govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_11-cr-00027-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case No. 1:11-cr-00027-JMS-MJD-2 
 
 
v. 
 ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
DAVID RYAN BOSTIC (COMPASSIONATE RELEASE) 
 
 
 Upon motion of ☒ the defendant ☐ the Director of the Bureau of Prisons for a reduction 
in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and after considering the applicable factors provided 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is: 
☒ DENIED. 
☐ DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
☐ OTHER: 
☒ FACTORS CONSIDERED: See attached opinion. PageID #:
<pageID>
2 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 1:11-cr-00027-JMS-MJD 
 ) 
DAVID RYAN BOSTIC, ) -02 
 ) 
Defendant. ) 
 
ORDER 
Defendant David Ryan Bostic (02) has filed a motion seeking compassionate release under 
§ 603 of the First Step Act of 2018, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) . [Filing No. 
380.] For the reasons explained below, his motion is DENIED. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 
 On June 6, 2011, Mr. Bostic pled guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Distribute Child 
Pornography and Receive Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), one count of 
Conspiracy to Commit Sexual Exploitation of Children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A), 
21 counts of Distribution of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) , and 5 
counts of Advertising Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) . [Filing No. 
119.] The same day, Mr. Bostic pled guilty in a separate case to 36 counts of Production of Child 
Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) , and one count of Possession of Child 
Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). [Filing No. 29 in United States v. David 
Ryan Bostic, 1:11-cr-00033-1-JMS-KPF.] PageID #:
<pageID>
3 
 
The offense conduct is summarized as follows: 
A federal search warrant was executed on the defendant's e- mail account in 
December 2010. An analysis of the account demonstrated the defendant was 
trading child pornography with dozens of individuals and also was a member of a 
large list of dozens of individuals sharing child pornography, information about 
where child pornography could be found, as well as generally encouraging one 
another to distribute and produce child pornography, in addition to sexually abusing 
children. The e -mail grou p was primarily administered by an individual later 
identified as Domminich Shaw, and included among its members the defendant and 
other co-defendants in the instant cause. 
 
The review of the defendant's e -mail account, as well as his admissions upon his 
arrest, demonstrates the defendant sought out like -minded individuals who had a 
sexual interest in children and child pornography on a photo sharing website, 
Imgsrc.ru. In July 2009, after apparently seeing sexually suggestive images posted 
to Imgsrc along with a contact e -mail, the defendant sent a number of e -mails 
requesting that Shaw agree to use software allowing limited remote access to one 
another's computers. When the defendant received no response, he then sent Shaw 
[an] e-mail stating "I added you but got no response. Here is some of what I got if 
you add me." The defendant attached to that e -mail images of Girl 2, a victim in 
cause number 1:11CR00033-001, engaged in sexually explicit conduct…. Several 
days later, Shaw accepted the request to use the remote access software, allowing 
access to one another's files. 
 
On October 8, 2010, Shaw sent a mass e-mail to more than 40 individuals who had 
previously sent him child pornography, including the defendant, and stated "Hello 
all iv [sic] been away for a while thank you for all your emails and attachments, 
very nice to come home to ; -)." The defendant responded on October 13, 2010, 
stating "May I please have some in return by any chance :)." Following this 
exchange, Shaw sent a long series of mass emails directed to dozens of individuals 
at once with whom, like the defendant, he had traded child pornography. Many of 
the mass e-mails requested child pornography in return, and child pornography was 
received in return. Several of these mass e -mails were responded to by the 
defendant, with requests for more images or discussions of his and Shaw's sexual 
interest in children. Several other members of the e-mail group also sent images to 
all of the other members of the e-mail group, including the defendant. 
 
* * * 
 
The defendant also traded child pornography images with PERSON 1, relating to 
their contact through the email group. In September 2010, the defendant sent 
PERSON 1 videos of a minor female appearing to be less than two years of age 
being subjected to sexual acts by an adult male…. In return, PERSON 1 sent the 
defendant a video depicting a nude minor female, appearing to be less than two 
years of age…. Later, in response to the portion of the defendant's request for new PageID #:
<pageID>
4 
 
"boards" (websites depicting child pornography), PERSON 1 sent to the 
defendant's e-mail account a hyperlink to a website created by Shaw displaying 
exclusively child pornography images of infant-aged children…. 
 
[Filing No. 124 at 7-11.] 
 
Mr. Bostic faced a guideline term of life imprisonment. [Filing No. 124 at 57.] The Court 
sentenced him to 60 years of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his sentence in 1:11-cr-
00033-JMS-KPF, followed by supervised release for life. [Filing No. 146.] The Bureau of Prisons 
("BOP") currently reports Mr. Bostic's anticipated release date as May 6, 2279. 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited June 8, 2026). 
Mr. Bostic has filed a Motion for Compassionate Release, [Filing No. 380], the 
Government opposes the motion, [Filing No. 386], Mr. Bostic did not file a reply, and the motion 
is now ripe for the Court's consideration. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The general rule is that sentences imposed in federal criminal cases are final and may not 
be modified.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) . Yet under one exception to this rule, a provision known as 
compassionate release, a court may reduce a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
The United States Sentencing Commission has been authorized by Congress to develop 
policies to be used by the courts in considering compassionate release motions. The Sentencing 
Commission has set forth the following considerations : First, whether "[e]xtraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and whether the reduction is otherwise "consistent with 
this policy statement"; and second, whether the defendant is "a danger to the safety of any other 
person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(1)(A) and 
(a)(2). If a court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons exists and that the defendant is 
not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, it goes on to consider the PageID #:
<pageID>
5 
 
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , "to the extent that they are applicable." U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.13(a). 
The Seventh Circuit has held that district courts have broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under the statute. United States v. Gunn, 980 
F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2020) . The district court must "consider[] the applicant's 
individualized arguments and evidence," United States v. Rucker , 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 
2022), but ultimately "[t]he movant bears the burden of establishing 'extraordinary and compelling 
reasons' that warrant a sentence reduction ," United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 
2021). On this point, the United States Sentencing Commission recently amended the Guidelines 
Manual to identify several new circumstances as "extraordinary and compelling" reasons 
potentially warranting compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (Nov. 2023). 
Mr. Bostic argues in his motion that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for his 
release, including that there is a combination of circumstances warranting release and that he 
received an unusually long sentence. The Court will address each argument in turn. 
A. Combination of Circumstances Under § 1B1.13(b)(5) 
Mr. Bostic checks a box on the form Motion for Compassionate Release which states: 
"There is another circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by 
themselves or together with any of the reasons described above, are similar in gravity to the reasons 
described above. See [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13(b)(5)." [Filing No. 380 at 5.] He then states: 
No one deserves the length of time I was given. Due to my charges and the increase 
of gang activity my saf[e]ty is decreasing. Staff have je[o]pardized my saf[e]ty 
numerous times, placing me with high risk inmates (was raped by one). Staff hired 
hit out on me due to my charge s because I filed on him for having me fired from 
my job (C.O. Murry). I am discriminated against based off charges and [length of] 
time I am serving were it be getting a job or into a class. The system is unjust and 
discriminates. I deserve a second chance. Please let me see my family again. PageID #:
<pageID>
6 
 
[Filing No. 380 at 6.] 
The Government responds that § 1B1.13(b)(5) "does not afford relief for purported changes 
in the law or sentencing disparities," and that such arguments are specifically covered by § 
1B1.13(b)(6). [Filing No. 386 at 5.] It asserts that Mr. Bostic has not presented circumstances 
similar in gravity to t hose set forth in § 1B1.13(b)(1) through (4), as required for the application 
of § 1B1.13(b)(5), and that Mr. Bostic cannot use § 1B1.13(b)(5) to challenge the reasonableness 
of his sentence. [Filing No. 386 at 6.] The Government argues further that Mr. Bostic's conditions 
of confinement, alleged sexual assault by another inmate, or the BOP's alleged retaliation against 
him are not extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 1B1.13(b)(5). [Filing No. 386 at 
7.] 
The Sentencing Commission has provided that extraordinary and compelling reasons for 
release exist under the following circumstances: 
(5) Other Reasons. —The defendant presents any other circumstance or 
combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with 
any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to 
those described in paragraphs (1) through (4). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). 
Mr. Bostic points to the following circumstances: that his sentence is lengthy, that there is 
gang activity within the facility where he is being housed, that his safety has been jeopardized and 
he was raped by another inmate, that BOP staff members have retaliated against him, and that he 
has been discriminated against based on his charge s. First, any argument regarding the length of 
Mr. Bostic's sentence can only be brought under § 1B1.13(b)(6) , and the Court discusses that 
provision below. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (any changes to the law relating to sentencing "shall 
not be considered for the purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason 
exists" "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)(6)"). PageID #:
<pageID>
7 
 
Second, as for the other circumstances that Mr. Bostic raises, the Court notes that 
allegations about his safety and potential discrimination relate to his conditions of confinement 
and are properly brought in a civil rights lawsuit. See United States v. Miller, 2022 WL 2187555, 
at *1 (7th Cir. June 16, 2022) ("[T]o the extent that [defendant] challenges the conditions…at [the 
prison] more generally, a compassionate -release motion is not the right vehicle.") (cleaned up) . 
Additionally, the Court does not find those circumstances to be similar in gravity to those outlined 
in § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4).1 
Mr. Bostic has not established that an extraordinary and compelling reason for release 
exists under § 1B1.13(b)(5), whether considered alone or in combination with any other reason. 
B. Unusually Long Sentence Under § 1B1.13(b)(6) 
In his Motion for Compassionate Release, Mr. Bostic checked a box stating: "I received an 
unusually long sentence, I have served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, and a change 
in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) 
would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be 
imposed on the date I filed this motion, after full consideration of my individualized circumstances. 
See § 1B1.13(b)(6)." [Filing No. 380 at 5-6.] He then states "[n]o one deserves the length of time 
I was given." [Filing No. 380 at 6.] 
 
1 While § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A) provides that an extraordinary and compelling reason exists where 
"[t]he defendant, while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced, was a 
victim of…sexual abuse involving a 'sexual act,'" the abuse must be committed by, or at the 
direction of, a correctional officer, BOP employee, or BOP contractor and the misconduct "must 
be established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, 
or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed or the 
defendant is in imminent danger." The Court finds that, although disturbing, Mr. Bostic's 
allegation that he was raped by an inmate is not similar in gravity to the circumstances outlined in 
§ 1B1.13(b)(4). PageID #:
<pageID>
8 
 
In its response, the Government argues that a non -retroactive change to the law cannot 
constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 1B1.13(b)(6), and that Mr. Bostic "has 
not pointed to any specific change in the law that would result in a different sentence than the one 
he received." [Filing No. 386 at 8-9.] 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) provides: 
(6) Unusually Long Sentence. —If a defendant received an unusually long 
sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in 
the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made 
retroactive) may be considered in determining whe ther the defendant presents an 
extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce 
a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be 
imposed at the time the motion is fil ed, and after full consideration of the 
defendant's individualized circumstances. 
Putting aside the issue of whether a non- retroactive change to a law affecting sentencing 
can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release,
2 Mr. Bostic 's argument is 
doomed because he has not pointed to any change in the law at all. Further, a motion for 
compassionate release is not the proper vehicle for challenging a sentence. Rather, Mr. Bostic can 
only challenge his sentence through a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United 
States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). He has already filed a § 2255 petition, [Filing 
No. 268], which the Court denied, [Filing No. 311]. He must receive permission from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), and he has not 
done so. 
 
2 The Court recognizes the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in United States v. 
Rutherford, 608 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 1485535, at *10 (May 28, 2026) , that "Congress's 
nonretroactive change to [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c) – considered by itself or in combination with other 
factors – cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release," and notes that the Supreme 
Court's reasoning would apply to other non-retroactive changes in the law outside of the § 924(c) 
context. PageID #:
<pageID>
9 
 
 Mr. Bostic's argument related to the length of his sentence under § 1B1.13(b)(6) is not an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, whether considered alone or in 
combination with any other reason. 
 Although Mr. Bostic has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, 
the Court briefly considers whether he is a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community and whether consideration of the factors set forth in § 3553(a) warrants release. 
C. Danger to the Safety of Any Other Person or to the Community 
Mr. Bostic does not address whether he is a danger to the safety of any other person or to 
the community in his Motion for Compassionate Release. [See Filing No. 380.] 
In its response, the Government argues that Mr. Bostic has served only 15 years of his total 
315-year sentence for both of his cases, outlines the "vile and egregious nature of his conduct," 
and notes that he "preyed upon very young children multiple times over an extended period of 
time" and "attempted to obtain access to additional children by placing, and replying to, 
advertisements seeking nannies or childcare workers."
3 [Filing No. 386 at 10.] 
The conduct that led to the charges in this case is horrific. Mr. Bostic conspired to 
distribute and received large numbers of sadistic and vile images depicting children as young as 
two years old engaged in sexual acts. Releasing him from his life sentence would put the most 
vulnerable members of society – young children – at risk and Mr. Bostic does not even attempt to 
persuade the Court otherwise. The Court cannot discount the real danger to the community that 
Mr. Bostic would pose if he were to be released. 
 
3 The Government asserts these arguments in connection with the § 3553(a) factors, but they apply 
with equal force to the analysis regarding whether Mr. Bostic is a danger to any other person or to 
the community. PageID #:
<pageID>
10 
 
The Court finds that Mr. Bostic is a serious danger to the safety of any other person or to 
the community, making compassionate release inappropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.13(a)(2). 
D. Section 3553(a) Factors 
Mr. Bostic does not directly address the § 3553(a) factors in his Motion for Compassionate 
Release, but he does submit a Proposed Release Plan in which he states that he would live with a 
relative and work at a manual labor job. [Filing No. 380-1 at 1-5.] 
The Government argues that the § 3553(a) factors weigh heavily against compassionate 
release. [Filing No. 386 at 10-11.] 
The Court has already found that compassionate release is not warranted because Mr. 
Bostic has not presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release and because he is a 
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community. Although it need not consider the 
factors set forth in § 3553(a) , it also finds for the reasons already discussed that releasing Mr. 
Bostic early would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide 
just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, or protect the 
public from further crimes. Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors provides an independent basis 
for denying Mr. Bostic's Motion for Compassionate Release. 
In sum, the Court finds that Mr. Bostic has not presented extraordinary and compelling 
reasons to release him, he remains a danger to the safety of any other person or the community , 
and the § 3553(a) factors weigh against compassionate release. Accordingly, his Motion for 
Compassionate Release, [Filing No. 380], is DENIED. PageID
#: <pageID>
11 
 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons stated above, Mr. Bostic's Motion for Compassionate Release, [380], is 
DENIED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record 
 
Distribution via United States Mail to: 
 
David Ryan Bostic 
#09828-028 
FCI Petersburg Medium 
Federal Correctional Institution 
P.O. Box 1000 
Petersburg, VA 23804 
 
 
Date: 6/10/2026 PageID
#: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight