govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_26-cv-01740-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
MARVIN ANTONIO SANTOS 
ESCOBAR, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
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* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
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 Civil Action No. GLR-26-1740 
 
 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Marvin Antonio Santos Escobar’s 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and Respondents Markwayne Mullin , 
Todd Lyons, Vernon Liggins , and Todd Blanche (collectively “Respondents” or “the 
Government”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no 
hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, 
the Court will grant the Petition in part and deny it in part and deny the Motion as moot. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Marvin Antonio Santos Escobar is a citizen and native of El Salvador . 
(Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus [“Pet.”] ¶ 32, ECF No. 1). He first entered the United States on 
or about December 12, 2004 , (id. ¶ 33), after which h e was ordered to appear before a n 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Texas on February 28, 2005, (Notice to Appear [“NTA”] at 1, 
ECF No. 1 -1).1 According to Respondents, an IJ ordered Santos Escobar removed, in-
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, c itations to the page numbers refer to the pagination 

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absentia, on February 28, 2005. (Mem. L. Supp. Resp. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus & Mot. 
Dismiss [“Resp.”] at 3, ECF No. 10 -1). In July 2018, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers allegedly took Santos Escobar into custody in Maryland due 
to the 2005 removal order. (Id.). Respondents state that an IJ then granted Santos Escobar’s 
motion to reopen his removal proceedings due to the issuance of the removal order in-
absentia. (Id.). Santos Escobar was released on bond on December 10, 2018. (Id.; Pet. ¶ 34; 
Custody Order at 1, ECF No. 1-2). 
Four years later, on December 21, 2022, an IJ ordered that Santos Escobar be 
removed to El Salvador but granted his request for withholding of removal to El Salvador 
under the Convention Against Torture. (Pet. ¶ 35; Removal Order at 1, ECF No. 1-3). Since 
the issuance of this removal order, Santos Escobar “has remained in compliance with all 
requirements imposed by immigration authorities, including attending annual check-ins at 
the Baltimore Field Office as inst ructed.” (Pet. ¶ 36). He also has maintained valid 
employment authorization under the Withholding of Removal category, and his most 
recently approved employment authorization does not expire until July 8, 2027. (Id. ¶ 37). 
On May 1, 2026, Santos Escobar appeared for a regular check -in at the Baltimore 
ICE Field Office. ( Id. ¶ 40). According to Respondents, ICE had determined at Santos 
Escobar’s April 2026 check -in that he was subject to a final removal order. (Resp. at 3). 
So, at the May 1 check-in, ICE detained Santos Escobar “to effect his removal to Mexico.” 
(Id.). ICE served Santos Escobar with a Warrant of Removal/Deportation, a Notice of 
 
assigned by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system. 

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Custody Determination, a Warning to Alien Ordered Removed or Deported, a Notice of 
Removal, and a Notice of Imminent Removal Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(4). (Id. at 3–
4; ECF Nos. 10 -2–10-3). The Warrant state s that ICE detained him because he is subject 
to a final removal order (Immigr. Docs . at 1, ECF No. 10 -2) The Warning explained that 
Santos Escobar would not be permitted to enter the U.S. for a period of ten years because 
he was deemed inadmissible under Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationali ty Act. 
(Id. at 4). The Notice of Removal notified Santos Escobar that ICE “intends to remove 
[him] to Mexico.” (Id. at 6). And the Notice of Imminent Removal states: 
This letter is to inform you that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
241.4(g)(4), [ICE] will not conduct a custody review at this 
time. ICE is in possession of a travel document to affect your 
removal and expects this to occur in 05/2026. You will remain 
in custody pending your removal. 
(Id. at 7). 
On the day of his detention, Santos Escobar expressed a fear of removal to Mexico. 
(Pet. ¶ 42). An asylum officer from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security interviewed 
Santos Escobar and, in a notice issued on May 11, 2026, determined that he “did not 
establish that it is more likely than not that [he] will be persecuted or tortured in Mexico.” 
(3d Country Screening Notice, ECF No. 10-3). 
Santos Escobar filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 while detained in Baltimore on May 1, 2026. ( ECF No. 1 ). Respondents filed a 
consolidated Response and Motion to Dismiss on May 26, 2026, (ECF No. 10), and Santos 
Escobar filed a Reply on June 3, 2026, (ECF No. 12). 

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II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in federal custody 
in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). If a 
district court entertains a habeas petition, then it must either award the writ or order the 
respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted, unless it is apparent 
from the application that the petitioner is not entitled to the requested relief. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2243. 
B. Analysis 
Santos Escobar argues that his continued detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and his 
due process rights, that the Government failed to follow its own regulations in revoking his 
supervised release, and that his removal to Mexico without judicial review of his negative 
fear determination violates his due process rights . (Pet. ¶¶ 45–68). The Government 
responds that ICE is authorized to detain and remove Santos Escobar under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6), that his continued detention is constitutionally permissible, and that he has 
received all process due to him under law. ( Resp. at 2). The Court will address each issue 
in turn. 
1. Santos Escobar’s Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) 
The facts and arguments concerning Santos Escobar’s due process claim as to his 
detention are similar to those in Solis Nolasco v. Noem, 820 F.Supp.3d 398 (D.Md. 2026), 
Montoya Palacios v. Baker , No. GLR -25-4045, 2026 WL 171690 (D.Md. Jan. 22, 

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2026), aff’d sub nom. Palacios v. Bacon, No. 26-6251, 2026 WL 1154321 (4th Cir. Mar. 
24, 2026), and other cases before this Court. See Hr’g Tr. 3:10–4:10, 5:9–23, 9:23–11:5, 
Cordon-Salguero v. Noem, No. GLR-25-1626 (D.Md. June 23, 2025) (raising due process 
claims as to petitioner’s detention and removal to third country where petitioner was 
complying with order of supervision and detained at scheduled check-in). As in those cases, 
there is no dispute here that Santos Escobar is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which 
requires the Attorney General to detain noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order 
during the ninety-day removal period following the issuance of that order. (See Resp. at 5; 
Reply Mem. Supp. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus [“Reply”] at 12 –13, ECF No. 12); see also 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). There also is no dispute that the Government may 
detain Santos Escobar beyond the removal period because he is inadmissible under 8 
U.S.C. §1182. (See Resp. at 5; Reply at 12–13); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Like in 
Solis Nolasco and Montoya Palacios, the dispute lies in whether Santos Escobar’s removal 
is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future such that the Government may 
continue to detain him beyond the removal period. (Resp. 7–9; Reply at 13–15). 
The Court reviewed Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), the seminal case 
on detention beyond the removal period, in Solis Nolasco: 
In Zadvydas, t he Supreme Court considered whether the 
Government may detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6) “indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for 
a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal.” 
533 U.S. at 682. The two noncitizen -petitioners in Zadvydas 
received removal orders and had been detained well beyond 
their removal periods under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), partly 
because their native countries and other countries to which they 
had connections had refused to accept them. Id. at 684–86. The 

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petitioners challenged the extent of the Attorney General’s 
authority to detain them on a seemingly indefinite basis despite 
the unlikelihood of the Government securing their removal. Id. 
at 684–86, 688. 
In assessing that authority, the Supreme Court recognized that 
“Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and 
that the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and 
Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area.” Id. at 695. 
“But that power,” the Court explained, “is subject to important 
constitutional limitations.” Id. And “an alien’s liberty interest 
is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to 
whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution 
permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent.” 
Id. at 696 (citation omitted). Considering the significant liberty 
interest at stake and the lack of “congressional intent to 
authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” id. at 699, 
the Court held that a noncitizen’s detention pending removal is 
presumptively reasonable only for six months (inclusive of the 
removal period), after which, if the noncitizen “provides good 
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government 
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing,” 
id. at 701. 
Solis Nolasco, 820 F.Supp.3d at 404. 
Here, Santos Escobar argues that his detention is unlawful under Zadvydas because 
his removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Pet. ¶¶ 46–54).2 
Respondents contend that Santos Escobar’s claim is premature because he has not yet been 
 
2 Santos Escobar raises this claim as both a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Claim 
One) and a due process violation under Zadvydas (Claim Two ). ( See Pet. ¶¶ 45–54). 
Section 1231(h), however, states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to create 
any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party 
against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(h). “The Court, therefore, will deny relief under [Claim One] and will address the 
merits of [Santos Escobar’s] Zadvydas argument as to his due process claim under [Claim 
Two].” Solis Nolasco v. Noem, 820 F.Supp.3d 398, 404 n.3 (D.Md. 2026) 

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detained for six months. (Resp. at 7). But the Court rejected this exact argument in Solis 
Nolasco, concluding that the six -month presumptively reasonable period expire s six 
months after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes administratively final and does not 
restart upon the noncitizen’s re -detention. 820 F.Supp.3d at 405 (collecting cases). Thus, 
in this case, Santos Escobar’s six -month period expired June 21, 2023 —six months after 
his removal order became final on December 21, 2022. (Removal Order at 1).3 
Respondents also argue that, even if not premature, Santos Escobar’s claim is 
meritless because he has not provided good reason to believe that his removal is not likely 
to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Resp. at 8–9). This Court disagrees. 
Santos Escobar has been granted withholding of removal from the only country to 
which he has a claim to citizenship or legal immigration status. (Pet. ¶¶ 35, 39; Reply at 3, 
9; Removal Order at 1 ). “This substantially increases the difficulty of removing him.” 
Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.Supp.3d 387, 398 (D.N.J. 2025). Santos Escobar further 
states, and t he Government does not dispute , that he has complied with all requirements 
imposed by immigration authorities” for the past three -and-a-half years, (Pet. ¶ 36; see 
generally Resp.), during which time Respondents could have, but apparently did not, work 
towards securing Santos Escobar’s removal, (Reply at 6) . Moreover, by granting Santos 
Escobar an Employment Authorization Document in January 2026, which remains valid 
 
3 The Court also noted in Solis Nolasco that “ the six-month presumption of 
reasonableness shifts the burdens between the Government and the noncitizen -detainee, 
but it does not prohibit judicial review of a noncitizen ’s detention for six months. Thus, 
even if [Santos Escobar’s] six-month period had not yet expired, his Petition still would 
not be premature.” 820 F.Supp.3d at 405 n.5 (citing Cruz Medina v. Noem, 794 F.Supp.3d 
365, 375–76 (D.Md. 2025)) 

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through July 2027, (Pet. ¶ 37), the Attorney General determined that Santos Escobar could 
not be removed either because the countries designated in his removal order refused him 
or because his removal “is otherwise impracticable or contrary to the public interest.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7). 
The Government has provided no information to suggest that Santos Escobar’s 
removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future other than general statements that 
ICE “intends to remove [him] to Mexico ” and that “ICE is seeking his removal to a third 
country . . . .” (Immigr. Docs. at 6; Resp. at 8). These “bare assertions,” however, are 
insufficient to rebut Santos Escobar’s contrary showing. Solis Nolasco, 820 F.Supp.3d. at 
406. The Government also offers an unsubstantiated statement that “ ICE is in p ossession 
of a travel document to affect [his] removal and expects this to occur in 05/2026,” (Immigr. 
Docs. at 7), but Respondents provide no evidence of this alleged travel document. 
Respondents also state that there have been “hundreds of successful removals to Mexico 
over the last year,” (Resp. at 8), but this generalized observation does not demonstrate that 
Santos Escobar, specifically, will be removed to Mexico successfully, particularly where 
the Government has provided no indication that Mexico has agreed to accept Santos 
Escobar or that the Government has commenced the steps necessary to secure Mexico’s 
acceptance, see Heng Meng Lin v. Ashcroft , 247 F.Supp.2d 679 , 686 n.9 (E.D.Pa. 2003) 
(“[S]tatistics on the number of aliens who have been successfully removed to a certain 
country may not itself demonstrate that an alien will likely be removed to that country in 
the foreseeable future. ”); (see also Cevallos Gonzalez v. Noem , 1:25-cv-2358, Hr’g Tr. 
8:12–9:2, ECF No. 12-9 (Government counsel explaining that noncitizen must be brought 

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to southern border and presented to Mexican officials to “decide whether or not to accept 
the [noncitizen] into their country”)); Lambert v. Warden, No. EP-26-CV-00427-DB, 2026 
WL 926216, at *2 (W.D.Tex. Apr. 6, 2026) (Government representing that “Mexico will 
only accept third country nationals if they consent to removal to Mexico”). 
Overall, Santos Escobar has provided good reason to believe that his removal to 
Mexico is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the Government fails 
to rebut that showing. Santos Escobar’s continued detention, therefore , violates his due 
process rights under Zadvydas.4 
2. Santos Escobar’s Removal to a Third Country 
Alongside his detention, Santos Escobar argues that his removal to a third country 
without IJ review of his negative fear finding violates his right to procedural due process. 
(Pet. ¶¶ 66–68; Reply at 15–17). Respondents contend that Santos Escobar has received all 
process due to him and that, to the extent he challenge’s ICE’s reasonable fear screening 
procedures as constitutionally deficient, his claim is more appropriately addressed in the 
pending nationwide class action lawsuit D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
778 F.Supp.3d 355 (D.Mass.), op. clarified, No. CV 25 -10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1323697 
(D.Mass. May 7, 2025), op. clarified, No. CV 25 -10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640 
(D.Mass. May 21, 2025), recons. denied, 786 F.Supp.3d 223 (D.Mass. 2025), and appeal 
 
4 Because the Court finds Santos Escobar’s detention unlawful on these grounds, 
the Court declines to address his claim that his detention is unlawful due to the 
Government’s alleged failure to follow the appropriate procedures in revoking his 
conditions of release. (See Pet. ¶¶ 59–65; Reply at 6–12). 

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dismissed and remanded, No. 25-1393, 2026 WL 1102937 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 2026). (Resp. 
at 10). 
Courts in this district have addressed this question numerous times. In some 
instances, courts have concluded that the claim should be addressed through the D.V.D. 
litigation due to “[b] asic principles of comity and judicial economy .” Solis Nolasco, 820 
F.Supp.3d at 408 (quoting I.V.I. v. Baker , No. JKB -25-1572, 2025 WL 1519449 , at *2 
(D.Md. May 27, 2025)); see also Tanha v. Warden, Balt. Det. Facility, No. JRR-25-2121, 
2025 WL 2062181 , *8 (D.Md. July 22, 2025) ; Ghamelian v. Baker , No. SAG -25-2106, 
2025 WL 2049981 , at *3, 5 (D.Md. July 22, 2025) . In other instances, courts have 
addressed the claim notwithstanding the D.V.D. litigation because not doing so “would 
effectively preclude [ the petitioner ] from the relief he seeks entirely and potentially 
foreclose any relief that he could be entitled to as part of the D.V.D. class if he is removed 
before the class -wide claims are resolved.” Portela-Hernandez v. Trump , No. BAH-25-
1633, 2026 WL 74042 (D.Md. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting Sagastizado v. Noem, 802 F.Supp.3d 
992, 1008 (S.D.Tex. 2025)); see also Mendoza Palacios v. Mullin, No. ABA-26-648, 2026 
WL 933319, at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 7, 2026). 
The Court adopts the reasoning of the latter camp , incorporates by reference the 
analyses in Portela-Hernandez v. Trump, No. BAH-25-1633, 2026 WL 74042 (D.Md. Jan. 
9, 2026), and Mendoza Palacios v. Mullin , No. ABA-26-648, 2026 WL 933319 (D.Md. 
Apr. 7, 2026), and concludes that Santos Escobar has a due process right to IJ review of 
his negative fear determination before removal to a third country. See Portela-Hernandez, 
2026 WL 74042, at *10–12 (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) factors 

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and holding that petitioner is entitled to IJ review of his negative determination because (1) 
petitioner’s private interest in not being prosecuted or tortured in Mexico is “significant 
enough to justify procedural protections”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards’ are high”; and (3) requiring IJ review of a negative fear 
determination is a “minimally burdensome procedural s afeguard” (citation modified) ); 
Mendoza Palacios, 2026 WL 933319, at *6–8 (applying same analysis and reaching same 
conclusion in context of motion for preliminary injunction). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 
Santos Escobar’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES as MOOT 
the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10).5 A separate Order follows. 
Entered this 10th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 /s/ 
 George L. Russell, III 
 Chief United States District Judge 
 
5 As the Court explained in Solis Nolasco, the proper response to a habeas petition 
is to file an Answer (not a motion to dismiss), to which the petitioner may file a Reply. 820 
F.Supp.3d at 409. Because Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss is simultaneously their 
Answer through a single brief, ( see ECF No. 10), “the Court finds that (1) there was no 
need for a Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Court’s resolution of the Petition necessarily 
resolves the Motion to Dismiss. The Court, therefore, denies Government’s Motion to 
Dismiss as moot,” Solis Nolasco, 820 F.Supp.3d at 409. 

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