govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-2_16-cr-00037-4

1 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 
) 
v. ) Criminal No. 16-37 
 ) 
LEONARD GIBBONS ) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
Following a jury trial before Judge Donetta Ambrose, on A pril 3, 2018, Defendant was 
convicted of the following: at C ount One of the Indictment with bank robbery on J uly 17, 2015 
and at Count 2 with bank robbery on November 19, 2015, each in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); 
at Count 3 with armed bank robbery on November 19, 2015, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d); 
at Count Four with felon in possession of firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 
924(e); and at Count Five with using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to 
a crim e of violence, and possession in furtherance thereof, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
924(c)(1)(a)(i) and 924(c)(1)(a)(ii), for conduct occurring on N ovember 19, 2015. (Docket Nos. 
128, 129). 
On December 19, 2018, J udge Ambrose sentenced D efendant to a tota l term of 264 
months’ imprisonment (consisting of 180 months at each of Counts One through Four to be served 
concurrently, and 84 months at C ount Five to be served consecutively to C ounts One through 
Four), followed by 5 years supervised release (consisting of 3 years at each of C ounts One and 
Two and 5 years at each of Counts Three, Four and Five all to run concurrently). (Docket No. 168 
at 3, 4). Defendant also was ordered to pay a $500 special assessment (consisting of $100 at each 
count of conviction) and restitution in the amount of $7,828 to C ompass Federal Savings Bank 
and $1,550 to First Commonwealth Bank. (Id. at 7). Finally, he was ordered to forfeit a Hi-point 

2 
 
9mm handgun and $2,421 in United States currency. (Docket No. 171). Defendant subsequently 
appealed the Court’s Judgment to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Docket No. 172). 
In April 2025, the Court of Appeals ruled that Defendant should not have been sentenced 
to concurrent sentences of 15 years (180 months) at Counts Two and Three because bank robbery 
at Count Two is a lesser-included offense of armed bank robbery at C ount Three.1 (Docket Nos. 
196, 199, 199- 2). Accordi ngly, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction and 
sentence on the lesser-included offense at Count Two and otherwise affirmed the judgment as to 
all other counts. (Docket No. 196). The case was then remanded to this Court so that the sentence 
could be corrected as to Count Two. 2 (Id. at 2). 
Thereafter, the C ourt appointed Attorney Michael E. Moser to represent D efendant at a 
resentencing hearing which was held on June 16, 2026. (D ocket No s. 197, 202). The Court 
resentenced Defendant a total term of 264 months ’ imprisonment, consisting of 180 months at 
each of Counts One, Three, and Four of the Indictment, said terms to be served concurrently, and 
84 months at Count Five to be served consecutively to Counts One, Three and Four , followed by 
5 years’ supervised release, consisting of 3 years at Count One of the Indictment and 5 years at 
each of Counts Three, Four and Five all to run concurrently. (Docket No. 204 at 3, 4). N o term 
of imprisonment or supervised release was imposed at Count Two of the Indictment given that the 
bank robbery offense of conviction at Count Two is a lesser -included offense of armed bank 
robbery at Count Three. Restitution was ordered to be paid to the same banks in the same amounts 
 
1 See United States v. Cesare, 581 F.3d 206, 207 (3d Cir. 2009) (bank robbery is a lesser included offense of 
armed bank robbery, thus the district court erred by imposing separate sentences for each, even though it ordered the 
terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently); United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2000) (district 
court erred by sentencing concurrently on both armed bank robbery and lesser included offense of bank robbery). 
 
2 Judge Ambrose had assumed senior inactive status by then, therefore Defendant’s case was re-assigned to 
this member of the Court. 
 

3 
 
as in the original Judgment, and a $400 special assessment was imposed. (Id. at 7). The Amended 
Judgment was entered on the Court’s docket on June 16, 2025. (Docket No. 204). Defendant did 
not appeal the Amended Judgment. 
On June 9, 2026, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to 
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he requests a 90-
day extension of time to file a § 2255 motion. (Docket No. 210). Defendant avers that he requires 
additional time because his § 2255 motion filing “deadline has not yet reached but rapidly 
approaches,” he “has no other choice but to represent himself,” he “has no training in the field of 
law and needs the additional time to research his claim(s),” he “has limited access to a limited law 
library as it contains 13 computers to facilitate approximately 1500 inmates . . . at FCI Hazelton,” 
and he is limited to one hour at a time to conduct research. (Id., ¶¶ 1-3). For the following reasons, 
Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time will be denied. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one- year 
statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f). This one-year period began to run when Defendant’s “judgment of conviction [became] 
final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
3 Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his resentencing 
judgment of conviction which was entered on June 16, 2025, (see Docket No. 204), meaning that 
it became final for § 2255 purposes 14 days later, on June 30, 2025. See Kapral v. United States, 
166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If a defendant does not pursue a timely direct appeal to the 
court of appeals, his or her conviction and sentence become final, and the statute of limitation 
begins to run, on the date on which the time for filing such an appeal expired.”); United States v. 
 
3 Under the statute, there are three other dates from which the one- year limitation period may run. 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2255(f)(2)-(f)(4). However, those circumstances do not appear to be applicable here. 

4 
 
Toombs, Crim. No. 20-119 (RBK), 2021 WL 5416674, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2021) (citations 
omitted) (where no direct appeal of judgment of conviction is filed, judgment becomes final for § 
2255 purposes 14 days after entry of judgment); Sayles v. United States, Crim. No. 09-273, 2013 
WL 4523593, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2013) (same); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (providing that 
a defendant convicted in a criminal case has 14 days to file a notice of appeal after the judgment 
is entered). Accordingly, Defendant has until June 30, 2026 to file a § 2255 motion. As noted, 
Defendant concedes that the time for filing a § 2255 motion has not yet expired. (See Docket No. 
210, ¶ 1) (stating that “Defendant’s AEDPA deadline has not yet reached”) . Despite that fact, 
Defendant claims that he needs additional time to file a § 2255 motion because he is not trained in 
the law and his law library access is limited. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 3). 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that district courts have s ubject matter 
jurisdiction to rule on a motion for an extension of time to file a § 2255 motion before the 
substantive motion for relief is actually filed. United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 
2013). The Court of Appeals explained that “[t]here are no bright-line rules for determining when 
extra time should be permitted in a particular case ;” instead, “the unique circumstances of each 
defendant seeking § 2255 relief must be taken into account .” Id. (citations omitted). However, 
the Court of Appeals cautioned that district courts “should grant a motion for an extension of time 
to file a § 2255 motion sparingly, and should do so only when the principles of equity would make 
the rigid application of a limitation period un fair.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). As the Supreme Court has instructed, equity permits extending the one -year statutory 
deadline when a defendant shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his wa y and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

5 
 
Consideration of the equitable principles identified by the Supreme Court do not weigh in 
favor of granting Defendant an extension of time to file a § 2255 motion. First, Defendant has not 
shown that he has been pursuing his rights diligently during the one -year AEDPA statute of 
limitations period. See United States v. Navarro, No. 18-2832, 2018 WL 7324798, at *1 (3d Cir. 
Dec. 13, 2018) (affirming determination that equitable tolling should not be applied to § 2255 
motion because movant failed to show that he acted with reasonable diligence during entire period 
at issue). Defendant has not specified a basis for a § 2255 motion beyond broadly stating that “his 
conviction/sentence was obtained under a constitutional violation that resulted in the fundamental 
miscarriage of justice and/or [his] incarceration” and that he needs “additional time to research 
him claim(s).” (Docket No. 210 at 1 and ¶ 2). Additionally, Defendant has not shown that some 
extraordinary circumstance has stood or st ands in his way and prevent s timely filing. As stated, 
Defendant seeks additional time to file a § 2255 motion because he lacks legal training and because 
his access to the law library supposedly is limited. However, Defendant’s lack of legal training 
and his unsubstantiated a ssertion regarding limited law library access do not constitute 
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to grant an extension of time . See, e.g., Ross v. Varano, 
712 F.3d 784, 800 (3d Cir. 2013) (observing that “lack of legal knowledge or legal training does 
not alone justify equitable tolling”) (citation omitted); Gonzalez v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 
287, 290 (D. Del. 2013) (“[A] prisoner’s limited access to a law library is a routine aspect of prison 
life, and is generally insufficient to trigger equitable tolling absent a causal relationship between 
the limited library access and the prisoner’s late filing.”); Gadsen v. United States, Crim. No. 09-
305, 2015 WL 9259402, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015) (“Petitioner’s limited access to the prison’s 
legal research materials, however, does not by itself warrant equitable tolling of § 2255(f)(1)’s 
one-year limitation period.”). 

6 
 
Finally, the period to timely file a § 2255 motion has not yet expired (which Defendant 
acknowledges), and he has not explained what would prevent him from filing a protective motion 
within that time. See, e.g., Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling 
not justified where petitioner had nearly one month left in limitation period in which he could have 
“file[d] at least a basic pro se habeas petition”); United States v. Cash, Crim. No. 19-190, 2025 
WL 2403589, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2025) ( observing that movant, “at any time before the 
deadline, could have filed a 2255 Motion presenting his arguments as completely as he could as 
of that time ,” thus an extension of time to file § 2255 motion was unjustified ). Under the 
circumstances of this case, equitable considerations do not weigh in favor of granting Defendant 
an extension of time to file a § 2255 motion. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order: 
AND NOW, this 10
th day of June , 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDE RED that Defendant’s 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, (Docket No. 210), is DENIED. 
s/ W. Scott Hardy 
W. Scott Hardy 
United States District Judge 
 
 
cc/ecf: All counsel of record 
 
 Leonard Gibbons (via U.S. mail) 
 Reg. No. 37875-068 
 FCI Hazelton 
 Federal Correctional Institution 
 P.O. Box 5000 
 Bruceton Mills, WV 26525 

Passage view · GavelSight