint sufficiently states a claim, the court must “construe it in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept well -pleaded facts as true, and draw all 
inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 
2014) (citation omitted). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
 
 
3 Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 18). Defendant did not file a reply. Page ID
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sufficient factual matter to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), and plausibly 
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim must be plausible 
rather than merely conceivable or speculative, meaning that the plaintiff must include 
‘enough details about the subject -matter of the case to present a story that holds 
together[.]’” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 826 –27 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 
404–05 (7th Cir. 2010)). “In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have 
happened, not did they happen.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404 –05 (emphasis in original). See 
also Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The purpose of a motion 
to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” ) (citation 
omitted). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a 
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). 
1. Sex Discrimination 
The College argues that Dr. Becker failed to state a claim for sex discrimination in 
Count 1 because she did not allege that she was treated less favorably than a similarly 
situated employee and did not even identify a similarly -situated employee in her 
Complaint (Doc. 17, pp. 6–7). This argument, however, is based on the legal standard for 
proving a prima facie case of sex discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. See Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 867 (7th Cir. 2018). The Seven th 
Circuit has very clearly instructed that in pleading a sex discrimination claim, a “plaintiff Page ID
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is not required to include allegations —such as the existence of a similarly situated 
comparator—that would establish a prima facie case of discrimination . . . .” Carlson v. 
CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506, 511 –12 (2002)). See also Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 493 (7th Cir. 2022) 
(“[F]ederal pleading standards do not ‘demand that complaints contain all legal elements 
(or factors) [of a particular legal theory] plus facts correspon ding to each.’”) (quoting 
Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop. , 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017). Rather, “[a] complaint 
alleging sex discrimination under Title VII ‘need only aver that the employer instituted a 
(specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her sex.’” 
Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827 (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
Here, Dr. Becker has alleged, amongst other things, that she was paid less than her 
male counterparts for the same/similar work, she was denied a promotion that went to 
a less qualified male, changes were made to her job title, responsibilities, and 
departments, and her employment was ultimately terminated because she is female and 
the College’s predominantly male Board either viewed her as being problematic because 
she was strong-willed, outspoken, and making waves or the Board simply preferred to 
have a male in her position (see Doc. 1, para. 43–47, 126–30, 136, 168–87, 200–11, 223–34). 
Dr. Becker supported her claims with many factual allegations (see, e.g., Doc. 1, para. 19, 
23–53, 60–78, 89, 93, 96–114, 133–37, 143, 147–153, 166–74, 178–80, 183–87, 193–98), which 
the Court must accept as true at this stage. Dr. Becker has thus easily satisfied the 
pleading standard for a Title VII sex discrimination claim. Page ID
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2. Hostile Work Environment 
The College next argues that Dr. Becker failed to state a claim for hostile work 
environment because she failed to allege sufficient facts showing she was subjected to 
unwelcome harassment (Doc. 17, p. 7). The entirety of the College’s argument is that Dr. 
Becker used the word “harassment” only once in the factual allegations of her complaint 
and that statement was a legal conclusion (Id.). 
The College’s contention completely ignores the substance of Dr. Becker’s factual 
allegations. The Complaint contains dozens of pages with factual allegations 
demonstrating that during her employment at the College, Dr. Becker learned of, 
witnessed, and experienced the College’s senior male leadership and Board members 
treating female leaders in an inferior and markedly different fashion than males. For 
example, Dr. Becker alleges that the female leaders were infantilized (e.g., called “kiddo”) 
and were not called by their professional titles, while the men were (Doc. 1, para. 39–42). 
She also alleges that female leaders were excluded from important decision -making 
processes and meetings at the institution ( Id. at para. 24, 49). When the females were 
invited, the senior male leadership and Board members demeaned the females and 
undermined their authority by raising their voices and making belittling comments to 
them (Id. at para. 31–32). Dr. Becker alleges that f emale leaders were paid less than the 
males (para. 24, 43–47, 136), and that females were repeatedly denied promotions in favor 
of less qualified males as a result of the Board’s personnel practices reflecting gender bias 
and discrimination (para. 24, 28, 66 –78, 88, 89, 93 –134, 139–51). Dr. Becker alleges that 
capable, strong-willed female leaders who spoke out were r epeatedly targeted and/or Page ID
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forced out of their positions under suspicious circumstances and/or for pretextual 
reasons (para. 26, 27, 38, 87, 89, 93, 98 –107, 133–35, 166, 186–88, 193–98, 211). Dr. Becker 
was warned (or threatened, depending on how one views the situation) that the Board 
would view her as a “complaining woman” and would manufacture a pretextual reason 
to get rid of her, and so she should “ keep [her] head down” to avoid being targeted ” 
because the Board had sufficient influence to negatively affect her future career in the 
region (para. 78 –82). Dr. Becker ’s Complaint describes how the senior male leaders’ 
actions created an overtly discriminatory environment and culture of fear and 
intimidation among female leaders, which adversely affected her emotional well -being 
(para. 33, 36, 93, 189, 214). 
Simply put, Dr. Becker’s allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim for 
hostile work environment. See Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook 
Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard for stating a hostile work 
environment claim). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“Title VII 
comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. A 
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect 
employees' psychological well -being, can and often will detract from employees' job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from 
advancing in their careers. ”); Jackson v. Cnty. of Racine , 474 F.3d 493, 500 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that workplace need not be “hellish” and relevant question for a hostile work 
environment claim is “whether a protected group is experiencing abuse in the workplace, 
on account of their protected characteristic, to the detriment of their job performance or Page ID
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advancement.”); Cooper-Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys ., 361 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A 
hostile environment is one that is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule 
and insult.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
3. Retaliation 
Finally, the College argues that Dr. Becker failed to state a Title VII claim for 
retaliation because she did not allege specific protected expressions or dates —instead 
making generalized references to “good -faith complaints” and “numerous occasions.” 
According to the College, Dr. Becker therefore failed to allege a causal connection 
between a specific protect ed expression and an adverse employment action (Doc. 17, p. 
8). But again here, the College’s argument is without merit and must fail . Dr. Becker 
alleged that she complained about gender -based disparate treatment to the President, 
more than one Board Member, Human Resources, and the interim Chief Administrative 
Officer (e.g., Doc. 1, para. 48, 64 –68, 83, 93, 154 –62, 171–80, 183–87). Dr. Becker alleged 
that she suffered adverse action s, for example, she was denied a promotion, she was 
stripped of responsibilities and oversight, and her contract was not renewed without any 
reason given (Id. at para. 172 –74, 204, 207, 216 –20). And Dr. Becker alleges a plausible 
causal relation between her complaints and the adverse actions she suffered through her 
numerous allegations about the College’s history of treating female leaders in an inferior 
fashion, the Board members’ preference for males and disdain for females, previous 
female leaders who were pushed out of their positions, and warnings she received about 
becoming a target (Id. at para. 25–27, 34, 36, 69–78, 82, 89, 93, 98–103, 178–80, 187). This is 
more than enough to state a claim for retaliation. Page ID
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, the College’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is 
DENIED. The College shall file its Answer to Dr. Becker’s complaint within 14 days of 
the date of this Order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(4). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED: June 10, 2026 
 
 MARK A. BEATTY 
 United States Magistrate Judge Page ID
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