govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_24-cv-00896-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ESTATE OF MICHAEL OLIVO, by 
and through successor in interest, 
PATRICIA OLIVO, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION et al., 
Defendants. 

 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND STRIKE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES [DOCS. 43, 49] 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss: one by Defendants Jeff 
Macomber, Diana Toche, Connie Gipson, Amar Mehta, James Hill, and Christopher 
Podratz (the “Executive Defendants”) to dismiss all causes of action asserted against 
them in the TAC and to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages, and another by Defendants 
Osuji and Haas1 to dismiss several causes of action against them and also strike punitive 
 
1 The Court will refer to the Executive Defendants and Defendants Haas and Osuji individually, or 
collectively as Defendants. As of the date of this order, Defendants Mendoza and Raymond do not 
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damages. (Mtn. [Doc. 43]; Second Mtn. [Doc. 49].) Plaintiffs oppose both motions. 
(Opp’n [Doc. 45]; Second Opp’n [Doc. 50].) In the event the Court grants the motions to 
dismiss, Plaintiffs request leave to amend. 
The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument 
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court 
GRANTS the motions to dismiss the TAC’s first through third causes of action as to all 
Defendants, the fourth cause of action as to the Executive Defendants and Defendant 
Haas, the fifth and sixth causes of action as to the Executive Defendants, and the seventh 
cause of action as to Defendant Haas and Osuji. All causes of action asserted against the 
Executive Defendants are dismissed WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, while all causes 
of action asserted against Defendant Haas and Osuji are dismissed WITH LEAVE TO 
AMEND. The Court also STRIKES Plaintiffs’ punitive damages as to all Defendants. 
 
II. B
ACKGROUND 
On January 26, 2023, 42-year-old Michael Olivo died while in custody at the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Richard J. Donovan 
(hereinafter “RJD”) Correctional Facility. (TAC [Doc. 40] at ¶ 1.) Mr. Olivo entered the 
CDCR system originally in November 2000 and was incarcerated at Kern Valley State 
Prison. (Id. at ¶ 50–51.) At that time, he received mental health treatment for symptoms 
of major depression and was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and anti-social 
personality disorder. (Id. at ¶ 51.) Mr. Olivo was allegedly housed in a mental health unit 
on three occasions between March, April, and July 2022. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Although he did 
not receive formal services through CDCR’s Mental Health Services Delivery System 
(“MHSDS”), Mr. Olivo participated in a mental health coping group from September to 
December 2022. (Id. at ¶ 54.) 
 
appear to have been served and are not represented by counsel. Therefore, this order does not apply to 
them. 
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In March 2022, while incarcerated at Kern Valley, Mr. Olivo allegedly submitted a 
Health Care Services Request Form requesting to speak with a psychiatrist, but he never 
met with one, and a new order was not placed upon his transfer to RJD later that month. 
(Id. at ¶ 52.) On January 12, 2023, Mr. Olivo was placed in the Administrative 
Segregation Unit (“ASU”) in a single person cell due to concerns for his safety. (TAC at 
¶ 55.) That same day, Defendant Osuji, a vocational nurse, completed a pre-placement 
mental health screening and Defendant Mendoza, a psychiatric technician, then 
completed an initial mental health screening. (Id. at ¶ 58–59.) Plaintiffs allege that the 
above Defendants failed to adequately complete a suicide risk assessment, and Defendant 
Mendoza additionally failed to ensure that Mr. Olivo was provided with follow-up 
treatment while housed in the ASU. (Id.) 
One week later, Mr. Olivio met with Defendant Haas, a senior psychologist 
specialist, who Plaintiffs allege failed to adequately complete an initial Mental Health 
Placement Chrono (“MHPC”) which is meant to assess an inmate patient’s level of care, 
among other things. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Then on January 25, 2023, Plaintiffs allege Defendant 
Raymond, a psychiatric technician, completed a suicide risk assessment, but failed to do 
so adequately “and [who] noted that there was no access to suicide means.” (Id. at ¶ 61.) 
Less than twenty-four hours later, Mr. Olivo was found hanging by a sheet tied around 
his neck in his cell and was pronounced dead at 5:18 a.m. (Id. at ¶ 62.) 
Plaintiffs have brought suit against various defendants in their individual 
capacities, including: (1) Jeff Macomber, CDCR Secretary; (2) Diana Toche, CDCR 
Undersecretary of Health Care Services; (3) Connie Gipson, CDCR Director of the 
Division of Adult Institutions; (4) Amar Mehta, CDCR Deputy Director of the Statewide 
Mental Health Program; (5) James Hill, RJD Warden; (6) Christopher Podratz, RJD 
Health Care Chief Executive Officer; (7) Kristen Haas, a CDCR Senior Psychologist 
Specialist and clinical supervisor; (8) Oscar Mendoza, CDCR Correctional Health Care 
Services Psychiatric Technician; (9) Rebecca Raymond, also a CDCR Psychiatric 
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Technician; and (10) Joy Osuji2, a CDCR Correctional Health Care Services Licensed 
Vocational Nurse. (See TAC.) 
The TAC asserts eight causes of action against the Defendants, including: (1) 
Failure to provide medical health treatment under the Eighth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983); (2) Failure to protect from harm under the Eighth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983); (3) Deprivation of the right to familial relationship with decedent under the 
Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) Supervisory liability causing 
constitutional violations (failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983) 3; (5) Wrongful death (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 377.60); (6) Negligence; (7) 
Failure to provide medical care; and (8) Declaratory relief (28 U.S.C. § 2201) 4. (See 
TAC.) 
The Executive Defendants previously moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC, and the 
Court granted dismissal of the first four causes of action with leave to amend and struck 
punitive damages. (Order [Doc. 29].) Though the causes of action five through seven 
were initially dismissed without leave to amend, they were reinstated after the Court 
granted Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 39.) 
 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
A pleading can be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 
pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only 
appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to 
 
2 The TAC added Defendants Osuji, Mendoza, Haas, and Raymond. (See TAC.) 
3 The first three causes of action are asserted against the Executive Defendants and Defendants Haas and 
Osuji. Whereas the fourth cause of action is asserted against the Executive Defendants and Defendant 
Haas only. 
4 The fifth, six, and eighth causes of action are asserted against all Defendants. The seventh cause of 
action is just asserted against Defendants Haas and Osuji. 
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support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pac. Police Depot, 901 F.2d 696, 699 
(9th Cir. 1988). At the motion to dismiss phase, the allegations of material fact in the 
complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations "must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations 
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Only a complaint 
that states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
A court “may order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Redundant matter “consists of 
allegations that constitute a needless repetition of other averments in the pleading.” 
Moreno v. USG Corp., No. CIV 06-CV-2196BPCL, 2007 WL 951301, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2007). Immaterial matter is “that which has no essential or important 
relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Id. Impertinent matter 
“consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in 
question.” Id. Finally, scandalous matter is “that which improperly casts a derogatory 
light on someone, most typically on a party to the action.” Id. “[T]he function of a 12(f) 
motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from 
litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . .” Sidney-
Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Courts have broad discretion to grant leave to amend a complaint. Nguyen v. 
Endologix, Inc., 962 F.3d 405, 420 (9th Cir. 2020). This discretion includes the right to 
deny leave to amend where such amendment would be futile. Lathus v. City of 
Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. 
v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[W]here the plaintiff 
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has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the 
requisite particularity to its claims, the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 
is particularly broad.” Nguyen, 962 F.3d at 420 (holding that the district court did not err 
by denying leave to amend “because it was clear that the plaintiff had made her best case 
and had been found wanting”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Causes of Action 1–4: Deliberate Indifference and Supervisor Liability 
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 causes of action on several 
grounds. The first three causes of action under Section 1983: (1) failure to provide 
medical health treatment, (2) failure to protect from harm, and (3) deprivation of the right 
to familial relationship, require a showing of deliberate indifference. To state a claim for 
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts 
showing that the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s 
health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Mere negligence, medical 
malpractice, or a difference of opinion concerning appropriate treatment is insufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057–160 (9th Cir. 
2004). Deliberate indifference is therefore a “high legal standard” requiring facts 
plausibly showing that the defendant was subjectively aware of a significant risk of harm 
and consciously disregarded that risk. Id. at 1058–1060. 
Similarly, to state a claim for deprivation of the right to familial relationship under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege conduct that “shocks the conscience.” 
Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent that showing, courts have 
also dismissed these claims for failing to plead deliberate indifference. See Est. of Bews v. 
Cty. of L.A., No. CV 23-9775 PA (JPRx), 2024 WL 1135671, at *5, 2024 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48671, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024) (dismissing deprivation of familial 
relationship claim where plaintiff failed to plead viable deliberate indifference claim); 
Hernandez v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 19-cv-07888-EJD, 2020 WL 3101041 at *5, 2020 
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102568 at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2020) (dismissing same claim as it 
“fail[ed] to clear the lower bar of adequately alleging deliberate indifference”); Fosbinder 
v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 24-CV-733-RSH-SBC, 2024 WL 4631275, at *9 (S.D. Cal. 
Oct. 30, 2024) (same). 
The fourth cause of action is premised on supervisor liability. Section 1983, 
however, does not permit liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory status. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Rather, “[a] supervisor may be liable only if 
(1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a 
‘sufficient casual connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 
constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (quoting Hansen v. 
Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Circ. 1989)); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 
942 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 
Constitution”)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (2009)).) 
The Court first addresses supervisory liability before turning to Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of direct liability. 
I. Supervisor Liability 
a. Executive Defendants – Causes of Action One Through Four 
The Executive Defendants argue that the TAC’s first four causes of action 
improperly rely on a theory of supervisory liability and fail to allege facts establishing 
their personal involvement in any constitutional violation. (Mtn. at 8–10.) The Executive 
Defendants further contend that the Coleman litigation does not provide a basis for 
liability. (Id.) Plaintiffs disagree, and in turn, maintain that the “[Executive] Defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to conditions that placed prisoners situated similarly to Mr. 
Olivo at substantial risk of harm.” (Opp’n at 9.) 
In an effort to address the deficiencies previously identified by the Court, the TAC 
added allegations concerning CDCR suicide prevention policies and a Quality 
Improvement Plan, including the following: 
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According to the MHSDS Program Guide (Program Guide), placement 
in an Administrative Segregation Unit is a risk factor for suicide. In addition 
to “dynamic” risk factors such as single-cell placement and fear for safety that 
requires ongoing assessment. As such, inmates undergo a pre -placement 
mental health screening to assess for “possible suicide risk, safety concerns, 
and mental health problems before placement in ASU.” Moreover, CDCR’s 
own policies recognize that suicide risk assessments are “critical” to suicide 
prevention. Accordingly, inmates housed in an Administrative Segregation 
Unit are required to be seen daily by c orrectional health staff conducting 
clinical rounds. Upon information and belief, Defendants were aware that 
inmates housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit, including Michael 
Olivo, were at an increased risk for suicide. Indeed, CDCR policy requires 
security checks in ASUs to be conducted every thirty (30) minutes. 
 
Upon information and belief, CDCR’s internal review of Mr. Olivo’s death 
contained four (4) recommendations for corrective action through a Quality 
Improvement Plan (QIP) in relation to his death. One of these 
recommendations included ensuring that staff responding to a suicide or 
attempted suicide have a cut-down kit. 
(TAC at ¶ ¶ 56, 57, 68.) These additional allegations do not cure the deficiencies 
previously identified by the Court. In partially dismissing the FAC, the Court explained 
that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts demonstrating how deficiencies in CDCR’s policies, 
training, actions, or inactions were attributable to the Executive Defendants or otherwise 
established deliberate indifference to Mr. Olivo’s constitutional rights. (Order at 8–9.) 
The newly added allegations remain generalized and fail to identify how any specific 
policy, training deficiency, or omission attributable to the Executive Defendants caused 
the alleged constitutional violation. Conclusory assertations that policies or training were 
inadequate, absent factual allegations identifying a specific deficiency and its causal 
connection to the alleged harm, are insufficient to establish supervisor liability under 
Section 1983. 
Nor do Plaintiffs allege facts demonstrating that any Executive Defendant, through 
his or her own individual conduct, violated the Constitution. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 
942. Plaintiffs do not identify any action, or inaction, by any Executive Defendant 
demonstrating a failure to implement adequate suicide risk assessments. Mere awareness 
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of systemwide problems, coupled with a failure to rectify them, is insufficient to impose 
liability under Section 1983. See Carrea v. California, No. EDCV07-1148CASMAN, 
2009 WL 1770130, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to 
plausibly allege a connection between any Executive Defendant’s conduct to a 
constitutional violation. 
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Coleman litigation does not alter this conclusion. See 
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp (E.D. Cal 1995). As the Court previously explained, 
although the Coleman Special Master’s recommendations are relevant to the adequacy of 
CDCR’s mental health treatment and suicide prevention policies, Plaintiffs must identify 
specific deficiencies recognized in Coleman and plausibly connect those deficiencies to 
the facts alleged in this case. (See Order at 8–9.) In an apparent effort to do so, Plaintiffs 
added the following allegations to the TAC: 
On January 7, 2020, the Court adopted the Coleman Special Master’s 
recommendations which required 90 percent of the custody and health care 
staff to receive annual suicide prevention training. (Id. at ¶47.) The Executive 
Defendants failed to take necessary and reasonable actions within their 
respective scope of responsibility to cure the identified deficiencies and 
ensure compliance with existing CDCR policies and procedures including 
annual requirements for suicide prevention training. 
(TAC at ¶71–72.) These additional allegations remain insufficient. Even accepting them 
as true, Plaintiffs still fail to allege facts showing how any particular Executive Defendant 
was personally responsible for implementing or failing to implement the training 
requirement, or how any failure to do so caused or contributed to Mr. Olivo’s death. 
Rather, Plaintiffs rely on the conclusory assertion that the Executive Defendants failed to 
ensure compliance with Coleman-related training mandates. Such generalized allegations 
of noncompliance do not satisfy the requirement of personal involvement or a causal 
connection under Section 1983. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942. Nor does Coleman itself 
impose liability on prison officials based solely on their supervisory positions. See 
Roberts v. Cate, No. 2:08-CV-2624 JAM KJN, 2013 WL 268709, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
23, 2013.) 
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Despite the Court’s prior guidance, the TAC continues to rely on generalized 
allegations concerning institutional failures and supervisory status rather than facts 
establishing personal involvement or a causal connection between any Executive 
Defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The failure to make any 
meaningful changes to the TAC to improve the Section 1983 causes of action lends itself 
to a finding of futility. Accordingly, the first four causes of action against the Executive 
Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
b. Defendant Haas – Fourth Cause of Action 
The same deficiencies apply to the extent Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on 
Defendant Haas based on her supervisory role. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haas, as a 
senior psychologist specialist and clinical supervisor, was responsible for supervising 
staff and promulgating policies at RJD, including supervising Defendants Mendoza, 
Raymond, and Osuji. (TAC at ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further allege, in conclusory fashion, that 
Defendant Haas “breached” the duty to properly train, supervise, or discipline 
subordinate staff. (Id. at 30–31.) 
These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for supervisor liability. The TAC 
identifies no specific deficiency in training, supervision, or discipline attributable to 
Defendant Haas and contains no facts showing her personal involvement in, or a causal 
connection to, the alleged constitutional deprivation. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on Defendant 
Haas’s title and supervisory responsibilities. Such allegations are insufficient under 
Section 1983. Therefore, the TAC fails to state a supervisory liability claim against Haas. 
Since Defendant Haas is a newly named defendant, and Plaintiffs have not had the 
opportunity to cure these deficiencies as to her, the Court cannot conclude that 
amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the fourth cause of action against Defendant 
Haas is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. This conclusion is limited to 
Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability theory. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Haas failed to 
adequately conduct a mental health evaluation of Mr. Olivo. (See TAC at ¶60.) Because 
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that allegation presents a distinct theory of direct liability, the Court addresses it 
separately below. 
II. Deliberate Indifference 
a. Defendants Haas and Osuji – Causes of Action One Through 
Three 
Defendants Haas and Osuji argue that the TAC alleges, at most, negligence or 
medical malpractice, which are insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference 
under Section 1983. (Second Mtn. at 14–15.) Plaintiffs respond that Defendants Haas and 
Osuji “knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Mr. Olivo’s health and safety[,]” and 
contend that, “where allegations ‘raise suggestions of deliberate indifference,’ courts 
‘must let the case proceed to discovery.’” (Second Opp’n at 9 (citing Rocha v. Kernan, 
No. EDCV 17-869-GW(FFMX), 2019 WL 2949031, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019)).) 
Apart from their titles and job descriptions, Plaintiffs allege the following with 
respect to Defendants Haas and Osuji: 
On January 12, 2023, Defendant LVN JOY OSUJI completed a pre-placement 
mental health screening. Upon information and belief, Defendant LVN JOY 
OSUJI failed to adequately complete a suicide risk assessment despite Mr. 
Olivo’s increased risk factors for suicide and concerns for his safety. 
 
On January 19, 2023, Mr. Olivo met with Defendant KRISTIN HAAS (Senior 
Psychologist Specialist) for an initial Mental Health Placement Chrono 
(MHPC). According to the MHDS Program Guide (Program Guide), a MHPC 
indicates “the inmate -patient’s LOC [level of care] medication status, any 
behavioral alerts, and their GAF [Global Assessment Functioning] score.” 
Upon information and belief, Defendant KRISTIN HAAS failed to adequately 
complete Mr. Olivo’s initial MHPC despite his increased risk of suicide and 
concerns for his safety which led to his placement in the ASU at RJD. 
(TAC at ¶¶ 58, 60.) These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for deliberate 
indifference. Plaintiffs allege only that Defendant Haas and Osuji inadequately completed 
mental-health evaluations, but they do not identify any specific deficiency in the 
assessments, no warning signs that were ignored, and no facts showing that either 
Defendant was aware of a substantial risk that Mr. Olivo would commit suicide. Nor do 
Plaintiffs allege how any purported deficiency in the evaluations contributed to Mr. 
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Olivo’s death. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to infer that the evaluations must have 
been inadequate because Mr. Olivo later committed suicide. Such speculation is 
insufficient to plausibly establish deliberate indifference. 
 The Court likewise finds Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rocha unpersuasive. In Rocha, the 
complaint alleged that the decedent had a well-documented history of depression, suicidal 
ideation, and suicide attempts during the two years she was treated by the defendant 
clinicians. See Rocha v. Kernan, 2019 WL 2949031, at *9–11. The plaintiffs further 
alleged that the defendants ignored repeated expressions of suicidal intent, failed to 
follow CDCR suicide-prevention policies, and repeatedly copied inaccurate information 
into suicide risk assessments, creating a false record that the decedent was not suicidal. 
Id. Based on those detailed allegations, the court concluded that the complaint plausibly 
supported an inference that the defendants knew of and consciously disregarded a 
substantial risk of suicide. Id. 
This case bears little resemblance to Rocha. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants 
Haas and Osuji were aware of a documented history of suicidal ideation, that Mr. Olivo 
communicated suicidal thoughts to them, that they ignored specific warning signs, or that 
they knowingly falsified or disregarded information concerning his suicide risk. Rather, 
Plaintiffs allege only that the evaluations were inadequately performed during isolated 
encounters with Mr. Olivo shortly before his death. Accordingly, Rocha does not support 
Plaintiffs’ contention that a mere suggestion of deliberate indifference is sufficient to 
proceed to discovery. Rather, Rocha involved detailed factual allegations supporting an 
inference that defendants were subjectively aware of and consciously disregarded a 
substantial risk of suicide. No comparable allegations are present here. Since the TAC 
does not plausibly allege that Defendants Haas or Osuji were aware of and disregarded a 
substantial risk that Mr. Olivo would commit suicide, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for 
deliberate indifference against either Defendant. 
Because Defendants Haas and Osuji are newly named defendants, and Plaintiffs 
have not had the opportunity to cure the deficiencies as to them, the Court cannot 
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conclude that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the first three causes of action 
against Defendants Haas and Osuji are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 
B. Causes of Action Five and Six – Executive Defendants 
Next, the Executive Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims for wrongful 
death and negligence should be dismissed as an improper claim against supervisors 
because the Executive Defendants are immunized by California Government Code 
Section 820.8. (Mtn. at 12.) Plaintiffs argue against immunity. (Opp’n at 10–11.) 
Regarding liability of public employees, Section 820.8 states that “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the 
act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee 
from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or 
omission.” Cal. Gov't Code § 820.8. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “supervisory 
personnel whose personal involvement is not alleged may not be held responsible for the 
acts of their subordinates under California law.” Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 
(9th Cir. 1975) (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 820.8); see also Weaver by & through Weaver v. 
State, 63 Cal.App.4th 188, 202-03 (1998) (a Commissioner of CHP officers was not 
liable because he did not train officers and was not personally involved in the incident in 
any way). 
Although a public employee may be held liable for any injury proximately caused 
by his own negligence, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific information which 
personally links the Executive Defendants to Mr. Olivos’s death for many of the same 
reasons discussed above. Statistics regarding prison suicides, citations to RJD’s mental 
health policies, proposed remedial measures, and non-implementation of Coleman 
recommendations do not impose individual liability on the Secretary for CDCR 
(Defendant Macomber), the Undersecretary of Health Care Services for CDCR 
(Defendant Toche), the Director of the Division of Adult Institutions (Defendant Gipson), 
the Deputy Director of the Statewide Mental Health Program for CDCR (Defendant 
Mehta), the Warden for RJD (Defendant Hill), or the Health Care Chief Officer for RJD 
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(Defendant Podratz). The facts alleged, even taken as true as the Court is bound to do at 
this stage, are insufficient to warrant finding personal negligence. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that statutory immunity does not apply because Section 
820.2 only confers immunity with respect to “basic policy decisions” and does not 
immunize government entities from liability for subsequent ministerial actions taken in 
the implementation of those basic policy decisions. (Opp’n at 10–11.) In so arguing, 
Plaintiffs confuse the applicable legal standard. The Ninth Circuit and the California 
Supreme Court apply the “basic policy decisions” standard to Section 820.2 immunity, 
not Section 820.8. McQuirk v. Donnelley, 189 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 
California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360 (1968). 
Plaintiffs do not address the applicability of Section 820.8 immunity, which is 
claimed by the Executive Defendants. However, in the Court’s own research, Section 
820.8 immunity applies to Plaintiffs’ causes of action against the Executive Defendants. 
Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, and the Plaintiffs have 
repeatedly failed to plead facts which link the alleged personal negligence of the 
Executive Defendants to Mr. Olivos’s death. As a result, Plaintiffs’ state law causes of 
action against the Executive Defendants are barred by California Government Code 
Section 820.8. Accordingly, the fifth and sixth causes of action against the Executive 
Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
C. Seventh Cause of Action – Defendants Haas and Osuji 
Additionally, Defendants Haas and Osjui argue that Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of 
action, failure to summon medical care, under California Government Code Section 
844.6 and 845.6, should be dismissed since there are no allegations in the TAC that 
support the claim. (Second Mtn. at 10–11.) The Court agrees. 
Section 844.6 of the California Government Code states that public entities are not 
liable for “injury to any prisoner” but clarifies that “[n]othing in this section exonerates a 
public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful 
act or omission.” Cal. Gov't Code § 844.6(d). This provision is partially modified by 
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Section 845.6, which states that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable 
for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical 
care for a prisoner in his custody . . . but [a] public employee, and the public entity where 
the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee 
knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and 
he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6 
Here, the TAC alleges that Defendant Osuji failed to “adequately” conduct a 
mental health evaluation on January 12, 2023, as well as Defendant Haas on January 19, 
2023. (TAC at ¶¶ 58, 60.) Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants knew or had reason to 
know that on or before January 26, 20235, Michael Olivo needed immediate medical care 
and was not given such care.” (TAC at ¶ 122.) As Defendants Osuji and Haas correctly 
assert, “[i]n order to state a claim against Defendants for failure to summon medical care, 
he would have to allege that when they saw Plaintiff . . . he was at that time suffering a 
physical injury requiring immediate medical care, they knew or should have known about 
this need for immediate care, yet they failed to summon anyone to provide such care.” 
(Second Mtn. at 10–11.) Plaintiffs do not allege any facts or circumstances that indicate 
that Defendant Osuji and Haas were in a position where they knew or should have known 
that Mr. Olivo needed immediate medical care. 
Since Defendant Haas and Osuji are newly named defendants, and Plaintiffs have 
not had an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in their allegations as to these Defendants, 
it is not clear that amendment would be futile. For these reasons, the sixth cause of action 
against Defendant Haas and Osuji is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 
D. Punitive Damages 
Lastly, Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages again 
because like its predecessors, the TAC lacks allegations sufficient to support punitive 
 
5 Mr. Olivo died on January 26, 2023. (TAC at ¶ 1.) 
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damages. (Mtn. at 13; Second Mtn. at 16–17.) Although Plaintiffs insist that they have 
sufficiently alleged facts to support a claim for punitive damages, for the same reasons 
illustrated above and those enumerated by the Court when it struck the request for 
punitive damages the first time, the facts alleged do not support such a claim. (See Opp’n. 
at 12; Second Opp’n at 12.) The facts do not show “evil motive or intent, or reckless and 
callous indifference to federally protected rights,” as would be required to succeed in a 
Section 1983 action for punitive damages. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The 
facts also do not reflect “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant[s] [have] been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice…,” as would be required to warrant punitive 
damages for the state law claims. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3294(a). As a result, Defendants’ 
motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED. 
 
V. C
ONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the Executive 
Defendants from the TAC (causes of action one through six) WITHOUT LEAVE TO 
AMEND because the record shows amendment would be futile. Plaintiffs have made two 
attempts to plead the same causes of action and there is no indication that Plaintiffs have 
other facts to allege to cure the deficiencies discussed above. 
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However, the Court GRANTS Defendant Haas’s motion to dismiss the fourth 
cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and Defendant Haas and Osuji’s motion to 
dismiss causes of action one through three and seven WITH LEAVE TO AMEND since 
Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to cure the deficiencies against these Defendants 
and there is no basis to conclude that amendment would be futile at this time. The Court 
also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages. Plaintiffs shall have until 
June 24, 2026 to file a fourth amended complaint in compliance with this Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 10, 2026 
 
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