govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02927-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
KIMBERLY CLISBEE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 1:25-cv-2927 (TNM) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Before the Court are Kimberly Clisbee’s pro se Complaint and miscellaneous filings. 
Because the Complaint falls short of minimum pleading standards, the Court will dismiss it 
without prejudice. The Court will also deny Clisbee’s many pending motions. 
I. 
From what the Court can glean in her voluminous filings, Kimberly Clisbee believes that 
her medically fragile daughter has long been the victim of medical malpractice and fraud in 
California. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 9, 24, 79–87, 269, ECF No. 1. Clisbee’s husband (who is also 
disabled) may be a victim of the same. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 7, 10. 
Last summer, Clisbee filed a meandering Complaint against a few federal entities, a few 
California entities, and the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles, seeking to hold them 
liable for a slew of wrongs. See generally ECF No. 1. Since then, Clisbee has also filed 
miscellaneous motions—many of which include threats alongside incoherent rants. 
 Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Complaint, arguing among other things that it 
fails Rule 8’s requirements. See U.C. Regents Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19; Nathan Hochman 

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Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 44; Cal. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 79-2; U.S. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 
No. 106. Those motions are now ripe. 
II. 
 The first order of business is Clisbee’s Motion for Recusal. ECF No. 121. Litigants can 
seek recusal of a federal judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455. That statute includes a catchall provision, 
requiring a federal judge to recuse himself from “any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). It also identifies “specific situations in which a 
judge must recuse himself from a matter, such as when he previously served as a lawyer in the 
matter in controversy, when he or a close family member has a financial interest in the matter in 
controversy, or when he or a sufficiently close relation is a party to the proceeding.” In re Third 
Party Subpoena to Fusion GPS, 292 F. Supp. 3d 307, 309 (D.D.C. 2018); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(b). Under either avenue, “disqualification of a judge is not lightly granted.” United States 
v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 Recusal is inappropriate here. As best the Court can tell, Clisbee roots her recusal 
request in the Court’s supposed association with the Alliance Defending Freedom. See Mot. for 
Recusal at 2. But the Alliance Defending Freedom is not a party to this lawsuit. And Clisbee 
offers no coherent theory for why recusal is nevertheless appropriate. The motion devolves into 
a series of insults against various non-parties and religious professions. See, e.g., id. at 2, 4. 
Those statements present no basis for recusal. More, having reviewed the record and the parties, 
the Court sees no legitimate basis for recusing itself. So the motion will be denied. 
III. 
 Turn now to the motions to dismiss the Complaint. Complaints filed by pro se litigants 
are held to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 

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U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). That includes Rule 8(a), 
which requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds on which 
jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). More, “[e]ach allegation must 
be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1). “Taken together, [those provisions] underscore the 
emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 
661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair 
notice of the claim asserted so that they can respond and mount an adequate defense. See Brown 
v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). 
Clisbee’s Complaint flunks Rule 8. First, it is “excessively long” and “rambling.” See 
T.M. v. District of Columbia, 961 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (D.D.C. 2013). The Complaint spans 117 
pages, including more than 300 paragraphs. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Add to that some 800 
pages of exhibits plus more submitted in various filings. Exhibits, ECF Nos. 1-1–1-5; see also, 
e.g., Errata, ECF No. 12 (300 exhibit pages); Notice of Whistleblower Retaliation, ECF No. 74 
(pages of emails, websites, and other documents). 
Comparable complaints frequently earn dismissal. See, e.g., Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 665 
(affirming dismissal of 61-page complaint with 105 paragraphs); Unfoldment, Inc. v. District of 
Columbia, No. CIV.A. 07-01717 (HHK), 2007 WL 3125236, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2007) 
(dismissing a 368-paragraph complaint “spread over 61 pages” that was “prolix, redundant, [and] 
bloated with unnecessary detail”). That is because a complaint’s length “is more than simply a 
matter of aesthetics.” Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 669. “Unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an 

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unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to 
select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Id. (cleaned up). 
More, the Complaint “patently fail[s]” Rule 8 because it is “rambling, disjointed, 
incoherent, [and] full of irrelevant and confusing material.” Jiggetts v. District of Columbia, 319 
F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. District of Columbia, No. 17-7021, 
2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). The Complaint details more than ten years of 
Clisbee’s family’s medical history, alongside rambling attacks on dozens of non-party doctors, 
nurses, teachers, and local officials. Bizarre allegations recur throughout. For example, Clisbee 
alleges she was “targeted in [her] pregnancy . . . and kidnapped out of [her] life and thrown into 
systematic slavery of the most grotesque kind.” Compl. at 122; see also, e.g., id. at 119 (“The 
county of Los Angeles are holding us as trafficking mules and medicare slaves.”). What role 
Defendants played in all of this is unclear. Whether and how the Court has jurisdiction over the 
California Defendants is equally uncertain. 
Clisbee’s many other filings are no help. See Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 
548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting courts’ obligation to consider all pro se filings together). For the 
most part, she rants about “stalking” and “retaliation” against her. See, e.g., Mot. for Order of 
Protection, ECF No. 40; Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 42. Sometimes she makes threats or hurls 
insults. See, e.g., Mot. for Order of Protection at 3, ECF No. 40 (calling a man named “Brian 
Allen” a “tub of lard bully” and “mob associate”); Mot. to Take Judicial Notice at 3, ECF No. 59 
(“I told a cop I hope they die. Who am I becoming!!!”); Resp. to Mot. for Extension of Time at 
3, ECF No. 97 (threatening to commit suicide). Other filings share political criticisms and 
nonsensical musings. See, e.g., Mot. to Take Judicial Notice at 2, ECF No. 59 (accusing 
California officials of perpetuating “communism through forced socialism”); Mot. for Default 

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Judgment at 2, ECF No. 32 (“We need helium in the earth to keep from hurtling into the sun, it 
has gotten so bad you cant [sic] buy helium ballons [sic] the way we once could.”). 
Again, Clisbee’s scattered allegations fail to put Defendants on notice of the claims 
against them. So the Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8.1 
IV. 
Before wrapping up, the Court addresses Clisbee’s other pending motions. Her failure to 
obtain Defendants’ position on any of the requested relief independently justifies denial. See 
LCvR 7(m); cf. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (recognizing “that district courts have 
the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient 
and expedient resolution of cases”). 
Even putting that defect aside, each motion requires denial. Those that request expedited 
hearings are now moot. See Notice of Filing, ECF No. 93; Mot. for Ex Parte Judgment, ECF No. 
94; Mot. for Ex Parte Judgment, ECF No. 115. Other motions do not present any coherent basis 
for awarding the requested relief. See Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 59; Mot. for 
Relief, ECF No. 88; Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 42; Mot. to Disqualify, ECF No. 23; Mot. for 
Default Judgment, ECF No. 32. As for the remaining motions, the Court will deny them because 
it cannot discern the relief requested. See ECF Nos. 9, 15, 40, 70. 
An Order will issue today. 
 
Dated: June 10, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J. 
 
1 Because the Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8, it will deny as 
moot California’s alternative request for a more definite statement. See Cal. Mot. to Dismiss at 
21 (requesting a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) as an alternative). 

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