govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-1_26-cv-01080-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
 
JOSEPH D. DUNLAP, 
Plaintiff, 
 
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No. 1:26-cv-01080-JDB-tmp 
 v. 
 
WARDEN, CORECIVIC, et al., 
Defendants. 
 
 
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, 
 DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 
 AND 
 GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 13, 2026, the Plaintiff, Joseph D. Dunlap, Tennessee Department of Correction 
prisoner number 446674, who is currently incarcerated at the Whiteville Correctional Facility 
(“WCFA”) in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1) and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (D.E. 3). 
On April 15, 2026, the Court granted leave to proceed IFP and assessed the $350 filing fee in 
accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (D.E. 4.) 
The complaint is before the Court for the purpose of screening Dunlap’s claims under the 
PLRA. The Court construes the complaint to assert Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. 
For the reasons explained below, the pleading is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and leave 
to amend the complaint is GRANTED. PageID
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff’s cellmate at WCFA was stabbed by an inmate identified 
as Jones. The entire prison was on lockdown at the time. Jones was not placed in segregation for 
the incident. The next day, a chief of staff called Dunlap out of his cell. When that occurred, 
Jones had Corrections Officer Marshall open his cell door. Jones chased Dunlap down “with a 
hunting knife that he had brought in from the streets” and stabbed him over eighteen times. (D.E. 
1 at PageID 4.) Plaintiff was airlifted to a hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, with lif e-threatening 
injuries. He still suffers severe nerve damage to his left arm and the right side of his face and sees 
a “face specialist” for the nerve damage every three months. (Id. at PageID 5.) Dunlap sues 
CoreCivic and WCF A employees Warden Adams, Chief Van Dyke, Chief Neil, Correct ions 
Officer Marshall, Sergeant A. Wilkes, Case Manager V. Williams, and Classification Officer L. 
Jackson,1 seeking unspecified compensation. 
SCREENING 
Legal Standard. 
 The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of 
it, if the complaint— 
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted; or 
 
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
 
1The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to reflect that CoreCivic and Warden 
Adams are two separate Defendants. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to modify the docket to 
include Van Dyke, Neil, Marshall, and Wilkes as Defendants. PageID
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 In assessing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the district 
court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 -79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 -57 
(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the district 
court accepts the complaint’s “well -pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines 
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal). The district c ourt does not assume that conclusory 
allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must 
be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 
provides guidance on this issue. Although the rule requires a complaint to contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires factual 
allegations to make a “showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting 
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not, however, exempt 
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 
(6th Cir. 1989). 
Requirements to State a Claim Under § 1983. 
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of 
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused 
the constitutional harm while acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co ., 398 
U.S. 144, 150 (1970). PageID
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ANALYSIS 
Claims Against CoreCivic. 
CoreCivic is a private company that manages WCF A.2 “A private corporation that 
performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law for 
purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corr. 
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) ). The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for 
assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that operate prisons or provide 
medical care to inmates. See id. at 749-49; see also Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18. CoreCivic “cannot 
be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 419 F. 
App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691 -92 
(1978)). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Dunlap “must show that a policy or well-
settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. 
See id. 
Plaintiff alleges that CoreCivic “is responsible for every person they have working under 
their seal, and that they are trained properly.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 5.) The Court construes this 
assertion to suggest that CoreCivic does not adequately train its employees regarding assaults. 
A prisoner may allege a municipal or company policy or custom by claiming that the 
entity’s training policies failed to teach officers and staff adequately how to “avoid the 
unconstitutional failure to protect inmates.” See Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 
130 F.4th 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2025); see also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(a plaintiff may establish a claim against a political subdivision by showing a policy of inadequate 
 
2See https://www.tn.gov/correction/state-prisons/state-prison-list/whiteville-correctional 
-facility.html (stating that WCF A “is managed by CoreCivic, a private corrections management 
firm”) (last accessed June 10, 2026). PageID
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training). “[A] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a 
claim turns on a failure to train.” Berry v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff’s Off ., 796 F. App’x 857, 861 
(6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). The failure to train must 
rise to the level of “deliberate indifference” to constitute a policy or custom actionable under § 
1983. See Connick, 563 U.S . at 61 (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 388 
(1989)). To properly allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) that the 
training program was inadequate to the tasks the officers must perform; (2) that the inadequacy 
was the result of the company’s deliberate indifference; and (3) that the inadequacy was “closely 
related to or actually caused” the plaintiff’s injury. Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., Tenn., 453 F. App’x 
557, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Plinton v. County of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008)); 
see also Winkler v. Madison Cnty. , 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). Failure-to-train 
liability depends on the substance of the training. See Howell v. NaphCare, Inc. , 67 F.4th 302, 
320 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. dismissed sub nom. Erwin v. Howell, 145 S. Ct. 110 (2024). 
Dunlap’s conclusory, barebones allegation that CoreCivic does not adequately train its 
employees is insufficient to plead failure-to-train liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also 
Grote v. Kenton Cnty., Ky., 85 F.4th 397, 415 (6th Cir. 2023) (denying relief against county where 
plaintiff did not explain how officers’ training was deficient or how such training would have made 
the possibility of a constitutional violation obvious), reh’g en banc denied, 2023 WL 8687002 (6th 
Cir. Dec. 6, 2023). He alleges no facts about CoreCivic’s training of employees, much less facts 
showing that such training is inadequate. For these reasons, his claims against CoreCivic are 
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. PageID
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Claims Against Individual Defendants.3 
Official-Capacity Claims 
 
The c omplaint is silent about whether Plaintiff sues the Individual Defendants in their 
individual or official capacities. It is preferable that a plaintiff state explicitly whether a defendant 
is sued in his or her “individual capacity,” but the failure to do so is not fatal if the “course of 
proceedings” test demonstrates that the defendant received sufficient notice that th e intent was to 
hold the defendant personally liable. See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 
2001). The Sixth Circuit has applied the course of proceedings test to determine whether § 1983 
defendants have received notice of a plaintiff’s intent to hold a defendant personally liable. See 
id. at 773; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (noting that the course of 
proceedings in unspecified capacity cases “typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought 
to be imposed”). The test considers the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, requests for compensatory 
or punitive damages, the nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, and whether 
subsequent filings put the defendant on notice of the capacity in which he or she is sued. Moore, 
272 F.3d at 772 n.1 (citing Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
Dunlap refers to the Individual Defendants by their official titles. He appears to seek relief 
based on their failure to perform tasks within the scope of their official capacities as employees at 
WCFA. As noted above, he also seeks unspecified compensation. Based on these factors, the 
Court construes his claims to be against these Defendants in their official capacities. 
Official-capacity claims are treated as claims against an individual defendant’s employer. 
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, that employer is CoreCivic. As set 
 
3The Court uses the term “ Individual Defendants ” when collectively referring to 
Defendants Adams, Van Dyke, Neil, Marshall, Wilkes, Williams, and Jackson. PageID
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forth supra, CoreCivic “cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell, 
419 F. App’x at 627. Because Plaintiff fails to allege that a CoreCivic policy or custom was the 
moving force behind the alleged violations of his rights, his official-capacity claims against the 
Individual Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for 
relief. 
Even if the Court liberally construed the complaint to assert individual -capacity claims 
against the Individual Defendants, the inmate fails to state a claim to relief. 
Individual-Capacity Claims Against Adams, Van Dyke, Neil, Wilkes, Williams, and Jackson 
Dunlap fails to allege a claim for relief against these Defendants in their individual 
capacities. Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed un der a theory of respondeat superior, a 
plaintiff must allege that a defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional 
activity of a subordinate in order to state a claim. Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 
(6th Cir. 2005). A failure to supervise, control, or train an individual is not actionable “unless the 
supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly 
participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, 
approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” 
Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). 
Dunlap does not reference Wilkes, Williams, or Jackson in the body of his pleading. He 
therefore fails to allege that any action or inaction by these individuals caused him harm. When a 
complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 
764 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The court is not required to accept non -specific factual allegations and PageID
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inferences or unwarranted legal conclusions.”). “Merely listing names in the caption of the 
complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to 
sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 
2004) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978)). For these reasons, the inmate’s 
individual-capacity claims against Wilkes, Williams, and Jackson are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief. 
Adams is sued because of his role as WCFA’s w arden. The complaint a lleges he is 
“responsible for every staff [member] he has working under him and should’ve made sure that his 
staff was following protocol and doing right by each inmate.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 5.) Dunlap avers 
that Adams should have let staff know that they had “just had a problem in this pod the day before.” 
(Id.) He further alleges that Chiefs Van Dyke and Neil “should’ve told their staff [to] let [the 
Special Operations Response Team (“SORT”)] come and get [him] for security purpose[s] and to 
only open [his] door for his safety.” ( Id.) He does not, however, set forth any facts suggesting 
personal involvement by Adams, Van Dyke, or Neil in the incident complained of. Further, he 
fails to allege facts suggesting that these individuals “authorized, approved, or knowingly 
acquiesced” in any unconstitutional conduct. See Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. For these reasons, the 
individual-capacity claims against Adams, Van Dyke, and Neil are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief. 
Individual-Capacity Claims Against Marshall 
The Court has construed the complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment failure -to-protect 
claim against Marshall. The amendment provides an inmate the right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It requires that prison officials “must take 
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” and “ protect prisoners from violence PageID
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at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832 -33 (1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). However, “not all injuries suffered by an inmate at the hands of another 
prisoner result in constitutional liability for prison officials under the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson 
v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998). 
To state a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and subjective component. 
Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn. , LLC, 98 F. 4th 679, 683 ( 6th Cir. 2024). Under the objective 
component, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 
337, 347 (1981)). A prisoner must therefore show he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. The subjective component requires a prisoner to demonstrate 
that the official acted with the requisite intent; that is, that the official had a “sufficiently culpable 
state of mind.” Id. Thus, “the plaintiff must show that ‘an official knew of and disregard ed an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tenn., 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th 
Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer at 837) (cleaned up). For a failure-to-protect claim, a prison official 
will not be liable without a showing that the official “should have been aware of the reasonable 
likelihood of a potential attack and intervened earlier.” Carico v. Benton, Ireland, & Stovall , 68 
F. App’x 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2003). 
The complaint ’s factual allegations are insufficient to maintain an Eighth Amendment 
failure-to-protect claim against Marshall. Dunlap alleges Jones should have been placed in 
segregation after he attacked Plaintiff’s cellmate the day before. The complaint, however, does 
not allege any facts suggesting that Marshall was aware that Jones had attacked Dunlap’s cellmate. 
The pleading alleges further that Marshall opened Jones’s cell and “let him chase [Dunlap] down 
with a hunting knife.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 4.) The complaint does not allege any facts suggesting PageID
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that Marshall “should have been aware of a reasonable likelihood” that Jones intended to attack 
and stab Dunlap and disregarded that risk. See Carico, 68 F. App’x at 639. At most, Dunlap has 
alleged negligence, which is insufficient to satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth 
Amendment claim. The individual-capacity Eighth Amendment failure -to-protect claim against 
Marshall is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief. 
AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA 
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint 
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir. 
2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other 
circuit to have reached the issue , that under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 15(a)[,] a district court can allow a 
plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the 
PLRA”); see also Brown v. Rhode Island , 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) 
(“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an 
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be af forded”). Leave to amend is not 
required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States , 257 F.3d 31, 
37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without 
prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that . . . amending 
the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 
1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a 
meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does 
not infringe the right of access to the courts”). 
The Court grants Dunlap leave to amend under the guidelines set forth below. 
 

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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above: 
 
A. The complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts 
stating a claim to relief. 
B. Leave to amend is GRANTED. Amended claims must be filed within twenty -one 
days after the date of this order. An amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement 
of Plaintiff’s claims. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and must be 
complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. Plaintiff must sign the amended 
pleading, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim 
without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the 
text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the pleading. All claims alleged in an 
amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for 
relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. If 
Dunlap fails to comply with Rule 8 and the Court’s instructions for pleading amended claims, the 
Court will dismiss improperly pleaded amended claims with prejudice. 
C. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court 
will dismiss the case with prejudice and enter judgment. The Court recommends that any such 
dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 
996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021). 
D. If the inmate is transferred to a different prison or released, he is ORDERED to 
notify the Court immediately, in writing, of his change of address. If he fails to abide by these or 

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any other requirements of this order, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, up to and 
including dismissal of this action, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of June 2026. 
 
 s/ J. DANIEL BREEN 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

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