govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_25-cv-01312-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 * 
DAMON B. WILSON, * 
 
 Plaintiff, * 
 
 v. * Civ. No. 8:25- cv-1312-PX 
 
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 
TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al., * 
 
Defendants. * 
 *** 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Pending is Plaintiff Damon B. Wilson (“Wilson”)’s motion for leave to file a fourth 
amended complaint that Defendants, Metro Officers Bryan Castro (“Castro”) and Gerald Rich 
(“Rich”), oppose as futile. ECF Nos. 33 & 37. The Court finds no need for a hearing. See D. Md. 
Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to amend is granted in part and denied in 
part. 
I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
 This lawsuit arises from Wilson’s interaction with Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority (“WMATA”) police officers after he allegedly failed to pay the fare for his M etrobus 
ride. See ECF Nos. 4 & 33-3. According to the proposed fourth amended complaint, on December 
11, 2023, Wilson, “a disabled individual,” boarded a Metrobus with his “Smart Trip Card,” which 
allowed him to ride the bus for free. ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 14. Castro, wearing plain clothes, “tapped 
[Wilson] on the shoulder,” identified himself as a law enforcement officer, and accused Wilson of 
not paying the fare. Id. ¶¶ 13–16. Wilson, in turn, showed Castro his unexpired Smart Trip Card 
which allowed Wilson to ride without paying the fare. Id. ¶ 17. But because Wilson “ had not 

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 II. Standard of Review 
 Amendment of pleadings should be granted liberally, unless the amendment prejudices the 
defendant, is futile, or was brought in bad faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Mayfield v. National 
Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Matrix Capital 
Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)). “Futility is apparent if 
the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying 
standards.” Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc ., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether a claim is futile, the Court reviews the cause of 
action under the same sufficiency standard articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
Kerrigan v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll Cnty., Civ. No. JKB-14-3153, 2016 WL 470827, at *3 (D. Md. 
Feb. 8, 2016). The Court must “accept the well -pled allegations of the complaint as true,” and 
“construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). The factual allegations must 
be enough to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 
435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
 
with a copy of the complaint.”). See also Mathies v. Silver, 266 F. App’x 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding a failure to 
effectuate service where summons was not signed or sealed by Clerk); Craig v. Melwood Horticultural Training Ctr., 
Inc., No. PWG-13-2742, 2014 WL 3547341, at *2 (D. Md. July 16, 2014) (concluding without “ valid summons, no 
amount of diligence would have allowed [plaintiff ] to attempt service on [defendant]”); Combs v. Shapiro & Burson 
LLP, No. GJH-15-846, 2016 WL 1064459, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2016) (finding insufficient service where plaintiff 
did not “provide properly executed summons for each Defendant to the Clerk for signature and seal”); Clayton v. Islas 
Transportation, LLC, No. 8:18-CV-03964-PX, 2019 WL 4805671, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2019) (“[Plaintiff’s] repeated 
attempts at service, even if believed, were an exercise in futility when considering that counsel was attempting to serve 
an improper, unexecuted summons.”). However, because the Court will allow partial amendment of the pleading, the 
motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint for failure to effectuate proper service is moot. That said, Wilson is 
forewarned that he must effectuate proper service of the revised Fourth Amended Complaint pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to effectuate proper service will result in dismissal of the pleading against the 
affected defendant without further warning. 

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 The Court considers the sufficiency of each count of the proposed fourth a mended 
complaint. 
III. Analysis 
A. Battery – Castro & Harris (Count I) 
 
 The proposed amended pleading sues Harris and Castro for battery. “A battery occurs 
when one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another without that person’s consent,” and 
may occur “through a defendant’s direct or indirect contact with the plaintiff.” Nelson v. Carroll, 
735 A.2d 1096, 1099–1100 (Md. 1999). “[I]in the absence of physical contact, a battery claim 
must fail.” Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Griffith v. Truette, 
866 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D. Md. 1994) ). Also, “intent is required; mere accidental or inadvertent 
conduct that results in harmful contact with another does not rise to the level of assault or battery.” 
Wolfe v. Columbia Coll., Inc., No. GJH-20-1246, 2021 WL 2805952, at *13 (D. Md. July 6, 2021). 
As applied to law enforcement, “an officer is not liable for battery for using a reasonable amount 
of force when effectuating a lawful detention or arrest.” Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366, 
383 (D. Md. 2018). However, if the officer “uses excessive force, or force greater than is 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances,” a battery claim may proceed. Id. (quoting French 
v. Hines, 957 A.2d 1000, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)). 
 As to Castro, the pleading avers that the officer battered Wilson by “touching” him on the 
shoulder to get his attention. ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 30. This claim fails. No facts make plausible that 
a mere tap on the shoulder constitutes “harmful contact.” Nor do any facts reflect the requisite 
intent to cause such harmful contact. Accordingly, the claim cannot proceed as to Castro, and so 
amendment is denied as futile. 

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 Harris compels a different outcome. The proposed fourth a mended complaint avers that 
even though Wilson was exiting the bus in compliance with Castro’s orders, Harris shoved him 
twice from behind, causing Wilson to hit the ground with such force that Wilson ended up in the 
hospital for his injuries. The contact was plainly excessive and “harmful,” and bore no reasonable 
relation to legitimate law enforcement action . Thus, the Court will allow Wilson to amend the 
pleading, adding Harris to Count I. 
B. Assault – Castro & Harris (Count II) 
 Although “the term ‘assault’ is often used interchangeably with battery to embrace conduct 
that constitutes battery,” they are distinct causes of action under Maryland common law. Jones v. 
Chapman, Civ. No. ELH-14-2627, 2017 WL 2472220, at *24 (D. Md. June 7, 2017) (citing Lamb 
v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) ). “An assault is a consummated battery, 
an attempted battery, or placing a victim in reasonable fear of an imminent battery.” Id. (citing 
Snyder v. State , 63 A.3d 128, 135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013)). As with battery, however, law 
enforcement officers will not be liable for assault in the context of a legitimate detention or arrest. 
See infra pp. 15–16; Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The parallel state law 
claim of assault and battery is subsumed within the federal excessive force claim[.]”); Calloway v. 
Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 2020) (concluding that because “corrections officers did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment in conducting a strip search of [plaintiff] ,” the district court was 
correct in determining that state law assault claim failed). 
 The proposed pleading avers that Castro assaulted Wilson by displaying a mace can when 
ordering Wilson off the bus. Castro, however, only pulled out the mace after Wilson refused to 
follow Castro’s lawful command to leave the bus . ECF No. 33- 3 ¶¶ 18, 47. Viewing the facts 
most favorably to Wilson, a reasonable officer in Castro’s position could have legitimately, even 
if incorrectly, perceived Wilson to be evading the fare and then refusing to disembark. Castro’s 

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brief display of the mace in response cannot be construed as unreasonable or excessive, and thus 
cannot constitute an assault. The claim fails and amendment is denied as futile. 
 In contrast, the proposed fourth a mended complaint makes plausible that Harris battered 
Wilson. Because assault, as a matter of law, can coexist with a completed battery, the assault claim 
will proceed as to Harris. 
C. Defamation Per Se – Castro, Harris & “Doe” (Count III) 
 
 A defamation claim will survive challenge if some facts make plausible the defendant “(1) 
made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2) the statement was false, (3) that the defendant 
was legally at fault in making the statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.” Offen 
v. Brenner, 935 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Md. 2007) (citing Smith v. Danielczyk, 928 A.2d 795, 805 (Md. 
2007)). Under Maryland law, where the alleged false statements alone “‘ impute the defamatory 
character,’ such that the plaintiff need not plead additional facts demonstrating their defamatory 
nature,” the plaintiff has alleged defamation per se. Solomon Foundation v. Christian Fin. 
Resources, Inc ., Civ. No. JRR -22-00993, 2023 WL 3058321, at *4 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2023) 
(quoting Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 274 F. Supp 3d 355, 366 (D. Md. 2017)). An 
officer’s accusation of suspected crime, even if mistaken, does not by itself constitute defamation. 
See, e.g., Crouch v. City of Hyattsville, Civ. No. DKC 09-2544, 2012 WL 6019296, at *7 (D. Md. 
Nov. 30, 2012) (“Aside from asserting that the arrest hurt his reputation in the community, Plaintiff 
has not proffered any evidence that he suffered any injury as a result of the alleged defamation.”). 
Indeed, “there is no ‘defamation by arrest’ cause of action in Maryland.” Thacker v. City of 
Hyattsville, 762 A.2d 172, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). 
 The proposed pleading avers that Castro had defamed W ilson by “publicly and falsely 
accus[ing] [him] of fare evasion, a criminal offense under Maryland law.” ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 46. 

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But according to the pleading, Wilson, in fact , had not paid the fare. Thus, Castro’s public 
statement that Wilson had not paid the fare was technically true. The error lies in whether Castro 
should have accepted Wilson ’s representation that he did not have to pay the fare. Similarly, 
Castro’s ultimatum that Wilson must leave the bus or face a fare evasion charge was not false. 
And as for Harris, nothing makes plausible he made any statements at all . ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 50. 
Accordingly, because the proposed pleading fails to allege any actionable false statements , 
amendment is denied as futile. 
 Wilson also includes a “ John Doe ” officer in this and several other claims . “ The 
designation of a John Doe defendant is generally not favored in the federal courts,” permitted only 
when “the identity of the alleged defendant is not known at the time the complaint is filed” but 
with discovery is likely to become known. Chidi Njoku v. Unknown Special Unit Staff, 217 F.3d 
840 (4th Cir. 2000) (table decision). But the Court previously granted Wilson expedited discovery 
precisely to identify the officers who participated in the incident. Nor does anything in the 
proposed fourth amended complaint suggest that some other “unnamed” officer had been involved 
in the incident, save for possibly another officer who waited with Wilson pending transport to the 
hospital. As to this, an officer’s mere presence at the scene does not, without more, amount to a 
restriction of Wilson’s liberty sufficient to plausibly aver a false imprisonment claim. Thus the 
John Doe officer is dismissed from the suit entirely. 
D. Malicious Prosecution – Castro, Harris, and Rich (Count IV) 
 
 The proposed pleading next avers that the officers are liable for malicious prosecution 
because they cited Wilson for fare evasion. ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 58. To make plausible the claim , 
some facts must show “1) the defendant instituted a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; 2) 
the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor; 3) the defendant did not have probable 

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cause to institute the proceeding; and 4) the defendant acted with malice or a primary purpose 
other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.” Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1057 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2004). Castro and Rich argue that the claim fails because Prince Georges County, not they, 
initiated the criminal prosecution against Wilson. ECF No. 25- 1 at 10. However, “an individual 
may still be liable when he ‘inspire[s] in any fashion a criminal proceeding against the (plaintiff) 
within the contemplation of the law of torts.’ ” Crouch, 2012 WL 6019296, at *3 (quoting 
Smithfield Packing Co. v. Evely , 905 A.2d 845, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)). Whether 
Defendant officers “inspired” a criminal proceeding against Wilson when they issued the citation 
depends on whether the officers supplied the prosecution with “information which [they] knew to 
be false and so unduly influenced the authorities” in pursuing baseless charges. Smithfield Packing 
Co. v. Evely, 905 A.2d 845, 855 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
In that respect, the proposed pleading merely avers that Wilson had displayed to the officers 
a Smart Trip Card and argues from there that any evasion charge must have been based on 
knowingly false information. This claim as pleaded is too barebones. Wilson clearly did not pay 
the fare which formed the basis for the fare evasion charge. What the officers knew or did not 
know about the validity of the card he presented to them is left for speculation. To be sure, no 
facts support that the officers pursued the fare evasion charge with “malice” or some other 
nefarious purpose. Naked legal conclusions to the contrary will not suffice. ECF No. 33- 3 ¶ 62. 
Thus, without more, the malicious prosecution fails and amendment is denied. 
E. Negligence and Gross Negligence – Castro & Harris (Counts V & VI) 
 The sufficiency of the negligence claims against the officers turns on the scope of public 
official immunity. Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 452 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (D. Md. 2020) . 
Public official immunity bars suit for common law negligence where “(1) the actor is a public 
official, rather than a mere government employee or agent; (2) the alleged tortious conduct 

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occurred while the actor was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts; [and] (3) 
the actor committed the relevant acts within the scope of his official duties.” Id. (citing Thomas v. 
City of Annapolis , 688 A.2d 448, 454 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Immunity, however, does not extend where the official acted with malice or gross 
negligence. Rodwell v. Wicomico Cnty., Maryland, No. CV DKC 22-3014, 2024 WL 1178202, at 
*6 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2024). Malice is “characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, 
knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud . . . . ” Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 311 (Md. 
2004) (quoting Shoemaker v. Smith, 725 A.2d 549, 559 (Md. 1999)). Gross negligence is defined 
as “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as 
affecting the life or property of another . . . .” Barbre v. Pope , 935 A.2d 699, 717 (Md. 2007) 
(quoting Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 495 A.2d 838, 846 (Md. 1985)). 
 It is undisputed that as law enforcement officers, Castro and Harris enjoy public official 
immunity when performing traditional law enforcement functions. Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 
297 (citing Robinson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cty ., 278 A.2d 71, 74 (Md. 
1971)). Thus, a mere negligence claim as articulated in Count V cannot proceed.4 
As to the gross negligence claim (Count VI), no facts make plausible that Castro had been 
grossly negligent in suspecting Wilson of fare evasion. ECF No. 33-3 ¶ 71. Indeed, Wilson had 
not paid the fare. Further, Castro’s suspicion arising from the time Wilson took to “flash” the 
Smart Trip Card is, at best, a mistake . No facts reflect that Castro deliberately, with “ill- will or 
fraud” (malice) rejected Wilson’s reason for not paying , or that Castro failed “ to perform a 
 
4 Wilson also contends in reply that he enjoys a “special relationship” with the officers that would defeat public official 
immunity. ECF No. 34 at 11–12. But the special relationship exception applies only where an officer fails “to protect 
an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen.” Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 753 
A.2d 41, 64 (Md. 2000) (emphasis added). Cf . Gray v. Kern, 124 F. Supp. 3d 600, 611 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom. 702 F. App’x 132 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The question of a ‘special relationship’ in Maryland law 
arises when a victim brings an action against a police officer for an injury caused by a third person.”). Nowhere is this 
claim made, and so this exception to the immunity doctrine does not apply. 

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manifest duty” with “reckless disregard” (gross negligence). Thus, the gross negligence claim 
fails as to Castro. 
Harris once again commands a different outcome. Harris’ unprovoked shoving of Wilson 
without lawful basis, resulting in significant injuries, minimally amounts to gross negligence. ECF 
No. 33-3 ¶ 79. Harris exerted unnecessary and gratuitous force on Wilson with reckless disregard 
for Wilson’s safety. Accordingly, the Court will allow amendment to assert a gross negligence 
claim against Harris. 
F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Castro & Harris (Count VII) 
 Although Maryland recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(“IIED”), the claim is reserved for only the most outrageous conduct deemed unacceptable in a 
civilized society. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat. Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 12 (Md. 
1992). To make plausible an IIED claim, some facts must show the defendant’s extreme and 
outrageous acts caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 
758 A.2d 95, 114 (Md. 2000). T he plaintiff’s “distress” must be “so severe that no reasonable 
man could be expected to endure it.” Thacker, 762 A.2d at 197 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). This standard sets a high bar. See B.N.S. by Stuart v. Brito, Civ. No. ELH-17-
2670, 2018 WL 5830565, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2018). The proposed fourth amended complaint 
fails to meet it. 
 As to Castro, it is hard to take seriously the contention that his brief display of mace and 
the tense exchange with Wilson amounts to “extreme and outrageous” conduct exceeding “ all 
possible bounds of decency.” Harris v. Jones , 380 A.2d 611, 614 ( Md. 1977) (quoting 
Restatement [Second] of Torts § 46, cmt. d) (emphasis added). Likewise, Harris’ shoving of 
Wilson, while serious, is insufficient to sustain an IIED claim. See, e.g., McGowan v. Prince 
George’s Cnty., Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 3d 564, 572 (D. Md. 2019) (intentional infliction of 

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emotional distress claim failed where four plain clothed officers grabbed plaintiff’s wrist, twisted 
it behind his back, pushed him against the car, and struck him on the back of his legs, causing 
significant injury). Nor has Wilson averred that h is injuries amount to the kind of intense and 
substantial interference with his daily functioning necessary to make the claim plausible . See 
Takacs v. Fiore , 473 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (D. Md. 2007). See also Manikhi , 758 A.2d at 115 
(“Nowhere does the complaint state with reasonable certainty the nature, intensity or duration of 
the alleged emotional injury.”). The claim fails as a matter of law and will not proceed. 
G. Violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights – Castro, Harris and Rich 
(Count VIII) 
 Count VIII combines violations of Articles 24 & 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
In Maryland , Articles 24 and 26 “are read in pari materi a with the Fourteenth and Fourth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, respectively.” Warren v. Montgomery Cty., Civ. 
No. PJM 09-2510, 2012 WL 3779165, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2012) (citing Davis v. DiPino, 708 
A.2d 357, 367 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)). Taking the Article 24 claim first, to state an equal 
protection violation, some facts must make plausible that the plaintiff “was treated differently from 
others who were similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory 
animus.” Equity in Ath., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 
see also Morrison v. Garraghty , 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To succeed on an equal 
protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he [or she] has been treated differently from 
others with whom he [or she] is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of 
intentional or purposeful discrimination.”). If the plaintiff plausibly makes this showing, the Court 
next must “determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level 
of scrutiny.” Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654 (citations omitted). 

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When reading the claim most favorably to Wilson, no facts support the claim. It is instead 
a mishmash of several other legal liability theories articulated elsewhere in the pleading. ECF No. 
33-3 ¶¶ 96 –100. But nothing shows how Wilson had been treated differently than similarly 
situated riders, or that such disparate treatment was on account of his disability. See SAS Assocs. 
1, LLC v. City Council for City of Chesapeake, Virginia, 91 F.4th 715, 720 (4th Cir. 2024). 
Amendment to include an Article 24 claim, therefore, is futile and must be denied.5 
Next, Article 26, like the Fourth Amendment, “bars police officers from using excessive 
force to seize a free citizen.” E.W. by and through T.W. v. Dolgos , 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 
2018) (quoting Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). An officer may use only that force which is necessary to bring a citizen 
under lawful control. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. An excessive force claim asks whether a 
reasonable officer in the defendant ’s shoes would have known that the force he used had been 
excessive given the circumstances at hand, and without regard to the officer’s “‘underlying intent 
or motivation.’” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 179 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 397); Henry v. Purnell , 
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996). 
The inquiry focuses on “the moment that the force is employed,” Henry, 652 F.3d at 531, to 
ascertain whether the totality of the circumstances supports that the use of force against the citizen 
as reasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015); see also Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 
95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015). T he Court considers the severity of the crime; whether the individual 
 
5 The pleading also obliquely suggests a substantive due process violation. ECF No. 33-3 ¶ 98. But such a claim lies 
only where arbitrary official action is so egregious as to be “conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). Accordingly, some facts must show that the officer “intended to 
injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest,” that goes beyond “negligently inflicted harm . . . .” 
Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., Md., 528 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 
849). No facts pull either Rich or Castro within the ambit of such a claim. And for Harris, the claim is pleaded as one 
for “excessive use of force.” ECF No. 33 -3 ¶ 101. The claim otherwise is so scattershot that the Court struggles to 
understand what else Wilson intends to aver. To survive challenge, more is required. The substantive due process 
claim, to the extent this is what Wilson meant to plead, will not proceed. 

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poses an immediate threat to the officers or others’ safety; and whether the individual is “actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 399; see also 
Lawhon v. Edwards, 477 F. Supp. 3d 428, 445 (E.D. Va. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Lawhon v. Mayes, 
No. 20-1906, 2021 WL 5294931 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (citing Jones, 325 F.3d at 527). 
 Although the claim is poorly pleaded, it survives as to Harris, who gratuitously shoved 
Wilson despite compliance with Castro’s command to leave the bus. Nothing Wilson said or did 
would require the application of such force to bring him under control. A s to the remaining 
officers, however, the claim fails. Rich never used any force on Wilson. Nor can Castro’s brief 
“display” of a mace to secure Wilson’s exist off the bus alone amount to excessive use of force. 
ECF No. 33-3 ¶ 19. Contrast Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 2005) (no violation of 
Fourth Amendment right against excessive force where officer “punched” plaintiff in the face and 
sprayed him with mace after plaintiff was repeatedly told to put hands behind back), and Karadi 
v. Jenkins , 7 F. App’ x 185, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2001) (no violation of Fourth Amendment right 
against excessive force where officer “threatened her with mace,” and “twisted her arm behind her 
back and pushed her against the wall for the purpose of handcuffing”), with Cowles v. Peterson, 
344 F. Supp. 2d 472, 482–83 (E.D. Va. 2004) (violation of Fourth Amendment right against 
excessive force where officer struck plaintiff in the head twice with a can of mace despite plaintiff 
not attempting to flee). Accordingly, Wilson may pursue the Article 26 claim only as to Harris. 
Amendment is otherwise denied. 
H. False Imprisonment – Harris & Castro (Count IX) 
 To make plausible this claim, some facts must show a defendant officer deprived the 
plaintiff his liberty without consent and without legal justification. Lipenga v. Kambalame, 219 
F. Supp. 3d 517, 527 (D. Md. 2016). Deprivation of liberty must amount to a “direct restraint” of 

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movement that compels the plaintiff to “remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where 
he does not wish to go.” Mason v. Wrightson, 109 A.2d 128, 131 (Md. 1954). See also Mahan v. 
Adam, 124 A. 901, 905 (Md. 1924) (“Any exercise of force, or threat of force, by which in fact the 
other person is . . . compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain . . . is an imprisonment.”); 
Amaral v. Amaral , No. 0086, Sept. Term 2014, 2015 WL 9257028, at *10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
Dec. 17, 2015). 
Viewing the proposed amended complaint facts most favorably to Wilson, no officer ever 
“compelled” him to remain “ where he [ did] not wish to remain.” Mason, 109 A.2d at 131. 
Although the proposed pleading suggests the officers had detained Wilson in advance of his 
transport to the hospital, ECF No. 33-3 ¶¶ 25, 110, no facts reflect Wilson had been held against 
his will. Rather, the pleading makes it equally plausible that officers stayed with Wilson to 
facilitate timely transport to the hospital for care. Id. Without more, the claim fails , and 
amendment is denied as futile. 
I. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act – WMATA (Count X) 
 Lastly, the proposed pleading reasserts a disability discrimination claim against WMATA 
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. To make plausible the claim, 
some facts must show that WMATA “excluded” Wilson “from participation in, or denied the 
benefits of, a program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by that 
entity.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 
2005) (emphasis omitted). The proposed pleading avers that WMATA discriminated against 
Wilson by “(a) failing to recognize and honor his valid disabled access card; (b) refusing to verify 
the legitimacy of his disability credentials when presented; (c) subjecting him to heightened and 
unwarranted scrutiny despite his proper documentation; (d) wrongfully accusing him of fare 

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 A separate order follows. 
6/2/2026 /s/ 
Date Paula Xinis 
 United States District Judge 

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