govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_26-cv-02047-2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
VICTORIA C. HOLLOMAN, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 26-2047-JWB 
 
 
RADIUS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the c ourt on Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
a more definite statement and Plai ntiff’s motion to file a surreply. (Docs. 19, 33.) The motions 
have been fully briefed and are ripe for decisio n. (Docs. 23, 24, 31.) Th e motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED IN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEME NT IN PART for the reasons set forth 
herein. 
I. Facts 
 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this matter . Plaintiff worked 
remotely for Defendant betw een May 27, 2025 and June 26, 2025.
1 From May 27 to June 13, 
2025, Plaintiff created a YouTube account where she “spoke about her love for God and support 
for the new administration.” (Doc . 1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff believes he r videos were shared at work 
leading to discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that she was forced into conversations about gay pride, 
sex changes, and identity issues, and that she was pressured to agree with viewpoints that she did 
not share. (Id. ¶ 14.) 
 
1 The complaint states that her dates of employment were May 27, 2025 to June 26, 2024. The court assumes that the 
2024 date was a typographical error. 

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 Plaintiff asserts that she was discriminated against because of her race (black), sex, 
religious beliefs, speech, status as a single mother, and sexual orie ntation. Plaintif f also asserts 
that Defendant retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff brings fifteen 
claims against Defendant, including the following: race, sex, and religious discrimination claims 
under Title VII; claims of retaliation and ho stile work environment under Title VII; race 
discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; a claim of First Amendment retaliation; and various 
state law claims. 
 Defendant moves to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s complaint is conclusory and not 
sufficient to state a claim. Al ternatively, Defendant asks for a more definite statement. In 
response, Plaintiff concedes that her First Amendment retaliation claim is subject to dismissal but 
asserts that her remaining claims should be liberally construed as a pro se plaintiff and allowed to 
proceed. 
II. Standard 
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a 
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face. Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from 
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 
1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations , however, have no bearing upon the court’s 
consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the c ourt is to liberally construe her filings. United 
States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). Howeve r, liberally construing filings does 

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not mean supplying additional factual allegations or constructing a legal theory on Plaintiff’s 
behalf. Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997). 
III. Analysis 
 Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII for discrimination on the basis of her sex, race, and 
religion. She also brings claims of hostile work environmen t and retaliation under Title VII. 
Plaintiff’s state law claims include invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence, negligent supervision, negligen t retention, defamation, fraud, and constructive 
discharge. Plaintiff’s allegations, however, are almost entirely conclusory. 
 Plaintiff alleges that she was “scolded, yell ed at and humiliated in front of others,” 
“experienced intentional misunderstandings,” “was isolated from groups,” “received mock calls,” 
“experienced invasion of privacy, including cameras and audio recordings,” her “requests to speak 
with HR or obtain relief were ignored,” sh e was “mocked by indivi duals,” blocked from 
promotions, given incorrect in formation, denied unemployment benefits, and made numerous 
complaints and was retaliated against for making the complaints. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s 
complaint fails to identify any facts regarding these allegations. Notabl y, Plaintiff has wholly 
failed to identify any actions that were taken because of her race or sex or religion. For example, 
Plaintiff alleges that she was ye lled at and humiliated but fails to identify who ye lled at her and 
what was said. Further, with re spect to her complaints, she fails to identity who she complained 
to and what was the substance of her complain t. Plaintiff should know the facts surrounding her 
alleged discriminatory treatme nt, including who made the stat ements, whether they were 
coworkers or supervisors, what the statements were, who did she complain to, and what was the 
basis of her complaint. 

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“A complaint raising a claim of discriminatio n does not need to conc lusively establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination, but it must contain more than [t]hreadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 
F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir. 2019). Th e Tenth Circuit does not “mandate the pleading of any 
specific facts in particular, [but ] a plaintiff must in clude enough context and detail to link the 
allegedly adverse employment action to a discriminatory or retaliatory motive with something 
besides sheer speculation.” Id. at 1274–75. Factual allegations rele vant to this inquiry include: 
“actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that could be viewed as reflecting a discriminatory 
animus . . . , preferential treatment given to employees [with different relevant characteristics] . . . 
or, more generally, upon the timing or sequence of events leading to plai ntiff's ter mination.” 
Plotke v. White , 405 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005). Plai ntiff’s complaint fa ils to plausibly 
allege a claim of Title VII discri mination. It also fail s to allege a claim of race discrimination 
under § 1981 which utilizes the same standards as Title VII. See Gerovic v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 
No. 22-1148, 2023 WL 2293518, at *7 (10th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023). 
Plaintiff also fails to allege a hostile wo rk environment claim wh ich requires a showing 
“(1) that she was discriminated against because of her sex [and/or race]; and (2) that the 
discrimination was sufficiently severe or pervasive such that it altered the terms or conditions of 
her employment and created an abusive working environment.” Sanderson v. Wy. Highway Patrol, 
976 F.3d 1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2020). Further, Plaintif f has not sufficiently alleged a retaliation 
claim because she fails to plausibly allege facts regarding her complaint of discrimination to show 
that she complained of race, sex, or religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. See Anderson 
v. Acad. Sch. Dist. 20, 122 F. App'x 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2004). 

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The court declines to specifically address all of Plaintiff’s state law claims as she has 
merely listed them in her complaint without any attempt to set forth facts to establish those claims. 
(Doc. 1 at 3.) In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and would also be subject 
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The court is cognizant of Plaintiff’s pro se status. As a result, the court will allow Plaintiff 
an opportunity to cure the defe cts as she may be able to st ate a claim against Defendant. Curley 
v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (providing that before dismissing a pro se plaintiff's 
complaint for failure to state a claim, “the district court should allow a [pro se] plaintiff an 
opportunity to cure technical errors or otherwise amend the complaint when doing so would yield 
a meritorious claim”). Therefor e, Plaintiff must file an ame nded complaint that includes the 
approximate dates when events occurred, specif ic acts or omissions taken by Defendant, and a 
factual basis for each claim. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alte rnative, for a more de finite statement (Doc. 
19) is GRANTED IN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT IN PART. Plaintiff’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim is dismissed. As to the remaining claims, on or before June 29, 2026, 
Plaintiff must file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this order. Should 
Plaintiff fail to do so, her complaint will be dismissed without prejudice without further notice. 
 Plaintiff’s motion to file a surreply (Doc. 33) is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 9th day of June, 2026. 
s/ John W. Broomes 
JOHN W. BROOMES 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
 

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